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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines and compares the impact of internally generated alternative corporate 
governance structures and compliance with country-level corporate governance regulations on 
financial performance of listed firms in South Africa and Nigeria. Firm-level data for the study was 
collected manually and triangulated with Datastream dataset for 100 listed firms for the period 2010–
2014 (500 firm-years) in South Africa and 80 listed firms for the period 2011–2015 (400 firm-years) 
in Nigeria. Adopting a multi-theoretical approach and more importantly New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) theory, this study shows that cultural, contextual and institutional similarities and differences in 
corporate governance mechanisms across different countries impact differently on firm-level 
behaviour, which affects firm financial performance differently.   
 
Empirically, the thesis shows there is a statistically significant positive effect of compliance with 
Nigerian and South African corporate governance code (compliance index model) on firm accounting 
performance (ROCE). This implies that firms that comply with corporate governance regulations in 
both countries benefit from increasing accounting returns more than firms that do not. However, 
results based on market performance (Q-ratio) show that compliant firms with King III corporate 
governance guidelines in South Africa are associated with decreasing market valuation (Q-ratio), 
whereas firms compliant with Nigeria SEC 2011 corporate governance regulations are associated with 
increasing market valuation (Q-ratio).  
 
The alternative internal corporate governance mechanisms (variables in the equilibrium variable 
models) show similar and consistent mixed results compared to those reported by previous studies. 
Specifically, in South Africa, excluding board size which showed consistent negative statistically 
significant coefficients across both performance measures, the rest of the internal mechanisms are 
either statistically significant with one performance measure but insignificant with the other 
performance measure or significant with both measures but with contradictory signs of coefficients. 
Similarly, in Nigeria, out of the 14 firm-level internal corporate governance structures, six showed 
insignificant results irrespective of the performance measure, whereas six showed significant results 
with one performance measure and insignificant results with the other. Only gender diversity and 
ethnic diversity showed consistent statistically significant coefficients across both firm financial 
performance proxies.  
 
The study contributes to corporate governance literature in many ways. First it shows the level of 
maturity in governance institutions, in addition to normative rules and informal norms across 
countries, has a significant bearing on firm-level governance practices. More so, historical and 
contextual path dependence has produced a diversity of firm-level and country-level specific internal 
CG structures that may work well within an institutional environment in which they have evolved but 
may not work in others. The resulting consequence is that in countries with developed or more mature 
governance institutions (e.g. South Africa), stock markets undervalue firms with high compliance 
with normative governance rules, whereas in countries with emerging/growing governance 
institutions (e.g. Nigeria), stock markets highly value firms’ compliance with normative governance 
guidelines. Furthermore, the impact of compliance with normative CG guidelines on firm accounting 
performance in countries with mature governance institutions (South Africa) is similar to that with 
emerging governance institutions (Nigeria). More so, despite institutional voids, firms in African 
markets are committed in improving governance institutions by adopting recommended good CG 
practices implemented by regulatory authorities. Hence emerging African economies are adopting 
institutional isomorphic practices in governance compliance. Specifically, firms in these markets are 
transmitting good governance institutions to emerging economies by improving on their CG practices. 
  
iii 
 
iii | P a g e  
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1: HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL MILESTONES LEADING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (KING I, II AND III). ................................................................................ 35 
TABLE 2: HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL MILESTONES LEADING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA’S 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE ............................................................................................................... 40 
TABLE 3: A SUMMARY COMPARISON OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMPLIANCE PROVISIONS OF NIGERIA 
AND SOUTH AFRICA (KING III) ..................................................................................................................... 46 
TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF KEY EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON CG AND PERFORMANCE NEXUS IN AFRICA ...................... 51 
TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE .............................................. 103 
TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF NIGERIAN SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE ................................................................ 105 
TABLE 7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – COMPLIANCE WITH COUNTRY-LEVEL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
(NICGI & SACGI), SHAREHOLDER AND STAKEHOLDER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS ............. 110 
TABLE 8: COMPLIANCE LEVELS BETWEEN DUAL- AND NON-DUAL-LISTED FIRMS (PANEL A) AND BETWEEN 
FIRMS WITH BIG 4 AUDITORS AND FIRMS WITH NON-BIG 4 AUDITORS (PANEL B) ................................. 120 
TABLE 9: COMPLIANCE LEVELS BETWEEN LARGE AND SMALL FIRMS (PANEL A) & BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND 
NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS (PANEL B) ............................................................................................................ 125 
TABLE 10: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: COUNTRY-/FIRM-LEVEL INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS ............................................................................................................................................ 137 
TABLE 11: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – PERFORMANCE & CONTROL VARIABLES ................................................ 139 
TABLE 12: NIGERIAN CORRELATIONS MATRIX BETWEEN NICGI, PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL VARIABLES – 
400 FIRM YEARS ........................................................................................................................................ 142 
TABLE 13: SOUTH AFRICAN CORRELATIONS MATRIX BETWEEN SACGI, PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL 
VARIABLES – 500 FIRM YEARS ................................................................................................................... 143 
TABLE 14: NIGERIAN CORRELATIONS MATRIX BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
VARIABLES, PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL VARIABLES – 400 FIRM YEARS............................................. 147 
TABLE 15: SOUTH AFRICAN CORRELATIONS MATRIX BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE INTERNAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES, PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL VARIABLES – 500 FIRM YEARS ..................... 148 
TABLE 16: NIGERIAN OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE COMPLIANCE INDEX MODEL BASED ON ACCOUNTING 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE VARIABLE (Q-RATIO) .......................... 154 
TABLE 17: SOUTH AFRICAN OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE COMPLIANCE INDEX MODEL (SACGI) BASED ON 
ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE MEASURE(Q-RATIO) ... 159 
TABLE 18: NIGERIAN OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUILIBRIUM VARIABLE MODEL BASED ON ACCOUNTING 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE VARIABLE (Q-RATIO) .......................... 166 
TABLE 19: SOUTH AFRICAN OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUILIBRIUM VARIABLE MODEL BASED ON 
ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE MEASURE (Q-RATIO) .. 174 
TABLE 20: RESULTS OF SUB-INDICES OF NICGI–COMPLIANCE INDEX MODEL BASED ON ACCOUNTING 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE VARIABLE (Q-RATIO) .......................... 184 
TABLE 21: RESULTS OF SUB-INDICES OF SACGI–COMPLIANCE INDEX MODEL BASED ON ACCOUNTING 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE VARIABLE (Q-RATIO) .......................... 188 
TABLE 22: NIGERIAN SUMMARY REGRESSION RESULTS – COMPLIANCE INDEX MODEL AND EQUILIBRIUM 
VARIABLE MODEL ...................................................................................................................................... 197 
TABLE 23: SOUTH AFRICAN SUMMARY REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE COMPLIANCE INDEX MODEL AND 
EQUILIBRIUM VARIABLE MODEL ............................................................................................................... 200 
TABLE 24: COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING RESULTS FOR NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
BASED ON BOTH THE EQUILIBRIUM VARIABLE MODEL AND THE COMPLIANCE INDEX MODEL .............. 208 
TABLE 29: NIGERIAN TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARE REGRESSION RESULTS BASED ON ACCOUNTING 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE MEASURE(Q-RATIO) – ALL (400) FIRM 
YEARS ........................................................................................................................................................ 229 
TABLE 30: SOUTH AFRICAN TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARE REGRESSION RESULTS BASED ON ACCOUNTING 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE MEASURE(Q-RATIO) FOR ALL (500) FIRM 
YEARS ........................................................................................................................................................ 232 
TABLE 31: DYNAMIC SYSTEM GMM RESULTS FOR THE NIGERIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX (NICGI), 
SUB-INDICES AND ACCOUNTING RETURNS (ROCE) AND MARKET RETURNS (Q-RATIO) RELATIONS FOR ALL 
(320) FIRM YEARS ...................................................................................................................................... 243 
iv 
 
iv | P a g e  
 
TABLE 32: DYNAMIC SYSTEM GMM RESULTS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX (SACGI), 
SUB-INDICES AND ACCOUNTING RETURNS (ROCE) AND MARKET RETURNS (Q-RATIO) RELATIONS FOR ALL 
(400) FIRM YEARS ...................................................................................................................................... 245 
TABLE 33: NIGERIAN DYNAMIC SYSTEMS GMM ESTIMATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM VARIABLE MODEL BASED 
ON ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE VARIABLE (Q-RATIO) 
FOR 320 FIRM YEARS ................................................................................................................................. 249 
TABLE 34: SOUTH AFRICAN DYNAMIC SYSTEMS GMM ESTIMATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM VARIABLE MODEL 
BASED ON ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE VARIABLE (Q-
RATIO) ....................................................................................................................................................... 253 
TABLE 35: COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF  HYPOTHESIS TESTING FOR DYNAMIC SYSTEM GMM  & OLS  RESULTS 
FOR NIGERIA AND SOUTH  AFRICA ........................................................................................................... 258 
TABLE 25: NIGERIAN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE COMPLIANCE INDEX MODEL 
BASED ON ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE VARIABLE (Q-
RATIO) FOR ALL 400 FIRM YEARS .............................................................................................................. 291 
TABLE 26: NIGERIAN CORRELATION FOR ALTERNATIVE INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND 
FIRM PERFORMANCE FOR ALL 400 FIRM YEARS ....................................................................................... 292 
TABLE 27: SOUTH AFRICAN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE COMPLIANCE INDEX 
MODEL BASED ON ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE MEASURE (ROCE) AND MARKET PERFORMANCE 
VARIABLE (Q-RATIO) FOR ALL 500 FIRM YEARS ........................................................................................ 293 
TABLE 28: SOUTH AFRICAN CORRELATION FOR ALTERNATIVE INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE FOR ALL 500 FIRM YEARS ......................................................... 294 
 
 
  
v 
 
v | P a g e  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIG. 1: COMPLIANCE WITH COUNTRY-LEVEL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS ................................. 109 
FIG. 2: COMPLIANCE WITH COUNTRY-LEVEL SHAREHOLDER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS ........ 113 
FIG. 3: COMPLIANCE WITH COUNTRY-LEVEL STAKEHOLDER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS ......... 115 
FIG. 4: COMPLIANCE LEVEL BETWEEN DUAL-LISTED AND NON-DUAL-LISTED FIRMS ..................................... 117 
FIG. 5: COMPLIANCE LEVELS BETWEEN FIRMS WITH BIG 4 AUDITORS AND FIRMS WITH NON-BIG 4 AUDITORS
 .................................................................................................................................................................. 122 
FIG. 6: COMPLIANCE LEVELS BETWEEN LARGE AND SMALL FIRMS .................................................................. 123 
FIG. 7: COMPLIANCE LEVELS BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS ........................................... 127 
FIG. 8: FIVE STAGES TO CHECK FOR ENDOGENEITY .......................................................................................... 215 
LIST OF APPENDICES  
 
APPENDIX A: TABLES ............................................................................................................................ 291 
APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES .......................................................................................... 295 
APPENDIX C: NORMALITY CURVES FOR COMPLIANCE LEVELS………………………………………………………296 
APPENDIX D: LIST OF SAMPLED FIRMS FOR NIGERIA ......................................................................... 299 
APPENDIX E: LIST OF SAMPLED FIRMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA ............................................................... 301 
 
LIST OF EQUATIONS  
 
PIT =Δ IT + Β1BSZIT + Β2 NEDIT + Β3 INEDIT + Β4 EDIT + Β5 GDIVIT + Β6EDIVIT + Β7 DUALIT+ Β8 GEAR IT +Β9 FRE-MIT + 
Β10 ILOCKIT+ Β11 INST-SHIT + Β12D-SHIT + Β13 IACIT + Β14 BNESS IT + Β15 CONTROLS IT + U IT … (1) ................. 88 
PIT =Δ + Β1CGII, T-1 + Β2 CONTROLS………………… (2) ................................................................................................ 90 
P =Δ + Β1NICGIIT + Β2CONTROLSIT + UIT……………………… (3) ............................................................................... 150 
PIT =Δ + Β1SACGIIT + Β2CONTROLSIT + UIT …………………………(4) ......................................................................... 153 
CGIIT = Δ IT + Β1PIT + Β2 BSZ IT + Β3 D-SH IT + Β4 INST-SH IT + Β5 GEAR IT +Β6S-GROWTH IT + Β7 DUA-LIST IT + Β8 AF-SIZE 
IT + Β9 F-SIZE IT + Β10TA IT + Β11 MV IT+ Β12 CAPEX IT +∑NT=1 Β13 INDUSIT + ∑NT=1 Β14 YDIT+ UIT… (5) ................ 221 
BSZ IT = Δ IT + Β1PIT + Β2CGIIT + Β3 D-SH IT + Β4 INST-SH IT + Β5 GEAR IT +Β6S-GROWTH IT + Β7 DUA-LIST IT + Β8 AF-SIZE 
IT + Β9 F-SIZE IT + Β10TA IT + Β11 MV IT+ Β12 CAPEX IT +∑NT=1 Β13 INDUSIT + ∑NT=1 Β14 YDIT+ UIT… (6) ................ 221 
D-SH IT = Δ IT + Β1PIT + Β2CGIIT + Β3 BSZ IT + Β4 INST-SH IT + Β5 GEAR IT +Β6S-GROWTH IT + Β7 DUA-LIST IT + Β8 AF-SIZE 
IT + Β9 F-SIZE IT + Β10TA IT + Β11 MV IT+ Β12 CAPEX IT +∑NT=1 Β13 INDUSIT + ∑NT=1 Β14 YDIT+ UIT .. (7) ................ 222 
INST-SH IT =Δ IT + Β1PIT + Β2CGIIT + Β3 BSZ IT + Β4 D-SH IT + Β5 GEAR IT +Β6S-GROWTH IT + Β7 DUA-LIST IT + Β8 AF-SIZE 
IT + Β9 F-SIZE IT + Β10TA IT + Β11 MV IT+ Β12 CAPEX IT +∑NT=1 Β13 INDUSIT + ∑NT=1 Β14 YDIT+ UIT ….(8) ............... 223 
GEAR IT = Δ IT + Β1PIT + Β2CGIIT + Β3 BSZ IT + Β4 D-SH IT + Β5 INST-SH IIT +Β6S-GROWTH IT + Β7 DUA-LIST IT + Β8 AF-SIZE 
IT + Β9 F-SIZE IT + Β10TA IT + Β11 MV IT+ Β12 CAPEX IT +∑NT=1 Β13 INDUSIT + ∑NT=1 Β14 YDIT + UIT … (9) ............... 223 
ROCEIT =Δ IT + Β1CGIIT + Β2 BSZ IT + Β3 D-SH IT + Β4 INST-SH IT + Β5GEAR IT + Β6S-GROWTH IT + Β7 DUA-LIST IT + Β8 AF-
SIZE IT + Β9 F-SIZE IT + Β10TA IT + Β11 MV IT+ Β12 CAPEX IT +∑NT=1 Β13 INDUSIT + ∑NT=1 Β14 YDIT+ UIT … (10) ...... 224 
Q-RATIOIT =Δ IT + Β1CGIIT + Β2 BSZ IT + Β3 D-SH IT + Β4 INST-SH IT + Β5GEAR IT + Β6S-GROWTH IT + Β7 DUA-LIST IT + Β8 
AF-SIZE IT + Β9 F-SIZE IT + Β10TA IT + Β11 MV IT+ Β12 CAPEX IT +∑NT=1 Β13 INDUSIT + ∑NT=1 Β14 YDIT+ UIT……………… 
(11) ............................................................................................................................................................ 224 
PIT =L. ∆PΔIT + ∆Β1CGIIT +∑NT=1 Β2∆CONTROLSIT + UIT …………………… (12) .................................................................. 238 
∆PIT =L. ∆PΔIT + Β1∆CGIIT +∑NT=1 Β2∆CONTROLSIT+ ∆UIT …………… (13) ................................................................. 239 
 
  
vi 
 
vi | P a g e  
 
KEY ABBREVIATIONS 
 
2SLS – TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARE 
BOD – BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
CG – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CGI – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
GDP – GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
GMM – GENERALISED METHOD OF MOMENTS 
IVM – INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE MODEL 
JSE – JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE 
LDC – LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
NICGI – NIGERIA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
NIE – NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
NSX – NIGERIA STOCK EXCHANGE 
OLS – ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE 
RDT – RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY 
SA – SOUTH AFRICA 
SACGI – SOUTH AFRICA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
SEC – SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
 
 
 
 
  
vii 
 
vii | P a g e  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF APPENDICES ......................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF EQUATIONS ......................................................................................................... v 
KEY ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................... vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................... vii 
CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................... 1 
1.0 BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Background of Corporate Governance in Africa ........................................................................... 2 
1.3 Problem Statement, Motivation, Research Gap and Contribution .............................................. 6 
1.4 Research Questions .................................................................................................................... 12 
1.4.1 Main Research Question .......................................................................................................... 12 
1.4.1.1 Sub-research Questions ........................................................................................................ 12 
1.5 Summary of Chapter ................................................................................................................... 12 
1.6 Organisation of Thesis ................................................................................................................. 13 
CHAPTER 2 ..................................................................................................................... 14 
2.0 THEORETICAL LITERATURE ........................................................................................ 14 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 14 
2.2 Defining Corporate Governance ................................................................................................. 14 
2.3 Corporate Governance Theories ................................................................................................. 17 
2.3.1 Agency Theory ......................................................................................................................... 18 
2.3.2 Stewardship Theory ................................................................................................................. 23 
2.3.3 Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) ....................................................................................... 26 
2.4 Justification for Multi-Theoretic Approach ................................................................................. 28 
2.5 Summary of Chapter ................................................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER 3 ..................................................................................................................... 31 
3.0 CONCEPTUAL LITERATURE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA ............................. 31 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 31 
viii 
 
viii | P a g e  
 
3.2 New Institutional Economics (NIE) Theory ................................................................................. 32 
3.3 Corporate Governance in South Africa (SA) ................................................................................ 34 
3.4 Corporate Governance in Nigeria ............................................................................................... 38 
3.5 NIE & CG Compliance Policies in South Africa and Nigeria ......................................................... 42 
3.6 Empirical Evidence on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Africa ........................ 47 
3.7 Summary of Chapter ................................................................................................................... 53 
CHAPTER 4 ..................................................................................................................... 54 
4.0 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ..................................................................................... 54 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 54 
4.2 Board Composition ..................................................................................................................... 55 
4.3 Board Leadership Structure (CEO/Chairman Separation) ........................................................... 59 
4.4 Board Size .................................................................................................................................... 60 
4.5 Board Gender Composition (Gender Diversity) .......................................................................... 63 
4.6 Frequency of Board Meetings ..................................................................................................... 65 
4.7 Board Ethnic Composition (Ethnic Diversity) .............................................................................. 67 
4.8 Interlocking Directorates ............................................................................................................ 69 
4.9 Gearing (Debt to Equity) ............................................................................................................. 72 
4.10 Corporate Ownership Structure ............................................................................................... 74 
4.11 Compliance with Corporate Governance Codes ....................................................................... 76 
4.12 Independent Audit Committee (IAC) ........................................................................................ 80 
4.13 Summary of Chapter ................................................................................................................. 81 
CHAPTER 5 ..................................................................................................................... 83 
5.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................... 83 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 83 
5.2 Research Approach, Rationale and Philosophy .......................................................................... 83 
5.2.1 Ontological Position ................................................................................................................. 83 
5.2.2 Research Epistemology ............................................................................................................ 85 
5.3 Data Analysis Methods ............................................................................................................... 86 
5.3.1 Equilibrium Variable Model ..................................................................................................... 87 
5.3.1.1 Independent Variables for the Equilibrium Variable Model ................................................. 89 
5.3.2 Compliance Index Model (CIM) ............................................................................................... 90 
5.3.2.1 Independent Variables for the Compliance Index Model (CIM) ........................................... 91 
5.3.2.2 Limitation/Choice of Weighted Index (SACGI and NICGI) ..................................................... 92 
5.3.3 Synopsis of Data Analysis Models ............................................................................................ 93 
ix 
 
ix | P a g e  
 
5.4 Dependent Variables................................................................................................................... 94 
5.4.1 Firm Financial Performance ..................................................................................................... 94 
5.5 Control Variables ......................................................................................................................... 96 
5.5.1 Sales Growth ............................................................................................................................ 96 
5.5.2 Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) .................................................................................................... 97 
5.5.3 Firm Size ................................................................................................................................... 97 
5.5.4 Dual Listing ............................................................................................................................... 98 
5.5.5 Industry (Indus) and Year Dummies (YD) ................................................................................. 98 
5.5.6 Audit Firm Size (Big 4 Auditors) ............................................................................................... 99 
5.6 Data Collection and Sample Selection ...................................................................................... 100 
5.6.1 Source of CG Information: Annual Reports ........................................................................... 100 
5.6.2 Sample Selection .................................................................................................................... 101 
5.7 Summary of Chapter ................................................................................................................. 106 
CHAPTER 6 ................................................................................................................... 107 
6.0 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: COMPLIANCE WITH COUNTRY-LEVEL GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS 
(NICGI & SACGI) ........................................................................................................... 107 
6.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 107 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics: Compliance with Country-level Corporate Governance Provisions ...... 107 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics: Compliance with Country-level Shareholder Corporate Governance 
Provisions ........................................................................................................................................ 111 
6.4 Descriptive Statistics: Compliance with Country-level Stakeholder Corporate Governance 
Provisions ........................................................................................................................................ 113 
6.5 Descriptive Statistics: Country-level Compliance Between Dual- and Non-Dual-Listed Firms . 116 
6.6 Descriptive Statistics: Country-level Compliance Between Firms with Big 4 Auditors and Firms 
with Non-Big 4 Auditors .................................................................................................................. 119 
6.7 Descriptive Statistics: Country-level Compliance Between Large and Small Firms .................. 122 
6.8 Descriptive Statistics: Country-level Compliance Between Financial and Non-Financial Firms126 
6.9 Summary of Chapter ................................................................................................................. 129 
CHAPTER 7 ................................................................................................................... 131 
7.0 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: FIRM-LEVEL INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS & 
CORRELATION RESULTS ................................................................................................ 131 
7.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 131 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics: Country-/Firm-level Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms ....... 132 
7.3 Descriptive Statistics: Country-/Firm-Level Performance & Control Variables ........................ 138 
x 
 
x | P a g e  
 
7.4 Test of Multi-Collinearity and Bivariate Correlations for Variables in the Compliance Index 
Model .............................................................................................................................................. 140 
7.5 Correlations Between Variables in Equilibrium Variable Model .............................................. 144 
7.6 Dealing with Outliers/Extreme Values of Control and Performance Variables (OLS Normality 
Assumption) .................................................................................................................................... 145 
7.7 Summary of Chapter ................................................................................................................. 145 
CHAPTER 8 ................................................................................................................... 149 
8.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: OLS REGRESSION .................................................................... 149 
8.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 149 
8.2 Results Based on the Compliance Index Model ........................................................................ 150 
8.2.1 Nigerian Empirical Results – Compliance Index Model ......................................................... 150 
8.2.2 South African Empirical Results – Compliance Index Model ................................................. 153 
8.3 Results Based on Equilibrium Variable Model (EVM) ............................................................... 160 
8.3.1 Nigerian Empirical Results – Equilibrium Variable Model (EVM) .......................................... 160 
8.3.2 South African Empirical Results – Equilibrium Variable Model (EVM) .................................. 170 
8.4 Empirical Results Based on the Compliance Index Model (CIM) Sub-Indices of NICGI and SACGI
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 181 
8.4.1 Nigerian Empirical Results – Shareholder (Shareholder–NICGI) and Stakeholder 
(Stakeholder–NICGI) Compliance Index .......................................................................................... 182 
8.4.2 South Africa Empirical Results – Shareholder (Shareholder–SACGI) & Stakeholder 
(Stakeholder–SACGI) Compliance Index ..................................................................................... 186 
8.5 Comparing Results of Equilibrium Variable Model and Compliance Index Model ................... 192 
8.5.1 Comparing Results of the Equilibrium Variable Model and Compliance Index Model in Nigeria
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 193 
8.5.2 Comparing Results of the Equilibrium Variable Model and the Compliance Index Model in 
South Africa ..................................................................................................................................... 198 
8.6 Comparative Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results for Nigeria and South Africa Based on 
Both Equilibrium Variable Model and Compliance Index Model ................................................... 202 
8.7 Summary of Chapter ................................................................................................................. 210 
CHAPTER 9 ................................................................................................................... 213 
9.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: ROBUSTNESS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ............................... 213 
9.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 213 
9.2 Endogeneity Problem ................................................................................................................ 214 
9.3 Simultaneous Equation Model/Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) Model ................................... 217 
9.3.1 Simultaneous Equation Model/Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) Model Results for Nigeria .. 224 
xi 
 
xi | P a g e  
 
9.3.2 Simultaneous Equation Model/Two Staged Least Square (2SLS) Model Results for South 
Africa ............................................................................................................................................... 230 
9.4 Dynamic System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Regression .................................. 235 
9.4.1 Dynamic System GMM Equation ........................................................................................... 237 
9.4.2 Dynamic System GMM Results–Compliance Index Model for Nigeria .................................. 240 
9.4.3 Dynamic System GMM Results–Compliance Index Model for South Africa .......................... 244 
9.4.4 Dynamic System GMM Results–Equilibrium Variable Model for Nigeria .............................. 247 
9.4.5 Dynamic System GMM Results–Equilibrium Variable Model for South Africa ...................... 251 
9.5 Comparison of Nigerian and South African Results – Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis ..... 255 
9.6 Summary of Chapter ................................................................................................................. 259 
CHAPTER 10 ................................................................................................................. 261 
10.0 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTION RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
.................................................................................................................................... 261 
10.1 Introduction and Summary ..................................................................................................... 261 
10.2 Summary of Results ................................................................................................................ 262 
10.3 Research Contribution ............................................................................................................ 263 
10.4 Policy Implications and Recommendations ............................................................................ 268 
10.5 Limitations of Study ................................................................................................................ 271 
10.6 Direction for Future Research ................................................................................................. 272 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 274 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 291 
APPENDIX A: TABLES ....................................................................................................................... 291 
APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES ........................................................................................ 295 
APPENDIX C: NORMALITY CURVES FOR COMPLIANCE LEVELS ....................................................... 296 
APPENDIX D: LIST OF SAMPLED FIRMS FOR NIGERIA ..................................................................... 299 
APPENDIX E: LIST OF SAMPLED FIRMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA ........................................................... 301 
CHAPTER 1
1.0 BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 1.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis examines and compares the impact of compliance with institutionalised country-
level corporate governance (CG) provisions and alternative internal CG mechanisms on firm 
financial performance in a multi-country context in Africa. Drawing from a multi-theoretic 
framework, and specifically from a New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework, the study 
argues that CG rules and requirements in emerging economies are embedded in the larger 
institutional, political, historical and legal frameworks (Adegbite, 2015, Adegbite et al., 2012, 
Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012, Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). Consequently, effective 
adoption of internal CG structures and practices and compliance with country-level CG 
provisions are contingent on the institutional environment in which firms and their 
stakeholders operate. Following from this theoretical background, this thesis focuses to 
investigate and compare the impact of internally generated alternative corporate governance 
structures and compliance with CG provisions on performance of listed firms in South Africa 
and Nigeria. Within this, three sub-objectives/questions are developed. First, using a 
compliance index model equation, the study specifically investigates and compares if firm-
level compliance with institutionalised country-level corporate governance provisions in 
Nigeria (as measured by NICGI, Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI) and South 
Africa (SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI) impacts on firm financial 
performance across Nigeria and South Africa (sub-research question one). On the other hand, 
using the equilibrium variable model, the study further evaluates and compares the effect of 
14 internally generated alternative firm-level corporate governance mechanisms (measured 
by, proportion of NEDs, proportion of EDs, proportion of independent NEDs, 
CEO/Chairman role separation, board size, board gender diversity, frequency of board 
meetings, board busyness, board ethnic diversity, board interlocks, gearing, director 
shareholding, institutional shareholding and audit committee independence) on firm financial 
performance of listed firms in Nigeria and South Africa (sub-research question two).  
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Finally, the study examines and compares whether firms’ choice of individual internal CG 
structures as measured by the equilibrium variable model is associated with increase in firm 
financial performance rather than with firm-level compliance with country-level CG 
provisions as measured by the compliance index model in South Africa and Nigeria (sub-
research question three).  
 
Thus, this chapter provides an overview of the motivations of the study. The chapter is 
organised as follows. The following section (1.2) provides the background of the study, the 
context of the thesis and reasons why the two selected African countries (Nigeria and South 
Africa) are relevant for the study. Section (1.3) presents the motivation of the study alongside 
the problem statement and research gaps. Section 1.4 outlines the thesis research questions. 
Section 1.5 summarises the chapter and section 1.6 presents the organisation of the thesis.  
1.2 Background of Corporate Governance in Africa  
 
For the last two decades, especially after the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s coupled with 
the recent global financial crisis of 2007, there has been a surge in corporate governance 
reforms within many emerging economies. The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s brought 
to light extensive inadequacies in corporate governance (hereafter referred to as CG) and the 
oversight role of internal CG mechanisms, especially the board of directors. In fact, the crisis 
showed gross inability of regulatory and supervisory bodies to control and oversee financial 
institutions in emerging economies (Rwegasira, 2000) and led to CG reforms in many emerging 
economies.  
 
This phenomenon became evident in the number of national corporate governance reports that 
have been produced in many African countries over the years (Rossouw, 2005). Good CG has 
been articulated as a prerequisite for development by many African governments, e.g. Kenya, 
Cameroon, Nigeria, Zambia and a host of other African countries. Klapper and Love (2004) 
indicated that there are extensive differences in organisation-level corporate governance across 
countries. Using firm-level data on corporate governance ranking across 14 emerging markets, 
with South Africa included, the study attributed the differences to the different CG systems 
within countries (see table 3 in Chapter 3 for a summary of CG provisions in Nigeria and South 
Africa). The study also shows that, on average, organisational-level corporate governance is 
weak in countries which have weaker legal systems (Klapper and Love, 2004). In addition, 
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superior corporate governance standards were seen to be highly correlated with better market 
valuation and operating performance (Okeahalam, 2004, Klapper and Love, 2004). In the same 
line of research, López de Silanes et al. (1998) conducted a comparative examination of good 
governance in a number of countries including Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya. 
Their results indicate that, in relation to shareholder rights (i.e. a measure of how strongly local 
legal structures protect and favour the interest of shareholders, e.g. one-share-one-vote rules), 
South Africa scored five points, which was above the sample average of four for countries with  
English-law/common law origin (López de Silanes et al., 1998). The other African countries 
with both civil and common law origin in the sample had a score of three (López de Silanes et 
al., 1998). However, in relation to creditor rights (i.e. a measure of how strongly local legal 
structures protect creditors, e.g. the right to repossess and then keep or liquidate collateral of a 
firm in case of default), within the whole sample of 49 countries around the world, all African 
countries in the sample scored four, which was higher than the average of the sample  (3.11), 
with the exception of South Africa, which had a score of three (López de Silanes et al., 1998). 
With regard to English origin group or common law group, the average score was (6.46), but 
all the African countries scored below average, with Kenya scoring the highest (5.42), followed 
by South Africa (4.42), Zimbabwe (3.68) and Nigeria (2.73) respectively. The preceding 
descriptive statistics from prior studies therefore suggest that, though some African economies 
have advanced in relation to a few ‘good’ corporate governance practices, these economies at 
an aggregate level are very lacking with respect to what is considered ‘good’ corporate 
governance.   
 
It has also been argued within the extant literature on corporate governance that the size of 
corporate boards impacts on firm performance (Pfeffer, 1972, Pearce and Zahra, 1992, Wagner 
III et al., 1998, Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, Phan et al., 2003, Mangena and Tauringana, 2006, 
Dahya and McConnell, 2007, Jackling and Johl, 2009). In fact, data from varied sources 
indicates that the average size of boards of firms in Africa ranges from four in South Africa to 
12 in Botswana and Namibia (Okeahalam, 2004). Some countries like Mauritius and Nigeria 
had an average board size of ten, Zimbabwe had nine, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Zambia had 
eight, and Ghana had seven (Okeahalam, 2004). However, most of the studies above used 
subjective corporate governance ratings such as the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) 
report. A major problem with using subjective CG rating is that they are based entirely on the 
analysts’ perception of good CG rather than examination of annual reports of listed firms. In 
addition, as Hassan and Marston (2010,  p.13) noted, subjective analysts’ perception ratings 
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turn out to have a favourable bias towards larger firms, which may bring into question the 
objectivity of the views of the analysts, given that no one can know their incentives to report 
their ratings and biases that might have influenced their judgements (Hassan and Marston, 
2010). In addition, prior studies which have used CLSA ranking are less representative of the 
population. For example, studies based on the CLSA 2000 ratings included only nine of the 
largest South Africa (SA) firms (Ntim, 2013a). Thus, significant sample selection bias based 
on CLSA ratings may pose serious econometric problems in associating CG and firm 
performance.  
  
Corporate governance in Africa has been under-researched as compared to many Western 
economies, and comparative studies of different CG systems and institutional settings are very 
few. This research therefore is timely as it is designed to examine internal CG mechanisms in 
Nigeria and South Africa, which are the two most advanced economies in Africa (see their 
historical development of CG in sections 3.3 and 3.4). South Africa has the most developed 
capital market with the highest number of listed firms and is the economic powerhouse of the 
Southern Africa economic area. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with the highest 
number of listed companies in West Africa as well as the economic powerhouse of West 
African countries (detailed discussions of the various countries are presented in 3.3 and 3.4). 
Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa with an estimated nominal GDP of $568.5 billion, 
exceeding South Africa’s $349.8 billion as of 2014 (Barungi, 2014). Comparing the GDP with 
the total GDP of $1.712 trillion for sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria’s GDP represents 33% while 
South Africa has 20%, and both countries generate 53% of the total GDP for sub-Saharan 
Africa. More so, Nigeria and South Africa get most of their economic income from mining. 
While Nigeria is seen to have the biggest economy in Africa, South Africa is considered the 
‘financial hub’ of Africa as a result of attracting the highest inflow of foreign direct investments 
(FDI). In 2013, FDI inflow to South Africa relative to FDI inflow to Africa as whole was at 
14% ($8.23 billion), while Nigeria had 10% ($5.6 billion).  
 
The two countries have been chosen owing to some unique similarities but importantly also 
differences in their respective corporate governance architecture which have been shaped by 
international pressures as well as local realities of conducting business in these economies. 
Both Nigeria and South Africa developed their CG codes from international CG benchmarks, 
especially the UK Cadbury 1992, though the two countries have developed CG codes at 
different times. Thus, it is expected that firms in both countries show some differences in levels 
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of maturity and selection of internal corporate governance mechanisms. For example, the SA 
King report has emerged from the development of King I of 1994, which was developed 
extensively from the provisions of the UK Cadbury report of 1992, centred on shareholder-
focused CG regime. This was followed by King II of 2002 to the current 2009 King III, with 
the latter operating under an affirmative stakeholder CG regime (Ntim, 2011, Ntim, 2013c, 
Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a). Nigeria had its first corporate governance 
code in 2003 (Adegbite, 2015, Adegbite et al., 2012, Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012, Osemeke 
and Adegbite, 2016), which was a year after the King II of South Africa; however, Nigeria’s 
second CG report came into effect in 2011, with some of its provisions similar to those of the 
King II CG but differs significantly from the King III (see table 3 in Chapter 3, column 2 and 
3). Owing to these differences as well as similarities in the corporate governance architecture 
in the two countries, there are extensive differences in organisational-level corporate 
governance across both countries. These differences in organisational-level corporate 
governance have different effects on firm-level financial performance. More so, both countries 
have developed their corporate governance codes to meet local and socio-economic realities of 
doing business in the respective countries. For example, the King CG codes in South Africa 
have provisions aimed at addressing inequities resulting from the aftermath of apartheid, while 
the Nigeria CG code has provisions which are aimed at addressing the problems created during 
the military rule (Okike, 2007, Okpara, 2011), which discouraged foreign investors from 
investing in Nigeria. Evidently, while South Africa has developed governance institutions 
which are arguably more mature within developing markets in Africa, Nigeria offers a context 
where governance institutions are still developing. Hence these differences in the development 
of governance institutions between both countries offer an interesting context to examine and 
compare firm-level adaptation to normative country-level governance guidelines and how such 
practices impact on firm financial performance over time.  
 
More so, despite these normative guidelines to encourage good corporate governance practices 
in both countries, like many emerging economies, both countries are characterised by high 
levels of income inequality, unemployment and poverty. In addition, both countries have very 
strong informal institutions which may limit or encourage the adoption of normative 
governance guidelines. While South Africa is seen as the citadel of development of good 
governance practices which reflect local realities of doing business in emerging economies 
(Ntim, 2013c, Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim et al., 2012), like many African economies, it still suffers 
from a tradition of corrupt practices (George et al., 2016, Rispel et al., 2015, Vaughn and Ryan, 
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2006). Similarly, Nigeria is characterised by rampant and enshrined corruption practices, which 
makes the enforcement of normative governance guidelines ineffective (Adegbite, 2015, 
Adegbite et al., 2012, Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012, Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). Drawing 
from these institutional contexts, this thesis argues that normative institutions can encourage 
good governance practices, but weak enforcement of formal guidelines (creating an 
institutional void) (Khanna et al., 2006) reinforces informal institutions, and hence both co-
exist. These strong informal institutional practices such as corruption may work counter to 
governance guidelines aimed at promoting good CG practices. As such, both countries are 
exemplary of an institutional void and/or weak institutional environments prevalent within 
African economies and hence provide interesting contexts to compare firm-level governance 
behaviour and to decide whether these behaviours vis-à-vis recommended and adopted 
governance practices have similar impacts on firm performance across both countries.   
 
The preceding discussion shows there is opportunity for comparing firm-level governance 
behaviour vis-à-vis country-level governance institutions and institutional constraints across 
both countries which will enhance understanding of CG in emerging African markets. Hence, 
investigating firm-level internal CG mechanisms as well as compliance with customised 
country-level CG provisions between Nigeria and South Africa and their bearing on financial 
performance offers an interesting context to compare results.     
1.3 Problem Statement, Motivation, Research Gap and Contribution  
 
A review of empirical research conducted in Africa on CG and performance nexus (see 
subsection 3.6 in Chapter 3) shows a dearth of comparative studies in this context. Prior studies 
in Africa have not yet provided a comprehensive and robust understanding of internal CG 
structures selected by firms from a multi-country perspective as well as the level at which these 
firms comply with local/institutional CG provisions and their bearing on firm financial 
performance. Therefore, the limitations of these empirical studies justify the need for this PhD 
research. In addition, the research fills the lacuna and contributes to CG literature as follows.  
 
First, research investigating CG and firm performance has mostly concentrated on a specific 
country (see section 3.6). For example, in Nigeria, some scholars have investigated CG 
practices and the state of governance practices. To mention a few, Nakpodia et al. (2016) 
reported that, in the presence of an institutional void, elites can invent, circumvent and corrupt 
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institutions in Nigeria, which works counter to initiatives for good governance practices. 
Osemeke and Adegbite (2016) reported that the presence of conflict among the various codes 
of governance at national and industry level reduces firm compliance and makes enforcement 
ineffective, which impedes good corporate governance practices in Nigeria. Though these 
studies in Nigeria provide contextual knowledge of micro-level governance practices, they are 
generally based on interviews and description of stakeholder perceptions of governance 
practices. A recent study which includes Nigeria by Zattoni et al. (2017) examined board 
independence-performance nexus and suggests the association is contingent on speciﬁc 
national contexts. Similarly, authors like Ntim (2012a), Ntim (2013c), Ntim (2014) and Ntim 
et al. (2015b) have examined CG practices of South African firms and reported affirmative 
effect on firm performance. However, mostly   single country studies which may affect 
generalisation of results across other African economies. In fact, these studies have not offered 
at macro level the state of CG compliance practices and internal governance mechanisms of 
firms over time and whether such macro-level practices impact on firm financial performance 
across different countries in Africa. This study builds on this prior research and fills the 
highlighted research lacuna by offering new evidence of comparative macro-level firm 
governance practices across more than one institutional context in Africa. To the best of my 
knowledge, the only comparative study in Africa was conducted by Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2008), but the study was limited in scope and sample size. Though this study was a major 
attempt to compare CG across countries, the study suffers from sample bias. For example, Nigeria, 
with more than 200 companies, has just 16 firms represented in the sample, while Ghana stock 
exchange, with fewer than 50 listings, has 22 firms within the sample. Further, the study was limited 
to few internal CG mechanisms in addition to oversight of compliance practices of firms within 
these economies. In addition, the period of data collection was before any corporate governance 
codes were instituted, apart from South Africa’s 1994 King I report. Therefore, this thesis fills 
this gap by examining CG practices of firms after the implementation of CG codes across 
peculiar institutional contexts (South Africa and Nigeria) where governance institutions are 
likely to have achieved some level of maturity (2010–2015 is ideal). Moreover, Kyereboah-
Coleman (2008) employed only OLS regressions, which does not adequately control for 
endogeneity. This study tests for presence and impact of endogeneity, which improves the 
robustness of findings and interpretation results. In addition, this study provides a response to the 
research questions as to how and to what extent internal governance structures chosen by firms 
operating in different institutional settings impact on firm financial performance, which 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) overlooks. Moreover, the choice of using two peculiar institutional 
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contexts in Africa responds to the recent call by Kumar and Zattoni (2015), who suggest the 
need for research on different geographies to help build understanding of maturation of 
corporate governance globally. Thus, as the field of CG is still emerging within an African 
context, coupled with the fact that many African economies have articulated CG as a 
prerequisite to attract FDI, to reduce institutional void and to enhance economic development 
(Rossouw, 2005,p.101), this study is timely as it advances and provides a comprehensive 
understanding and a comparative insight into the various CG practices in Nigeria and South 
Africa and their impact on financial outcomes of firms. 
 
The study contributes in advancing CG literature in relation to CG compliance and its impact 
on firm performance. CG codes/regulations have been utilised as popular standards to 
encourage firms to increase accountability and transparency (Cuomo et al., 2016). Such 
regulations are expected to act as safeguards against managerial inefficiencies and 
misappropriation of firm resources, in addition to promoting and adapting to societal needs. It 
is unsurprising that firms in Africa and other emerging economies have embraced the 
implementation of CG regulations as a way of improving CG practices to attract cheaper capital 
and reassure investors of managerial commitment to maximise firm value (Fernandes and 
Ferreira, 2008). However, despite the proliferation of CG codes around the world, a recent 
review of empirical studies by Cuomo et al. (2016, p.235) shows the number of articles focused 
on comparisons of different national codes over time is limited. They attribute the lack of 
comparative studies on corporate governance compliance and firm performance impact to 
difficulties in data collection. Cuomo et al. (2016, p.235) show evidenced that only two cross-
country comparative CG studies have been published on this area and are based on developed 
economies. To the best of my knowledge, there is no study which has examined the level of 
compliance with country-level governance regulations across more than one emerging 
economy, especially in Africa. This is an interesting gap to fill because, except for South 
Africa, which has had a CG code since 1994, most African countries including Nigeria 
developed a country-level CG code only after the year 2000. Therefore, this study provides 
timely evidence of compliance with different institutionalised country-level CG codes and their 
impact on firm performance over time comparatively in two less discussed contexts – Nigeria 
and South Africa. The study contends that, after more than a decade of implementing respective 
country-level CG codes, it is important to empirically verify if these country-specific codes are 
engaged with by firms and how such firm-level compliance impacts on financial performance.   
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In addition, a comparative study of the impact of individual internal corporate governance 
structures and firm compliance with country-level corporate governance code is deficient in 
Africa. Therefore, there is a need to investigate the validity of claims about impact of 
individual internal CG structures of firms (e.g. board size, composition, board interlock, 
proportion of NEDs) on firm performance and compare if internal corporate governance 
structures explain performance better than the compliance with CG provisions. In fact, an 
unanswered theoretical and an empirical question in CG research remains: Should firms 
choose governance structures as a bundle or as standalones? Do empirical results from the 
research show better performance is associated with firms implementing some individual 
internal CG structures (e.g. proportion of non-executive directors)? For example, if a firm’s 
compliance with country-specific CG provisions shows a positive relationship with firm 
performance but, at the same time, some internal mechanism shows similar effect, it would 
be reasonable to infer that complying with provisions of a country’s CG code may be costlier 
to firms. Hence, instead of complying with corporate governance provisions, firms may adopt 
specific CG structures as determined internally by the firm (e.g. CEO duality or higher 
proportion of non-executive directors). Therefore, by investigating the question as to whether 
individual internal CG structures of firms explain performance better than firm compliance 
with CG provisions, this study contributes immensely to extant literature on CG and firm 
performance nexus, especially in a comparative African context. 
 
As noted earlier, the study employs New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory as a 
complementary theoretical angle to agency, stewardship and resource dependence theories. 
As will be discussed later, NIE helps explain contextual differences and similarities in CG 
mechanisms and CG codes operation in the two selected African countries. This enables an 
appreciation of the different CG regimes and historical development within the selected 
countries and how these various set-ups impact on firm-level governance behaviours. In so 
doing, the study tests the assumption that different combinations of country- and firm-level 
CG mechanisms can lead to similar firm performance outcomes as suggested by prior 
research (e.g. Aguilera and Jackson, 2010, Aoki and Jackson, 2008, Filatotchev et al., 2013).  
 
More so, like most developing economies with Commonwealth heritage, CG internal systems 
and principles have mostly been borrowed from the UK (see their historical development of 
CG code in these countries in sections 3.3 and 3.4). This thus brings into question the 
applicability of some of these internal CG mechanisms and CG provisions implemented in 
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Nigeria and South Africa and how this impacts on firm performance in specific country 
contexts. More so, the relationship between internal CG mechanisms, CG compliance and firm 
performance can be expected to differ in what has been reported in prior country-specific 
studies. Thus, the study provides interesting contexts to compare results.  
 
In addition, the Anglo-American model (discussed in 2.2) within which South Africa and 
Nigeria have developed their CG codes assumed that ownership structures of firms are 
relatively dispersed. However, African countries have been noted to have concentrated 
ownership structures (Ntim, 2012a, Ntim, 2013d, Ntim et al., 2014a, Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim et 
al., 2015b, Ogbechie, 2010, Okeahalam, 2004, Rwegasira, 2000, Sanda et al., 2005)). These 
studies thus suggest that the market for managerial labour and corporate control through which 
managers and non-performing organisations are to be disciplined may not be effective in 
African countries as compared to the UK and the US. In addition, many African countries are 
noted to have weak records of implementation and enforcement of governance regulations 
(Adegbite, 2015, Adegbite et al., 2013, Adekoya, 2011, Nakpodia and Adegbite, 2017, 
Nakpodia et al., 2016, Ntim et al., 2015b, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b, Okeahalam, 2004, 
Okike, 2007, Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016, Rossouw, 2005, Sanda et al., 2005, Uche et al., 
2016). Therefore, it is questionable whether the UK regulatory style of ‘comply or explain’ 
operational in Nigeria and The Netherlands’ style of ‘apply or explain’ operational in South 
Africa is effective and efficient in improving CG standards among listed firms in these African 
economies.  
 
Furthermore, most studies in Africa have been conducted using a sample of non-financial firms 
(see subsection 3.6 and table 4 in Chapter 3) ( e.g. see Ntim, 2013b, Ntim, 2015, Ntim et al., 
2014a, Sanda et al., 2011, Sanda et al., 2005, Sanda et al., 2010, Zattoni et al., 2017). Our 
understanding of CG and firm performance in the financial sector in Africa is still limited. This 
study is particularly important to fill this gap in research as it covers a large sample of firms 
across both countries, including financial and non-financial firms. This will enable comparison 
between countries and within countries and increase the statistical significance and validity of 
the results, as well as provide strong evidence that enhances generalisation of results. 
Therefore, the study offers an opportunity to examine the effect of internal CG mechanisms, 
governance compliance and firm financial performance from a sample of both financial and 
non-financial firms within the same period in two different countries.   
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In addition, as will be discussed in section 2.3, most quantitative studies in CG have often 
looked at internal corporate governance mechanisms derived from agency theory internal board 
compositional constructs, such as proposition of NEDs, board leadership, board size ( e.g. see 
Ntim, 2013b, Ntim, 2015, Ntim et al., 2014a, Sanda et al., 2011, Sanda et al., 2005, Sanda et 
al., 2010, Zattoni et al., 2017). This line of enquiry has also dominated CG research in Africa 
(see subsection 3.6). To the best of my knowledge, only Ntim et al. (2015b) and Ntim (2014) 
have incorporated resource dependency theory board compositional constructs such as board 
interlock and its impact on firm performance. This study provides a comprehensive 
representation by looking at 14 internal CG variables. Therefore, using 14 firm-level internal 
CG mechanisms from different theoretical angles enhances our understanding of the 
substitutability and complementary use of different CG mechanisms. In addition, the 
comparative approach adopted using a comprehensive number of internal CG mechanism 
enhances the theoretical basis for configuration approach in comparative studies.  
 
More so, as has been highlighted as one of the problems in some of the empirical studies in 
Africa (see section 2.3.6), there are serious concerns that the existence of an endogenous 
relationship between variables can mix up empirical research outcomes (Ntim, 2014, Ntim et 
al., 2014a, Ntim et al., 2014b, Ntim et al., 2015b). This may also bring into question the 
reliability of the empirical outcomes of these prior studies in Africa. As noted by Cuomo et al. 
(2016, p.235), one of the reasons for inconclusive research findings in CG research to date is 
the lack of control for specific firm-level idiosyncrasies owing to the over-reliance on OLS 
regressions, which lack the ability to control for endogenous associations and selection bias. 
Cuomo et al. (2016, p.235) suggest that future studies should avoid such deficiencies. This 
study addresses these deficiencies and contributes immensely to CG scholarship by providing 
more robust results. Specifically, in addition to the traditional OLS approach, the study 
employs a pluralism of analytical methods including dynamic system Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) approach, a two-stage least square model and an instrumental variable 
model. This enhances reliability of the thesis research findings. More so, the study includes 
both market- and accounting-based performance variables. This ensured a test of robustness of 
results, which some previous studies in Africa have failed to provide. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
 
Given the research gaps and contributions identified above, the thesis main research question 
(sub-section 1.4.1) and sub-research questions (subsection 1.4.1.1) are outlined as follows: 
  1.4.1 Main Research Question  
 
How and in what ways do the choices of internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
compliance with corporate governance provisions affect firm financial performance of listed 
firms in Nigeria and South Africa?  
   1.4.1.1 Sub-research Questions  
 
To address the main research question effectively, the following sub-research questions are 
examined: 
I. How and in what ways does firm-level compliance with exogenously developed 
corporate governance provisions impact on firm financial performance in Nigeria and 
South Africa? 
II. Do endogenously generated alternative firm-level internal corporate governance 
mechanisms affect firm financial performance in Nigeria and South Africa? 
III. Are firms’ choices of individual internal CG structures as measured by the 
equilibrium variable model associated with better firm performance than firm-level 
compliance with CG provisions as measured by the compliance index model? 
1.5 Summary of Chapter 
 
This chapter has provided the contextual background of CG in Africa, covering antecedents 
of contextual, historical and economically important events that have shaped the development 
of CG in Africa. Further, the chapter highlights the focus and research contribution of the 
study. The thesis evidences that prior studies have been country-specific and limited in scope 
and robustness. Therefore, the thesis focuses on comparing the impact of different internal 
CG mechanisms and compliance with country-specific CG code in Africa’s two biggest 
economies on firm financial performance. The thesis argues that both countries show some 
institutional similarities but stark differences in governance institutions. Thus, the study 
draws on these differences and similarities in institutional/context-specific CG practices to 
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provide a robust empirical analysis of the impact of internal CG structures and regulatory 
compliance on firm financial performance.  
1.6 Organisation of Thesis  
 
The thesis is divided into ten chapters including this chapter. The remaining nine chapters are 
organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a critical review of global CG. Specifically, the 
chapter builds on extant literature to support the motivation of the thesis, contribution and the 
developed research question presented in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 discusses the contextual 
literature based on New Institutional Economics (NIE) and the development of CG codes in 
Nigeria and South Africa. The chapter draws on NIE to recapitulate similarities and 
differences between the governance institutions in both countries and justifies why both 
countries are selected to examine the main research question. The chapter ends with a 
summary of CG provisions in both countries and a discussion of key empirical research in 
Africa. In Chapter 4 hypotheses are developed to examine the research questions stated in 
Chapter 1. Chapter 5 explains the research methodology including research ontology, 
epistemology, data collection methods, sample and sources, variables discussion and 
analytical models. Chapter 6 presents the comparative descriptive statistics for firm- and 
country-level CG compliance with corporate governance codes and well as discussion of the 
sub-categories of governance compliance. Chapter 7 presents additional comparative 
descriptive statistics and correlation results for firm-level internal CG mechanisms, control 
and performance variables. Chapter 8 presents the main results based on the compliance 
index model (sub-research question 1) and equilibrium variable model (sub-research question 
2) using OLS regression. Chapter 9 tests the main results based on a raft of sensitivity and 
robustness analysis. Specifically, the chapter examines whether the results presented in 
Chapter 8 are sensitive and robust to possible alternative explanations. Hence, the chapter 
uses alternative sensitivity and regression models, including a test of exogeneity using the 
Durbin–Wu–Hausman Exogeneity Test, Two Staged Least (2SLS)/Simultaneous Equation 
Model and Dynamic System Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) Model. Finally, 
Chapter 10 presents a brief summary of results, but, more importantly, the chapter presents 
the contributions of the thesis, policy implications, limitations and direction for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2.0 THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the extant literature in corporate governance, within which the identified 
research gap (as in section 1.3) and research questions (presented in 1.4) are developed. The 
chapter begins with a wider debate surrounding the concept of corporate governance. 
Following from this and drawing from international governance literature, selected CG 
theoretical underpinnings guiding the research are discussed. These theoretical discussions 
provide a broader picture of international CG within which the African CG research has been 
developed and inform the focus of the thesis. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 2.2 offers debates surrounding CG with a working definition of corporate governance. 
Section 2.3 reviews the main theoretical CG models as developed within the international CG 
literature. Section 2.4 discusses the rationale for adopting a multi-theoretic framework. Finally, 
2.5 summarises the chapter.  
2.2 Defining Corporate Governance  
 
Following the emergence of CG decades ago, there has been constant variation and discrepancy 
on what CG entails. In fact the scope of CG has been ever increasing in its content and context. 
Abor (2007) and Rwegasira (2000) argue that the scope of CG can be attributed to the different 
disciplines within social science (including economics, ethics, finance, accounting, law, 
management, organisational behaviour, and politics, among others), with no unanimously 
accepted definition for the term. As a consequence, there exist quite a number of definitions 
associated with CG.    
 
Though there are varied definitions of CG, researchers have often categorised it under a 
shareholder or ‘narrow’ categorisation and a stakeholder or ‘broad’ categorisation. In fact, the 
shareholder or narrow definition of CG is generated from the extent to which a corporate 
governance system principally focuses on satisfying the parochial interests of fund providers 
or shareholders (e.g. Cadbury, 1992, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). On the other hand, the 
stakeholder or ‘broad’ categorisation centres on meeting the broader interests of diverse 
societal stakeholder groups (e.g. Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
These two categories imply different ways of understanding and justifying the central questions 
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regarding the purpose of the firm and its supplementary structure of corporate governance 
(Ayuso et al., 2007, Ayuso et al., 2014).  
 
In fact, shareholder categorisation of CG can be traced back to the days of Adam Smith. Smith 
stated that:  
 
‘The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it 
with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private co-partnery frequently 
watch over their own … Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or 
less, in the management of the affairs of such a company’ (see Smith, 1776, paragraph 
V.1.107).  
 
Following from Smith, in the traditional shareholder regime, corporations are legal instruments 
for shareholders’ wealth maximisation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.797). In this view, CG is 
a ‘system by which companies are directed and controlled’ (Cadbury, 1992,s.2.5). Similarly, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.797) define it to be ‘… the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
firms assure themselves of getting a return on their investment’. In this view, organisations are 
seen as extensions of the shareholders with the primary agenda of providing goods or services 
to consumers, mainly to maximise the wealth of equity holders. Still in a narrow view, many 
researchers argue CG as a way both to reduce agency costs and to reduce private benefits and 
pet projects for managers of firms. It is argued that this will lead to more effective and efficient 
investments, boosting growth and performance, and a way to protect investors from managerial 
expropriation, thus easing an organisation’s access to external financing and enhancing 
valuation (Bruno and Claessens, 2007, Bruno and Claessens, 2010). 
 
Explicitly from the preceding definitions, a firm first and foremost is accountable to 
shareholders. This means shareholders have the power to appoint and remove directors and top 
management if they don’t work towards value maximisation. In so doing, shareholders make 
sure that the right internal governance mechanisms are in place to safeguard their interest. By 
the same reasoning, this view argues that shareholders have the power to remove board 
members and executive management from office in a general meeting if the interests of such 
board members and executive management are not in line with theirs. Following from Cadbury 
(1992), the board as a CG mechanism has the obligation to make sure that the firm is properly 
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governed so as to maximise shareholders’ value. These tasks include but are not limited to 
setting the firm’s strategic aims, appointing or removing the top management team, controlling 
and overseeing the management team and reporting to the shareholders of the firm on their 
stewardship.  
 
From the preceding discussion, a ‘narrow’ definition of CG will entail a definition which is 
concerned with the interaction of key internal actors for the sole purpose of profit maximisation 
for the shareholders rather than trying to manage the expectations of varied stakeholders, e.g. 
customers, regulators, suppliers, governments, employees, creditors and local communities, 
among others.  
 
However, from a broader perspective, CG is seen as ‘the relationships among stakeholders in 
the process of decision making and control over firm resources’ (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003 
, p.450 ). This definition goes beyond shareholder return maximisation. In fact, though there is 
emphasis upon shareholders’ return, it also recognises the need for considering interests of a 
wider range of stakeholders. Similarly Huse (2007, p.15) further distinguished between the 
‘narrow’ view of CG and the ‘broader’ view by defining CG as ‘the interactions between 
various internal and external actors and the board in directing a firm for value creation.’ In a 
broader view, according to Monks  and Minow (2008 p.12), ‘Corporate governance involves 
the relationship among various participants, including the chief executive officer, 
management, shareholders and employees, in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations.’ These ‘broader’ definitions implicitly mean corporate governance goes beyond 
and above the immediate internal shareholder corporate systems to include external CG 
systems and other stakeholders.  
 
Typically, as highlighted before, the internal corporate governance mechanisms will include 
the management, employees, shareholders and the board of directors, while the externally 
oriented corporate governance system includes regulators, suppliers, the labour and managerial 
control market, cultural, political, social and economic policies, creditors and others depending 
on the type of organisation and industry a firm operates in.  
 
In summary, the major difference between a ‘narrow’ or shareholder categorisation and a 
‘broad’ or stakeholder corporate governance regime can be seen explicitly in the orientation 
of each regime. In the shareholder regime of CG, the central concern of internal corporate 
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governance mechanisms is to create value for the shareholders, while stakeholder 
categorisation is geared towards creating value to benefit shareholders and other potential 
stakeholders. 
 
The narrow or shareholder-oriented view of CG is dominant in Anglo-Saxon countries like the 
US and the UK. This view proliferated as the US was seen as the most powerful economy of 
the world – a ‘citadel of capitalism’ – and a role model for other countries to emulate (Turnbull, 
1997, p.186). However, the Anglo-Saxon or shareholder-oriented CG model becomes less 
applicable when economic transactions are mediated by business-related associations, cultural 
significances, trade, institutional cultures, vocational, socio-political and social networks 
(Turnbull, 1997, p.186). These characteristics are more prominent in continental Europe (e.g. 
Germany and France) and some Asian and African economies. Therefore, it is common to see 
the stakeholder regime of CG within these countries and in some emerging economies where 
firms are not driven only by profit maximisation for shareholders but for the maximisation of 
expectations of multiple stakeholders. This is particularly relevant to this study. The context of 
countries studied in this thesis is, therefore, discussed in section 2.3.  
 
Section 2.1 so far has provided debates on the meaning of CG and how different meanings have 
generated different types of CG regimes around the world. Thus, these meanings attached to 
CG have contributed in shaping the theoretical development and debates within CG. The next 
section and further discussion of respective CG regimes in the selected African countries will 
assist in the development of the research gaps and research questions (as presented in 1.3 and 
1.4). The following section provides a detailed overview, discussion of CG theories and the 
key constructs within these theories. This discussion will enhance our understanding and 
appreciation of the shareholder and stakeholder regimes of CG (discussed in 2.1) further while 
identifying some emerging gaps in CG within which research gaps and questions discussed in 
sections 1.3 and 1.4 are developed.   
2.3 Corporate Governance Theories  
 
The majority of research in CG as discussed briefly above has been predominantly from a 
shareholder ownership perspective drawn from agency theory. In fact, agency theory has 
guided research in CG until recently when there has been a challenge on the extensive use of 
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agency theory to understand corporate governance constructs (Kumar and Zattoni, 2015). More 
so, overreliance on this theory has generated conflicting results in empirical research.  
 
Specifically, this study gives attention to the three CG theories because, as the preceding 
discussion highlights, the extant literature in CG has largely been considered and investigated 
from an agency theory perspective (Huse, 2000, Minichilli et al., 2009, Stiles and Taylor, 
2001)). In cases where other theories have been used, they have been investigated in isolation 
to each other (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Very few researchers have attempted to compare 
agency theory with other theoretical approaches – e.g. institutional theory ( e.g. Judge and 
Zeithaml, 1992, Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, Zona and Zattoni, 2007) – or combine agency 
theory with other theoretical underpinnings, such as stewardship theory, stakeholder and 
resource dependence theories (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Owing 
to the mixed findings from CG research, CG scholars have called for the need to employ varied 
theoretical angles other than agency theory to understand CG issues (Daily et al., 2003, 
McNulty et al., 2013, Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, Zona and Zattoni, 2007). 
 
Indeed Nicholson and Kiel (2007) studied the relationship between board variables and firm 
performance within agency, stewardship and resource dependency theories. They argue that 
while each CG theory can explain a particular case, no single theory explains the universal 
pattern of results. Similarly Daily et al. (2003) and Jackling and Johl (2009) support the use of 
a multi-theoretic approach to understand CG issues as it enables the study to identify and to 
comprehend the interconnectedness of structures and mechanisms that potentially enhance firm 
performance and value creation. In fact since CG in emerging African economies is still very 
much embryonic (Young et al., 2008), using the three most dominant theoretical underpinnings 
will eliminate the assumption that a particular theory is relevant in the African context. This is 
because studies till date have not provided empirical evidence to support this assumption. 
Therefore, it is my belief that agency, stewardship and resource dependency theories are 
relevant theoretical starting points to understand CG mechanisms in Africa and their bearing 
on firm financial outcomes.  
  2.3.1 Agency Theory 
 
The notion fundamental to agency theory is that managers who are entrusted by the owners to 
ensure an efficient use of their funds tend to be selfish opportunists who, if not monitored 
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effectively, will pursue self-interested goals at the expense of shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation. Opportunistic and selfish behaviour of managers can be manifested through 
clear and tangible benefits such as perquisites (large offices, flying first class and luxurious 
cars) and in less identifiable motivations such as the pursuit of growth at the expense of profit 
maximisation (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, Huse, 2007)). Therefore the information asymmetries 
that exist between knowledgeable managers and more distant and widely dispersed owners are 
expected to provide an avenue for this managerial opportunism, which the agents will act upon 
unless they are incentivised or monitored and controlled not to do so (Eisenhardt, 1989, Fama 
and Jensen, 1983, Jensen and Meckling, 1979a, Ross, 1973). Implicitly, there are gains to 
separating ownership and control of firms, without which the continuity of a firm is uncertain 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003). Thus the conflicts of interest between principals and agents on 
one hand, and on the other hand, the inability to write perfect contracts without incurring cost 
in monitoring managers reduces the value of the firm, all things being equal (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003). Indeed, these concepts form the foundation for research on corporate 
governance. In fact, the question as to how managers, shareholders, entrepreneurs minimise 
the loss of value as a result of the separation of ownership and control has driven the extensive 
literature that can be seen in CG.   
 
Thus, agency theory has been employed as the most dominant theoretical lens to demonstrate 
how internal CG mechanisms could affect financial performance of firms. It has been employed 
extensively by scholars in finance (Huse, 2000, Huse, 2005, Huse, 2007, Jensen and Meckling, 
1979a, Fama and Jensen, 1983), economics (Fama and Jensen, 1983, Ross, 1973) and 
organisational behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989), and in other fields like sociology and politics. 
This theory dates back more than 200 years ago to the days of Adam Smith when the ownership 
and control of firms were separate (as they are today), with the possibility of conflict of interest 
between fund suppliers and the people entrusted to manage these funds. The problem of 
separation of ownership and control was later highlighted by Berle and Means (1932). 
According to Berle and Means (1932), firms whose ownership is dispersedly held in effect 
disenfranchise small, remote shareholders, leaving excessive power in the hands of savvy 
agents (managers) who could run the firms to suit their selfish interests (Miller and Sardais, 
2011).    
 
Following from this premise, in the wake of various financial crises from the 1960s to date, 
which were attributed to mismanagement of investors’ funds, agency theory has been the most 
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dominant theoretical perspective applied in corporate governance (Miller and Sardais, 2011, 
Huse, 2007, Denis and McConnell, 2003, Daily et al., 2003, Jensen, 2000, Turnbull, 1997, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Fama and Jensen, 1983). From 1976 onwards, scholars ( e.g. Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976, Jensen and Meckling, 1979a, Jensen and Meckling, 1979b) offered 
agency theory as a description of how public enterprises could exist, given the assumption that 
managers of firms are self-interested, and thus a context in which these agents do not bear the 
full wealth effects of the decisions they take. Hence, given that managers of firms are 
responsible for leading the business in the interest of the shareholders, and given that managers’ 
own self-interests will never be in line completely with the interests of the principals, managers 
of firms will sometimes experience scenarios where conflicts of interest will arise when 
conducting business on behalf of the owners (Bryant and Davis, 2012, Miller and Sardais, 
2011). By inference, managers are more likely to act in the interests of the firm when their 
interests are aligned with those of the shareholders or when their behaviours are controlled and 
monitored against opportunistic behaviour. In the same reasoning, firms should either increase 
incentive mechanisms that align the interests of principals and agents (Fama and Jensen, 1983, 
Fama, 1980) or increase control and monitoring of agents by the principal’s delegates (e.g. 
board of directors) (Bryant and Davis, 2012).  
 
Hence, according to agency theory, the administrative function of controlling and monitoring 
management decisions, behaviour and actions is the primary function of internal CG 
mechanisms, particularly the board. As a result, agency theory has been one of the dominant 
theories used to understand the role of boards. Agency theorists suggest that the board exists 
principally to hire, remove, monitor and compensate management, with the aim of maximising 
value for the shareholders (Denis and McConnell, 2003, Daily et al., 2003, Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2001). The implication for CG is to provide efficient and effective control and 
monitoring mechanisms to protect shareholders from management misappropriation 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, Huse, 2007). Another form in which agency cost can be reduced is 
through executive compensation concerned with the degree to which executive managers are 
compensated in ways that align their interests with those of shareholders (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003, Daily et al., 2003, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001). It is reasonable to infer 
from the preceding discussion that greater overlap between ownership and control of 
companies should lead to a reduction in conflicts of interest between principals and agents and, 
therefore, to higher firm value. As a result, ownership by an organisation’s management can 
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assist to better align the interest of managers with those of equity holders (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003, Daily et al., 2003, Fama, 1980)). 
 
Agency theory proposed curbing the opportunistic behaviour of managers through the 
composition of board of directors as an internal CG mechanism. According to agency theory, 
board of directors as an internal governance structure should be made up of more non-executive 
directors for effective control. This will lead to board independence in monitoring and passing 
fair and unbiased judgement with best interest of shareholders, which enhances firm 
performance. In addition to the composition of boards, agency theory argues that, in relation to 
board leadership, there should be a separation of positions of CEO and board chairperson as 
this reduces the concentration of power on one individual and thus greatly reduces the influence 
of a single individual on management and board. In summary, agency theory holds implicitly 
several premises about human behaviour and the goals of an organisation’s ownership 
including: 
 
First, shareholder wealth maximisation should be the goal of a firm. Second, the BOD is an 
appropriate internal governance mechanism used by the principal to monitor managers. Third, 
top management and board actions and interactions are predominantly products of economic 
forces. Fourth, the board of director’s acts as a single unitary actor. Fifth, executive 
compensation through ownership incentives helps to curb agency cost. Furthermore, board 
composition should include more non-executive directors (NEDs) than executive directors. 
Finally, a separation of CEO and chairman position (Bryant and Davis, 2012). However, in 
cases where the internal mechanisms fail to control agency cost, external mechanism such as 
market for ownership and control, legal and regulatory mechanisms may come in to play.  
 
The theoretical claims of agency theory have been investigated extensively in developed 
economies, LDCs and most recently African economies (see further discussions in section 3.6 
and column 4 in table 4, in Chapter 3). It is suggested that internal and external CG mechanisms 
can help reduce the cost associated with monitoring and controlling management. Such internal 
corporate governance mechanisms include effective structured boards with effective 
subcommittees (e.g. the audit and remuneration committees), compensation contracts which 
encourage shareholder wealth maximisation and concentrated ownership which leads to active 
monitoring and control of executives, while the market for corporate control as an external 
mechanism may become operational when the internal mechanisms fail (Daily et al., 2003) to 
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align the interest of agents with those of principals. In this regard, some researchers have shown 
that better corporate governance mechanisms can assist in curbing agency costs. In a related 
study, Core et al. (1999) showed that firms with weaker governance structures have higher 
agency costs. In addition, they showed that CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive 
higher compensation, and that firms with greater agency problems have worse financial 
performance.   
 
Agency theory has been used extensively to understand the economic forces that drive 
organisational performance. It has also contributed immensely in understanding rational human 
behaviours through the principal–agent conflict. Based on its constructs, researchers have 
investigated CG mechanisms and firm financial performance. However, agency theory has 
attracted criticism from scholars in fields like sociology and psychology. These scholars have 
suggested agency theory to be very narrow in its construct of human behaviour by 
concentrating only on stock prices (Perrow, 1986, Hirsch and Friedman, 1986). Furthermore, 
the theory doesn’t provide any clear and substantial problems within organisational context 
(Perrow, 1986, Hirsch and Friedman, 1986). More so, agency theory is seen by Perrow (1986 
p.235) as being trivial while others see it as dehumanised, unrealistically one-sided and not 
providing any clear account for any existing trust and cooperation between shareholders and 
managers (Fehr and Falk, 2002, Perrow, 1986). The limitation of agency theory coupled with 
the conflicting empirical results based on its constructs on internal CG mechanisms therefore 
calls for the need to bring in additional theoretical lenses to provide alternative and 
complementary constructs of internal CG mechanisms (discussed in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 
below).  
 
Even though agency theory dominates CG literature to date, extant governance literature stems 
from a wider range of theoretical perspectives. As Daily et al. (2003) noted, many of these 
theoretical lenses are not intended as substitutes but also as complements to agency theory to 
understand CG constructs. Hence, a multi-theoretic approach to CG is essential for 
distinguishing the many mechanisms and structures that might reasonably enhance 
organisational financial performance. In fact, most of board compositional constructs studied 
in CG research have tended to have favourability towards agency theory, and this is even more 
noticeable in the few studies which have been conducted in African economies. Reliance on 
agency theory board compositional constructs has often yielded very conflicting results 
(evident in column 8 in table 4 in Chapter 3). A contribution of this research is employing (in 
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addition to agency theory board compositional constructs) other theoretical governance and 
board compositional constructs to provide a comprehensive view of internal governance 
mechanisms and its impact on firm performance in Africa (this is discussed further in sections 
2.2.2 and 2.2.3). Specifically, within this thesis, though agency theory provides theoretical 
foundations for the development of hypothesis with regard to board size, board composition, 
CEO–chairman separation, director ownership, board independence, as a standalone theory, it 
does not provide a conceptual framework to appraise governance complexity and other 
governance attributes which may affect firm value creation. Hence the subsequent sections 
discuss some of the theories complementary to agency theory within this thesis.  
 
  2.3.2 Stewardship Theory  
 
‘Stewardship is the extent to which an individual willingly subjugates his or her personal 
interests to act in protection of others’ long-term welfare’ (Hernandez, 2012 ,p.8 ).  
 
This theory has also attracted attention, both as a substitute and as a complement to agency 
theory. Contrary to agency theory, which was drawn from an economic or financial literature, 
stewardship theory is drawn from psychology and sociology to provide a different view in 
which agents see greater long-term utility in other focused, pro-social behaviour rather than the 
self-serving, short-term opportunistic behaviour promulgated by agency theory (Hernandez, 
2012, Miller and Sardais, 2011, Fehr and Falk, 2002, Davis et al., 1997, Donaldson, 1990, 
Eisenhardt, 1989, Perrow, 1986, Hirsch and Friedman, 1986). It was developed to examine 
situations in which agents as stewards are driven to act in the best interests of providers of 
funds.  
 
Within this theory, relationship-centred cooperation within the firm fosters pro-firm and 
trustworthy behaviour in executive managers (Hernandez, 2012, Davis et al., 1997). Implicitly, 
managers display stewardship behaviours by placing the interests of shareholders above theirs, 
thus acting in the best interests of the company. Following from Davis et al. (1997) and 
Hernandez (2012), managers hold a covenantal relationship with shareholders which represents 
a moral commitment that binds both principals and agents to work towards a common goal, 
without being opportunistic. The resulting relationship is a covenantal one in which a reciprocal 
promise-based agreement contains both transactional and psychological elements (Hernandez, 
24 
 
24 | P a g e  
 
2012). Hence, managers as stewards recognise their fiduciary obligations to protect the 
interests of shareholders and as a result believe they are morally obliged to pursue the interests 
of their principals.  
 
This is not to argue that stewardship theorists assume managers are altruistic; instead, they 
recognise that there are many situations in which executive managers of organisations conclude 
that serving the interests of the owners means their interests are also served. Indeed, 
stewardship behaviour is different from altruism. This is because, in serving the interest of a 
single benefactor; empathy-induced altruistic actions can undermine collective good. However, 
managerial  stewardship behaviours serve the interests of many individuals with self-sacrificial 
behaviours which are aimed at benefiting collective interests of the shareholders (Hernandez, 
2012). Therefore implicitly, managers’ stewardship behaviour represents a more expansive 
construct than altruism, given that their decisions are focused on broadly beneficial ends 
(Hernandez, 2012).   
 
Whereas agency theorists identify managers of businesses as self-serving and opportunistic, 
stewardship advocates describe them as people who frequently have interests that are 
isomorphic with those of the owners (Davis et al., 1997, Daily et al., 2003). Stewardship 
theorist arguments are centred around a model individual whose behaviour is tailored in such 
a manner that pro-firm, collective behaviours have higher utility in an indifference curve than 
individualistic, self-serving behaviours (Davis et al., 1997). By inference, given a choice 
between a manager’s self-serving behaviour and pro-firm behaviour, managerial behaviours 
will not depart from the interests of  shareholders (Davis et al., 1997). Thus managers of firms 
will substitute or trade self-serving behaviours for firm collective behaviours (Davis et al., 
1997). By inference, even in situations where the interests of the agent steward and of the 
shareholder–principal are not aligned, the manager will place higher value on collaboration 
than defection. This is because managers perceive greater utility in pro-shareholder-oriented 
behaviours. 
 
Based on these arguments by stewardship theorists, they contend increase in firm financial 
performance is likely to be associated with internal CG practices which give executive directors 
greater power over the decision making of the company. Examples of such practices include 
conferring the position of the CEO and chairman to one person, executive directors (EDs) on 
25 
 
25 | P a g e  
 
the board and fewer non-executive directors (NED) (Daily and Schwenk, 1996, Davis et al., 
1997, Erhardt et al., 2003, Huse, 2000).  
 
Following from the preceding arguments, this study uses stewardship theory constructs as an 
alternative view of agency theory and thus helps in results interpretation. An area where these 
contrasting views are relevant is in regard to agency theory recommendation for more non-
executive directors to monitor and control management. Whereas stewardship theory argues 
for executive directors, as they are stewards with robust understanding of the organisation and 
are motivated to make decisions in the best interests of the shareholders. Hence there is no need 
for them to be monitored or motivated with performance-related compensation packages. As 
such, if results indicate stewardship premise holds, then increasing non-executive directors on 
board may increase cost through higher compensation. Hence the cost of monitoring adversely 
affects a firm’s financial performance. Most studies have not investigated board composition 
in relation to the stewardship construct of executive directors (EDs), and this is almost absent 
in emerging African markets. Therefore, this research fills this gap in the comparative emerging 
African market context.  
  
As discussed above, stewardship theory provides an explanation of the existence of 
collaboration and trust between shareholders and managers, with a two-sided balanced view of 
the agent–principal relationship. However, the theory has been criticised for painting an 
extremely rosy image of managers (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003) and failing to highlight what 
aligns the interests of principals and agents (Davis et al., 1997). Finally, like agency theory, 
stewardship theory does not recognise the influence of the external environment and neither 
does it address the competencies needed by BODs to direct firms towards increased financial 
performance. Specific to this thesis, stewardship theory provides a basis for leadership duality 
and more executive director arguments to develop hypothesis in Chapter 4. However, it does 
not provide a comprehensive articulation of other corporate governance mechanisms that can 
affect firm financial performance. Thus, resource dependency theory discussed below 
complements both agency and stewardship theory because it provides an understanding of 
some competencies needed by a board of directors to direct a firm towards value maximisation.  
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  2.3.3 Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) 
 
One of the theories which has been used infrequently in understanding corporate governance 
and firm performance both in developed and emerging markets is resource dependency theory. 
The resource dependency paradigm dates back to Selznick (1949) and his research on the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (Bryant and Davis, 2012). Selznick reported that, when faced with 
resilient opposition, the Tennessee Valley Authority would include opposition members on its 
governing board (Bryant and Davis, 2012, Selznick, 1949). This policy, termed co-optation, 
was a tactic or strategy used by the Tennessee Valley Authority to minimise external 
uncertainty by exercising some level of control over the source of uncertainty. 
  
The theory was developed later on by Pfeffer (1972) in his paper ‘Size and Composition of 
Corporate Boards of Directors: The Organization and its Environment’ and later on in Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) book titled The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective. Since then, the theory has attracted a lot of attention from strategy to 
finance scholars in understanding organisational complexities. In fact, it has often been used 
as a complement to agency theory in corporate governance research. Even though this theory 
has been used as complementary to agency theory, it is very much distinct from both agency 
and stewardship theory. Whereas agency theory and stewardship theory are concerned with the 
alignment of the interest of agents and principals, resource dependency moves away from this 
form of internal conceptualisation of relationships. Instead it looks at the organisation as an 
entity operating in an uncertain environment. Resource dependency theory offers a theoretical 
basis for internal corporate governance mechanisms such as boards of directors as a resource 
to the company (Daily et al., 2003, Hillman et al., 2000, Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Advocates 
of this theory see boards of directors as contributors and as boundary spanners (linking the firm 
internal networks with external sources of information) of the firm and its environment ( e.g. 
see Daily et al., 2003, Hillman et al., 2000, Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
 
According to Pfeffer (1972), if boards as an internal corporate governance mechanism act as 
environmental linking bodies, when firms are confronted with greater external resource 
dependencies, a larger board with a greater proportion of outside directors will be necessary to 
reduce these dependencies (Bryant and Davis, 2012, Huse, 2007, Pfeffer, 1972, Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Evidence from Pfeffer (1972) study provides support for: i) positive 
correlations between organisation resource dependencies related to sales and finance and the 
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number of outside directors; ii) positive correlations between finance and regulation and the 
number of directors. In relation to Pfeffer (1972) results, the rationale within this theory is that 
boards should be structured and composed in such a way that reflects a firm’s resource 
dependencies. As such, Pfeffer (1972) observed that, when board composition and structure 
were different than the normative or reflective size for a given level of a firm’s external 
resource dependence, organisational financial performance declines in proportion to the 
amount of misalignment from required board structure.  
 
Following on from the preceding discussion, outside directors according to the resource 
dependency theory provide access to resources needed by the firm (Bryant and Davis, 2012, 
Miller and Sardais, 2011, Daily et al., 2003, Pfeffer, 1972). For instance, outside directors who 
are also executives of banks may assist in securing credit for the firm. Similarly, outside 
directors who are legal practitioners provide legal advice both in private communication with 
the firm’s executives or during board meetings which ceteris paribus may otherwise be more 
expensive for the organisation to secure (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, Daily et al., 2003). The 
provision of these resources by the board as an internal corporate governance mechanism 
enhances the firm’s operation, firm financial performance and survival in the long run (Daily 
et al., 2003).  
 
In relation to the composition of the boards as an internal governance mechanism, both agency 
theory and resource dependency theory have advocated for more outside directors or non-
executive directors, but they differ in that the latter is concerned with the composition and 
inclusion of outside directors in relation to a firm’s dependencies. Whereas the former is in 
relation to independence in monitoring and control of management. Agency theory board 
taxonomy distinguishes between outside directors and inside directors; however, the resource 
dependency taxonomy retains the typical inside director classification but disaggregates the 
outside directors into three distinct classes, namely business experts, support specialists and 
community influencers (Bryant and Davis, 2012, Hillman et al., 2000). Therefore an efficient 
resource dependent board will modify its structure and composition by adding additional non-
executive directors in the category of support specialists, business experts and/or community 
influencers to reflect new resource dependencies as required by the firm (Bryant and Davis, 
2012). Inside directors in the resource dependency taxonomy are there to fulfil the task of 
meeting the internal resource dependency requirements of the firm (Bryant and Davis, 2012, 
Hillman et al., 2000). As Bryant and Davis (2012) put it, as former or current executives of the 
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firm, executive directors are best placed to provide knowledge and expertise vis-à-vis the 
strategic and day-to-day needs of the firm (Bryant and Davis, 2012).  
 
In fact, some scholars have noted that, historically, CG scholars have often regarded 
composition of boards with a bias towards agency theory (Bryant and Davis, 2012, Hillman et 
al., 2000), and this is more evident in the very few studies conducted so far in Africa (see 
section 3.6 and table 4). This is one of the areas where this study seeks to contribute to CG 
empirical research by looking at, in addition to board compositional constructs of agency 
theory, board interlock and busyness constructs within resource dependency taxonomy. 
Therefore, given this limitation and the need to understand CG beyond agency theory 
prescriptions, this study uses agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependency 
theory to understand internal CG mechanisms within an African context (Kumar and Zattoni, 
2015). Specifically, the limitations of each of the theories and their empirical predictions enable 
a triangulation of governance constructs to provide a robust and comprehensive understanding 
of CG–firm performance in a comparative African context.  
2.4 Justification for Multi-Theoretic Approach  
 
The preceding sections have attempted to define the theoretical underpinnings of this study. 
Consistent with some prior studies and suggestions (Ntim, 2013c, Huse et al., 2011, Minichilli 
et al., 2009, Nicholson and Kiel, 2007) and in addition to the complex nature of corporate 
governance across the globe, this study adopts a multiple-theoretical perspective in 
understanding corporate governance internal mechanisms. These theories include agency, 
stewardship and resource dependency theories. Because this study is approaching positively 
the subject of corporate governance from a finance perspective, these three theories are relevant 
and closely related in understanding and answering the research questions. The theories help 
in elucidating the often-complex organisational relationships between owners, managers and 
stakeholders in modern firms.  
 
In brief, agency theory proposes that, because of the separation of ownership and control of 
firms, managers of firms may be less inclined to work in the interests of the shareholders. Thus, 
to limit divergence of shareholder and managerial interests, owners of firms have to put in 
place internal CG mechanisms to monitor and control managers. Ceteris paribus, by putting in 
place effective internal CG structures, agency costs are reduced which is likely to increase firm 
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financial performance. Stewardship theory on the other hand suggests that, owing to the 
manager’s knowledge and information advantages, better firm financial performance is likely 
to be associated with internal CG structures that provide greater managerial powers and trust. 
Last of all, resource dependence theory suggests that internal CG structures (e.g. the board of 
directors) tailored towards linking the firm to control external uncertainties and critical 
business inputs are associated with higher firm financial performance. 
 
Specific to this thesis, each of these theories offers peculiar recommendations on how internal 
governance mechanisms should be structured. For example, the study uses agency theory 
recommendations for effective monitoring, including board composition (NED), board 
leadership separation, board independence, corporate ownership structure, board size and 
capital structure. On the other hand, the study uses stewardship theory recommendations for 
including more executive directors and CEO/chairman duality. Finally, the thesis uses resource 
dependency constructs, including board interlock, board size and diversity. Hence this thesis 
uses the limitations (merits) of each of the theoretical recommendations for particular internal 
CG mechanisms to complement each other in providing a holistic development of different 
hypotheses (presented in Chapter 4) to inform the main focus of the research.   
 
It should, however, be noted that other theoretical approaches (e.g. upper echelons theory, 
social network theory and other related theories) could be used to study CG, but given the scope 
and context of this research and after a thorough review of the extant literature as detailed 
above, the three theoretical perspectives discussed above were considered more appropriate to 
answer the research questions in relation to internal CG mechanisms as measured by the 
equilibrium variable model introduced in subsection 1.4. However, some of the theories, such 
as upper echelons theory and social network theory and other related theories, will be discussed 
as needed to elucidate and debate on some CG constructs from the three key theoretical 
underpinnings of the research, especially during hypothesis development. For example, some 
board compositional arguments drawn from upper echelons theory, managerial hegemony and 
social network theory will also be introduced to elucidate some board constructs such as board 
gender, ethnic diversity and board interlock.    
 
The above-discussed theoretical perspectives postulate why one or a few internal CG structures 
is (are) more important than others in affecting firm value. However, they fail to recognise that 
firms operate in countries with different historical, cultural, legal, formal and informal norms 
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which shape firm economic and governance behaviours. Consequently, in addition to the 
above-discussed theories, New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory is introduced in the next 
chapter as a supplementary theoretical lens to understand and elucidate how country 
institutional differences and/or similarities shape firm-level CG structures.  Consequently, this 
study contributes to comparative institutional CG literature in Africa where there exist a dearth 
in research on how institutional differences and similarities across countries shape firm-level 
choice of a bundle of internal CG structures as prescribed by respective countries CG codes 
(see subsection 3.5 and table 3). Further discussion linking selected theories and how they 
inform the choices of internal corporate governance mechanisms as well as the analytical 
models to be used in this study will be presented during hypothesis development in Chapter 4. 
Therefore, the multi-theoretical approach in this study enables the study to widen and combine 
various theoretical lenses to develop new interpretations and a better understanding of CG 
regulations and mechanisms.  
2.5 Summary of Chapter   
 
This chapter provided a broader view of international corporate governance literature and 
theoretical underpinnings within which the thesis corporate governance framework is 
presented, and research questions are developed. This chapter has reviewed the extant literature 
in corporate governance, within which the identified research gap (as in subsection 1.3) and 
research questions (presented in 1.4) are developed. Specifically, the chapter has presented the 
debates surrounding corporate governance definition. In addition, it has also presented detailed 
debates on selected CG theoretical underpinnings, which guides the research questions. Based 
on the theoretical debates from agency, stewardship and resource dependency theories, a multi-
theoretical approach is adopted to articulate the often-complex organisational relationships 
between shareholders, managers and stakeholders in modern firms. More importantly, these 
theories pave the way for a contextual theoretical discussion in the next chapter (Chapter 3) 
and development of hypotheses in Chapter 4.    
 
The next chapter discusses contextual/institutional development of CG regimes and codes in 
the countries chosen for the study. Specifically, it presents the New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) theory as an additional theoretical lens to understand how firm choice of CG is 
influenced by country-specific individualities
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CHAPTER 3 
3.0 CONCEPTUAL LITERATURE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 2 discussed the definition of CG, debates on the various CG regimes, 
theoretical development and identification of various internal CG mechanism(s) 
advocated by individual theories and justification for a multi-theoretic approach in the 
thesis. This chapter builds on preceding discussions by examining how CG in South 
Africa and Nigeria has developed and how the various CG regimes which are 
operational in these countries have been shaped by the different governance institutions, 
theoretical debates (discussed in 2.2) and CG regime debates (discussed in 2.1).  
 
Specifically, the chapter draws on these preceding discussions to discuss how the 
various CG regimes operational in Nigeria and South Africa have been shaped by 
institutional differences and similarities. Section 3.2 presents New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) theory as a complementary theoretical angle to the earlier-discussed 
theories in Chapter 2. As will be discussed later, NIE is suitable to understand 
contextual differences and similarities in governance institutions and codes operation 
in the two selected African economies. This discussion enables an appreciation of the 
different CG regimes and the historical development of CG institutions in each country 
and how these various set-ups fit within the shareholder CG regime, the stakeholder 
CG regime, or a blend of both. Building from the discussions on NIE, section 3.3 
presents the background of South Africa and narrates how this background led to the 
development of CG in the country. Similar discussions for Nigeria are presented in 
section 3.4. Drawing from sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, section 3.5 summarises and 
compares the different CG codes operation in both countries from an NIE perspective. 
Finally, key empirical works conducted in Africa (3.6) are discussed. This provides a 
strong background within which the focus of the thesis is developed. Finally, section 
3.7 presents a summary of the chapter.  
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3.2 New Institutional Economics (NIE) Theory  
 
Emerging discussions in corporate governance scholarship argue that the most 
important and promising corporate governance research should seek to recognise how 
institutional context impacts on the behaviour of firms rather than using classical 
agency theory approach (Judge et al., 2008, Aguilera and Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2009). 
Economic, governance and financial circumstances vary greatly from country to 
country. As noted by Filatotchev and Boyd (2009 pp.264), future research should aim 
at integrating corporate governance research with institutional economics perspective. 
This study sympathises with this line of academic thinking and, as such, in addition to 
the traditional CG theories discussed in Chapter 2, the study uses NIE as an additional 
theoretical lens to understand how institutional context including historical, cultural, 
formal and informal rules operation in each country has shaped the development of 
their respective CG codes.  
   
Different from agency theory, typical classical and neo-classical economic theorising, 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) does not assume institutional arrangements as 
given but makes it an important object of research. NIE seeks to cogitate the 
consequences of a country’s given institutional arrangements for economic behaviour 
of firms. According to North (1981, 1986, 1990), local and national institutions shape 
the rules of the game in economies, which enhances structural motivations in human 
interchange and influences economic performance of nations. These institutional rules 
of the game have implications on how firm-level behaviours are impacted by the 
economic, historical, political and socio-cultural environment in which it operate 
(Williamson, 2000, pp.259). Consequently, different countries generate and sustain 
different institutions, which helps in facilitating economic transactions with the 
consequence that particular institutions will be more effective and efficient than 
others, and all have a tendency to evolve over time (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009 
pp.264). For instance, the polity may demand that a firm’s internal corporate 
governance structure be organised in a way that fosters the implementation of some 
public policy. As a result, players outside the firm may affect its internal CG 
structures by instituting governance arrangements through political institutions 
(Gabbioneta et al., 2013). This can enable the banning of certain business practices, 
raise cost for others and subsidise others (Greif, 2008, Richter, 2005, Richter, 2015). 
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Consequently, NIE embodies the vital role of government and other institutions 
capacity in shaping the institutional business environment in which firms operate. 
North (1981, 1986, 1990), Richter (2005), Adegbite (2015), Adegbite and Nakajima 
(2012), Nakpodia et al. (2016) argue that formal and informal rules including political 
rules (e.g. constitutions), economic rules (property rights, company law), history, 
traditions and contractual agreements between economic players (sales contracts) are 
institutional constraints that limit firm behaviour. 
 
Drawing from this, this study argues that corporate governance rules and requirements 
in emerging economies are embedded in the larger institutional, political, historical, 
and legal frameworks (Areneke et al., 2017). Concisely, effective practice and 
compliance with CG provisions are contingent on the institutional environment in 
which firms and their stakeholders operate. Consequently, the reaction of corporate 
managers in Nigeria and South Africa is deeply enshrined in the system of norms and 
relations, which are socio-culturally and politically constructed.  
 
This study argues that, in Nigeria and South Africa, corporate governance practices do 
not naturally arise out of a nexus of contracts as agency theory postulates but from 
arrangements that are reflective of the prevailing economic, political, socio-cultural 
and historic process. More so, the development of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 2011 code in Nigeria and King III in South Africa (as will be 
discussed later) is in place as a result of interconnected institutions reinforcing each 
other, including the government, the stock markets, auditors, shareholder groups, 
international pressure from World Bank and IMF and other stakeholders. However, if 
these codes do not fit within the context, as the applicability of some of the borrowed 
CG mechanisms and CG provisions implemented is questionable, coupled with the 
lack of regulatory enforcement, weak and corrupt institutional environment, then we 
may see resistance to compliance (Nakpodia et al., 2016). Thus, compliance with SEC 
2011 corporate governance requirements in Nigeria and King III CG code depends on 
wider cultural beliefs and rules that structure managerial decision-making in both 
countries. 
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3.3 Corporate Governance in South Africa (SA) 
 
South Africa is seen today to be one of the largest and most developed economies in 
the African continent and generates up to 20 per cent of the income generated within 
the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). One of the major reasons 
given for such an astonishing success in the region is thanks to its leadership in the 
corporate governance area. According to Statistics South Africa (2016), as of 2013, 
75.7% of SA GDP is derived from the private sector, with finance, real estate and 
business services contributing 19.4%; wholesale, retail and motor trade, catering and 
accommodation 13.7%; manufacturing 13%; transport, storage and communication 
8.4%; mining and quarrying 7.7%; personal services 5.4%; construction 3.4%; 
electricity, gas and water 2.4%; and agriculture, forestry and fishing 2.3%. South Africa 
is seen to not only be one of the biggest economies in Africa but also Africa’s most 
sophisticated economy (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006), with its financial institutional 
structures very much advanced compared to other emerging markets (Andreasson, 
2011, Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). Table 1 below shows the historical context and 
milestones within which CG has emerged in South Africa. 
 
Historically, South Africa has suffered notoriously with a high crime rate and sluggish 
economy, especially during the era of apartheid. In fact, during the period 1961–1994, 
the country was almost excluded from the global economy as a result of its apartheid 
practices (Andreasson, 2011, Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). Owing to the oppressive 
political environment of the country at the time, the United Nations excluded South 
Africa from partaking in international unions, and economic and trade sanctions were 
imposed, helping to effectually stifle the country’s economic growth and development 
(Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). These sanctions arguably also protected South African firms 
from outside competition, as financial sanctions kept international organisations out of 
the country’s domestic market and national firms out of the global capital market 
(Vaughn and Ryan, 2006, Ntim, 2013c, Ntim et al., 2014c). As a result of this, corporate 
practices, regulations and domestic laws fell far behind global standards, and, by the 
late 1980s, a lot of the country’s firms were fuzzy entities led by self-serving  and 
entrenched executives (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006).  
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Table 1: Historical and Contextual Milestones Leading to the Development of South 
Africa’s Corporate Governance Code (King I, II and III). 
 
After 1986, South Africa started witnessing political reforms, with certain repeals to 
the apartheid legislation; however, it was not until the complete collapse of apartheid 
in 1994 and the release of Nelson Mandela from prison that the country was once more 
welcomed to the global economy (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). Faced with the challenges 
of being welcomed in the international market, South African firms were compelled to 
embrace and address international corporate governance standards as investors 
1887
•Creation of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)
Pre-
1910
•British colonisation of South Africa 
•South Africa Act 1909 
•Common Law system 
1913 •Natives' Land Act  (black South Africans were relatively restricted from the legal ownership of land)
1948
• Beginning of Apatheid South Africa 
1961-
1980
•South African republic referendum to gain independence
•Isolated from the global economy by the UN  because of  apartheid practices
•Excluded from economic and trade transactions
•Corporate practices, laws and standards were far behind international standards
•Firms were entities led by self-serving, entrenched executives 
1986
•Repeals to Apartheid legislation 
1992
• Formation of the King Committee on corporate governance,  tasked with developing CG codes 
1994
• Release of Nelson Mandela 
• End of Apartheid South Africa 
• Creation of King I corporate governance code  derived from the UK 's 1992 Cadbury report within the Anglo-American 
CG model (discussed in  2.1);  applicable to listed firms in the JSE
• Re-introduction of SA into the global economy 
2002
•Creation of King II corporate governance report with hybridisation of the Anglo-American CG model and the 
stakeholder CG model. Applicable to listed firms under the UK principle of 'comply or explain' 
•Introduction of triple bottom line reporting  (firms are to report on environmental, financial and social aspects of an 
entity) 
2004 •Introduction of the Socially Responsible Investment Index by the JSE  
2008
• New Companies Act incorporating some CG provisions in King I and II into law
2009
• Creation of King III CG report 
• Applicable to all firms, whether listed or unlisted
• King III  operates under the principle of  'apply or explain' (borrowed from The Netherlands) to give some flexibility to 
firms in their reporting    
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demanded a reform in both corporate governance practices and corporate structures. 
Indeed, the South African government and economic enterprises equally acknowledged 
that an improvement in corporate governance rules and policies could enhance the 
country’s ability to achieve increased productivity growth and economic stability, 
which were seen as crucial for long-term national development (Vaughn and Ryan, 
2006, Andreasson, 2011).  
 
Similar to many African countries, South Africa’s colonial inheritance and follow-on 
ties with the UK have assured that corporate practices and corporate laws have been 
adopted mainly from the UK. Thus, the South African corporate governance regime has 
been heavily based on the corporate governance system in the UK. To respond to 
international pressure, the King Committee on Corporate Governance was formed in 
1992 with the task of developing CG codes. Its first report was published in 1994 (King 
I), with substantial inspiration drawn from the UK 1992 Cadbury Committee report 
(Ntim et al., 2014b, Ntim, 2013c, Andreasson, 2011, Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). The 
production of the King I CG report also coincided with post- apartheid South Africa 
and the re-integration into the world economy. As a result of this affiliation, the King I 
corporate governance report was tailored to reflect the Cadbury report of the UK (Ntim 
et al., 2014b, Ntim, 2013c, Andreasson, 2011, Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). The South 
African first corporate governance regime (the King I report), which was developed in 
1994, fits the traditional Anglo-American corporate governance model with a more 
shareholder-oriented approach. In fact, this model included: (i) a single-tier board 
system with only shareholder representation; (ii) an active local capital market which 
ensures that financial markets play a dominant role in governance; (iii) a banking 
structure which plays a secondary role, in which banks are not controllers of firms and 
avoid excessively close relationships with customers; and finally (iv) a general 
commitment to a market-driven economic course of action in which industrial policy 
plays a very minimal role as articulated in the government’s Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution policies (GEAR) (Andreasson, 2011, López de Silanes et al., 1998).  
 
The King I report was later followed by the King II report in March 2002, which was 
different from the King I report in that it moves away from the Anglo-American model 
to a somewhat mixed model which has come to be known as a ‘hybrid model’, 
incorporating both the shareholder and stakeholder regime of CG. In fact, King 
37 
 
37 | P a g e  
 
II recommended the introduction of ‘triple-bottom-line’ reporting (Ntim et al., 2014b, 
Ntim, 2013c, Andreasson, 2011, Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). Hence, King II requires 
firms to report on environmental sustainability and social aspects of the firm’s 
activities, in addition to traditional reporting on the economic and financial ‘bottom 
line’ as in the King I report (Ntim et al., 2014b, Ntim, 2013c, Andreasson, 2011, 
Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). As a result of both the ‘triple-bottom-line’ reporting standard 
and the implementation of a Socially Responsible Investment Index by the JSE in 2004, 
South Africa is praised to be the first emerging market to introduce such reforms 
(Andreasson, 2011, Vaughn and Ryan, 2006).   
 
In 2009, a third report (King III) was developed with the aim of continuous promotion 
of the principles-based approach of King I and King II (Andreasson, 2011), with some 
of the principles of the King report established in law. In contrast to King I and II, which 
were applicable only to listed companies in the JSE, King III is applicable to all entities, 
be they private, non-profit or public. The King III regime follows The Netherland’s 
enforcement principle of ‘apply or explain’, where boards are to decide how to apply 
the recommendations of King III or apply another practice which can still enable the 
firm to achieve the objectives of CG principles of accountability, fairness, 
responsibility and transparency (see summary of provisions of King III in table V). In 
fact, the main difference between the ‘comply or explain’ principle in the King II report 
and the King III ‘apply or explain’ principle is that, under the former, firms could denote 
a mind-set on complying with King II provisions regardless of its applicability to the 
firm. While the latter shows an appreciation for the fact that it is often not the case of 
compliance but instead of considering how the King III principles and 
recommendations can be applied at firm level which fits with both the Anglo-American 
CG model and the stakeholder CG model. Indeed, the King III report covers a number 
of global emerging governance trends, including alternative dispute resolution, 
shareholder approval of remuneration of non-executive directors, evaluation of 
directors’ and board performance and risk-based internal auditing, IT governance and 
business rescue (Esser, 2009, Posthumus et al., 2010, Gstraunthaler, 2010, Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2014).  
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In a nutshell, the principal objective of the King reports on corporate governance is to 
encourage the highest corporate governance standards in South Africa by promoting an 
assimilated approach to corporate governance in the interests of a wide range of 
stakeholders. The report addresses the responsibilities and accountability of executives, 
boards and individual directors, laterally auditing process and accounting. Some of 
these recommendations include: encouraging shareholder activism, improving the 
Companies Act, implementing accounting standards into company law and calling on 
the powers that be to improve the enforcement of existing rules and regulations (Esser, 
2009, Posthumus et al., 2010, Gstraunthaler, 2010, Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014). 
Indeed, South African CG standards have become notable examples of how emerging 
markets especially in Africa can develop CG regulations which incorporate 
international best practices in corporate governance while also addressing national 
needs through corporate social responsibility, which are essentials for broad-based 
development in the country (see section 3.5 for a synopsis of institutional context and 
table 3 for a summary of CG provision of King III).  
3.4 Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
 
Nigeria is the biggest and most populous country in Africa. The country now has the 
largest economy in Africa (followed by South Africa), with an estimated nominal GDP 
of $568.5 billion, exceeding South Africa’s $349.8 billion as of 2014 (Barungi, 2014). 
According to Barungi (2014), Nigeria has sustained its impressive growth over the 
years with a record growth of 7.4% real GDP in 2013, a rise from 6.7% in 2012. 
Nigeria’s growth rate is greater than the average of the West African sub-region and far 
greater than that for sub-Saharan Africa (Barungi, 2014).  
 
Similar to other African countries which had colonial rule, from 1960, which represents 
the post-colonial era in Nigeria, the country adopted an interventionist development 
strategy which entailed restrictions on foreign ownership of firms and an active role of 
the state in strategic sectors of the economy, particularly oil and gas and infrastructure 
(Ahunwan, 2002). Operating with this type of strategic initiative in a context of weak 
market institutions (Adegbite, 2012, Adegbite, 2015, Adegbite et al., 2012, Adegbite et 
al., 2013, Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011, Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012, Adekoya, 
2011, Nakpodia and Adegbite, 2017, Nakpodia et al., 2016, Osemeke and Adegbite, 
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2016), absence of healthy political democracy according to Ahunwan (2002) did not 
result in the practice of good corporate governance. Table 2 below shows the historical 
context and milestones within which CG has emerged in Nigeria.  
 
The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSX) came into existence immediately after 
independence in 1960, but became operational with under ten stocks in 1961 (Sanda et 
al., 2005). As of 31 December, 2013, 53 years after its creation, it had about 210 listed 
companies with a total market capitalisation of about N12.88 trillion ($80.8 billion). 
Though a remarkable growth, considering the number at the initial stage, 
comparatively, this is below the number of listings for other emerging markets such as 
the Malaysian and South Korean exchanges, with more than 250 listed companies 
(Sanda et al., 2005). After its creation in 1960, the stock exchange operated without any 
regulatory body till 1979, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was 
established (Sanda et al., 2010, Sanda et al., 2005). It took a further 20 years for the 
Securities and Investment Act (1999) to be enacted.  
 
International economic pressures in recent years prompted Nigeria to take on a 
programme of deregulation and economic liberalisation (Ahunwan, 2002). Supporters 
of the changes point to the potential not only for accelerating economic growth, but also 
for enhancing responsible corporate governance (Ahunwan, 2002, Akinkoye and 
Olasanmi, 2014). As a result, in June 2000 the Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) put together a Committee on Corporate Governance of Public 
Companies in Nigeria (Okike, 2007). This committee was charged with reviewing 
corporate governance practices in Nigeria and, thereafter, providing recommendations 
for a code of best practice to be implemented by public firms listed on the NSX. 
 
The code is to exercise power over the direction of the firm, the supervision of 
management actions, transparency and accountability in the firm’s governance within 
the regulatory framework and NSX rules (Okike, 2007, p.173. ). Nigeria also has a 
common law system which is rooted in the British legal system (Ogbechie, 2010). The 
corporate governance legal framework in Nigeria is principally guided by the 
Investments and Securities Act (ISA) No. 29 of 2007, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) rules and regulations pursuant to the ISA, the Companies and Allied 
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Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990 and the Trustee Investments Act of 2004 (Akinkoye and 
Olasanmi, 2014).  
 
Table 2: Historical and Contextual Milestones Leading to the Development of Nigeria’s 
Corporate Governance Code  
 
 
 
 
 
1900-
1960
•British colonial rule with a common law system 
1960
•Independence of Nigeria
•Continuation of British common law system   
1961 •Creation of Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSX) 
1962
•Adoption of an interventionist development strategy which entailed restrictions on foreign ownership 
of firms
•Enactment of Foreign Exchange Control Act of 1962. Promoting indigenous ownership of firms 
1968
• Enactment of Companies Act derived largely from English company act of 1948
1972 
• Enactment of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 4 of 1972, prohibiting the creation or 
transfer of any security or interest in a security in favour of a person resident outside Nigeria 
1979 •Creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate stock market 
1990 •Enactment of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA)   
2003 
•Creation of the first CG code by the SEC which was largely derived from the UK Cadbury report and fit 
within the Anglo-American CG model 
2004
•Enactment of Trustee Investments Act 
2011
•Creation of the second CG code by the SEC which was a revision of the 2003 code. The 2011 code 
included stakeholder provisions to incorporate triple-bottom-line reporting
•The 2011 code blends both the Anglo-American and stakeholder models of CG but incorporates the 
UK's 'comply or explain' principle. All listed companies are expected to comply with this provision
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In 2003, the SEC inaugurated a code of best practices in corporate governance 
(Adegbite, 2012, Adegbite, 2015, Adegbite et al., 2013). Later on in 2006, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) implemented another code of corporate governance for 
Nigerian banks post-consolidation (Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014, Adekoya, 2011). 
These codes were aimed at supplementing the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 
1990 implemented during the military administration era to regulate all corporate 
entities in Nigeria (Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014, Adekoya, 2011). The 2003 code was 
derived largely from the UK Cadbury report; as such, the code was somewhat a mirror 
of the Anglo-American CG regime. However, a revised code was introduced in 2011 
which emphasises responsibilities and the structure of the board of directors (Akinkoye 
and Olasanmi, 2014, Adekoya, 2011, Okike, 2007). The code stipulates that the BODs 
are responsible for the operations of the firm in an efficient, effective and lawful manner 
to ensure that the firm is constantly enhancing its value creation as much as possible 
(Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014, Adekoya, 2011, Okike, 2007). The board is also tasked 
to ensure that the value created by the firms is shared among the shareholders and 
employees while meeting the interests of the other stakeholders of the firm (Akinkoye 
and Olasanmi, 2014, Adekoya, 2011, Okike, 2007). The board is also expected to 
appraise management’s strategic planning, selection, performance, executive 
compensation and succession planning among other aspects of the board’s activities 
(Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014, Adekoya, 2011, Okike, 2007).  
 
As in the UK, Nigeria’s public limited companies have a unitary board system. Though 
the code specifies a minimum number of five directors on the board, it does not specify 
an upper limit. The code suggests that the constitution of a corporate board should 
reflect the scale and complexity of a firm, ensuring diversity of experience without 
undermining integrity, availability, independence and compatibility with the firm’s 
needs (Okike, 2007). The code also recommends that the board consist of a mix of non-
executive and executive directors under the leadership of the chairman who should be 
a non-executive director (Okike, 2007). The 2011 code requires triple-bottom-line 
reporting including sustainability issues which are similar to South Africa’s King II 
report. The code also includes stakeholder CG provisions, shareholder CG provisions 
and global CG trends, including alternative dispute resolution, shareholder approval of 
remuneration of non-executive directors, evaluation of directors’ and board 
performance, risk-based internal auditing, social, ethical, cultural diversity, corruption, 
42 
 
42 | P a g e  
 
strategies for HIV/AIDS and other diseases and environmental reporting. At the time 
of the creation of the 2011 CG code, companies were expected to comply or give 
reasons for non-compliance. This reflected the UK ‘comply or explain’ orientation. 
However, in May 2014, the SEC made compliance with the code mandatory, which is 
line with the US compliance doctrine of ‘comply or else’. Violation of the code attracts 
a fine of N500,000 ($2,483) in the first instance and N5,000 ($24) for every additional 
day of non-compliance. See subsection 2.3.6 for a synopsis of institutional context and 
table 3 below for a summary of Nigeria’s CG provisions.  
 
3.5 NIE & CG Compliance Policies in South Africa and Nigeria 
 
The preceding section has discussed the historical development of CG policies across 
Nigeria and South Africa. From these discussions, it is evident that institutional 
reforms have been pursued in these countries to ensure ‘good’ CG practices. 
However, owing to institutional differences, the level of development of CG codes 
differs in both countries. This creates different but unique governance environments 
whereby the impact of internal CG mechanisms and compliance with country-specific 
CG codes can be explicitly examined and compared. Table 3 below summarises CG 
provisions across both countries and shows how they differ. Some of the institutional 
differences in CG environment across both countries are: 
 
First, the historical development of each of these countries has shaped the level of 
maturity of CG codes between the countries. Though both countries developed the 
various CG codes from international CG benchmarks (e.g. UK Cadbury 1992, OECD, 
CACG codes), they all are different in levels of maturity. For example, South Africa’s 
King report has emerged from the development of King I of 1994, which was 
developed extensively from the provisions of the UK Cadbury report of 1992 centred 
on shareholder CG regime through King II of 2002 to the current 2009 King III which 
operates under an affirmative stakeholder CG regime. Though Nigeria’s second CG 
report came into existence in 2011, with some of its provisions similar to King II 
guidelines, it differs significantly from King III (see table 3 below, column 2 and 3). 
For example, Nigeria CG code does not cover integrated sustainability provisions 
(e.g. IT governance and black empowerment) which is a major advancement in King 
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triple-bottom-line reporting (see ‘integrated sustainability provisions’ in table 3 
below). In fact, the requirement of King III for firms to report on health and safety, 
black empowerment, employment equity, environment and HIV/AIDs is a major 
attempt at addressing historical socio-economic inequalities between non-white and 
white South Africans. 
 
In a nutshell, looking at table 3 below and from the historical development of Nigeria 
and South Africa CG discussed in 3.3 and 3.4, both countries have developed CG 
codes over the years to reflect local/institutional realities of doing business in the 
countries. Though both country codes show some resemblance to the Anglo-
American shareholder model such as voluntary compliance, unitary boards and CEO–
chairman role separation, these countries have developed and emphasised provisions 
relating to shareholder and stakeholder protection differently owing to their 
institutional realities. Both countries have advanced to triple-bottom-line reporting 
(with different provisions) to require firms to disclose transparent information on 
many stakeholder inclusive and affirmative actions to reflect the socio-economic 
realities of each country. This therefore implies that the requirements for internal CG 
mechanisms to be implemented by firms across each country will differ as well as 
compliance with country-specific CG code.   
 
A notable example that CG codes in Africa have attempted to adapt to institutional 
realities as opined by NIE is evidence in Nigeria and South Africa. For example, in 
Nigeria, the SEC CG code of good practice does not cover provisions such as black 
empowerment, which is a major advancement in South Africa’s King II and III triple-
bottom-line reporting. This is because Nigeria historically and institutionally is 
different from South Africa.  
 
As noted by Cave (2013), Nakpodia et al. (2016,pp.2), governance regulations should 
be in consonance with institutional settings and must fit within regulatory strategy 
incorporated in the institutional environment. Following the historical and 
institutional context enshrined in the development of CG code in Nigeria and South 
Africa, NIE highlights the critical interaction between Nigerian and South African 
institutions and firm-level behaviour. As such, the impact of corporate governance 
compliance practices on firm financial returns of Nigerian and South Africa-listed 
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firms will be associated with how firms relate institutionally to the SEC 2011 code 
and King III respectively.   
 
Despite Nigeria’s economic growth, the country still suffers from poor management of 
companies (Adegbite, 2015, Adegbite et al., 2012, Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011, 
Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012, Nakpodia and Adegbite, 2017, Nakpodia et al., 2016, 
Okike, 2007, Okpara, 2011, Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). Poor CG is argued to be a 
reason for the failure of many firms in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2012, Adegbite, 2015, 
Adegbite et al., 2012, Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011, Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012). 
Indeed in 1995, several directors and CEOs of Nigerian banks were arrested for non-
performing loans that were allocated to their families, relations, friends and themselves 
(Ogbechie, 2010). Bad CG practices led to corporate fraud and failure, including the 
2007 Cadbury Nigeria and the 2008 Halliburton scandals (Adegbite and Nakajima, 
2012). On the other hand, compared to Nigeria, South Africa has taken steps to reduce 
corruption in the corporate sector (Ntim, 2013c, Ntim, 2013a, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013b). Despite these efforts and the significant development of governance 
institutions in South Africa compared to other emerging economies, informal 
institutional practices including bribery and corruption continue to affect the 
effectiveness of normative guidelines (Nattrass, 2014, Rispel et al., 2015). Recent 
studies have suggested that corruption in South Africa is a result of inadequate 
separation of powers between the party in power (ANC) and the state (Matshiqi, 2012), 
information asymmetries, lack of enforcement of regulations and conflicts of interest 
(Edmeston, 2012, Rispel et al., 2015). Even though the Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) was welcomed as an advancement from apartheid South Africa, its poor 
implementation and monitoring in addition to weak regulatory enforcement has opened 
the door for growing corruption (Nattrass, 2014). This is because the close relationship 
between the ruling elite and BEE beneficiaries has promoted the transfer of corruption 
from the state to the corporate sector (Nattrass, 2014).   
 
Despite the importance of governance regulations aimed at reducing institutional void 
and negative informal practices in both countries, extant literature has generally focused 
on description of the state of governance practices from interviewee accounts 
(especially for Nigeria). More so they are country-specific and limited to micro-level 
analysis. For example, drawing from interviewee accounts, some scholars have 
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reported the role of elites as inventors and promoters of corrupt institutions in Nigeria 
(Nakpodia et al., 2016) and conflict among the various codes of governance (Osemeke 
and Adegbite.,2016) which perpetuates corrupt practices in addition to weak 
enforcement of normative guidelines. In a recent quantitative study including IPO firms 
from Nigeria, Zattoni et al. (2017) reported that the impact of board independence on 
firm financial performance is contingent on speciﬁc national context. Similarly, in 
South Africa, authors like Ntim (2012a) have examined CG practices of South African 
firms and reported affirmative effect on firm performance. African economies have 
articulated CG as a pre-requisite to attract FDI, reduce institutional void and enhance 
economic development (Rossouw, 2005,p.101), which has led to the development of 
normative governance guidelines as discussed above. However, there is a lacuna of 
comparative institutional governance research which examines how various 
institutionalised governance guidelines across African countries influence firm-level 
governance practices and its consequent effect on firm financial performance. This 
study fills this lacuna in governance research by drawing on institutional theory to 
provide comparative institutional evidence on how macro-level internal corporate 
governance and compliance practices of firms impact on firm financial performance 
amid institutional constraints in emerging African economies. 
 
The thesis argues that because of institutional differences across emerging African 
economies country-level governance institutions may operate differently and have 
varied performance effects on firms as there is undoubtedly cost and benefit associated 
with different CG structures that are optimised for the benefit of a firm. In addition, 
there is significant variation in national financial systems or structures across both 
countries, which allows a test for the impact of such cross-country institutional 
dissimilarities on firm governance and financial performance. More so, the level of 
maturity in governance institutions vis-à-vis normative rules and informal norms across 
both contexts may have significant bearing on firm-level governance practices and 
performance. For example, South Africa is an example of a mature governance 
institutional context owing to its development of corporate governance regulations from 
King I of 1994 to King III of 2009, whereas Nigeria offers an emerging governance 
institutional environment as its first corporate governance code was instituted in 2003 
with a revision in 2011. Table 3 below summarises the provisions of country-specific 
CG provisions.  
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Table 3: A Summary Comparison of Corporate Governance Compliance Provisions of 
Nigeria and South Africa (King III) 
Note: Compiled from South Africa (King III) 2009 (The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA), 2009) and Nigeria 
(2011) corporate governance principles (Nigeria SEC, 2011).  
Corporate Governance provisions SA (2009) King III Nigeria SEC (2011) CG code 
Board of Directors 
Board structure Unitary board Unitary board 
Board composition  Majority of NEDs At least 5 members 
Non-executive directors (NEDs) Majority of board Majority of board 
Independent non-exec. Directors Majority of NEDs  At least one 
Board intellectual composition 
Should reflect skills, knowledge, resources, diversity and 
demography 
Should reflect skills, knowledge, resources, gender and 
age 
Board leadership duality Separate chairperson and CEO Separate chairperson and CEO 
Chairperson independence Non-executive director Not covered 
Chairman election  Annually  Not covered 
NEDs rotation  A third should rotate every year At least once in three years 
Executive directors (EDs) Minimum of two  No definite number  
Board meetings At least quarterly  At least quarterly  
Company secretariat  Appoint a company secretary  Appoint a company secretary  
Board committees Audit, remuneration & nomination Audit and remuneration  
Performance assessment  Report board appraisal process Perform annual evaluation 
Multiple directorship  Not specified No limit  
Director/insider share dealings Prohibits insider trading  Prohibits insider trading  
Risk Management, Internal Audit and Control: Risk Management 
Internal audit Create internal audit function  Create internal audit function  
Internal control system Create internal control systems Establish a risk management committee 
Accounting and auditing Internal audit function and audit committee Internal audit function and audit committee 
Audit committee composition  At least 3 and all must be NEDs At least one member should be financially literate  
Accounting/financial reporting Accounting standard (IFRS) Not specified 
Relationship with shareholders  
Equitable treatment of all shareholders irrespective of the 
amount of shareholding 
Equitable treatment of all shareholders irrespective of the 
amount of shareholding  
Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
Ethics Code of ethics  Code of ethics  
Environment Environmental reporting  Environmental reporting  
IT governance  Establish IT governance framework  Not covered 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Disclose ADR Disclose ADR 
Health and safety Health and safety  Health and safety 
Affirmative/employment equity Equality in employment  Equality in employment 
Black empowerment Black empowerment Not covered 
HIV/AIDS and diseases HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS, malaria and others 
Compliance and Enforcement 
Compliance or regulation Voluntary or self-regulation  Voluntary or self-regulation  
Application of code All firms irrespective of form Listed and other public firms  
Compliance Model  Apply or explain  Comply or explain  
Reporting system  Triple bottom line  Triple bottom line 
Compliance enforcement bodies Board, institutional investors and other stakeholders  Boards and shareholders 
Kind of corporate governance Inclusive stakeholder CG Affirmative stakeholder CG 
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The next section discusses some of the CG empirical research conducted in Africa. 
3.6 Empirical Evidence on Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance in Africa 
 
The issues of CG and firm performance have been investigated extensively in 
developed economies and it is widely noted that sound CG enhances firm performance 
albeit with contradictory results (Hearn, 2011, Andreasson, 2011, Barako et al., 2006, 
Morck et al., 2004, Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Erhardt et al., 2003, Daily et al., 2003). 
A major concern of previous research has been the link between CG mechanisms and 
firm financial performance which mainly focused on developed and emerging stock 
markets of Europe, America and Asia-Pacific (Ntim, 2013c). Indeed, such studies have 
only started gaining ground in emerging African economies (see table 4 below for 
summary of studies).   
 
To begin with, Sanda et al. (2005) examined 93 firms quoted on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange for the period 1996–1999 using typical board variables such as board size, 
ownership structure, CEO duality, proportion of outside directors, leverage on ROA, 
ROE, Tobin Q and PE ratio performance variables. Most of the variables in the study 
did not show significant relationships. A major issue with this study is the use of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in measuring relationships, which does not capture 
rigorously time and sectorial variations.  
 
From a disclosure angle, Barako et al. (2006) conducted a longitudinal study to examine 
the extent to which ownership structure, corporate governance attributes and company 
characteristics impact on voluntary disclosure practices in 54 Kenyan listed firms from 
1992 to 2001. Their findings suggest that the presence of an audit committee, 
institutional and foreign ownership is significantly associated with the level of 
voluntary disclosure, but the proportion of non-executive directors had significantly 
negative association with the extent of voluntary disclosure. However, the years 
covered by this study were before the implementation of the Kenyan CG code. Hence 
there is a need for further investigation post CG code implementation. 
 
A study by Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006b) examined the influence of board 
composition, board size and CEO duality on ROA, Tobin’s q and growth in sales of 
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non-financial registered firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange between 1990–2001. They 
arrived at inconclusive results. The same authors conducted similar research 
(Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a) using instead 100 non‐traditional export 
(NTE) sector firms in Ghana for the period 1995–2004. They still arrived at 
inconclusive results regarding CEO duality, board size and firm performance. 
However, they showed a positive significant relationship between NEDs, ownership 
structure and firm performance. A problem with both studies is that they used few CG 
variables and did not test for endogeneity between the variables. An inclusion of many 
CG characteristic variables and a test of endogeneity would have improved the 
robustness of their findings.  
 
More so, Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) conducted one of the rare studies which looked 
at CG and performance across different countries using 103 listed firms from South 
Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya for the period 1997–2001. His results indicated large 
and independent boards, size of audit committees and the frequency of meetings have 
positive influence on firm performance. However, CEO duality, CEO’s tenure and board 
activity intensity had a negative relationship with firm performance. Though this study was 
a major attempt to compare CG across countries, the study suffers from sample bias. For 
example, Nigeria with more than 200 companies has just 16 firms represented in the sample 
while a small stock market like Ghana has 22 firms. In addition, theoretically the study 
discussed board composition in terms of resource dependency and agency theory. However, 
the composition of the board was measured using agency theory insider/outsider constructs 
only. A comprehensive view of composition would have looked at, in addition to agency 
theory construct, a resource dependency view which includes board interlock (proportion 
of board members who sit on other boards) and board busyness. In addition, the period of 
data collection covered the period before any corporate governance codes were instituted 
in African economies except for South Africa’s King I report. Therefore, there is a need to 
further investigate CG mechanisms in a period after the implementation of CG codes across 
the two biggest economies in Africa and when these codes are more likely to have achieve 
some level of maturity and adaptation (2010–2015 is ideal). More so, Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2008) employed OLS regressions, which does not adequately control for endogeneity. To 
address this limitation, this thesis controls for endogeneity and provides robust findings.  
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In addition, one of the few studies from North Africa was conducted by Khanchel El 
Mehdi (2007), employing OLS regression for 24 registered firms from the Tunisian 
Stock Exchange for the period 2000 to 2005. His results indicate a strong relationship 
between governance and firm financial performance. Similarly, a study conducted by 
Abor (2007) using a sample of 22 listed firms on the GSE during 1998–2003 showed a 
significantly positive effect between board size, board composition, CEO duality and 
capital structure of firms. Similarly, Ehikioya (2009) examined 107 firms listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period 1998 to 2002 and the results revealed that 
ownership concentration and leverage had a positive impact on firm performance but 
CEO duality negatively impacted on firm performance. In Kenya, Mang’unyi (2011) 
studied ownership structure and firm performance using a survey sample of 40 bank 
managers from Kenyan and results indicate no significant relationship between type of 
ownership and financial performance of Kenyan banking firms. A major problem with 
these studies is they fail to control for endogenous effect between variables. More so, 
they also examined CG variables at a time when CG codes were still under 
development, and they are all single country studies. In addition, they used very few 
CG variables against one or two performance variables without testing for robustness 
and endogeneity.  
 
However, Ntim (2012a) studied the relationship between director share-ownership and 
firm performance using 169 listed firms from 2002 to 2007 in South Africa. His results 
showed a statistically significant positive relationship between director share-
ownership and firm performance. In another study, Ntim (2013c) used a sample of 169 
South African listed firms in the period from 2002 to 2007 and showed positive 
association between a broad set of good CG practices and firm financial performance. 
More so, in one of the rare studies on board diversity in Africa, Ntim (2014) 
investigated the effects of board ethnic and gender diversity on market valuation. His 
results indicate that board diversity is positively linked to market valuation. A further 
study by Ntim et al. (2014a) examined the association between executive compensation 
and firm financial performance. Findings show insignificant executive pay and 
performance association based on OLS, but significant association based on 3SLS. In 
a more recent study, Ntim et al. (2015b) used 169 South African firms for the period 
2002 to 2011 and reported positive board size–firm valuation association, with larger 
boards providing superior access to resources. Though the five former studies have 
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somewhat elucidated our understanding of some CG variables and firm performance, 
the studies are however limited to South Africa and measured CG variables in isolation 
to each other. More so, computation of CG indices is based on the King II report, hence 
a need for studies which investigate the CG indices in South Africa using the most 
recent King III guidelines. Furthermore, these studies were limited to non-financial 
firms. The current study includes both non-financial and financial firms and advances 
a comprehensive articulation of CG constructs and their impact on firm outcomes 
across more than one country and therefore enhances generalisation.     
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Table 4: Summary of Key Empirical Studies on CG and Performance Nexus in Africa  
Study and Country Sample  
 
Period  
 
Theoretical 
Lens  
Analytical 
Approach  
 
CG Mechanism Index  Performance 
Variables Unit  
Results  
(Sanda et al., 2005) 
Nigeria 
93 listed firms  1996–
1999 
Agency Theory  Equilibrium 
Variable Model  
NEDs, board size, CEO duality, 
ownership structure, leverage  
ROA, ROE, PE 
ratio, Tobin’s Q  
 Positive effect between leverage and firm performance  
 Mixed results on board size, CEO duality, 
 directors’ shareholding and firm performance 
(Kyereboah-Coleman 
and Biekpe, 2006a)  
Ghana  
100 non-traditional 
export firms  
1995–
2004 
Agency Theory  Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
Board size, CEO duality, NEDs, 
ownership structure  
ROA, Tobin’s Q, 
sales growth  
 Inconclusive results on the impact of CEO duality and   
board size on firm performance  
 Positive significant relationship between NEDs, 
ownership structure and firm performance 
(Kyereboah-Coleman 
and Biekpe, 2006b)  
Ghana   
16 listed non-
financial firms  
1990–
2001 
Agency Theory   Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
Board size, CEO duality, NEDs  Tobin's Q, ROA, 
sales growth  
 Inconclusive results on the impact of CEO duality and   
board size on firm performance  
(Khanchel El Mehdi, 
2007)  
Tunisia  
24 non-financial 
firms listed on the 
Tunisian Stock 
Exchange 
2000–
2005 
Agency Theory   Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
NEDs, CEO compensation, CEO 
duality, board size, board meeting 
frequency  
ROA, growth in 
total assets 
 Positive significant relationship between board size,  
 CEO compensation, NEDs and firm performance 
(Abor, 2007)  
Ghana 
22 listed firms 1998–
2003 
Agency Theory  Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
CEO duality, board size, NEDs, CEO 
tenure   
Capital structure   Positive relationship between board size, NEDs, CEO duality and capital 
structure  
(Kyereboah-Coleman, 
2008) 
South Africa, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Kenya   
103 listed firms  1997–
2001 
Agency Theory 
and RDT 
Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
NEDs, board size, board activity 
intensity, CEO duality, CEO tenure, 
audit committee, institutional 
ownership 
ROA, Tobin’s Q  Large and independent boards, size of audit committees and  
the frequency of their meetings have positive influence  
on firm performance 
 CEO duality and tenure, board activity 
 intensity had a negative relationship with firm performance 
(Ehikioya, 2009) 
Nigeria  
107 non-financial 
firms listed on the 
1998–
2002 
Agency Theory  Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
NEDs, CEO duality, NEDs, board 
size, ownership  
ROA, ROE, PE 
ratio, Tobin’s Q 
 Positive significant relationship between ownership concentration, 
leverage and performance proxies 
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Nigerian stock 
exchange  
 Negatively relationship between CEO duality and  
Performance proxies. 
(Ntim, 2012a) South 
Africa  
169 non-financial 
listed firms 
2002–
2007 
Agency Theory  Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
Director shareholding structure  Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
TSR  
 Positive impact of director ownership on firm performance  
(Ntim, 2013c) South 
Africa  
169 non-financial 
listed firms 
2002–
2007 
Agency Theory  
 
Compliance 
Index Model  
Integrated CG indices  Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
TSR 
 Positive impact of integrated CG on firm performance 
(Ntim et al., 2014a) 
South Africa  
291 non-financial 
listed firms 
2002–
2007 
Agency Theory Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
Executive compensation  TSR  Positive impact of executive compensation and firm performance. 
(Ntim, 2014) South 
Africa  
291 non-financial 
listed firms 
2002–
2007 
Agency Theory 
and RDT 
Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
Ethnic and gender diversity  Tobin’s Q  Positive impact of board ethnic and gender diversity on firm  
Financial performance.  
(Ntim et al., 2015b) 
South Africa  
169 non-financial 
listed firms 
2002–
2011 
Agency Theory 
and RDT 
Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
Board size  Tobin’s Q  Positive impact of board size on firm financial performance. 
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3.7 Summary of Chapter   
 
Building from Chapter 2, this chapter has presented the development of CG codes and 
governance institutions in South Africa and Nigeria and shows that CG regimes in these 
countries have been shaped by differences and similarities in economic institutions. 
Specifically, using NIE as a complementary theoretical angle to the earlier discussed 
theories in Chapter 2, this chapter has provided a robust articulation of the different 
governance institutions within the selected countries and how these various set-ups fit 
within the shareholder CG regime, the stakeholder CG regime, and or a blend of both.  
 
Drawing from NIE and the contextual development of governance institutions and 
codes in both countries, the chapter has compared the different CG codes and justifies 
why these institutional contexts are significant in examining the main research question 
of the thesis. Finally, a discussion of key empirical works conducted in Africa was 
presented.  
 
Developing from chapters 1, 2 and 3, the next chapter (Chapter 4) presents the various 
hypotheses to examine the research questions in Chapter 1. Specifically, hypotheses 1 
to 9 and 11 examine the equilibrium variables model (sub-research question 2), whereas 
hypothesis 10a, b and c test the compliance index model (sub-research question 1).  
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CHAPTER 4 
4.0 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the hypotheses developed from the extant literature and 
developed from the theories discussed in chapters 2 and 3. It begins with section 4.2 
which discusses literature leading to the development of three hypotheses (hypotheses 
1a, 1b and 1c). Section 4.3 discusses extant literature on board leadership separation 
and hypothesis 2 is developed. 4.4 discusses extant literature on board size with its 
corresponding hypothesis (hypothesis 3). 4.5 presents prior research on board gender 
diversity and its consequent hypothesis (hypothesis 4). Section 4.6. develops a 
hypothesis for frequency of board meetings (hypothesis 5). 4.7 discusses ethnic 
diversity and development of hypothesis 6 based on evidence from the extant 
literature. Further, in section 4.8, theoretical and empirical debates on board interlocks 
and board busyness lead to the development of two hypotheses (hypothesis 7a and 
7b). Extant literature on gearing as an internal CG mechanism is discussed in section 
4.9 with its corresponding hypothesis (hypothesis 8). Corporate ownership literature 
covering literature on institutional shareholding and director ownership is presented in 
section 4.9 with two hypotheses (hypotheses 9a and 9b). Section 4.11 discusses the 
extant literature on compliance with corporate governance code. This section covers 
literature on compliance with country-composite CG code. CG compliance guidelines 
are further divided into shareholder compliance provisions and stakeholder 
compliance guidelines respectively and hypotheses 10a, 10b, 10c are developed. 
Finally, the hypothesis in section 4.12 is developed from the literature on board audit 
committee independence. Note that hypotheses 1 to 9 and hypothesis 11 are 
developed from internal CG structures endogenously (selected by firms internally) 
chosen by firms and measured by the equilibrium variable model. Hence hypotheses 1 
to 9 and hypothesis 11 examine sub-research question two (see section 1.4.1.1) stated 
as ‘Do endogenously generated alternative firm-level internal corporate governance 
mechanisms affect firm financial performance in Nigeria and South Africa?’, whereas 
hypotheses 10a, 10b and 10c are developed from compliance with country-level CG 
code and measured by the compliance index model and examine sub-research 
question one stated as (section 1.4.1.1) ‘How and in what ways does firm-level 
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compliance with exogenously developed corporate governance provisions impact on 
firm financial performance in Nigeria and South Africa?’ Sub-research question three 
(3) stated as ‘Are a firm’s choices of individual internal CG structures as measured by 
the equilibrium variable model associated with better firm performance than firm-
level compliance with CG provisions as measured by the compliance index model?’ is 
examined by comparing the results of hypotheses 1 to 9 and 11 with those of 
hypotheses 10a, b and c.  
4.2 Board Composition 
 
The board composition construct signifies the balance between non-executive 
directors (outside directors) and executive directors (inside directors). It is 
operationalised traditionally in terms of percentage of non-executive directors (NED) 
on the board (Minichilli et al., 2012, Hearn, 2011, Miller and Del Carmen Triana, 
2009, Kula, 2005, Nahar Abdullah, 2004, Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003, Erhardt et al., 2003). Grounded in agency theory, board independence 
is achieved when a majority of board members are non-executive directors (NEDs) 
(Kula, 2005, Adams and Mehran, 2005, Klapper and Love, 2004, Keenan, 2004). 
Therefore, by inference, NEDs are assumed to be more effective in monitoring top 
management of firms on behalf of the shareholders than executive directors. NEDs’ 
effectiveness is attributed to their independence from the firm and CEO (Kula, 2005, 
Adams and Mehran, 2005, Klapper and Love, 2004, Keenan, 2004). In other words, 
the argument here is that inside or executive directors (EDs) may lack independence 
and objectivity from management of firms and thus are not capable of reducing 
agency cost and protecting shareholder value creation. In fact, members of a board of 
directors who are connected with the day-to-day management of the firm are less 
effective monitors and controllers of management as their position as inside directors 
perpetuates agency problems and may not enhance shareholder value (Kula, 2005, 
Adams and Mehran, 2005, Klapper and Love, 2004, Keenan, 2004). Consistent with 
preceding argument, firm performance can only be enhanced through the inclusion of 
more NEDs than executive directors on corporate boards. Indeed, agency theorists 
argue  more outsiders on the board means  monitoring and control will be effective, 
and this will therefore translate into shareholder value maximisation which will mean 
an increase in the firm’s financial performance. 
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The relationship between NEDs and firm performance has often generated some 
evidence suggesting that increasing the number of NEDs enhances performance. In 
fact, some studies have found a positive relationship ( e.g. Pearce and Zahra, 1992, 
Wagner III et al., 1998, Ibrahim and Samad, 2011, Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008, Dahya 
and McConnell, 2007), while other scholars have found no relationship between this 
nexus ( e.g. Bhagat and Black, 2002, Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998, Weir et al., 2002, 
Sanda et al., 2005). Owing to these mixed empirical findings, this study proposes the 
following hypotheses:  
 
H01a: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the 
proportion of NEDs and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and 
Q-ratio.  
 
H11a: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between the 
proportion of NEDs and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and 
Q-ratio.  
 
Based on agency theory, most researchers have investigated the impact of NED on 
firm performance in both advanced and emerging African economies. However, very 
limited research has been conducted using stewardship theory recommendation for 
more executive directors than NEDs even in advanced economies and there seems to 
be nonexistence of this construct in an African milieu. Stewardship theorists advocate 
for an insider-dominated board for easy decision making. Advocates of this theory 
opine that increase in firm financial performance is associated with a majority of EDs 
who naturally work towards value maximisation for shareholders (Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2007). It is argued that since inside directors’ work within the firm on a day-to-
day basis, they understand the operation of the firm better than NEDs and so make 
superior decisions which enhance firm financial performance (Donaldson and Davis, 
1994, Pearce and Zahra, 1992, Donaldson, 1990, Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). By 
inference, because EDs have a better knowledge of the firm, they inherently have 
superior access to relevant information and are therefore able to make better-informed 
decisions, which enhances financial performance.  
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However, very few studies have provided empirical evidence to support the EDs–firm 
financial performance nexus. Indeed, as Nicholson and Kiel (2007) noted, 
stewardship theorist literature has not established the processes which associate EDs 
with increased firm performance (attributed to favouritism towards agency theory), 
although by making superior decisions firm performance is affected positively. 
Hence, the following null and alternative hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H01b: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the 
proportion of EDs and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and 
Q-ratio. 
 
H11b: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between the 
proportion of EDs and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and 
Q-ratio. 
 
In addition to the proportion of non-executive directors and executive directors 
discussed above, there is a general agreement in CG scholarship, policy and practice 
that the presence of independent NEDs (referred to as non-executive directors who do 
not have a stake in the firm) increases board monitoring and controls and reduces 
agency cost (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Independent NEDs are unique from ordinary 
NEDs in that they have no link to any member of the company or shareholder of the 
company, whereas NEDs may have some stake in the company either as a shareholder 
or representative of shareholders, past employee of the firm or member of a special 
interest group etc. Therefore, independent NEDs (INEDs) will provide impartial 
judgements and may not suffer from conflict of interest (Terjesen et al., 2016). From 
agency theory perspective, INEDs curtail agency costs in corporations, which 
improves firm performance since these directors are impartial in their decision-
making process (Ntim, 2011, pp.7). Similarly, INEDs are opined to be able to increase 
independence in their advice role and monitoring and are able to discipline managers. 
In addition, from a resource dependency perspective, INEDs act a resource because of 
their experience, business contacts and reputation, which enhances firm valuation and 
performance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, Ntim, 2011). 
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However, stewardship theory contends that, owing to the limited knowledge of 
INEDs, they are be unable to understand the complexities of a firm and therefore will 
be incapable of providing relevant advice to management of firms (Ntim, 2011, Weir 
and Laing, 2001). Others have argued that INEDs have limited time to perform their 
monitoring, control, advisory duties because they are part-timers and mostly are 
directors on other boards and may be too busy to serve (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, 
Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), which is detrimental to firm economic performance.  
 
Drawing from the conflicting nature of the impact of INED, some studies have 
reported increase in firm performance (e.g. Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, Ntim, 2011, 
Weir et al., 2002) whereas others have reported negative associations (e.g. Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996, Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). In Africa, some authors have 
reported positive INED–firm performance relations. For example, Ghana Abor Abor 
(2007), Abor and Biekpe (2007) and Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006b) 
reported positive associations. Khanchel El Mehdi (2007), Mangena et al. (2012) and 
Ntim (2011) also reported positive associations in Tunisia, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa respectively. However, Sanda et al. (2011) reported a negative association 
between INEDs and firm performance in Nigeria. A recent comparative study 
including Nigeria by Zattoni et al. (2017) reports that the effect of board 
independence on firm financial performance is contingent on the speciﬁc national 
context. Following from this mixed extant empirical literature, this study hypothesises 
that:  
 
H01c: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the 
proportion of INEDs and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and 
Q-ratio. 
 
H11c: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between the 
proportion of INEDs and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and 
Q-ratio.   
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4.3 Board Leadership Structure (CEO/Chairman Separation) 
 
The debate on board leadership (CEO duality) theorises the separation of the 
chairman of the board and CEO so as to balance power towards a powerful board, 
which limits insider dominance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, Kula, 2005). This 
argument is rooted with sympathisers of agency theory. The argument here is that 
separating the chairman of the board and CEO ensures the necessary independence of 
judgement which enhances more active debates and dialogue between executive 
management and the board (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, Kula, 2005). Hence, by 
separating these functions, efficacy, accountability, transparency of the board are 
achieved (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, Kula, 2005). In similar reasoning, the separation 
of the positions of CEO and chairman is a more effective measure of control. In 
relation to the preceding reasoning, the separation of the CEO and chairman positions 
is anticipated to enhance firm financial performance (Nahar Abdullah, 2004). 
Therefore, when there is CEO-chairman duality, the board’s ability to monitor and 
control management decreases which consequently leads to lack of independence of 
the board and thus agency conflict may continue and negatively impact on 
shareholders’ value maximisation goal. Similarly, some scholars have argued that 
CEO duality gives too much power to the CEOs to influence board decisions in a 
manner that suits them, which may not be in line with the interests of shareholders 
and therefore will adversely affect performance and thus increase agency cost. Hence, 
if leadership is concentrated in a single person, the duly empowered CEO will act as a 
superior ruler which compromises board independence in decision making (Nahar 
Abdullah, 2004). Thus, separating the positions will dilute the CEO’s power and 
control over the board and thus reduce the potential for EDs dominating decision 
making of the board.  
 
On a contrary view, stewardship theorists argue for the CEO to double as the 
chairman of the board. Proponents posit that a duly empowered CEO possesses the 
necessary technical and managerial competence that contributes to easy decision 
making (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Carter et al., 2003, Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2001, Wagner III et al., 1998, Davis et al., 1997, Donaldson and Davis, 1994)). 
Furthermore, CEO duality provides a milieu/avenue for unified leadership of firms 
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which builds trust and stimulates the motivation to perform well and, thus, enhances 
organisational performance.   
 
Like research on board composition, empirical results on CEO duality and firm 
performance nexus have generated inconclusive findings. For example, Baliga et al. 
(1996) investigated this nexus using Fortune 500 companies from 1980 to 1991. Their 
results indicate that a firm’s performance is indifferent to changes in a firm’s 
leadership duality. They also showed that there was limited evidence to link changes 
in CEO duality status and operating performance. Finally they argued that the 
evidence that shows CEO duality status of firms and its impact on firm performance 
was weak even after controlling for other factors (Baliga et al., 1996). Other studies, 
using stock market performance measures, have found no significant impact of 
leadership separation on firm performance ( e.g. Baliga et al., 1996, Pearce and Zahra, 
1992, Pearce and Zahra, 1991)). Thus, following the arguments for CEO duality, I 
propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H02: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between 
CEO/chairman role separation and firm financial performance as measured by 
ROCE and Q-ratio. 
 
H12: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between 
CEO/Chairman role separation and firm financial performance as measured by 
ROCE and Q-ratio. 
4.4 Board Size 
 
There has been considerable empirical research which focuses on the effect of board 
size on a firm’s financial performance. However as Finegold et al. (2007) noted, many 
CG studies have the size of boards either as part of analysing the insider–outsider 
ratio or a control variable. The size of boards has predominantly been studied from 
two dissimilar perspectives (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). To begin with, it has 
been opined that the number of directors on a board may influence the board 
functioning and hence firm financial performance (Van Den Berghe and Carchon, 
2002, Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Nahar Abdullah, 2004, Van den Berghe and Levrau, 
2004, Kula, 2005). A key argument in this line of reasoning is rooted in organisation 
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theory. The theory opines that if the size of a group or team increases, it becomes very 
ineffective and difficult to coordinate (Pfeffer, 1972, Pfeffer, 1973). As a result, 
agency theorists have taken two opposing stands in relation to this reasoning. 
Drawing from organisational theory, some agency theorists have argued that smaller 
boards are more effective and efficient than larger boards in enhancing firm financial 
performance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992, Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Jensen, 1993).  
 
Indeed Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that while boards organise, plan, control, 
monitor and direct the firm, board size also has financial cost implications associated 
with it. Thus, all things being equal, a larger board consumes more financial and non-
pecuniary resources of the firm in the form of privileges, bonuses and remuneration 
than smaller boards. More so, Jensen (1993, p.865) contends that when boards 
become too large, it is not only challenging and cumbersome to coordinate, it is 
comparatively very easy for the CEO to dominate and control the operations because 
directors become ‘free riders’. Thus, it is inferred that there will be cohesiveness and 
more effective discussions and critical decisions with a smaller board. In fact, Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992, p.68) contend that smaller boards enable directors to unequivocally 
express and contribute their thoughts and views within the available limited time. 
Indeed, the argument is that bigger boards are prone to suffering from higher agency 
costs and are far less effective to monitor and control management compared to 
smaller boards.  
 
Contrary to the preceding view, from another angle, some agency theorists and 
resource dependency theorists have promoted the idea of bigger boards, which are 
argued to contribute positively to firm financial performance. From a resource point 
of view, bigger boards are endowed with a greater variety of skills, experience, 
technical abilities and contacts than smaller boards, which consequently provides a 
milieu to secure critical resources needed by the firm (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, 
Pearce and Zahra, 1992, Erhardt et al., 2003, Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003, Kula, 2005). More so, bigger boards are argued to be well 
positioned to provide access to corporate external environmental resources, which 
consequently reduces environmental uncertainties and helps in ensuring the 
safeguarding of critical environmental resources (e.g. finance, raw materials and 
contracts) (Huse, 2000, Bhagat and Black, 2002, Daily et al., 2003, Erhardt et al., 
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2003, Nahar Abdullah, 2004, Florackis, 2005). Similarly, some agency theorists have 
contended that bigger corporate boards can monitor and control management. More 
so, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) opine that boards with a large number of directors with 
wide-ranging expertise are better placed to scrutinise and monitor managerial 
decisions.  
 
While this area has been studied extensively in developed economies, most recently 
gaining momentum in developing economies, the empirical evidence related to board 
size and firm performance nexus is mixed (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003, Nahar Abdullah, 2004, Adams and Mehran, 2005, Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a, Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007). For example, with a sample 
of 452 large US industrial firms between 1984 and 1991, Yermack (1996) discovered 
an inverse relationship between the size of boards and firm value. Yermack (1996) 
study was criticised for using only large US firms, and it was argued that his results 
were inconsistent when applied to smaller firms. Eisenberg et al. (1998) estimated this 
construct using data for 1992 to 1994 with a sample of 879 small and medium-size 
Finnish firms. They also found a negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance. Similarly, Mak and Kusnadi (2005), using a sample of Singaporean and 
Malaysian firms, found the same negative results. In same construct, Guest (2009) 
used a sample of 2,746 UK listed firms covering the period 1981 to 2002 and also 
reported a negative relationship between the size of the board and firm performance. 
These studies thus provide empirical evidence that smaller boards may be more prone 
to effective executive monitoring, candid assessment of management performance and 
fast, effective and easy decision-making (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Pearce and Zahra, 
1992, Jensen, 1993).  
 
Contrary to the above studies, some scholars have reported a positive relationship 
between board size and performance construct. For example, a study by Adams and 
Mehran (2005) showed a positive relationship between the size of boards and firm 
performance. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) found similar results in Switzerland. This 
positive relationship is very visible in the few studies that have been conducted in 
Africa. For instance, Sanda et al. (2005), using a sample of 93 Nigerian-listed firms 
for the period 1996–1999, showed a positive relationship between board size and 
profitability (measured in terms of ROE). Similarly, using Ghanaian firms, Abor 
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(2007) showed a statistically significant and positive relationship between board size 
and firm performance. Recently Ntim et al. (2015b), using 169 South African firms 
from 2002 to 2011, showed a positive association between board size and firm 
valuation. In fact Ntim et al. (2015b) suggest that larger boards provide better access 
to external and internal resources. Following from the preceding arguments and 
noting that empirical research as discussed is mixed, the null and alternative 
hypotheses are proposed as follows: 
 
H03: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between board size 
and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and the Q-ratio.  
 
H13: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between board size 
and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and the Q-ratio.  
 
4.5 Board Gender Composition (Gender Diversity)  
 
The issue of diversity has attracted considerable attention especially after the most 
recent financial crisis. This construct goes beyond traditional board structure research 
constructs and looks more at board demographic characteristics. The study is rooted 
in Hambrick and Mason (1984) upper echelons theory. The theory was developed in 
the 1980s and aimed at explaining how corporate outcomes, strategic choices and firm 
performance levels are somewhat partially predicted by top managerial demographic 
characteristics (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). This reasoning has been borrowed and 
applied to the board of directors in recent years. In fact Tuggle et al. (2010) opine that 
board of directors’ intellectual frames which may be attributable to gender differences 
play an essential function in board decision making and can positively impact firm 
outcomes. Daily and Schwenk (1996) noted that heterogeneity or homogeneity of 
teams such as boards has a bearing on firm financial outcomes.  
 
One of the areas where the diversity contruct has been applied to board research is 
gender diversity. Until a decade ago, studies which had centred on diversity contructs 
and their impact on firm performance had largely concentrated on workforce diversity 
(Erhardt et al., 2003). Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) contend that the presence 
of female directors on corporate boards has been a centre of attention and a high-
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profile issue in the last decade. However, studies in this area have extensively focused 
on the Anglo-Saxon CG regimes. Gender representation on corporate boards has 
become a measure of board diversity. In  the US for example , this is evident with the 
increasing numbers of black, Hispanic and Asian-American women in corporate 
boards (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008).  
 
There exist two schools of thought regarding female representation on corporate 
boards. First, proponents of increased female representation argue that the presence of 
female directors in corporate boards can enhance the execution of board strategic 
function and increase firm outcomes (Fondas, 2000). Fondas (2000) contends that 
female directors have a slight edge over their male counterparts in relation to 
impacting a firm’s strategic planning. Consequently, female directors can potentially 
enhance the board’s performance of strategic role. Rose (2007) opines that female 
directors are more likely to express their opinion and confess ignorance during board 
discussions than male directors. Similarly, Dimovski and Brooks (2006) contend that 
including female directors on corporate boards bring additional viewpoints to board 
decision-making, which would not be possible in a board consisting of only men. 
However, it is argued that if women are appointed to boards just to motivate societal 
pressure for greater equality in gender, then female representation on boards will have 
a negative impact on firm performance (Ntim, 2015). 
 
Empirical research on gender diversity in boards has also generated some mixed 
results. For example, Rose (2007) conducted a study of listed Danish firms during the 
period of 1998–2001 and she didn’t find any significant relationship between gender 
diversity and firm performance. Similarly with a sample of Norwegian firms, Bøhren 
and Strøm (2010) showed no significant relationship between gender diversity and 
firm performance.   
 
On the contrary, Carter et al. (2003) examined gender diversity based on data from 
Fortune 1000 firms and their results indicate that there is a significant positive 
association between gender diversity and firm performance (measured using Tobin’s 
Q). Similarly, Erhardt et al. (2003) examined this construct based on US data and 
reported that gender-diverse boards have a statistically significant impact on firm 
performance. Adams and Ferreira (2004) found that less diverse boards are associated 
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with a more volatile stock price and that greater board diversity is associated with 
higher firm performance. Because of the mixed empirical results, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H04: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and Q-
ratio.  
 
H14: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and Q-
ratio.  
 
4.6 Frequency of Board Meetings  
 
The frequency of board meetings in recent years has attracted considerable attention. 
The relationship between the frequency of board meetings and organisation financial 
outcomes has been echoed to be one of the internal corporate governance mechanisms 
that has attracted a lot of attention both for researchers and policy makers. There are 
two theoretical perspectives when it comes to this construct: those who favour 
frequent board meetings and those who do not favour frequent board meetings (Brick 
and Chidambaran, 2010, Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998, Jensen, 1993, Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992)).  
 
To begin with, those who advocate for frequent board meetings opine that meetings 
provide boards of directors time to monitor management and set strategy, while 
reducing agency cost (Vafeas, 1999 , p.118 ). The premise here is frequency of board 
meetings ensures board activity intensity, thereby enhancing effectiveness of 
monitoring and control of management behaviour (Vafeas, 1999). According to 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992), the most widely shared concern is  directors lack of time to 
perform board tasks. Thus, frequent board meetings may assist directors to remain 
abreast and well-informed of essential developments within an organisation. As a 
result, directors will be better placed to follow up and take care of emerging issues 
affecting the firm. More so, from an agency theoretic angle, frequent board meetings 
are argued to be essential for the board to be able to protect shareholder value 
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maximisation by ensuring managers make decisions which do not stand in the way of 
shareholder expectations (Vafeas, 1999, Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Indeed, Conger et 
al. (1998) add that the time directors spend in board meetings is an essential resource 
in improving board effectiveness which has a positive impact on firm performance. 
By inference, ceteris paribus, more frequent board meetings enhance the quality of 
decision-making, managerial monitoring and control, which affects firm financial 
performance positively.  
 
Taking a contrary view, frequent board meetings are not essentially useful because the 
limited period directors spend together during board meetings is not necessarily 
utilised for the significant interchange of ideas with management or among 
themselves (Vafeas, 1999). As a result, the CEO virtually set the agenda for board 
meetings (Vafeas, 1999, Jensen, 1993). More so, board meetings are very expensive 
(e.g. directors’ meeting fees, managerial time, travel expenses, refreshments and other 
related expenses) (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010, Vafeas, 1999, Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992).  
 
In relation to the preceding arguments, the empirical evidence on frequency of board 
meetings and firm financial performance is very limited, which does indicate that this 
is an important gap to fill as to date very little research has looked at this construct in 
an African context. In addition, the limited empirical evidence has generated 
conflicting results. For instance, Vafeas (1999) studied a sample of 307 US-listed 
firms over the period 1990–1994, and his results indicated a statistically negatively 
significant relationship between the frequency of board meetings and firm financial 
performance (Q-ratio). However, he discovered that firms’ operating performance 
was significantly improved in years of abnormal/increase in board meetings.  
 
On the contrary, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) conducted another research using a 
sample of 275 US-listed firms from 1995–2000 and found a positive relationship 
between frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance. In an African 
context, Mangena and Tauringana (2006) studied a sample of 157 Zimbabwean-listed 
firms covering the period 2001–2003 and they found a positive relationship between 
firm performance and frequency of board meetings. In fact, their results support the 
premise that board oversight function is more intense in periods of crisis, and firms 
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who have frequent board meetings perform better. Following from the arguments and 
empirical findings, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H05: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between frequency of 
board meetings and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and Q-
ratio. 
 
H15: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between frequency 
of board meetings and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and 
Q-ratio. 
4.7 Board Ethnic Composition (Ethnic Diversity) 
 
Among the various underlying attributes of teams, ethnic diversity has been argued to 
be particularly relevant in corporate settings and has been used in the past to study top 
management team attributes, and this has been applied to corporate boards over the 
last two decades (Minichilli et al., 2009). The construct of ethnic diversity of 
organisational boards covers at least two important premises. First, that ethnic 
minorities with external networks, human capital, information and other relevant 
attributes merit opportunities to serve as directors on corporate boards (Carter et al., 
2010). In line with this reasoning, understanding how homogeneous or identical forms 
of social capital grounded on common race and ethnic affiliations can supplement 
diverse forms that create wider relationships across margins and institutional 
corporations can provide needed support in an increasingly diverse business 
environment (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003 , p.397 ). Second, ethnic diversity in 
boards results in better organisational governance, which enhances profitability for 
the business and increases shareholder value (Carter et al., 2010 ,p.397 ). Carter et al. 
(2010,p.397) contend that the business case for ethnic diversity implies that 
competent ethnic minority directors are not an alternative to traditional corporate 
directors with homogeneous abilities and aptitudes; nonetheless, qualified ethnic 
minority board members possess unique individualities which when mixed create 
additional value for the firm. 
 
More so, resource dependency theory provides another angle to supplement the 
business case for ethnic diversity in boards. Indeed, ethnic diversity presents 
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opportunities for unique information sets, which are available to assist management of 
firms to make better decisions (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003, Carter et al., 2010). 
More so, directors with different ethnic backgrounds provide access to and linkages to 
the external environment which a firm can harness to increase its performance by 
reducing external uncertainties (Carter et al., 2010, Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). 
More so, ethnically diverse boards have the ability to provide legitimacy for firms 
with both internal and external communities in countries like South Africa because of 
increasing growth in post-apartheid proportion of ethnic minority groups. Nielsen and 
Nielsen (2008) add that boards with diverse ethnic backgrounds and skills are better 
placed to manage complex strategies, compared to boards with homogeneous 
backgrounds. The same authors contend that firms may boost their capability in 
confronting challenges in the international business environment by taking on 
directors with diverse ethnic origins who possess skills, characteristics and 
experiences which are needed for business survival. More so, ethnically diverse 
boards are argued to be better in contributing to board critical thinking and innovation 
(Carter et al., 2010, Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003, Brammer et al., 2007).  
 
Taking an opposing view, though the presence of ethnic minorities on boards is often 
viewed favourably by some corporate stakeholders, the extant literature is more 
pessimistic on how ethnic-minority directors can successfully influence board 
decisions (Brammer et al., 2007, Carter et al., 2010, Carter et al., 2003). From a social 
psychological theory point of view, ethnic differences in boards reduce social 
cohesion during board meetings. As a result, this social barrier limits the likelihood 
that the point of view of ethnic minority directors will influence board decisions 
(Brammer et al., 2007, Carter et al., 2010). From a social impact theory point of view, 
directors who possess majority status have a tendency to exert an unequal amount of 
influence during board decision-making processes.  
 
Empirical results on ethnic diversity and firm performance have been mixed. For 
instance, Zahra and Stanton (1988), with a sample of US firms, found no relationship 
between ethnic minorities on the board and firm performance using profit margin, 
return on assets, sales to equity, EPS and dividends as performance proxies. Similarly, 
Carter et al. (2010), using a sample of major US firms, did not find any significant 
association between ethnic diversity and firm performance. However, Carter et al. 
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(2003) showed a significantly positive relationship between ethnic diversity and firm 
performance (using Tobin Q’s as a proxy) after controlling for other variables that can 
impact on firm performance. Similarly, Erhardt et al. (2003), using a sample of US 
firms, discovered a significant positive association between ethnic diversity and firm 
performance (using ROA and ROE as proxies). More so, in one of the rare studies 
which examined this construct in Africa, Ntim (2014) investigated the effect of board 
ethnic diversity on market valuation. His results indicate board ethnic diversity is 
positively linked to market valuation. Given the preceding discussions and cognisant 
that ethnic diversity-firm performance nexus is not well established in Africa, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H06: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between board ethnic 
diversity and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and the Q-
ratio. 
 
H16: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between board 
ethnic diversity and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and 
the Q-ratio. 
 
4.8 Interlocking Directorates  
 
One of the many areas with limited literature in emerging African economies relates 
to the concept of interlocking directorates. Significant empirical studies on 
interlocking directorate constructs have been carried out in the US, the UK, Europe, 
Canada and Australia. Thus far, the exact extent and structure of interlocking 
directorates among African firms is still unknown, nor have there been studies linking 
this construct to firm performance.  
 
From a resource dependency view, boards of directors are potentially an essential 
strategic resource for the firm, particularly with relation to the firm’s external 
resource needs. These linkages include networks/affiliations to business elite, 
competitors, banks, or market and industry intelligence (Van der Walt and Ingley, 
2003,  p.220 , Phan et al., 2003). Unlike agency theory, which asks for more NEDs 
for the purpose of monitoring management, resource dependency theory holds that 
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outside directors are interlocks between the firm and its external environment (Pfeffer, 
1972, Pfeffer, 1973, Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). In this 
context, diversity is seen as a broader range of backgrounds among outside directors 
in providing resources needed by the firm (Pfeffer, 1972, Pfeffer, 1973, Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978, Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). In fact, resource dependence theory 
contends that organisations appoint NEDs to the board for the purpose of tapping into 
resources they bring from their external linkages (Pfeffer, 1972, Pfeffer, 1973, Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978, Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978, Peng, 2004). More so, Peng (2004) 
opines that more resource-rich NEDs are solicited on boards to help bring in needed 
external resources which enhance the firm’s financial performance. It is argued that 
the size of a firm is directly connected to the number of board interlocks it has with 
other firms (Ong et al., 2003). In addition, the frequency of board interlocking with 
financial firms reflects dependency of the firm on the external sources of capital to 
finance its growth requirements (Ong et al., 2003). In addition, interlocking directors 
enable firms to acquire scarce resources and thereby assist in survival and growth of 
the firms. In fact Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) postulate that the principal role of 
outside directors is to provide the firm with external linkages (e.g. information and 
expertise), create channels of communication with related firms, provide support from 
external groups or organisations and legitimise the firm in its external environment. 
Thus, boards should be composed of members with both internal and external 
resource links. Internal resources may include executive directors who have 
knowledge of the firm, while external resources may include business experts, support 
specialists and community influencers. Therefore, the composition of the board 
should reflect its resource needs, which consequently enhances firm financial 
performance.  
 
Contrary to the preceding arguments, from class hegemony theory, interlocks are 
formed to serve mutual protection of interest of a social class (Phan et al., 2003). 
Thus, the appointment of board members is driven by identification of similar 
backgrounds, political beliefs and characteristics within personal networks of existing 
board members, resulting in ‘class hegemony’. As a result, the primary attention of 
directors will be to serve the purpose of protecting class welfare by extending the 
courtesy to persons who belong to the class. This  has a detrimental effect on the firm 
performance as this limits criticality and independence in  board discussions, leading 
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to lack of monitoring (Phan et al., 2003). In such a scenario, board members have a 
laissez faire attitude in their functions and as such will be ineffective monitors, and 
firm value maximisation will fall. In a nutshell, the inclusion of outside directors leads 
to more interlocks because directors favour nomination of individuals who belong to 
same social ‘class’, hence expanding board interlock but with negative effect on firm 
performance. A similar line of argument is rooted in institutional theory, which argues 
that appointing NEDs for their networks may merely represent an organisation’s 
attempt to comply with institutional pressures and may not necessarily have a positive 
impact on firm performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
The empirical evidence on board interlock is also mixed. For example Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) looked at the impact of interlocking directorates on firm 
performance and their results show an inverse statistically significant relationship to 
market-to-book ratio of firms. However, Ong et al. (2003) studied interlocking 
directorates among 295 listed Singaporean firms and found a positive relationship 
with firm performance (using total assets, ROA, return on sales and profit before tax 
as proxies). Peng (2004), using 405 publicly listed firms in China, suggests that 
interlocking directors affect sales growth positively. Fich and White (2005) studied 
reciprocal CEO interlocks and firm performance using data for 576 firms in 1991, and 
their results indicated a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and reciprocal CEO 
interlocks. Pombo and Gutiérrez (2011) also studied board interlocks and firm 
performance using 335 Colombian firms for the period 1996–2006. They reveal a 
positive relationship between board interlocks and firm performance (using ROA as a 
proxy). Following these empirical results, the following hypotheses is proposed  in 
relation to interlocking directorate construct:  
 
H07a: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between board 
interlocks and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and the 
Q-ratio. 
 
H17a: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between board 
interlocks and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and the 
Q-ratio. 
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On the other hand, some scholars have argued that director busyness limits the ability 
of directors to perform their board tasks (Falato et al., 2014, Ferris et al., 2003, 
Jiraporn et al., 2009). Arguments for the busyness hypothesis suggest that directors 
holding more directorships outside a firm have less time to spend serving on board as 
a result of their commitment to attend board meetings in other firms (Jiraporn et al., 
2009,pp.819). In addition, busy directors will not be able to monitor, control and 
evaluate management behaviour which may adversely impact on firm performance. 
As such, owing to lack of time, busy boards will allow managers to pursue their 
objectives at the expense of shareholders’ interest (Di Pietra et al., 2008). 
 
Conversely, a director’s busyness may signal success to fund providers. As Di Pietra 
et al. (2008) posit, this is because efficient and successful directors tend to sit on other 
boards, which signals success. This arguably enhances increased equity valuation in 
the stock market and impacts positively on firm performance.  
 
In Western economies, a limited number of studies had examined the impact of 
director busyness on firm financial outcomes. For example Di Pietra et al. (2008) and 
Field et al. (2013) reported a positive director busyness–firm performance association. 
However, Falato et al. (2014) reported a negative association. There is a dearth of 
research examining the director busyness–firm performance association. This study 
attempts to fill this gap by examining the following hypotheses:  
 
H07b: There is a statistically significant negative relationship between director 
busyness and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and the Q-
ratio. 
 
H17b: There is no statistically significant negative relationship between director 
busyness and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and the Q-
ratio. 
 
4.9 Gearing (Debt to Equity) 
 
Firm performance can be adversely affected by the equity to debt ratio which is 
essentially linked to agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986b). The 
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effect of firm leverage can be examined from two perspectives. According to Margaritis 
and Psillaki (2010), on the one hand there is efficiency risk where firms may choose 
higher debt to equity ratios. On the other hand is distress and franchise value where 
efficient firms choose lower equity to debt ratios to protect economic rents derived from 
the possibility of liquidation (Berger and Di Patti, 2006). Debt and equity trade off 
matter to the value firms. The weight of the trade-off  differs from firms with more net 
present value projects than others (McConnell and Servaes, 1995). Managers take debt 
to equity ratios as signals of the fact that higher leverage implies higher risk and costs 
of bankruptcy for firms (Brealey et al., 1977), and debt structures are considered to be 
market signals. A similar conclusion was made by Krishnan and Moyer (1997), who 
found a negative relationship between debt to equity ratio and firm performance. In the 
case where a risk of default occurs, causing a conflict between equity and debt 
investors, this may create debt overhang where an increase in debt will have a negative 
effect on the firm value (Myers, 1977, Jensen, 1986b, Stulz, 1990). Therefore firms 
with lower debt perform better than firms with higher debt ratios because they can 
maximise their performance by having zero debt (Kinsman and Newman, 1998). Firms 
with the intention of maintaining high efficiency rates lower debt to equity ratios to 
reduce economic rents and the threat of liquidation (Berger and Di Patti, 2006).  
  
Also researchers emphasise the importance for a firm to have an optimal capital 
structure (Brigham and Gapenski, 1994). The emphasis on optimal capital structure is 
in line with the trade-off theory. This theory argues for an optimal capital structure 
where the benefit of debt financing outweighs the costs associated with leverage.  Thus 
firms should continue borrowing till the marginal costs of financial distress offset the 
marginal benefit of debt (Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014). On the other hand, agency 
theorist contend debt decreases agency costs as managers’ efficiency increases owing 
to the requirement to pay interest and creditors on time, which enhances firm 
performance (Jensen, 1986b, Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
Based on most of the empirical literature and evidence, higher firm gearing (debt to 
equity ratio) reduces the value and performance of firms, which leads to the following 
null and alternative hypotheses: 
 
74 
 
74 | P a g e  
 
H08: There is a statistically significant negative relationship between firm gearing 
and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and the Q-ratio. 
 
H18: There is no statistically significant negative relationship between firm 
gearing and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and the Q-
ratio.  
4.10 Corporate Ownership Structure  
 
It is argued that the conflict between the type of ownership (shareholders, corporate 
board/managers and debt holders) and control is the core (Jensen, 1986b) and the basis 
on which much of the research on corporate ownership is centred. The separation of 
ownership and control, according to Pradhan et al. (2011), is the central issues which 
justifies the need for corporate governance. Issues like ownership arrangements, 
ownership concentration and management ownership have been argued to be factors 
that mitigate agency conflict.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and (Jensen, 1986b) stated more formally that ownership 
structure in favour of the manager reduces the incentives for managers to consume 
privileges, exploit shareholders’ wealth or participate in other sub-optimal activities 
and thus helps in supporting the interests of both managers and shareholders which in 
turn lowers agency costs and increases performance. There have been empirical 
conclusions that manager/board ownership enhances firm performance as board 
members are encouraged to supervise managers in a more efficient way (Brickley et al., 
1988, Chung and Pruitt, 1996, Jensen and Murphy, 1990, Mehran, 1995).  
 
A vast amount of research – most of which is tied to agency theory – has examined the 
relationship between corporate board ownership and firm performance (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 2012, Klein et al., 2005). However, some  authors have a different view on 
board ownership-firm performance link. Morck et al. (1988) argue there is a negative 
relationship between board ownership structure and firm performance. Similarly 
Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) examined the linkages between board ownership and 
firm performance and they concluded that board ownership increased agency costs as 
a result of information asymmetry between firm managers and outsider investors. These 
results are consistent with the entrenchment theory argument which stipulates that 
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managers with high levels of ownership tend to focus more on maximising the market 
share rather than profit maximisation and having directors as shareholders also has a 
negative effect on the value of the firm (Dwivedi and Jain, 2005). However, other 
studies have shown no statistically significant effect of board ownership on firm 
performance (Weir and Laing, 2001, Faccio and Lang, 2002). For instance Chen et al. 
(2008) conducted a study in New Zealand and concluded that neither management-
controlled nor ownership-controlled boards had a significant effect on performance.  
 
In a study conducted in Africa, Mangena et al. (2012) argued that the effect of board 
ownership on firm performance is dependent on the location and political 
circumstances. The conclusions of the latter authors varied from a negative relationship 
during post-presidential elections in Zimbabwe to a positive one during pre-presidential 
elections. Also, non-linear relationships have been found between board ownership and 
firm performance in developed countries like the US and the UK (Morck et al., 1988, 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990). In South Africa, Ntim (2012a) examined the 
relationship between director shareholding and corporate performance and reported a 
positive relationship. Based on empirical literature on director/board shareholding, the 
following sub-hypotheses are proposed:  
 
H09a: There is a statistically significant negative relationship between director 
shareholding and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and 
the Q-ratio. 
 
H19a: There is no statistically significant negative relationship between director 
shareholding and firm financial performance as measured by both ROCE and 
the Q-ratio. 
 
On the other hand, from an agency theory position, the presence of institutional 
shareholders facilitates monitoring and control of management than disperse 
ownership. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) support this view by showing that large external 
equity holders can mitigate agency conflicts because of their strong incentives to 
monitor and discipline. Firms with higher levels of institutional ownership are better 
off as information asymmetry is reduced, which reduces agency cost and impacts 
positively on firm financial performance. A similar conclusion was made by Elyasiani 
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and Jia (2010), that independent shareholders have a positive effect on firm 
performance through the reduction of effects like information asymmetry. On the other 
hand, Klein et al. (2005) assert disperse ownership  increases the probability of the 
positive relationship between measures of corporate governance and firm performance. 
Based on empirical literature, the presence of institutional ownership reduces agency 
cost and leads to better firm performance, which leads to the following two sub-
hypotheses: 
 
H09b: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between 
institutional shareholding and firm financial performance as measured by both 
ROCE and the Q-ratio. 
 
H19b: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between 
institutional shareholding and firm financial performance as measured by both 
ROCE and the Q-ratio. 
4.11 Compliance with Corporate Governance Codes  
 
Corporate governance research experienced an important turn in the 1990s. Though 
corporate governance guidelines existed as embedded in company law in some 
countries, the introduction of CG code only started gaining momentum after the 
introduction of the Cadbury report in the UK in 1992 (Alves and Mendes, 2004). 
Following the Cadbury report, both national and international institutions have 
developed corporate governance standards to be complied with by firms. From a 
rational efficiency perspective, CG codes are essential in compensating for 
insufficiencies in the legal systems of countries with regard to investor protection 
(Alves and Mendes, 2004, Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). According to Zattoni and 
Cuomo (2008) the effectiveness of CG systems is linked to the legal tradition of a 
particular country, but common law countries have stronger investor protection 
systems than civil law countries. Hence CG codes are therefore in place to increase a 
firm’s transparency and accountability, which attracts both national and foreign 
investors. Firms that comply with CG provisions are seen to attract investors as such, 
increasing the liquidity of a compliant firm which enables such a firm to be able to 
invest in projects, which increases the firm’s profitability. Hence compliance with 
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corporate governance provisions has been seen as a tool for prudent decision making 
and profit maximisation (Pradhan et al., 2011, Owusu and Weir, 2012). 
 
In emerging economies, CG compliance is a prerequisite for capital market 
development where new investors would be encouraged to invest (Lishenga  and 
Mbaka 2015). Thus, CG compliance is argued to positively affect the value and 
performance of the firm. Compliance with corporate governance leads to positive firm 
performance (Owusu and Weir, 2012, Lishenga  and Mbaka 2015). Following the 
same reasoning, Ntim (2013c) argues that compliance with CG provisions curbs the 
cost of monitoring and bonding and makes investors enthusiastic about future cash 
flow of a firm.  
 
Furthermore, compliance with corporate governance code, and its effect on firm 
performance, has been studied through its mechanisms and characteristics, such as 
frequency of board meetings, which increases monitoring and is seen as influential in 
improving operating performance (Vafeas, 1999, Vafeas, 2005). Others have 
investigated some CG provisions such as board composition by evaluating issues 
related to outside independent directors (Fama, 1980, Brickley et al., 1994).  
 
The relationship between compliance with CG regulations and firm performance has 
been investigated extensively in most developed and Asian economies. For example, 
Wahab et al. (2007), Alves and Mendes (2004) and Goncharov et al. (2006) reported a 
positive relationship between corporate governance compliance and firm performance 
using a sample of Malaysian, Portuguese and German-listed firms respectively. Other 
cross-country studies by Durnev and Kim (2005) and Klapper and Love (2004) have 
also shown a positive relationship between CG compliance and firm performance. A 
few studies in Africa have also shown similar results in Ghana (Owusu and Weir, 
2012), Kenya (Lishenga  and Mbaka 2015) and South Africa (Ntim, 2013c). 
However, with the exception of Ntim (2013c), the few studies conducted in Africa 
used international corporate governance provisions rather than local corporate 
governance provisions. More so, all the studies conducted in Africa have been single-
country studies. Hence, by comparing firm compliance with CG provisions as detailed 
in Nigeria’s 2011 corporate governance code and South Africa’s King III report, this 
study contributes immensely in our understanding of this nexus.  
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Despite the above evidence which has indicated that compliance with CG provisions 
has a positive effect on firm performance, other authors, e.g. Alves and Mendes 
(2004), contend that there is doubt as to the applicability of CG provisions in 
continental Europe and emerging economies where the enforcement of norms is very 
weak. Drawing from the preceding arguments and empirical findings, the following 
null and alternative hypotheses in relation to the corporate governance compliance 
construct are examined as follows:  
 
H010a: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between compliance 
with country-level corporate governance code requirements and firm financial 
performance as measured by ROCE and Q-ratio. 
 
H110a: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between 
compliance with country-level corporate governance code requirements and firm 
financial performance as measured by ROCE and Q-ratio. 
 
In addition, prior studies suggest that compliance with integrated shareholder 
requirements as defined by corporate governance code impacts positively on firm 
financial returns (Cheung et al., 2010). However, most of these studies have been 
limited to developed economies and to a limited extent Asian economies (Ntim et al., 
2012). For example,  some authors in the US (Cremers and Nair, 2005), Europe 
(Beiner et al., 2006) and Asia (Leung and Horwitz, 2010) have examined the impact 
of shareholder CG disclosures and firm returns. In Africa, however, with the 
exception of ( e.g. Ntim et al., 2012), who used King II, there is dearth of studies 
investigating shareholder disclosures and firm returns. Similar empirical investigation 
is non-existent in Nigeria and South Africa despite that fact that SEC 2011 CG code 
and King III substantially require disclosures aimed at protecting shareholders’ 
interest. In addition, comparative studies are non-existent. It is expected high level of 
compliance/disclosure to shareholders requirement of SEC 2011 CG code and King 
III will signal to investors the presence of high-quality standards within listed firms in 
both countries. This will show greater transparency and accountability and is therefore 
expected to enhance firm financial returns. Therefore, the following hypotheses are 
proposed:  
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H010b: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between compliance 
with country-level shareholder corporate governance code requirements and firm 
financial performance as measured by ROCE and Q-ratio. 
 
H110b: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between 
compliance with country-level shareholder corporate governance code 
requirements and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE and Q-ratio. 
 
On the other hand, it has been debated whether complying and disclosing to 
stakeholder CG provisions as specified in CG codes impacts on firm returns (Ntim et 
al., 2012). However, there is a dearth of empirical research in this area as very few 
studies have investigated this relationship. With the exception of Ntim et al. (2012), 
who investigated this construct in South Africa, there is a paucity of similar single-
country and comparative research in other emerging African economies. This study 
advances this line of research in Africa by investigating this relationship 
comparatively in Nigeria and South Africa.  
 
From a legitimacy perspective, providing transparent information on stakeholder 
dealings by listed firms can enhance firm returns by reducing political cost (Chen et 
al., 2008, Ntim et al., 2012). Similarly, stakeholder disclosures/compliance signals 
that a firm is conforming to societal norms and expectations, which can enhance firm 
returns (Ntim et al., 2012). In addition, from a resource perspective, disclosure of 
stakeholder initiatives can facilitate access to critical resources needed by the firm, 
including finance, taxation and government and local government contracts, that 
contribute to increasing firm returns (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Similarly, as Ntim et 
al. (2012) observed, firms who provide stakeholder disclosure information (though 
involving huge financial cost) may signal to investors that a firm is committed to 
increasing accountability and good governance, which impacts positively on firm 
returns.  
 
As noted earlier, because of high levels of corruption and historical readjustments 
after the military rule in Nigeria and apartheid in South Africa, SEC 2011 and King 
III incorporate provisions aimed at addressing stakeholder expectations, which are 
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embedded in the respective countries’ institutional economic environments. This 
implies firm compliance with stakeholder engagements as required under the SEC 
2011 and King III provisions at a minimum may allow firms access to relevant 
resources and to legitimise their operations, which can facilitate growth and improve 
firm returns. Therefore, the following hypothesises are examined:  
 
H010c: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between compliance 
with stakeholder corporate governance code requirements and firm financial 
performance as measured by ROCE and Q-ratio. 
 
H110c: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between 
compliance with stakeholder corporate governance code requirements and firm 
financial performance as measured by ROCE and Q-ratio. 
 
4.12 Independent Audit Committee (IAC) 
 
There is a growing literature suggesting that an independent audit committee 
(hereafter IAC) is essential for firm financial scrutiny, which affects positively firm 
economic returns. An audit committee (hereafter AC) is a sub-committee of the board 
which act as a medium of communication between the board, firm internal monitoring 
system, internal audit and external auditors. Bradbury et al. (2006,pp.4) contend that 
an AC has an oversight role in a firm’s financial reporting process and therefore its 
independence is crucial in making sure firms are reporting a fair value of their 
performance. Chan and Li (2008) add that boards with IAC demand higher audit 
quality beyond the normal and standard expectations, which makes it difficult for 
management to manipulate the members of the committee. In addition, Klein 
(2002,pp.7) contends that independent audit committees are best suited as active 
overseers of the financial accounting process of a firm and as such can withstand 
pressure from management to manipulate earnings. Similarly, from an agency theory 
perspective, independent audit committees signal to shareholders that the firm’s 
accounting and reporting information is being monitored and strengthen internal audit 
function (Aldamen et al, 2011). On the other hand, some authors have argued that 
owing to their complete separation from the day-to-day running of the company, IACs 
are less likely to understand industry issues and more likely to side with auditors, 
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signalling less negotiation and deliberation on accounting processes and thus fewer 
audit meetings (Aldamen et al., 2012, Sharma et al., 2009), which impacts negatively 
on AC monitoring role in financial reporting.  
 
Some empirical research, mostly non-African studies, has shown that IACs enhance 
quality financial reporting (e.g. Carcello and Neal, 2003), increase firm performance 
(Chan and Li, 2008) and negatively impact on abnormal accruals (e.g.Klein, 2002). 
With the exception of Chan and Li (2008), very few studies in CG scholarship have 
examined the performance effect of IACs on firm performance. Studies on IACs-firm 
performance nexus is deficient within African context. This study attempts to extend 
the existing literature on IACs in CG scholarship and provide new evidence from a 
comparative context in Africa with the following hypotheses:  
  
H011: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between independent 
audit committees (IACs) and firm financial performance as measured by ROCE 
and Q-ratio. 
 
H011: There is no statistically significant positive relationship between 
independent audit committees (IACs) and firm financial performance as 
measured by ROCE and Q-ratio. 
 
4.13 Summary of Chapter  
 
The chapter has presented the extant theoretical and empirical CG literature on internal 
CG mechanisms and firm financial performance nexus. The objective was to link the 
existing theoretical foundations discussed in chapters 2 and 3 and how their empirical 
debates shape firm choices of internal CG structures and their impact on firm financial 
performance. The chapter recognises the complex and multi-theoretic nature of CG, 
and, consistent with prior studies, adopts a multi-theoretical perspective in constructing 
the complex CG–firm performance relationship.  
 
The chapter has further built on the two main empirical models within the existing 
literature: the compliance index model and the equilibrium variable model. Hypotheses 
1 to 9 and 11 are developed from internal CG structures endogenously chosen by firms 
82 
 
82 | P a g e  
 
and measured by the equilibrium variable model. Hence, hypotheses 1 to 9 and 
hypotheses 11 examine sub-research question two (see section 1.4.1.1). Whereas 
hypotheses 10a, 10b and 10c are developed from compliance with country-level 
corporate governance code and measured by the compliance index model and examines 
sub-research question one. Sub-research question three is examined through a 
comparison of the results of hypotheses 1 to 9 and 11 with those of hypotheses 10a, b 
and c. Prior empirical results on the equilibrium variable model as discussed under its 
constituent hypothesis show mixed results compared to the reported results for the 
compliance index model in country-specific studies. It will be interesting to examine 
whether the findings of this research are consistent from a comparative perspective 
(discussed later in chapters 7 to 9). The next chapter presents the methodology adopted 
in this thesis. It specifically describes the research rationales, sample and data, 
variables, and model specifications. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This study has premised on chapters 1, 2 and 3 that there is emerging evidence in the 
literature suggesting that CG practices in Africa are still developing and there is an 
absence of studies comparing the internal CG structure in different countries and its 
impact on firm financial outcomes. In addition, research comparing firm compliance 
with adopted Western-style CG codes in African economies and its impact on company 
performance is absent. Considering these gaps (see section 1.3 for detailed discussion), 
the researcher further noted that though CG codes operational in South Africa and 
Nigeria are somewhat similar in some respects owing to influences of Western CG 
provisions, there are considerable variations between the governance codes in both 
countries owing to different levels of maturity of governance institutions and hence 
variability in applicability and compliance. Thus, the researcher seeks to evaluate and 
compare if different internal CG mechanisms in South Africa and Nigeria as well as 
compliance with country CG codes have an impact on firm financial outcomes of listed 
firms in these countries. Thus, to fulfil the main objective and the sub-objectives 
highlighted in subsection 1.4.1.1, this research methodology chapter discusses the 
research methods, analytical approach and data collection methods employed to 
empirically examine the main research question (as in 1.4.1) and sub-research questions 
(as in subsection 1.4.1.1). The chapter outlines the research design, data set, variables 
and data analysis methods. It begins by discussing the ontological and epistemological 
position adopted for the thesis and its justification (5.2). Section 5.3 discusses the 
analytical methods and corresponding independent variables. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 
present the dependent and control variables respectively. This is followed by data 
collection section (5.6). Section 5.7 summarises and justifies the methodological 
choices of the thesis.  
5.2 Research Approach, Rationale and Philosophy 
 5.2.1 Ontological Position  
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Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality (Hammersley, 2002, Lewis et al., 2007, 
Bryman and Bell, 2011). According to Hammersley (2013), ontology is a theory about 
the nature of reality, as to whether it exists subjectively or objectively. Ontology raises 
the question as to the researcher’s assumptions about the way the world operates and 
his or her particular view (Lewis et al., 2007, Bryman and Bell, 2011). There are two 
main ontological positions in research. 
 
An objective ontological position views social entities’ existence in reality as external 
to social actors (Saunders et al., 2012). Thus an objective ontology view argues that the 
world is ‘out there’, real and completely unconnected from human meaning-making 
(Hammersley, 2013, Saunders et al., 2012, Bryman and Bell, 2011, Lewis et al., 2007). 
This view holds that the world, whether physical or social, is an ordered system 
composed of separate and observable events which have objective reality and operate 
in a systematic manner (Hammersley, 2013, Saunders et al., 2012, Bryman and Bell, 
2011, Lewis et al., 2007). Thus, objectivism is a major influence on quantitative 
research.  
 
On the other hand, subjective ontology assumes that reality or constructs being researched 
is neither external nor unconnected from social actors or the researcher (Hammersley, 
2013, Saunders et al., 2012, Bryman and Bell, 2011, Lewis et al., 2007). Thus, this 
ontological position contends that reality is emergent and socially constructed by 
humans through the ideas of multiple social actor’s contingent on their lived 
experiences. Thus meanings of social constructs will differ from one actor to another 
(Hammersley, 2013, Saunders et al., 2012, Bryman and Bell, 2011, Lewis et al., 2007).  
 
In view of the different ontological positions above, the researcher believes that an 
objective ontological perspective is suitable to investigate internal CG structures, firm 
regulatory compliance and its impact on firm financial performance. This position is 
consistent with research which has investigated similar constructs ( see , Agyemang et 
al., 2015, Ntim, 2013c, Ntim, 2013d, Abor and Fiador, 2013, Samaha et al., 2012, 
Mangena et al., 2012). In addition, the outcomes of the research are not dependent on 
the interpretation of social actors, as data is collected from secondary sources. Thus, 
the results are not subject to multiple interpretations, as meanings are not constructed 
from social actors’ interpretations. Thus, by measuring or examining individual internal 
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CG mechanisms such as board structure and firm compliance with country-specific CG 
codes through an objective method, the study permits generalisation. As mentioned 
earlier, an ontological view logically influences a researcher’s epistemological 
perspective (discussed in the next subsection). 
 5.2.2 Research Epistemology  
 
Epistemology is concerned with what constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field. 
While ontology is concerned with theory on the nature of reality, be it objective or 
subjective, epistemology is concerned with the theory of how knowledge of reality is 
to be obtained either through a positivist angle by objectively measuring constructs or 
through social constructions by subjectively interpreting the world (Saunders et al., 
2012, Bryman and Bell, 2011). Thus, an ontological position logically influences a 
researcher’s epistemological stands.  
 
As a result, there are mainly two research philosophies in social science research: 
positivism and social constructivism. Positivist philosophy is consistent with the 
objective ontological position. According to the latter philosophy, the social world 
exists externally, and as such its properties can and should be measured through an 
objective method rather than subjectively inferred through sensation, intuition and 
reflection (Bryman and Bell, 2011, Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, Saunders et al., 2012). 
In fact, as Hammersley (2002) puts it, positivism philosophy seeks to employ scientific 
methods to study and understand social constructs, including human behaviour, 
organisational social constructs and history. Thus data collection is typically numerical 
in nature and also consists of large samples, as such studies are aimed towards 
generalisation of findings (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). More so, the results of 
positivist research are usually intended to test theories and define cause and effect 
relationships between constructs (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  
 
On the other hand, social constructivism or interpretivism contrasts the positivist view 
by contending that social science research deals with humans and humans are different 
from atoms or non-human forms of life (which is the centre of positivism). This is 
because humans actively interpret or make sense of the environment in which they live 
as such meanings can be subjectively inferred through intuition, sensation and 
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reflection (Bryman and Bell, 2011, Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, Saunders et al., 2012). 
Thus, according to social constructivism, people construct different types of 
knowledge, and each of these meanings is subject to human interpretations. In fact, this 
epistemology seeks to gain an understanding of human actions and considers the 
researcher as part of the phenomena under study in an attempt to gain accounts about a 
particular construct from social actors (Hammersley, 2013, Saunders et al., 2012, 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, Bryman and Bell, 2011, Lewis et al., 2007, Hammersley, 
2002).  
 
Given the above understanding in relation to the different epistemological positions in 
research, this thesis adopts a positivist perspective as the most appropriate approach to 
be able to answer the research questions of the study. The choice of a positivist 
epistemological position was weighed against social constructivism epistemology. 
Primarily, after the review of the literature (in chapters 2, 3 and 4), the bulk of extant 
empirical CG research aimed at understanding internal CG constructs predominantly 
adopts a positivistic perspective. More so, consistent with prior studies, this study aims 
to test theoretical internal CG mechanism constructs drawn from agency, stewardship 
and resource dependency theories, as such a positivist standpoint is selected as the most 
appropriate method to achieve these objectives. In addition, because this study is aimed 
at generalisation of results, a positivist approach of collecting rich quantitative data is 
adopted. Furthermore, to evaluate internal CG mechanisms such as board structure, the 
research uses numerical data from annual reports of firms to examine their impact on 
firm performance. Hence a positivist approach through development of testable 
hypotheses is chosen as more appropriate owing to the focus of the thesis.  
 
5.3 Data Analysis Methods  
 
As noted in section 1.3, this study uses two major contrasting positivist empirical 
corporate governance data analysis models: the equilibrium variable model and the 
compliance index model. Most researchers, especially in Africa, have often used the 
equilibrium variable model to investigate internal CG structures and firm performance 
nexus (Ntim et al., 2014b, Ntim et al., 2014a, Ntim, 2014, Abor and Fiador, 2013, 
Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008, Kajola, 2008). Meanwhile, just a few studies have 
investigated the compliance index model perspective (Ntim, 2013c, Barako et al., 
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2006). However, the two data analysis models are based on different assumptions 
theoretically.  
 
The next subsections discuss these two models alongside their theoretical assumptions 
and independent variables used in the models.  
 5.3.1 Equilibrium Variable Model  
 
The equilibrium variable model (EVM) is developed from the argument that there were 
no mandatory CG provisions for organisations to comply with before the late 1980s. 
Since the 1980s, there has been an increasing propagation of CG provisions or codes to 
ensure managers of firms are acting in shareholders’ interest (Danielson and Karpoff, 
1998). Thus, before the proliferation of CG codes, internal CG mechanisms were driven 
by essential court decisions, firms’ specific needs or requirements (e.g. environmental 
uncertainties, attracting skilled, well-educated and qualified directors and pressure from 
the owners), legal and business advice, peer industry behaviours etc. (Black, 1992, 
Danielson and Karpoff, 1998). Hence the EVM assumes that, without CG provisions, 
internal CG structures like the composition of the board and CEO duality are mainly 
derived within a firm (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). More 
so, the model assumes that some CG structures are more important than others 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Memon et al., 2012, Mangena 
et al., 2012, Antwi et al., 2012, Mehran, 1995, Barako et al., 2006).  
 
Second, the EVM assumes there will be varied agency problems across different firms 
as a result of variability in the ownership structure, size of the firm and other firm-
specific idiosyncrasies (Gillan, 2006). Furthermore, external CG structures  (e.g. legal 
and regulatory requirements and market for corporate control) are exogenously derived 
in such a manner that differences across the external environments in which firms 
operate may both help increase or decrease the value of a firm (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Last of all, the EVM assumes that the use of specific 
internal CG mechanisms is not automatically complementary. Thus the use of a 
particular internal CG mechanism more frequently than others may still equally lead to 
increase in firm financial performance (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998, Danielson and 
Karpoff, 1998, Botosan, 1997, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
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This therefore suggests that there is an optimal mix of internal CG structures which 
impacts positively on a firm’s financial performance. By this reasoning, a firm will 
continue to put in place internal CG mechanisms to the point where marginal benefit 
will be equal to the marginal cost (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985).  
 
In a nutshell, the EVM assumes an association between the implementation of internal 
CG mechanisms and firm financial outcomes. As such, it assumes that each firm has an 
optimal internal CG structure. Consequently, each firm should be able to make choices 
regarding its internal CG structures without any interference from the outside. Thus 
firms’ internal CG mechanisms are internally generated (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998, 
Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, Botosan, 1997, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985). Hence a firm will continue to put in place internal CG structures to 
the point where the cost associated with a marginal increase in its internal governance 
structure will be lower than an increase in the financial outcomes (i.e. at a point such a 
firm is in equilibrium in its internal CG structure).  
 
This means for example that, while increase in director and managerial ownership to 
align the interest of executives with that of shareholders may effectively increase the 
firm’s financial performance in one firm, it may not necessarily be effective for another 
firm because of variability in the size of the firm, ownership structure of the firm and 
other firm-level idiosyncrasies. This is the oldest approach and most popular approach 
researchers have used to investigate internal CG and firm performance nexus even after 
the proliferation of good CG codes around the world (Ntim, 2013c, Danielson and 
Karpoff, 1998, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). This model 
therefore is used to examine research sub-question two: ‘Do endogenously generated 
alternative firm-level internal corporate governance mechanisms affect firm financial 
performance in Nigeria and South Africa?’ The EVM for this study is stated as follows: 
 Equilibrium Variable Model: 
 Pit =δ it + β1BSZit + β2 NEDit + β3 INEDit + β4 EDit + β5 GDIVit + 
β6EDIVit + β7 DUALit+ β8 GEAR it +β9 FRE-Mit + β10 ILOCKit+ β11 
INST-SHit + β12D-SHit + β13 IACit + β14 BNESS it + β15 
CONTROLS it + U it … (1) 
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Where i=1… 180, t=...5   and Pit is performance measures of ROCE (Return on Capital 
Employed) and Q-ratio for firm i at time t, β1 to β14 are the vectors of individual internal 
CG variables, board size (BSZ), non-executive directors (NED), independent non-
executive directors (INED), executive directors (ED), gender diversity (GDIV), ethnic 
diversity (E-DIV), gearing (GEAR), frequency of board meetings (FRE-M), board 
interlock (ILOCK), institutional shareholding (INST-SH), director shareholding (D-
SH), audit committee independence (IAC), board busyness (BNESS) as independent 
variables plus the control variables (CONTROLS) and Uit is the error term.  
  5.3.1.1 Independent Variables for the Equilibrium Variable Model 
 
I. Board size: Measured by the total number of directors who serve on a board.   
II. Board structure (proportion of NEDs): A variable which measures percentage of 
non-executive directors to total number of directors who serve on a board.   
III. Proportion of EDs (Executive Directors): A variable which measures percentage 
of executive directors to total number of directors who serve on a board.   
IV. Proportion of independent NEDs: A variable which measures percentage of 
independent non-executive directors to total number of directors who serve on a 
board.   
V. Frequency of board meetings: A variable which measures number of board annual 
meetings. 
VI. CEO/Chairman role separation: Measured by a dummy with ‘1’ when the 
positions of board chairman and CEO are held by separate individuals and ‘0’ 
when the positions are held by an individual.  
VII. Board gender composition (gender diversity): A variable which measures 
percentage of women to total number of directors who serve on a board.  
VIII. BOD ethnic composition (ethnic diversity): A variable which measures the 
percentage of black directors to total number of directors who serve on a 
particular board.  
IX. Interlocking directorates: Measured by average number of boards the directors of 
a firm sit on outside the firm.  
X. Board busyness: Measured as the average firm-level number of board meetings 
multiplied by average firm-level board interlock.  
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XI. Gearing (debt to equity): A variable which measures total debt, divided by total 
equity.  
XII. Institutional shareholding: Measured by the percentage of institutional 
shareholders and block holders to the total shares of a firm.  
XIII. Director shareholding: Measured by the number of shares held by directors (both 
executive and non-executive) to the total shares of a firm as a percentage.  
XIV. Independent audit committee: Percentage of independent non-executive directors 
to total number of directors who serve on the audit committee. 
 5.3.2 Compliance Index Model (CIM) 
 
Contrary to the EVM, which assumes an endogenous generation of internal CG 
mechanisms, the compliance index model (CIM) assumes that internal CG structures 
are externally enforced, as such organisations tend to select internal CG structures as a 
set or bundle (Gillan, 2006, Danielson and Karpoff, 1998). The CIM thus assumes that 
the financial performance of a firm is likely to be influenced by a collection of internal 
CG mechanisms derived from CG provisions or codes instituted and backed by 
statutory legislations. Furthermore, as a result of external influence on internal CG 
mechanisms, there exists possible interdependence between internal CG structures 
(Gillan, 2006, Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Owing to 
this possible interdependence of various CG structures, rather than looking at them as 
individual CG mechanisms often in isolation to each other, the CIM advocates for a 
construction of compliance index which is based on a set of CG provisions to 
empirically investigate internal CG and firm financial performance nexus. This model 
therefore is used to examine research sub-question one: ‘How and in what ways does 
firm-level compliance with exogenously developed corporate governance provisions 
impact on firm financial performance in Nigeria and South Africa?’ Following from 
the preceding argument, the compliance index model is stated as follows:  
Compliance Index Model: 
 
                Pit =δ + β1CGIi, t-1 + β2 CONTROLS………………… (2)    
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Pit is performance measures of ROCE and Q-ratio for firm i at time t, β is a vector of 
compliance index (CGI), and CONTROLS represents control variables and Uit is the 
error term.  
  5.3.2.1 Independent Variables for the Compliance Index Model (CIM) 
 
I. Composite/Integrated Corporate Governance Index (CGI):  
 
Independent variables for the CIM for both countries is represented by the South 
African Corporate Governance index (SACGI), which is a composition of CG 
provisions outlined in King III which firms are required to apply or explain reasons for 
non-application. Similarly, the Nigerian Corporate Governance Index (NICGI) is 
composed of the provisions of SEC 2011 CG code expected to be complied with by 
listed firms or reasons given for non-compliance. Consistent with prior research (Ntim, 
2013a, Ntim, 2013c, Black et al., 2006), a binary coding scheme is adopted to construct 
a firm-level compliance index in each country. This involves awarding ‘1’ where a firm 
complies with an internal CG provision of the country code in the annual report and ‘0’ 
where it does not. The CG provisions composed in the SACGI (South Africa) and 
NICGI (Nigeria) are based on provisions of SA (2009) King III and Nigeria’s (2011) 
CG code. The scoring involves manually reading firms’ annual reports and awarding 
one point where a firm discloses/complies with/applies a CG provision and zero when 
it does not. For example, South Africa’s King III report has 84 CG provisions required 
to be applied by listed firms; thus, a firm’s total compliance score for the year ranges 
from zero (0%), indicating no compliance, to 84 (100%), indicating full compliance. 
Similarly, in Nigeria, the NICGI is composed of 75 CG provisions as stated in the SEC 
2011 CG code. Therefore, a firm will score between ‘0’ (0%) for non-compliance and 
75 (100%) for full compliance.   
 
The CG indices for Nigeria and South Africa are broken down into two indices. One 
captures provisions aimed to protect shareholder value creation and the other 
incorporates affirmative country-level stakeholder provisions. These sub-indices are 
presented below. 
 
II. Shareholder compliance index (Shareholder–NICGI and Shareholder–SACGI): 
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To test hypothesis H10b, an index for shareholder disclosures includes 61 shareholder 
provisions (shareholder–NICGI) in Nigeria as specified in the SEC 2011 CG code. 
These disclosures include traditional corporate governance requirements aimed at 
increasing shareholders’ returns by reducing agency cost. Shareholder provisions 
scores (shareholder–NICGI) vary from zero (0%) to 61 (100%) in Nigeria.  
In South Africa, the shareholder–SACGI (shareholder provisions) captures 71 
conventional corporate governance provisions borrowed from the Anglo-American 
CG model with the premise of reducing agency cost and increasing shareholders’ 
return. Shareholder provisions scores for South Africa (shareholder–SACGI) vary 
from zero (0%) to 71 (100%). 
 
III. Stakeholder Compliance Index (Stakeholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–SACGI): 
 
On the other hand, to test H10c, the South African Stakeholder–SACGI (stakeholder 
provisions) have thirteen (13) contextual inclusive actions and stakeholder provisions 
as stated in King III, whereas the Nigerian stakeholder disclosure requirement 
(Stakeholder–NICGI) is composed of fourteen (14) contextual inclusive actions and 
stakeholder provisions of SEC 2011 CG code. Similarly, the stakeholder provisions 
score for Nigeria (Stakeholder–NICGI) ranges from zero (0%) to 14 (100%), and in 
South Africa it ranges from zero (0%) to 13 (100%).  
  5.3.2.2 Limitation/Choice of Weighted Index (SACGI and NICGI) 
 
The various country CG compliance indices (SACGI and NICGI) are coded using a 
binary coding scheme and the indices are unweighted. As noted by Barako et al. 
(2006), Ntim (2009) and Ntim et al. (2012), unweighted indices are not able to 
capture important groups of requirements as they treat all CG provisions as equal in 
importance, which may be inconsistent in theory and practice. However, empirical 
research in CG suggests that weighted and unweighted indices give similar results, 
especially where CG provisions are large (e.g. Barako et al., 2006, Ntim et al., 2010, 
Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim, 2013c). Specifically, this study did not use weighted indices 
as it would have meant some CG provisions are given more weight than others, which 
would not be an accurate representation of respective country CG regulations. More 
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so, the use of an unweighted index in this study is consistent with prior research 
(Ntim, 2013a, Ntim, 2013c, Black et al., 2006). 
 
  5.3.3 Synopsis of Data Analysis Models   
 
To date, no researcher has investigated internal CG mechanisms and firm 
performance using these two analytical approaches (i.e. the equilibrium variable 
model and the compliance index model) within cross-country comparative studies in 
different contexts. From a methodological standpoint, there may be serious empirical 
questions to be answered in relation to both models. For example, results from the 
EVM may be spurious, as it ignores the possibility of interactions among CG 
structures (Core et al., 1999, Danielson and Karpoff, 1998). In addition, the possibility 
of omitted variables bias in the equilibrium variable model implies that cross-
sectional regression using a single internal CG variable may result in misleading 
interpretation of regression coefficients (Black et al., 2006, Core et al., 1999, 
Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). More so, while it may be 
easy theoretically for a firm to determine an optimal internal CG structure, the 
practicality of unravelling this is very difficult.  
 
On the other hand, a compliance constructed index is argued to be able to enhance the 
explanatory power through aggregation (Core et al., 1999). However, if the compliance 
index model assumes that a firm’s internal CG structures are exogenously determined 
by regulatory frameworks, then the model fails to provide strong explanations as to the 
reason why prior cross-sectional studies show considerable differences in the use of 
internal CG structures by firms (Ntim, 2013c, Core et al., 1999).    
 
The preceding arguments for both models lead to a key methodological question as to 
whether the use of the equilibrium variable model or the compliance index model has 
influence on the interpretations of research results (research sub-question three), (Ntim, 
2013c, Core et al., 1999); in other words, if individual internal CG structures as 
measured by the equilibrium variable model is associated with better firm performance 
than firm level compliance with CG provisions as measured by the compliance index 
model. Another critical question may be this: if both models show similar results, is it 
valuable to construct a compliance index given that it is time consuming and labour 
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intensive? If they show similar results, at firm level, will it be essential for firms to 
comply with CG provisions given that it will be more expensive than choosing an 
optimal internal CG mechanism that will generate similar results? For example, if 
empirical results in South Africa based on the EVM show there is a positive relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance but NEDs do not impact positively on firm 
performance; then it will be costly for firms to comply with King III recommendation 
for majority NEDs. This is because complying with this provision does not have a value 
relevance impact on firm financial performance.  
 
The preceding argument therefore establishes the foundation to compare the 
explanatory power and empirical validity of both models at a cross-country level. Most 
studies in Africa have investigated internal CG mechanisms and firm nexus using 
principally the equilibrium variable model (Ntim et al., 2015b, Agyemang et al., 2015, 
Ntim et al., 2014a, Ntim, 2014, Ntim, 2012a, Ehikioya, 2009, Kyereboah-Coleman, 
2008, Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007). However, Ntim (2013c) constructed a compliance 
index based on the South African King II report. His results show positive impact of 
compliance with the South African King II provisions on firm performance. However, 
Ntim (2013c) results were based on the King II provisions; as of yet, no research has 
been done to show compliance with the King III provisions. No study yet has compared 
both models across different African countries. Hence, based on the respective 
theoretical and empirical validity of both models and given that corporate governance 
studies in Africa are still embryonic, the equilibrium variable model and compliance 
index model are independently examined in both South Africa and Nigeria and results 
are compared. Therefore, the relationship between firm-specific individual internal CG 
structures and their impact on firm performance is examined using the equilibrium 
variable model, while a constructed firm compliance index to country-specific CG 
provisions is assessed using the compliance index model. 
5.4 Dependent Variables 
5.4.1 Firm Financial Performance  
 
Firm financial performance has been used a considerable amount in accounting, 
economic and finance research to assess the fulfilment of a firm’s economic 
objectives and has long been considered the main research focus on firm performance 
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(Gentry and Shen, 2010, Hult et al., 2008, Richard et al., 2009). Owing to the 
influence of organisational economics before the mid-1980s, researchers typically 
used accounting-based financial performance measures as an economic measurement 
of firm profitability (Gentry and Shen, 2010, pp.516). These accounting-based 
performance measures are historical and so involve more backward- and inward-
looking emphasis (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). These measures also represent the 
effect of many factors, including board advisory to the management team, and are the 
traditional mainstay of corporate financial performance measures (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003 ,pp.10). However, the influence of finance theories in the 1980s led 
to the introduction of market-based financial performance measures (Gentry and 
Shen, 2010, pp.516). More so, the rise of shareholder activism in the 1980s and 1990s 
pushed firms to adopt shareholder value maximisation objectives using market-based 
performance measures in addition to accounting-based measures (Gentry and Shen, 
2010, pp.516). As such, market-based financial performance measures incorporate 
overall value placed on a firm by the market and may not bear any association with 
valuation of asset, firm historical profitability and or its current operations. Therefore, 
market valuations emphasise and incorporate the firm’s expected future earnings and 
as such are considered as forward-looking measures that reflect firms’ current plans 
and strategies.    
 
There has been considerable debate within accounting and finance literature on the 
value relevance of each financial performance measure. For example, proponents of 
market-based financial performance measures argue that they include all relevant 
information. Hence, different from accounting measures, market-based financial 
performance measures are not limited to a single aspect of firm financial performance 
(Gentry and Shen, 2010, Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986). More so, accounting 
performance measures have been criticised for their susceptibility to managerial 
distortions and manipulation (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008, Gentry and Shen, 2010).  
As a result, market-based performance measures have been proposed as  an appealing 
alternative and a complement to accounting-based performance.  
 
Within extant CG literature, one of the reasons for inconclusive research findings in 
CG–performance nexus is attributed to restrictive use of one performance measure in 
isolation to the other (Gani and Jermias, 2006, Kyereboah‐Coleman, 2007). 
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Recognising that both accounting and market measures are not perfect, many 
researchers examining CG–performance nexus have accepted both measures as valid 
proxies of firm financial performance (Ntim et al., 2015b, Agyemang et al., 2015, 
Ntim et al., 2014a, Ntim, 2014, Ntim, 2012a, Ehikioya, 2009, Kyereboah-Coleman, 
2008, Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007). Consequently, this study employed the widely used 
Q-ratio as a proxy for market returns and Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) as a 
proxy for accounting returns to measure firms’ financial performance (Pit). These two 
financial returns variables are employed to provide robust results for alternative firm 
performance measurements.  
 
I. Return on Capital Employed (ROCE):  
An accounting-based measure calculated by earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
divided by capital employed (equity plus long-term loans). 
II. Q-ratio:  
Consistent with prior research (Ntim et al., 2015b, Agyemang et al., 2015, Ntim et al., 
2014a, Ntim, 2014, Ntim, 2012a, Ehikioya, 2009, Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008, 
Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007), the study employs Tobin’s q (Q-ratio) as the empirical 
measure for the size-normalised market value of a firm. It shows the ratio of a firm’s 
market value (i.e. market value of its outstanding stock and debt) to its replacement 
value of assets (book value).  
5.5 Control Variables  
 
According to Black et al. (2006), studies which omit relevant economic variables to 
predict firm performance could generate wrong empirical interpretations and 
conclusions. Consequently, to overcome omitted variable bias, this study included 
several control variables, which can potentially impact on firm performance (please 
see appendix B for measurement of all variables).  These variables include:  
 5.5.1 Sales Growth 
 
Considerable research on CG scholarship has argued that firms with higher 
investment opportunities are more likely to grow faster (Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim, 
2013c). In addition, high growth potential firms may receive higher market valuation 
and are expected to experience increase in future financial performance. Hence, firm 
performance is impacted positively by sales growth (S-growth) because, with 
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increasing firm turnover, these firms have higher ability to invest relatively faster than 
firms with limited growth in turnover (Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim, 2013c). Consequently, 
sales growth is controlled for. It is measured as firm’s percentage change of current 
year’s sales minus previous year’s sales divided by previous year’s sales.  
 
 5.5.2 Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 
 
Firms with higher capital expenditure in technology and innovation are theoretically 
argued to be more competitive through the launching of new products, services and 
processes than firms with low innovation prospects (Ntim, 2009). Thus, such firms 
are expected to experience premium prices and are expected to generate long-term 
performance owing to intensive investments (Durnev and Kim, 2005). However, 
because capital expenditure in each year will generate future performance in 
subsequent years, it may impact adversely in a firm’s current year performance. 
Following previous research (e.g. Durnev and Kim, 2005, Ntim, 2009, Ntim et al., 
2010), capital expenditure is expected to affect firm performance either negatively or 
positively. It is measured as a percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets of 
a firm.  
 
 5.5.3 Firm Size 
 
Prior literature suggests that firm size is likely to affect both the quality of CG 
systems and firm performance (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006, Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim et al., 
2012). This suggests that larger firms may receive higher valuation than smaller firms 
and enjoy lower costs of raising external capital (Beiner et al., 2006, Ntim et al., 2010, 
Ntim et al., 2012). However, according to Klapper and Love (2004,pp.713), smaller 
firms tend to have better growth prospects than larger firms and therefore will need 
external sources of capital. This implies that smaller firms may have to show a better 
CG system to be able to attract cheaper sources of external finance. In addition, as 
suggested earlier, faster growth will mean increase in firm financial performance 
(Black et al., 2006). Following prior CG research (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, 
Beiner et al., 2006, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), this study controls for three variables of 
firm size: market value, total asset and local stock market size rating of firms. Hence, 
the study hypothesis that firm total asset (TA), firm stock market size rating (F-SIZE) 
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and market value (MV) affect either positively or negatively on firm returns. Hence 
these variables are controlled for in each panel estimation. 
 
 5.5.4 Dual Listing 
 
Firms strategically choose to secondarily list their shares in a foreign market which 
may or may not involve initial public offering (IPO) or raising additional capital. The 
benefits of cross-listing have been argued to include financial gains, increase in 
liquidity, increased shareholder base, visibility and market motivation (Licht, 2004). 
Cross-listing of firms can serve as a bonding structure to corporate managers to gain 
the trust of investors and show investors they are committed to sound CG disclosure 
practices which may increase market valuation (Siegel, 2009).  
 
Some studies have investigated cross-listing firm economic performance nexus and 
have shown consistency with the bonding hypothesis. For example, some scholars 
have reported larger stock reactions (Miller, 1999), higher valuation (Doidge et al., 
2004), increased financial analyst scrutiny (Lang et al., 2003), better environmental 
information (Bailey et al., 2006) and increased access to external finance (Reese and 
Weisbach, 2002). Dual-listed (DUA-LIST) firms are argued to have more 
transparency as a result of high scrutiny in different markets, which may attract 
investors and hence impact on firm returns (Ntim, 2012b, Ntim et al., 2012). Hence, 
the study predicts an association between dual listing and firm financial returns.  
 
 5.5.5 Industry (Indus) and Year Dummies (YD) 
 
As a result of differences in the complexity of business lines, operations, capital 
requirements, growth opportunities, access to markets, innovation, ownership structures, 
corporate governance practices and firm performance may vary between industries 
(Ntim, 2012b, Ntim et al., 2012). In addition, local and global economic conditions 
and developments may affect different industries in different ways. For example, 
while most industries were affected by the 2008 financial crisis, financial firms were 
more affected than other industry firms. More so, owing to innovation in the telecom 
industries, they are expected to grow faster than manufacturing or agricultural firms, 
and therefore telecom firms may experience greater financial returns than other firms. 
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Thus, following prior literature, industry (six industry dummies in both South Africa 
and Nigeria) effect can impacts on firm performance either negatively or positively.  
Thus, industry individualities are controlled.  
 
Similarly, there is general consensus that corporate governance practices and firm 
performance vary and change over time (Henry, 2008,pp.933). Some scholars have 
shown that firm year is associated positively with firm financial outcomes. More so, 
current financial outcomes can influence future financial returns and corporate 
governance practices (e.g. Henry, 2008, Ntim, 2012b, Ntim et al., 2012). Following 
these prior studies, this study predicts that year dummies (YD) for the five firm years 
in each country impact differently on firm performance.  
 
 5.5.6 Audit Firm Size (Big 4 Auditors) 
 
Extant literature suggests that the size of an audit firm matters in determining CG 
systems, quality of annual reports and firm valuation (El Ghoul et al., 2016, Ntim, 
2013c, Ntim et al., 2010). Particularly, literature suggests that the extent to which an 
auditor is independent and audit quality are dependent on the size of the audit firm. 
This is because the size of an audit firm determines its access to resources (e.g. human 
capital, internationalisation, information, knowledge and finance), its reputation, and 
independence (Young et al., 2008,pp.1108) . This implies that large and international 
audit firms such as Deloittes, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG and Ernst and 
Young (EY) enjoy size advantage over smaller firms that may not be able to resist 
management pressure in conflict situations (Ntim, 2009).  
 
Literature suggests that audit firm size positively correlates with audit fees (Alsaeed, 
2006, Francis, 1984) . This implies that firms are more likely to employ the big four 
audit firms as they are expected to have access to resources in addition to both local 
and international reputation. Consequent firms who employ these large firms are 
willing to adhere to stringent CG standards and quality financial reporting, which 
enhances firm valuation. However, the associated increase in audit fees as a result of 
employing a large audit firm suggests that there is an inverse relationship with 
accounting returns of firms. The study predicts that audit firm size (AF-SIZE) impacts 
on the quality of financial reports and as such larger firms tend to use the big four 
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auditor firms (i.e. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG and 
Ernst and Young) who are perceived as trustworthy (El Ghoul et al., 2016). In this 
study, a dummy variable ‘1’ is used if a firm is audited by a top big four firm (i.e. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG and Ernst and Young), 
otherwise ‘0’.  
 
5.6 Data Collection and Sample Selection  
 5.6.1 Source of CG Information: Annual Reports 
 
Data for internal CG variables and compliance index are collected principally based on 
firm’s CG information provided annual reports. Annual reports are chosen as the main 
source of information for this thesis due to the following reasons First, it has been 
contended that the compulsory nature of annual reports for listed firms across the globe 
makes them a consistent and reliable source to collect CG and financial information 
(Stanton and Stanton, 2002, Cooke, 1989). This is because firms can be sanctioned and 
sued for disclosing misleading information in annual reports. Furthermore, evidence 
from prior research suggests that annual report disclosure levels are positively 
associated with lower cost of equity capital (Wallace et al., 1994, Botosan, 2000, 
Botosan, 1997). Third, the weight of annual report disclosures used by many major 
corporate governance independent professional research and ratings agencies (e.g. 
CLSA, AIMR/AFAF/ SEC, S&P) ranges between 40%–50% of the overall firm 
disclosure scores while quarterly and other information published by firms ranges 
between 30%–40% (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Following from Botosan and Plumlee 
(2002), the weight attached to annual reports shows their importance as one of the most 
essential sources of corporate governance information. In addition, as some authors 
contend (e.g.,  Botosan and Plumlee, 2002, Botosan, 2000, Botosan, 1997), a firm’s 
annual report is a principal firm reporting document; as such, any other financial report 
is in some respects a subordinate or an add-on to it. More so, given unavailability of 
CG information in most financial data sources such as DataStream and Compustat for 
African countries, annual reports are considered the natural choice for corporate 
governance information. Finally, the use of annual reports is consistent with previous 
CG studies conducted in Africa, which have principally used annual reports ( e.g. Ntim 
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et al., 2014b, Ntim et al., 2014a, Ntim, 2014, Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014), and thus 
will allow for direct comparison of the study results.  
 
Though the preceding discussion contends that annual reports are the main source of 
data for the research, other sources of data are used to supplement data from the annual 
reports. For example, data from other sources such as DataStream, Compustat, 
company websites and other relevant sources where available are used to triangulate 
with the information available on annual reports. By employing other data sources to 
complement the main data source, this study uses data triangulation as a strategy 
whereby multiple perspective of the same phenomena are considered through analysis 
of different data sources. According to Bryman and Bell (2011), richness and depth are 
gained with an analysis of multiple sources of data available to the researcher for each 
of the variables under study. 
 5.6.2 Sample Selection  
 
As mentioned earlier, included in the research are Nigeria and South Africa. The 
sampled firms included in this study are drawn from firms listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) and the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSX). Data for this study 
covers a five-year period (2010–2015). The choice of listed companies and period is 
because of the following reasons: 
 
First, the possibility of data availability and completeness for listed firms included in 
the study. Second, the CG codes operational in these countries were implemented 
before this period and therefore compliance with these codes can only be measured in 
the post-implementation era. Third, using the same period and type of firms allows for 
comparison across both countries. In addition, a five-year period meets the 
requirements for a dynamic panel data analysis (to be discussed in next section). More 
so, a five-year data set with both cross-sectorial and time series properties assists in 
ascertaining if the perceived cross-country and sectorial internal CG structures and firm 
financial performance nexus are consistent over time. In addition, sufficient time series 
data for five years is necessary to permit statistical and robustness analyses such as the 
test of endogeneity. Finally, using listed firms and a five-year period is consistent with 
prior studies in Africa which have typically used listed firms covering a five-year period 
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(Ntim et al., 2015b, Ntim et al., 2014b, Ntim et al., 2014a, Ntim, 2014, Ntim, 2013a, 
Abor and Fiador, 2013, Ehikioya, 2009, Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008, Khanchel El 
Mehdi, 2007, Sanda et al., 2005). 
 
As of 31 December 2015, there were 188 listed firms on the Nigerian stock exchange 
(NSX), and South Africa (JSE) had 402 companies. The study first adopts a purposive 
sampling strategy to maximise representativeness of the sample in relation to the 
number of listed firms. Purposive sampling is used to select 80 firms from Nigeria and 
100 firms from South Africa covering five-year period. Therefore, the sample size after 
purposive sampling gives a total of 500 firm-years (2010–2014) for South Africa and 
400 firm years (2011–2015) for Nigeria, with a total of 900 firm years of data (i.e. 900 
annual reports).  
 
Following purposive sampling above, the next step captures a representative sample of 
listed firms for the 80 firms included in the final sample for Nigeria and 100 for South 
Africa. In this regard, a stratified quota sampling technique was adopted to include a 
representative sample from major industries in the respective stock markets. 
 
In South Africa, all 402 listed firms on the JSE belong to one of the ten major industries, 
namely financials, oil and gas, consumer goods, consumer services, health care, 
industrials, technology, telecommunications, basic materials and utilities (see table 5, 
panel A). Health care, oil and gas, utilities and telecommunications industries where 
distributed to similar industry class because they each have less than ten listings and 
these firms represent less than 5% of the total of listed firms (see table 5, panel A and 
B).  For example, health care is added to consumer services, and oil, gas and utilities 
are added to basic materials while telecoms IS added to technology (table 5, see panel 
B). For the final 100 sampled firms from South Africa, quota sampling is based on the 
quota of the resulting six industries, which gives a representation of 25% of the total 
sample of firms listed on the JSE. 
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Table 5: Summary of the South African Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Panel A: Industrial composition of all listed firms as of 
31/12/2014  
No.  of 
listed firms 
in each 
industry  
Percentage 
(%) of total 
population  
Financials  109 27.1% 
Industrials  81 20.1% 
Basic Materials  67 16.7% 
Consumer Services  62 15.4% 
Consumer Goods  36 9.0% 
Technology  31 7.7% 
Health Care  7 1.7% 
Telecommunications  4 1.0% 
Oil and Gas  3 0.7% 
Utilities  2 0.5% 
Total Sample  402 100% 
   
 Panel B: Industrial composition of companies available 
to be sampled 
No.  of 
listed firms 
in each 
industry  
Percentage 
(%) of total 
population  
Financials  109 27.1% 
Industrials  81 20.1% 
Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  72 17.9% 
Consumer Services/Health Care  69 17.2% 
Consumer Goods  36 9.0% 
Technology/Telecommunications  35 8.7% 
Total sample 402 100% 
   
Panel C: Final 100 stratified quota-sampled firms  No.  of 
listed firms 
in each 
industry  
Final no. of 
stratified 
quota sample  
Final 
sample 
percentage 
of total 
listed 
population  
Final 
sample 
percentage 
(%) of 
industrial 
sample  
Financial Services 109 27 6.7% 25% 
Industrials  81 20 5.0% 25% 
Basic Materials /Oil and Gas /Utilities  72 18 4.5% 25% 
Consumer Services / Health Care  69 17 4.3% 25% 
Consumer Goods  36 9 2.2% 25% 
Technology /Telecommunications  35 9 2.2% 25% 
Total Sample  402 100 25% 
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Like South Africa, all the 188 listed firms in the NSX were sampled to select 80 firms 
which are representative of the stock exchange listing. Listed firms in the NSX are 
categorised into 11 major industries, namely, financials, industrial goods, oil and gas, 
construction/real estate, natural resources, consumer goods, conglomerates, health care, 
telecommunications, agriculture and services (see table 6, panel A). Owing to fact that 
there were fewer than ten listings in each of the categories of construction/real estate, 
natural resources, conglomerates, telecommunications and agriculture (see table 6, 
panel A below), these categories were distributed to industries with similar 
characteristics (see table 6, panel B below). To enable classification into related 
industries, a description of the various industries in the NSX was used as a guide to 
make sure industries which are put together are more similar than any other industry 
classification. Thus, conglomerates were added to industrial goods; natural resources 
was added to oil and gas; agriculture was added to consumer goods; health care was 
added to services; and construction/real estate and ICT/telecommunications were added 
together (see panel B, table 6 below). For the final 80 firms used in the sample from 
Nigeria, quota sampling based on resulting six industries gives a representation of 43% 
of the total sample of listed firms in the NSX.  
 
To be included in the sample across both countries, a mixture of both large and small 
firms was chosen based on the average market capitalisation of firms in an industry as 
reported in the respective stock exchanges. All firms sampled must have full annual 
report for the period 2010–2014 for South Africa and 2011–2015 for Nigeria. This 
must be available either through the respective stock exchange information centre, 
DataStream or Compustat, or available via another media site such as INET-Bridge 
electronic database, the African Securities Exchanges Association (ASEA), 
AfricanFinancials.com or the company website.  
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Table 6: Summary of Nigerian Sample Selection Procedure 
Panel A:  Industrial composition of all listed firms as of 31/12/2015  No.  of listed 
firms in each 
industry  
Percentage (%) 
of total 
population  
Financials  57 30.3% 
Industrial Goods 21 11.2% 
Construction/Real Estate 9 4.8% 
Natural Resources  5 2.7% 
Consumer Goods  28 14.9% 
Conglomerates  6 3.2% 
Health Care  11 5.9% 
Telecommunication /ICT 9 4.8% 
Oil and Gas  14 7.4% 
Agriculture  5 2.7% 
Services  23 12.1% 
Total population  188 100% 
Panel B: Industrial composition of companies available to be sampled No. of listed 
firms in each 
industry  
Percentage (%) 
of total 
population  
Financials  57 30.3% 
Industrials/Conglomerates  27 14.3% 
Natural Resources/Oil and Gas/Utilities  19 10.1% 
Consumer Services/Health Care  34 18.0% 
Consumer Goods/Agriculture  33 17.6% 
ICT/Real Estate   18 9.6% 
Total population  188 100% 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Final 80 stratified quota-sampled firms  No. of listed 
firms in 
each 
industry  
Final no. of 
stratified quota 
sample  
Final sample 
percentage of 
total listed 
population  
Final sample 
percentage (%) of 
industrial sample  
Financials  57 31 17% 54% 
Industrials/Conglomerates  27 6 4% 22% 
Natural Resources/Oil and Gas/Utilities  19 9 5% 47% 
Consumer Services Health Care  34 12 6% 35% 
Consumer Goods/Agriculture  33 16 9% 48% 
ICT/Real Estate   18 6 4% 33% 
Total population  188 80 45% 
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5.7 Summary of Chapter  
 
To examine the main research question and sub-research questions highlighted in 
section 1.4.1.1, this chapter has presented, discussed and justified the chosen research 
methodology. Specifically, the chapter clearly articulates the research methods, 
analytical approaches, variables, data collection methods employed to examine the 
main research question (1.4.1) and sub-research questions (1.4.1.1). More importantly, 
the chapter develops model specification for the compliance index model and the 
equilibrium variable model. Hence, the chapter overlays the foundation within which 
Chapter 6 (descriptive for country-level CG compliance) and Chapter 7 (descriptive for 
country-level CG alternative internal mechanisms and correlation results) are 
developed.   
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CHAPTER 6 
6.0 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: COMPLIANCE WITH COUNTRY-
LEVEL GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS (NICGI & SACGI) 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, two main CG models are employed to examine sub-
research questions 1 and 2. This chapter presents the descriptive statistics for country-
level compliance with CG provisions which is the descriptive for the independent 
variables in the compliance index model. To begin with, section 6.2 presents 
comparative descriptive statistics for level of compliance with Nigeria’s SEC 2011 
corporate governance code (measured by the index NICGI) and South Africa’s King 
III code (measured by the index SACGI). These descriptives are reported in table 7 
(Panel A) and represented diagrammatically in figure one (Fig 1). The next section 
(6.3) presents the descriptive statistics for country-level compliance with shareholder 
CG provisions and as reported in table 7 (Panel B) and in figure one (Fig 1). Section 
6.4 presents the descriptive statistics for country-level institutional stakeholder CG 
provisions as shown in figure three (Fig 3) and reported in table 7 (Panel C). 6.5 
compares the level of compliance between firms cross-listed in other stock markets 
(dual list) and firm who are not cross-listed (non-dualist) in both countries and 
reported in panel A in table 8. Section 6.6 compares the level of compliance between 
firms audited by the top four international auditors (Deloittes, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG and Ernst and Young) and those audited by 
non-top four auditors and the descriptives are presented in panel B in table 8. 
Similarly, 6.7 discusses CG compliance descriptives between large and small firms as 
shown in table 9, panel A. The next section (6.8) presents comparative compliance 
descriptives between financial and non-financial firms as shown in table 9, panel B. 
Finally, 6.9 presents the conclusion of the chapter.  
 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics: Compliance with Country-level Corporate 
Governance Provisions  
 
As noted earlier, countries have developed CG regulations based on the institutional 
realities of conducting business in these countries. For example, South Africa as 
discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.3) has developed the King III report with provisions 
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aimed at eradicating the problems caused by apartheid, whereas Nigeria’s CG code is 
geared towards alleviating inequalities and corruption, attracting foreign investors and 
reducing the problems faced during the military era. As such, the next few paragraphs 
present and compare how firms have complied with these CG provisions in the 
respective countries. Table 7, panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum and percentage increase in country-level CG compliance by listed firms in 
Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
From panel A on table 7 below, there has been an increasing trend of compliance with 
country-level CG codes in both Nigeria and South Africa. The average compliance by 
Nigerian firms to the SEC 2011 CG code ranges from 63.9% (i.e. 48 out of 75) in 
2011 to 79.92% (i.e. 60 out of 75) in 2015, with a pooled average of 71.38% (i.e. 54 
out of 75), whereas in South Africa, firm application of King III CG code ranges from 
80.39% (i.e. 66 out of 84) in 2010 to 89.16% (i.e. 75 out of 84) in 2014, with a pooled 
average of 86.05% (i.e. 72 out of 84). The average level of compliance with King III 
within the 5-year period (86.05%) surpasses the compliance level of 61.34% reported 
by Ntim (2012; p.45; 2013, p.13), who used the King II CG code for the period 2002 
to 2006 and 2002 to 2007 respectively. However, the average compliance with SEC 
2011 CG code (71.38%) is like the 72% level of compliance reported by Akinkoye 
and Oladsnmi (2014) using SEC 2003 CG code for the period 2003–2010.  
 
Furthermore, from figure 1 below, comparatively, South African firms comply more 
with the country-level CG provisions than Nigerian firms. This is because South 
African firms have reached a level of maturity in CG regulatory compliance since 
they started reporting on CG practices in 1994 after the King I report, whereas 
Nigerian firms may still be getting accustomed to CG compliance as its first CG code 
was introduced in 2003. However, over the five-year sampled period, Nigerian firms 
seem to be increasing their compliance level over the years more than South African 
firms. The average increase within the five-year period in Nigeria ranges from 2.90% 
in 2013 to the highest of 5.68% in 2015, with five-year pooled average of 4.01%, 
whereas, in South Africa, average compliance by listed firms ranges from 0.58% in 
2014 to a high of 4.52% in 2011, with a pooled average of 2.19%. These figures 
suggest that, after the introduction of King III, firms increased their CG compliance in 
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2011, but, beyond that, compliance levels have increased at a decreasing rate. In 
Nigeria, however, listed firms are on average increasing their CG compliance levels.  
 
In addition, there is high variability in compliance with country-level CG provisions. 
However, Nigerian firms show higher variations in their CG compliance than South 
African firms. For example, the standard deviation for CG compliance in Nigeria is 
approximately 16.71% (i.e. 13 out of 75), with a pooled maximum of 98.87% (i.e. 74 
out of 75) and minimum of 16% (i.e. 7 out of 75). But in South Africa, compliance 
with King III has an average variation of 7.88% (i.e. 7 out of 84), with a minimum of 
52% (i.e. 44 out of 84) and a maximum of 98% (i.e. 82 out of 84). This suggests that, 
in Nigeria, despite the increasing demand for compliance with CG provisions across 
the globe, some firms comply with less than 50% of the SEC 2011 CG requirements, 
whereas listed South African firms comply with more than 50% of King III CG 
requirements.  
 
Fig. 1: Compliance with Country-level Corporate Governance Provisions  
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics – Compliance with Country-level Corporate Governance 
Index (NICGI & SACGI), Shareholder and Stakeholder Corporate Governance Provisions  
 
 
 
Nigeria (400 firm years, i.e. 2011–2015) 
 
South Africa (500 firm years, i.e. 2010–2014) 
 
Year Mean SD Min Max % Increase Mean SD Min Max % 
Increase 
 
 Panel A: Compliance with Country-level Corporate Governance Provisions (NICGI & SACGI)  
 
Nigerian Corporate Governance Index (NICGI) 
 
South African Corporate Governance Index 
(SACGI) 
 
All Firm Years 71.38 16.71 16.00 98.67 4.01 86.05 7.88 52.00 98.00 2.19 
2010 - - - - - 80.39 8.68 52.00 94.00 - 
2011 63.90 17.09 16.00 96.00 0.00 84.91 7.27 54.00 98.00 4.52 
2012 67.98 17.32 16.00 96.00 4.08 87.21 6.89 55.00 98.00 2.30 
2013 70.88 15.77 16.00 96.00 2.90 88.58 6.73 55.00 98.00 1.37 
2014 74.23 14.91 16.00 97.33 3.35 89.16 6.39 55.00 98.00 0.58 
2015 79.92 14.00 21.33 98.67 5.68 - - - - - 
 
Panel B: Compliance with Country-level Shareholder Corporate Governance Provisions 
 
Nigerian Shareholder Corporate Governance Index (Shareholder–
NICGI) 
 
South African Shareholder Corporate Governance 
Index (Shareholder–SACGI) 
 
All Firm Years 72.71 15.45 18.03 98.36 3.86 87.36 8.24 54.00 100.00 2.27 
2010 - - - - - 81.41 9.12 54.00 94.00 - 
2011 65.61 15.91 18.03 95.08 - 86.36 7.65 55.00 99.00 4.95 
2012 69.39 15.97 18.03 95.08 4.08 88.60 7.23 56.00 100.00 2.24 
2013 72.13 14.44 18.03 95.08 2.90 89.96 7.01 56.00 100.00 1.36 
2014 75.39 13.43 18.03 96.72 3.35 90.47 6.63 56.00 100.00 0.51 
2015 81.05 12.99 24.59 98.36 5.66 - - - - - 
 
 Panel C: Compliance with Country-level Stakeholder Corporate Governance Provisions 
 
Nigerian Stakeholder Corporate Governance Index (Stakeholder–
NICGI) 
 
South African Stakeholder Corporate Governance 
Index (Stakeholder–SACGI) 
 
All Firm Years 65.59 26.41 0 100.00 4.64 79.43 10.12 23.00 100.00 1.80 
2010 - - - - - 75.21 10.96 23.00 100.00 - 
2011 56.43 26.93 0 100.00 - 77.78 9.43 46.00 92.00 2.57 
2012 61.88 27.46 0 100.00 5.45 80.07 9.22 46.00 100.00 2.29 
2013 65.45 25.85 0 100.00 3.57 81.67 9.39 46.00 100.00 1.60 
2014 69.20 25.81 7.14 100.00 3.75 82.40 9.95 46.00 100.00 0.73 
2015 75.00 22.50 7.14 100.00 5.80 - - - - - 
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6.3 Descriptive Statistics: Compliance with Country-level Shareholder 
Corporate Governance Provisions  
 
As noted earlier in 5.2.4.1 (Chapter 5), two sub-indices are developed in the 
respective countries with one containing provisions aimed at protecting shareholder 
value whereas the other captures context-specific stakeholder issues. This section 
therefore discusses and compares the distributional characteristics of firm-level 
compliance with 61 provisions in Nigeria (Shareholder–NICGI) and the 71 
conventional shareholder corporate governance requirements in South Africa 
(Shareholder–SACGI) aimed at protecting shareholder value maximisation in both 
countries. The essence is to ascertain whether firm-level compliance with country-
level CG requirements (NICGI and SACGI) observed in the preceding section also 
exists in terms of compliance with shareholder requirements. As noted earlier in 
section 4.11 in Chapter 4, it is expected that a high level of compliance with 
shareholder requirements of SEC 2011 CG code and King III will signal to investors 
the presence of high-quality standards within listed firms in both countries, which will 
show greater transparency, accountability and commitment to reducing information 
asymmetry.  
 
Panel B on table 7 above and figure 2 (Fig.2) below report the pooled average and 
annual aggregate levels of compliance with Shareholder–NICGI and Shareholder–
SACGI in Nigeria and South Africa respectively. Several patterns can be observed in 
Panel B and figure two. First of all, consistent with the level of compliance with 
NICGI and SACGI, there is evidence of wide variability in the level of compliance 
with shareholder provisions in both countries. The scores in Nigeria range from 
65.61% (i.e. 40 out of 61) in 2011 to 81.05% (i.e. 49 out of 61) in 2015, with a pooled 
average of 72.71% (i.e. 44 out of 61). Similarly, Shareholder–SACGI scores in South 
Africa range from 81.41% (i.e. 57 out of 71) in 2010 to 90.47% (i.e. 64 out of 71) in 
2014, with a pooled aggregate of 87.36% (i.e. 62 out of 71). This suggests that firms 
in both countries comply with shareholder CG provisions in the same manner as they 
comply with the composite country-level provisions (NICGI and SACGI). However, 
on average in both countries, compliance with shareholder requirements is higher than 
compliance with the composite index. For example, in Nigeria, on average firms’ 
compliance with Shareholder–NICGI is at 72.71% whereas it is at 71.38% for NICGI. 
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Similarly, in South Africa, firm compliance with Shareholder–SACGI is on average 
87.36% compared to 86.05% for SACGI. Like SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI 
aggregate compliance results are higher than those reported by Ntim, (2012, p.19; 
2013, p.13).  
 
In addition, as with NICGI and SACGI, there is an increasing trend in compliance 
with shareholder provisions in both countries. The pooled average increase in 
compliance with Shareholder–SACGI is 2.27%, with a maximum increase of 4.95% 
in 2011 and a minimum of 0.51% in 2014. Similarly, Shareholder–NICGI shows an 
aggregate increase of 3.86%, ranging from 2.90% in 2013 to 5.66% in 2015. 
Comparatively, the average percentage increase in Shareholder–SACGI (2.27%) is 
higher than for the SACGI (2.19%). On the contrary, in Nigeria, Shareholder–NICGI 
has a lower aggregate percentage increase (3.86%) as compared to NICGI (4.01%).  
 
Similar to NICGI and SACGI, from figure two below, comparatively, South African 
firms on average comply more with shareholder CG provisions than Nigerian firms. 
However, consistent with the respective compliance levels for NICGI and SACGI 
reported earlier, on average, over the five-year sampled period in both countries, 
Nigerian firms are increasing their shareholder requirement compliance level more 
year-on-year than South African firms. Aggregate shareholder CG compliance 
increased in the five-year period in Nigeria, ranging from 2.90% in 2013 to the 
highest level of 5.66% in 2015, with a pooled average of 3.86%. While in South 
Africa, average compliance with shareholder CG requirements by listed firms ranged 
from 0.51% in 2014 to a high of 4.95% in 2011, with a pooled average of 2.19%. 
Hence, similar to NICGI, listed firms in Nigeria are on average increasing their 
compliance with shareholder CG provisions. On the contrary but consistent with 
SACGI, after the introduction of King III, firms increased their shareholder CG 
compliance in 2011, but, beyond that, compliance levels to shareholder requirements 
have increased at a decreasing rate.  
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Fig. 2: Compliance with Country-level Shareholder Corporate Governance Provisions  
 
 
 
 
6.4 Descriptive Statistics: Compliance with Country-level Stakeholder 
Corporate Governance Provisions 
 
As earlier discussed, countries have incorporated stakeholder inclusive practices in 
CG codes, requiring firms to comply with them. As noted earlier, these 
contextual/institutional stakeholder inclusive provisions in the respective countries are 
reflective of the prevailing economic, political, socio-cultural and historical processes.  
 
As mentioned earlier, SACGI and NICGI were split into two, with one containing 
provisions aimed at protecting shareholder value (descriptive discussed in 6.3) 
whereas the other captures country-specific stakeholder issues. As such, this section 
discusses and compares the distributional features of firm-level compliance with 13 
provisions in South Africa (Stakeholder–SACGI) and 14 stakeholder inclusive 
requirements in Nigeria (Stakeholder–NICGI) aimed at protecting stakeholder 
expectations in both countries. The reason for this is to ascertain whether firm-level 
compliance with country-level and shareholder CG requirements discussed in 6.2 and 
6.3 respectively exists in terms of compliance with institutional stakeholder 
provisions. As mentioned in section 4.11 (Chapter 4), it is expected that a high level 
of compliance with stakeholder requirements of SEC 2011 CG code and King III 
signals that a firm is conforming to societal norms and expectations in respective 
countries, which shows greater transparency and accountability beyond shareholder 
expectations.  
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Descriptive results for pooled average and annual combined levels of compliance with 
Stakeholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–SACGI in Nigeria and South Africa 
respectively are reported in Panel C in table 7 above and figure three (Fig.3) below. 
Interesting distributional properties can be observed in figure 3 and panel C. To begin 
with, like the levels of compliance with NICGI and SACGI, there is an indication of 
wide heterogeneity in the levels of compliance with stakeholder provisions in both 
countries. The scores in South Africa range from 75.21% (i.e. 10 out of 13) in 2010 to 
82.40% (i.e. 11 out of 13) in 2014, with a pooled average of 79.43% (i.e. 10 out of 
13). However, in Nigeria, Stakeholder–NICGI scores vary with a maximum of 75% 
(i.e. 11 out of 14) in 2015 and a minimum of 56.43% (i.e. 8 out of 14) in 2011, with a 
combined average of 65.59% (i.e. 9 out of 14). These results imply that listed firms in 
Nigeria and South Africa are compliant with institutional/contextual stakeholder CG 
practices in the same way that compliant with both the composite country-level 
provisions (NICGI and SACGI) as well as the shareholder provisions. However, 
contrary to the descriptive observed with compliance with shareholder requirements, 
compliance with country-specific stakeholder requirements is less than compliance 
with the composite index (SACGI and NICGI) and shareholder provisions in both 
South Africa and Nigeria. For instance, in South Africa, on average firm compliance 
with Stakeholder–SACGI is at 79.43% whereas compliance with SACGI and 
Shareholder–SACGI are at 86.05% and 87.36% respectively. Equally in Nigeria, firm 
compliance with Stakeholder–NICGI is on average 65.59% compared to 72.71% for 
Shareholder–NICGI and 71.38% for NICGI. Interestingly, Stakeholder–SACGI 
average compliance results are similar those reported by Ntim et al. (2012,pp.19), 
Ntim (2013a,pp.13) in South Africa using stakeholder provisions from the King II CG 
code.  
 
More so, both countries show similar increasing trends in compliance with context-
specific stakeholder provisions. In Nigeria, the pooled average increase in compliance 
with stakeholder requirements is 4.64%, with a maximum increase of 5.80% in 2015 
and a minimum of 3.57% in 2013. Likewise, compliance with the King III CG 
provisions displays a pooled average increase of 1.80%, with a minimum of 0.73% in 
2014 and a maximum of 2.57% in 2011. 
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Fig. 3: Compliance with Country-level Stakeholder Corporate Governance Provisions  
 
 
Interestingly, year-on-year average increase in compliance with stakeholder CG 
provisions in Nigeria is on average higher (4.64%) than for the composite index, i.e. 
NICGI (4.64%) and shareholder index (3.86%). In contrast, aggregate percentage 
increase in Stakeholder CG practices in South Africa is lower (1.80%) as compared to 
shareholder CG compliance (2.27%) and the composite index, i.e. SACGI (2.19%).  
This suggests that, while compliance with country-specific CG practices in both 
countries is increasing, Nigerian firms are continuously improvising on their 
disclosure of stakeholder CG practices year-on-year whereas South African firms are 
increasing their stakeholder CG practices but at a decreasing rate. This suggests that, 
consistent with SACGI and Shareholder–SACGI, after the introduction of King III, 
firms increased compliance with South African contextual stakeholder practices in 
2011, but beyond that, compliance levels with contextual stakeholder practices have 
increased at a decreasing rate.  
 
However, consistent with the results reported for the composite indices in both 
countries as well as the shareholder indices, comparative examination from figure 
three above (Fig.3) shows that, on average, South African-listed firms comply more 
with South African context stakeholder CG provisions than Nigerian firms. Worthy of 
note is that in both countries, while some firms comply with stakeholder provisions 
fully across all firm years, some firms do not or comply partially with stakeholder CG 
practices. For example, from 2011 to 2013, some firms in Nigeria have a zero score 
(non-compliance), 7.14% in 2014 and 2015, whereas in South Africa, the least score 
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for stakeholder compliance in 2010 was 23% and increased to 46% in the subsequent 
years to 2014. This low level of compliance with country-specific CG provisions in 
both countries suggests that some firms may not see the value of disclosing or 
complying with stakeholder expectations.  
 
Following CG compliance literature (e.g. v Werder et al., 2005, Ntim et al., 2012, 
Ntim et al., 2015b), the pooled samples in both countries are split into sub samples on 
the basis of listing, external auditor size, firm size and industry. The aim of these 
splits is to verify whether the observed variability in country-level composite CG 
indices and sub-indices can be explained by firm-level characteristics. In addition, the 
sample is divided into these different groups because these firm-level characteristics 
(e.g. firm size and industry) are the main criteria for stratified sample (discussed in 
5.6.2) of 100 firms and 80 firms selected in South Africa and Nigeria respectively. 
Therefore, the next section further examines the distributional properties of the 
country-level CG index and the sub-composite indices (shareholder and stakeholder 
indices) across these firm- and industry-level peculiarities.  
 
 
6.5 Descriptive Statistics: Country-level Compliance Between Dual- 
and Non-Dual-Listed Firms 
 
As discussed in 5.5.4, dual listing can serve as a bonding structure used by corporate 
managers to gain the trust of investors and show investors they are committed to 
sound CG disclosure practices which may increase market valuation (Siegel, 2009). In 
addition, dual-listed firms are argued to have more CG transparency owing to high 
scrutiny (Ntim, 2012b, Ntim et al., 2012). To ascertain whether dual-listed firms are 
more likely to comply with CG provisions in respective countries, the sample was 
split between dual-listed and non-dual-listed firms.   
 
Panel A in table 8 and figure four (Fig.4) below show the levels of compliance 
between dual-listed firms and non-dual-listed firms based on the pooled mean. Firm-
level compliance with the Nigerian Corporate Governance Index (NICGI) for dual-
listed-firms displays an average of 82.04% (i.e. 62 out of 75), with a maximum of 
98.67% (i.e. 74 out of 75) and a minimum of 42.67% (i.e. 32 out of 75), with a 
standard deviation of 7.58%. However, non-dual-listed firms on average comply with 
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NICGI at 69.12% (i.e. 52 out of 75), with the most compliant firm scoring 96% (i.e. 
72 out of 75) and the least compliant score of 16% (i.e. 12 out of 75), with a variation 
of 16.45%. Similarly, on average, dual-listed South African firms comply with 
88.74% (i.e. 75 out of 84) of the King III CG provisions, with a high of 98% (i.e. 82 
out of 84), a low of 69% (i.e. 58 out of 84) and a variation of 4.96%. In contrast, non-
dual-listed South African firms on average comply with 85.5% (i.e. 72 out of 84) of 
SACGI, with a minimum of 52% (i.e. 44 out of 84), a maximum of 98% (i.e. 82 out of 
84) and a variation of 8.25%. These results suggest cross-listed firms in both countries 
comply with country-level CG requirements more than non-dual-listed firms. These 
results support the bonding hypothesis argument that dual listing subjects firms to 
more rigorous CG requirements, which enhances their ability to comply with country-
level CG practices, especially for firms from weak institutional environments ( see, 
Charitou et al., 2007, Coffee Jr, 2002, Lel and Miller, 2008).  
 
Fig. 4: Compliance level between dual-listed and non-dual-listed firms  
 
 
However, comparatively, there is considerable heterogeneity between South Africa 
and Nigeria regarding compliance by dual-listed firms. For example, the mean 
difference in compliance between dual- and non-dual-listed firms is significant at 1% 
in both countries, but there is a higher variation in Nigeria (12.914***) than in South 
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Africa (3.242***). This suggests more symmetry in compliance between cross-listed 
and non-cross-listed South African firms whereas there is more dispersion between 
these groupings in Nigerian. The low level of compliance heterogeneity between non-
dual-listed and dual-listed firms in South Africa can be attributed to the fact that 
South African firms have been accustomed to CG regulations since 1994. 
Accordingly, irrespective of dual listing, most firms have attained some level of 
maturity and are accustomed to CG compliance as it has become a culture embedded 
with firm CG practices irrespective of cross-listing status. However, the high variation 
between cross-listed Nigerian firms and non-cross-listed firms can be attributed to 
limited exposure to good CG practices, since firms were exposed to CG regulations 
only in 2003 and as such may be getting used to the compliance process. 
Consequently, cross-listed firms that are exposed to CG regulations in more stringent 
stock markets comply more to the SEC 2011 CG than non-dual-listed firms.    
 
Interestingly, there are non-cross-listed firms that comply with CG provisions more 
than some cross-listed firms in both countries. For example, the average compliance 
of non-cross-listed firms of 69.12% in Nigeria and 85.50% in South Africa compared 
to the minimum of 42.67% in Nigeria and 69% in South Africa for dual-listed firms 
suggests that some non-dual-listed firms comply with CG provisions more than some 
dual-listed firms.   
 
Similar to compliance with respective country CG indices (NICGI and SACGI), the 
level of compliance with shareholder and stakeholder CG provisions in both countries 
is higher for dual-listed firms than non-dual-listed firms. However, the mean variation 
in compliance with stakeholder CG practices in Nigeria shows a higher statistical 
significance (1%) than in South Africa (10%). Interestingly, there is almost an equal 
level of compliance with South African contextual CG provisions between dual-listed 
firms (80.84%) and non-dual-listed firms (79.14%). More so, consistent with country 
CG index, the compliance with shareholder and stakeholder CG provisions is higher 
in South Africa than in Nigeria, indicating South African firms comply with 
institutional CG expectations better than Nigerian firms.  
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6.6 Descriptive Statistics: Country-level Compliance Between Firms 
with Big 4 Auditors and Firms with Non-Big 4 Auditors 
 
As noted earlier in subsection 5.5.6, extant CG literature suggests that the size of an 
audit firm matters in determining CG systems, quality of annual reports and firm 
valuation (Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim, 2013a, El Ghoul et al., 2016). Particularly, 
literature suggests that the extent of an auditor’s independence and audit quality is 
dependent on the size of the external audit firm. Literature suggests that audit firm 
size is positively correlated with audit fees (Francis, 1984; Alsaeed, 2006). This 
implies large firms are more likely to employ the big four audit firms, as they expect 
to have access to resources in addition to both local and international reputation. 
Consequently, firms who employ these large audit firms are seen to be willing to 
adhere to stringent CG standards and quality financial reporting which enhances firm 
valuation. Thus, it is expected that firms who employ the top four audit firms (i.e. 
PWC, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG and Ernst and Young) are more likely to 
comply with CG provisions.  
 
External auditors in both the South African King III and Nigerian SEC 2011 CG are 
expected to certify the annual reports of firms to be of ‘true and fair’ value to the 
firms. In addition, audit firms in both countries are expected to comment on the level 
of existing CG systems in firms. Following from extant literature and the 
recommendation of the respective country-level CG codes, the sample was split into 
firms with top big four auditors and those audited by non-top big four auditors.  
 
Panel B on table 8 shows the distributional properties between firms audited by the 
big four auditors and those audited by non-big four auditors. The table shows that, on 
average, 87.15% (i.e. 73 out of 84) of firms audited by the big four auditors comply 
with King III CG provisions (SACGI), whereas firms with non-big four auditors 
comply at 84.39% (i.e. 71 out of 84). Similarly, in Nigeria, firms audited by the big 
four auditors comply with 75.92% of the SEC 2011 CG provisions (i.e. 56 out of 75) 
whereas firms audited by non-big four auditors comply with 62.57% (i.e. 47 out of 
75) of the SEC 2011 CG provisions. There is a statistically significant mean 
difference in compliance with respective country CG codes between firms audited by 
top four auditors and those not audited by top four auditors
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Table 8: Compliance Levels between Dual- and Non-Dual-Listed Firms (Panel A) and between Firms with Big 4 Auditors and Firms with Non-Big 4 
Auditors (Panel B)
Panel A: Level of Compliance – Dual-Listed versus Non-Dual-Listed Firms 
 Nigeria (400 firm years, i.e. 2011–2015) South Africa (500 firm years, i.e. 2010–2014) Mean Comparison (T-Test) 
 Dual-Listed Nigerian Firms (70 firm years) Dual-Listed South African Firms (85 firm years) Nigeria South Africa 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max   
Corporate Governance Index (NICGI & 
SACGI) 82.04 13.58 42.67 98.67 88.74 4.96 69.00 98.00 (12.914) *** (3.242) *** 
Shareholder Corporate Governance Index 80.70 12.78 45.90 98.36 90.38 5.05 69.00 99.00 (9.684) *** (3.634) *** 
Stakeholder Corporate Governance Index 87.86 19.66 28.57 100.00 80.84 9.91 54.00 100.00 (26.991) *** (1.698) * 
 
Non-Dual-Listed Nigerian Firms (330 firm 
years) 
Non-Dual-Listed South African Firms (315 firm 
years)   
Corporate Governance Index (NICGI & 
SACGI) 69.12 16.45 16.00 96.00 85.50 8.25 52.00 98.00   
Shareholder Corporate Governance Index 71.02 15.45 18.03 95.08 86.74 8.62 54.00 100.00   
Stakeholder Corporate Governance Index 60.87 25.23 0.00 100.00 79.14 10.15 23.00 100.00   
Panel B: Level of Compliance – Firms with Big 4 Auditors versus Firms with Non-Big 4 Auditors 
 
Nigerian Firms with Big 4 Auditors (264 firm 
years) 
South African Firms with Big 4 Auditors (301 firm 
years)   
Corporate Governance Index (NICGI & 
SACGI) 75.92 14.78 22.67 98.67 87.15 6.36 65.00 98.00 (13.556)*** (2.762)*** 
Shareholder Corporate Governance Index 76.21 13.72 22.95 98.36 88.51 6.68 66.00 99.00 (10.287)*** (2.901)*** 
Stakeholder Corporate Governance Index 74.68 23.78 21.43 100.00 80.28 9.65 23.00 100.00 (26.7234)*** (2.135)** 
 
Nigerian Firms with Non-Big 4 Auditors (136 
firm years) 
South African Firms with non-Big 4 Auditors (199 
firm years)   
Corporate Governance Index (NICGI & 
SACGI) 62.57 16.75 16.00 94.67 84.39 9.51 52.00 98.00   
Shareholder Corporate Governance Index 65.92 16.39 18.03 93.44 85.61 9.92 54.00 100.00   
Stakeholder Corporate Governance Index 47.95 22.01 0.00 100.00 78.14 10.69 38.00 92.00   
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This supports extant literature that the size of an audit firm is important in increasing 
CG compliance practices in both countries (Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim, 2013a, El Ghoul 
et al., 2016).  
 
In addition, like dual listing, the variation between compliance by firms audited by the 
big four auditors is high in Nigeria compared to South Africa. The mean difference in 
South Africa is 2.762*** but 13.556*** in Nigeria. Again, this suggests that South 
African firms on average irrespective of auditor’s size have less heterogeneity in their 
CG compliance than Nigerian firms. In addition, South African firms audited by both 
the big four auditors and non-big four auditors on average comply with SACGI 
(South Africa) better than Nigerian firms comply with NICGI.  
 
In addition, consistent with compliance with respective country compliance indices 
(NICGI and SACGI), compliance with shareholder and stakeholder CG requirements 
in Nigeria and South Africa is generally higher for firms with big four auditors than 
those with non-big four audit firms. The average variation in country-level 
stakeholder and shareholder CG requirements in both countries is statistically 
significant. Nevertheless, like dual listing, the heterogeneity in compliance with 
stakeholder CG practices by firms with top four auditors and those with non-top four 
auditors is higher in Nigeria (26.72***) than in South Africa (2.14***). Like dual 
listing, there is almost an equal level of compliance with South African contextual CG 
provisions for firms with top four auditors (80.28%) and non-top four audit firms 
(78.14%). More so, analogous with dual listing, compliance with shareholder and 
stakeholder CG provisions is higher in South Africa than in Nigeria. Again, this 
suggests that, irrespective of audit firm size, South African firms comply with 
stakeholder and stakeholder institutional CG expectations better than Nigerian firms.  
 
Following the above discussions, figure five (Fig.5) below shows the distributional 
properties between firms with top four auditors and firms with non-big four auditors 
in South Africa and Nigeria.  
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Fig. 5: Compliance Levels Between Firms with Big 4 Auditors and Firms with Non-Big 4 Auditors  
 
 
 
6.7 Descriptive Statistics: Country-level Compliance Between Large 
and Small Firms 
 
As noted earlier in 5.5.3, existing literature suggests the size of a firm is likely to 
affect both the quality of CG systems and firm performance (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006, 
Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim et al., 2012). Some authors have argued that, owing to the 
need to mitigate agency problems and reduce agency cost, large firms are likely to 
comply with country-level CG disclosure requirements (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim 
et al., 2012, p.17). However, other scholars (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004, p.713) posit 
that smaller firms tend to have better growth prospects than larger firms and will need 
external capital to finance growth. Thus, small firms will comply with CG 
requirements, as it signals commitment to transparency which attracts external 
financing. Moving away from prior studies using total assets (e.g. Ntim et al., 
2012,pp.17, Dauth et al., 2017,pp.77) as firm size proxy, this study adopts respective 
stock market rating of firm size to capture institutional classification of size. The 
following figure (Fig.6) displays the distributional compliance characteristics between 
large and small firms in both countries.  
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Fig. 6: Compliance Levels between Large and Small Firms  
 
 
Panel A in table 9 displays the descriptive features of compliance levels between large 
and small firms in the respective countries. To begin with, on average, large firms in 
Nigeria comply with 79.22% (i.e. 59 out of 75) of the SEC 2011 provisions whereas 
small firms comply with 64.08% (i.e. 48 out of 75), with a significant mean difference 
of 15.142*** at 1%. Similarly, in South Africa, small firms’ compliance with King III 
CG provisions on average is at 83.81% (i.e. 70 out of 84), compared to 88.29% (i.e. 
74 out of 84) for large firms, with significant mean difference of 4.484*** at 1%. This 
suggests that, like dual listing and big 4 auditors, large firms in both Nigeria and 
South Africa comply with country-level CG requirements more than small firms. This 
lends support to the argument that large firms are more likely to highly comply with 
country-level CG disclosure requirements to mitigate agency problems and reduce 
agency cost than smaller firms. In addition, the sample t-test for equality of means in 
both countries between small and large firms (Panel A, table 9, column 10 & 11) 
rejects the null hypothesis that the means are equal at 1% significance level.  
 
Comparatively, there is at least twice the level of heterogeneity in CG compliance 
between small and large firms in Nigeria than in South Africa. For example, the mean 
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level of variation in Nigeria between large and small firms is at 15.14% compared to 
4.48% in South Africa. In addition, between large firms, the level of variation in 
South Africa is at 5.22%, whereas in Nigeria it is at 14.24%. Similarly, small firms in 
South Africa vary in their compliance by 9.33%, while in Nigeria it is at 15.51%. This 
evidences that South African firms are improving their CG standards more 
symmetrically than Nigerian firms irrespective of size. In fact, the average 
compliance with King III CG provisions in South Africa by small firms (83.81%) is 
higher than the average compliance with SEC 2011 CG regulations by large firms in 
Nigeria (79.22%).  
 
Furthermore, consistent with compliance with respective country compliance indices 
(NICGI and SACGI) discussed in the preceding paragraphs, compliance with 
shareholder and stakeholder CG requirements by large firms is higher than for small 
firms. There is consistent statistically significant average variation in country-level 
stakeholder and shareholder CG requirements in both countries. Nonetheless, similar 
to dual listing and audit firm size, the level of compliance with country-level 
stakeholder CG practices by large firms compared to small firms is eight times as 
large in Nigeria (28.95***) than in South Africa (3.69***). In addition, comparable 
with dual listing and audit firm size, compliance with shareholder and stakeholder 
inclusive CG provisions by both large and small firms in South Africa is higher than 
in Nigeria. This implies that, irrespective of firm size, South African firms comply 
with institutional stakeholder CG expectations better than Nigerian firms. However, 
interestingly, large firms in Nigeria comply with institutional stakeholder (80.57%) 
provisions better than they do with the composite CG provisions (79.22%) and 
shareholder CG provisions (78.91%) of the SEC 2011 CG code, but the reverse is true 
for South African firms. The high level of compliance by large firms with institutional 
stakeholder provisions (though this involves huge financial cost) in both countries 
may signal to investors that they are committed to increasing accountability and good 
governance.  
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Table 9: Compliance Levels between Large and Small Firms (Panel A) & between Financial and Non-Financial Firms (Panel B) 
 
Panel A: Level of Compliance – Large versus Small Firms 
 Nigeria (400 firm years, i.e. 2011–2015) South Africa (500 firm years, i.e. 2010–2014) Mean Comparison 
 
Nigerian Large Firms (200 firm years) South African Large Firms (250 firm years) Nigeria South Africa 
Corporate Governance Index (NICGI & SACGI) 79.22 14.24 24.00 98.67 88.29 5.22 68.00 98.00 (15.142)*** (4.484)*** 
Shareholder Corporate Governance Index  78.91 13.03 22.95 98.36 89.68 5.48 66.00 99.00 (11.973)*** (4.648)*** 
Stakeholder Corporate Governance Index  80.57 23.58 14.29 100.00 81.27 8.75 54.00 100.00 (28.948)*** (3.692)*** 
 
Nigerian Small Firms (200 firm years) South African Small Firms (250 firm years) 
  
Corporate Governance Index (NICGI & SACGI) 64.08 15.51 16.00 92.00 83.81 9.33 52.00 98.00 
  
Shareholder Corporate Governance Index  66.94 15.32 18.03 95.08 85.04 9.75 54.00 100.00 
  
Stakeholder Corporate Governance Index  51.62 20.64 0.00 100.00 77.58 11.04 23.00 92.00 
  
Panel B: Level of Compliance – Financial versus Non-Financial Firms 
 
Nigerian Financial Firms (155 firm years) South African Financial Firms (135 firm years) 
  
Corporate Governance Index (NICGI & SACGI) 77.14 14.04 28.00 98.67 84.16 10.54 52.00 98.00 (9.391)*** (2.584)*** 
Shareholder Corporate Governance Index  77.84 12.33 27.87 98.36 85.34 10.82 54.00 100.00 (8.374)*** (2.766)*** 
Stakeholder Corporate Governance Index  74.06 24.58 21.43 100.00 77.82 12.80 23.00 100.00 (13.822)*** (2.197)** 
 
Nigerian Non-Financial Firms (255 firm 
years) 
South African Non-Financial Firms (365 firm years) 
  
Corporate Governance Index (NICGI & SACGI) 67.74 17.25 16.00 96.00 86.75 6.51 63.00 96.00 
  
Shareholder Corporate Governance Index  69.47 16.34 18.03 95.08 88.11 6.92 62.00 97.00 
  
Stakeholder Corporate Governance Index  60.23 26.17 0.00 100.00 80.02 8.88 54.00 100.00 
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6.8 Descriptive Statistics: Country-level Compliance Between 
Financial and Non-Financial Firms 
 
As earlier mentioned, most of the studies conducted in Africa have used a sample of 
non-financial firms (see 3.6 and table 4). Our understanding of single-country and 
multi-country CG compliance within the financial sector in Africa is still limited. 
Extant literature suggests that financial firms are heavily regulated, which may impact 
positively on their CG compliance (Yermack, 1996,pp.189, Chen et al., 2008,pp.12, 
Ntim, 2009,pp.134). According to Adams and Mehran (2003,pp.124), financial firms 
are unique from non-financial firms in that the number of stakes in financial firms 
complicates the governance structure and the health of the whole economy depends 
on the financial sector. There seems to be a consensus in CG scholarship that financial 
firms will comply with CG provisions better than non-financial firms, as regulators 
place additional expectations on them. Consequently, regulatory oversight is seen as 
an additional CG mechanism for financial firms (Adams and Mehran, 2003,pp.124).  
 
In both Nigeria and South Africa, this seems to be the case. For example, in addition 
to King III CG requirements, South African financial firms are mandated by the South 
African Reserve Bank Act, 1989 (Act No. 90 of 1989), the Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act, 2001 (Act No. 38 of 2001), the Companies Act, 2008 (Act No. 71 of 
2008) and the Postbank Limited Act, 2010 (Act No. 9 of 2010). Similarly, in Nigeria, 
financial firms are mandated by other regulations in addition to the SEC 2011 CG 
requirements, including the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 2006 code of CG for 
banks and the 2009 NAICOM code of good CG for insurance firms. Drawing on these 
evidences of more scrutiny in the finance sector, compliance for financial firms is 
compared with those of non-financial firms. The descriptive features are presented 
below. This will assist in ascertaining whether financial firms comply more with CG 
regulations than non-financial firms. Figure 7 (Fig.7) below captures the distributional 
compliance individualities between financial and non-financial firms in Nigeria and 
South Africa.  
 
Panel B in table 9 above summarises the compliance distributional properties between 
financial and non-financial firms in both countries. Reading from Panel B, financial 
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firms in Nigeria comply with 77.14% (i.e. 58 out of 75) of the SEC 2011 CG 
provisions compared with 67.74% (i.e. 51 out of 75) for non-financial firms, with a 
significant average variation of 9.39%. 
 
Fig. 7: Compliance Levels between Financial and Non-Financial Firms 
 
 
Contrary to theoretical expectations and the compliance level in Nigeria, non-
financial firms in South Africa comply with 86.75% (i.e. 73 out of 84) of the King III 
CG provisions, which is more than the compliance level for financial firms of 84.16% 
(i.e. 70 out of 84), with a mean significant difference of 2.584***. Furthermore, the 
sample t-test for equality of means in both countries between financial and non-
financial firms (see Panel B, table 9, columns 10 & 11) rejects the null hypothesis that 
the means are equal at 1% significance level.  
 
The results for Nigerian financial firms compared to non-financial firms confirm the 
general consensus in CG scholarship that regulatory oversight is an additional CG 
mechanism (Yermack, 1996,pp.189, Adams and Mehran, 2003,pp.124, Chen et al., 
2008,pp.12, Ntim, 2009,pp.134) which improves CG compliance of financial firms in 
Nigeria, but the results in South Africa are in contrast to this contention. This suggests 
that, while additional regulatory oversight of the financial sector may coerce and 
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reinforce country-level CG regulatory compliance in some countries compared to 
non-highly regulated industries, in other countries, additional regulatory oversight 
may not necessarily improve country-level CG compliance of financial firms 
compared to non-financial firms.   
 
Similar to comparison by firm’s size, listing and audit firm size, there is at least thrice 
as much level of variation in CG compliance between financial and non-financial 
firms in Nigeria compared to South Africa. For a case in point, the mean deviation in 
compliance between financial and non-financial firms is at 9.39% for Nigeria 
compared to 2.58% in South Africa. Additionally, within financial firms, the level of 
heterogeneity in CG compliance in South Africa is at 10.54% but in Nigeria it is at 
14.04%. Likewise, non-financial firms in South Africa have a compliance deviation of 
6.51% while in Nigeria it is at 17.25%. Like firm-size comparison, these indicate that, 
in South Africa, both financial and non-financial firms are improving their CG 
standards more symmetrically than Nigerian firms. In effect, the average compliance 
with SEC 2011 CG regulations by financial firms in Nigeria is 77.14%, which is 
lower than the 84.16% compliance with King III CG provisions in South Africa. 
Worthy of note is that the level of deviation in country-level CG compliance of 
financial firms in Nigeria is 14.04% and in South Africa is 10.54%, with a mean 
difference of 3.5%, which is less than for non-financial firms in Nigeria (17.25%) 
compared to South Africa (6.51%), with an aggregate difference of 10.74%. This also 
implies that, in South Africa, there is higher deviation in compliance with King III CG 
provisions within financial firms as opposed to non-financial firms and vice versa for 
Nigeria.  
 
What's more, consistent with compliance with country-level CG provisions discussed 
above, compliance with shareholder and contextual stakeholder CG provisions by 
financial firms is higher than for non-financial firms in Nigeria, whereas, in South 
Africa, non-financial firms comply with shareholder and contextual stakeholder CG 
provisions more than financial firms. Similarly, there is statistically significant 
average deviation between financial and non-financial firms in country-level 
stakeholder and shareholder CG requirements across both countries. Nonetheless, 
comparable to dual listing, audit firm size and firm size, the level of compliance with 
institutional stakeholder CG practices by financial firms compared to non-financial 
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firms is about six times as large in Nigeria (13.82***) as it is in South Africa 
(2.20***). However, analogous with dual listing, audit firm size and firm size, 
compliance with shareholder- and stakeholder-inclusive CG provisions irrespective of 
whether financial or non-financial firms is higher in South Africa than in Nigeria.  
 
6.9 Summary of Chapter  
 
In conclusion, the descriptive statistics show that CG codes operational in these 
countries which are developed to capture shareholders, historical, societal and 
institutional needs have shaped firm-level behaviour as opined by NIE theory. As 
such, there are some similarities and differences in firm-level CG compliance 
practices in both Nigeria and South Africa. Notably, the differences in the level of 
compliance in the two countries show how firms relate institutionally to the SEC 2011 
code in Nigeria and King III respectively. For example, as noted earlier, whereas 
some firms in Nigeria comply with the maximum requirements, other firms do not 
comply with up to a quarter of the SEC 2011 provisions, but in South Africa, on 
average, firms comply with more than 50% of the King III CG provisions.  
 
More so, the level of compliance with country-specific shareholder and stakeholder 
CG requirements is similar to the level compliance with the overall corporate 
governance indices in both countries (NICGI and SACGI). This suggests that any 
financial performance consequence of compliance with country-level or contextual 
shareholder and stakeholder CG requirements can be expected to be in the same 
direction as the composite country-level CG provisions (NICGI and SACGI). In other 
words, if firms with better CG standards (as measured by compliance with King III in 
South Africa, i.e. SACGI, and SEC 2011 CG code, i.e. NICGI) do generate increase 
in financial performance of listed firms, then it is expected that compliance with 
country-specific shareholder and stakeholder CG requirements will generate higher 
firm returns.  
 
More so, splitting of compliance distributional properties in both countries according 
to dual listing, audit firm size, firm size and sector indicates that there are 
considerable differences in compliance in both countries because of these firm-level 
individualities. Generally, in both countries,  dual-listed firms, firms audited by big 
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four auditors and large firms comply with country-level CG provisions and sub-
provisions better than non-dual listed firms, firms not audited big four auditors and 
small firms. However, with regard to distinction between financial and non-financial 
firms, the former complies with country-level CG provisions and sub-provisions 
better in Nigeria, whereas the latter complies with these provisions better in South 
Africa. In addition, splitting firms with respect to these firm-level individualities 
shows considerable differences within groups and across groups. These differences 
justify the use of these firm-level individualities as extraneous/control variables 
(discussed in 5.5) in this study, as will be seen in the regression results in chapters 8 
to 9.       
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CHAPTER 7 
7.0 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: FIRM-LEVEL INTERNAL 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS & CORRELATION 
RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed and compared the descriptive properties in relation to 
country-specific CG compliance (i.e. compliance index model) in Nigeria and South 
Africa. This chapter presents (section 7.2) the descriptive statistics for country-level 
individual corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. independent variables in the 
equilibrium variable model). In addition, the chapter discusses (in section 7.3) the 
distributional properties of the control/extraneous variables as well as the performance 
variables (dependent variables) (discussed in 5.4 and 5.5 respectively).  
 
More so, given that multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique 
is the main model of estimation of the relationship between internal CG variables 
based on the compliance index model and the equilibrium variable model (as stated in 
the model specification), the assumptions of multi-collinearity and normality are 
tested. Multi-collinearity is tested using correlation matrix among variables (section 
7.4 and 7.5). As Cameron and Trivedi (2005,pp.23) opine, the choice of model used in 
research is very critical in the interpretation of result. Correlation was therefore used 
to verify the OLS assumption of absence of multi-collinearity among variables. To 
achieve robustness of results, both Pearson parametric and Spearman non-parametric 
correlation results for internal corporate governance variables based on the 
compliance index model are reported in table 12 (for Nigeria) and 13 (for South 
Africa) in section 7.4, while the correlation results for variables in the equilibrium 
variable model are reported in tables 14 and 15 for Nigeria and South Africa 
respectively in section 7.5. This is followed by discussion of normality assumption 
and dealing with outliers in section 7.6. The chapter ends with a summary in section 
7.7.  
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7.2 Descriptive Statistics: Country-/Firm-level Internal Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms 
 
Pooled firm-/country-level distributional properties for independent/alternative 
internal CG mechanisms (as measured in the equilibrium variable model) are 
presented in table 10 below for both countries (for brevity reasons, year-on-year 
descriptives are not shown in the table).  
 
To begin with, the proportion of NEDs in Nigerian corporate boards ranges from 
44.44% to 100%, with a pooled average of 71.32%, whereas in South Africa the 
minimum proportion of NEDs is at 36% while the maximum is at 100% with an 
aggregate of 69.66%. This suggests that on average Nigerian boards have more NEDs 
than South African boards, but both countries have boards which are entirely made up 
of NEDs. Both countries meet the requirements of respective country CG codes that 
the majority of the board should be made up of NEDs, even though the minimum 
number of NEDs in both countries shows that some firms do not meet this 
requirement. The proportion of NEDs in this study surpasses those reported by earlier 
studies in South Africa: Ho and Williams (2003) reported 52%, Mangena and 
Chamisa (2008) 57% and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013b) 45.28%. Similarly, in 
Nigeria, the proportion of NEDs exceeds the 54% reported by Uadiale (2010). On the 
other hand, in Nigeria, the proportion of executive directors is at 28.68%, whereas it is 
30.42% in South Africa. Given the earlier studies discussed above for NEDs, the 
proportion of EDs has declined over the years to achieve board independence as 
required by the respective country-level CG code. Interestingly, the average 
proportion of independent NEDs (INEDs) is at 52.92% in South Africa and 9.01% in 
Nigeria. This suggests that there are more INEDs in South Africa than Nigeria. 
However, this is not surprising given that King III requires the majority of NEDs to be 
independent whereas SEC 2011 stipulates at least one. This implies that, because of 
the difference in board compositional provisions in CG codes at country level, there 
are considerable firm-level differences in board composition. In fact, the descriptive 
suggests that Nigerian firms are meeting just the minimum requirement of SEC 2011 
code with respect to INEDs, whereas South African firms are exceeding the 
requirements of King III in relation to director independence. In addition, it is also 
clear from table 10 that some Nigerian firms do not meet the minimum requirements 
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of SEC 2011 code with respect to INEDs, with some firms having zero independent 
NEDs.  
 
Furthermore, CEO/Chairman separation descriptive indicates that 98% (0.98) of 
Nigerian boards have separate individuals as CEO and chairman, whereas it is 95% 
(0.95) in South Africa. These aggregates show that firms in both countries have met 
the requirements of respective country-level CG in relation to board leadership. 
However Nigerian firms have higher levels of separation of leadership positions than 
South African firms. Nevertheless, the absence of 100% separation of leadership role 
suggests that some firms in both countries are not meeting the requirements of the 
respective country CG codes. The separation of leadership position in South Africa 
exceeds the 64.2% reported by Mangena and Chamisa (2008), whereas the Nigerian 
results exceed those of prior research, e.g. 86% Sanda et al. (2005), 86% Kajola 
(2008), 91% Ehikioya (2009), 87% Uadiale (2010), 56% Ujunwa et al. (2012). Hence, 
compared to prior studies in both countries, leadership separation has increased over 
time.  
 
With regard to board size, on average Nigerian boards are composed of approximately 
ten (9.8) persons whereas South African boards are made up of approximately 11 
(10.62) directors. The aggregate board size in Nigeria over the five-year period meets 
and exceeds the recommendation of SEC 2011 code which stipulates that the board 
should be made up of at least five directors. Worthy of note is that, in Nigeria, the 
minimum number of board members over the period is three (3), suggesting that some 
firms within this period did not meet SEC 2011 code requirements. However, a 
specific number of board members is not mandated in King III as the latter requires 
that the number of board members should be reflective of firm-specific needs. Similar 
to leadership separation, the board size in this study exceeds those reported by prior 
studies in Nigeria, e.g. Kajola (2008) and Uadiale (2010), who reported nine 
members, whereas in South Africa, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) reported seven, 
with ten reported by Ntim (2009), Ntim et al. (2013).  
 
As shown in table 10, 17.52% of corporate boards in Nigeria are composed of female 
directors (gender diversity) as compared to 12.83% in Nigeria. Though corporate 
governance codes in both countries require women to be part of the management of 
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firms, they do not stipulate any definite number or proportion to meet female 
representation. However, compared with prior studies in both countries, the 
proportion of female directors has increased, indicating that firms are responding to 
calls to increase female representation on boards. For example, female representation 
was reported at 4.6%, 10.74% by Ujunwa et al. (2012,pp.612) and Akpan and Amran 
(2014,pp.84) in Nigeria respectively. Whereas in South Africa, 5.4% was reported by 
Terjesen et al. (2016,pp.61) and 16.75% by Ntim (2015,pp.32). This shows some 
level of growth in female representation, but it is still below the female population 
composition. As of 2015, 49.5% of the Nigerian population was female (Nigeria 
National Bureau of Statistics, 2016,pp.2), with 51.7% for South Africa (Statistics 
South Africa, 2016,pp.1). This suggests that women are underrepresented in corporate 
boards in both countries. In addition, while some firms in Nigeria and South Africa 
have a maximum of 42.86% and 57.14% of female directors respectively, some firms 
still have zero female directors.  
 
Furthermore, on average, corporate boards in Nigeria meet approximately five (5.07) 
times annually but in South Africa, it is 6 (5.58) times annually.  This indicates that, 
on an aggregate level, firms in both countries meet at least quarterly as required by the 
respective country CG codes. However, though some firms go beyond the expectation 
of CG requirements in both countries, with a maximum of 15 and 18 meetings in 
Nigeria and South Africa respectively, other firms meet twice in both countries, which 
is less than the requirements of normative guidelines. The frequency of board 
meetings in this study, however, exceeds those reported by Ntim and Oseit 
(2011,pp.93) (four meetings) in South Africa.  
 
Similar to gender diversity, ethnic diversity showed wide spreads in both Nigeria and 
South Africa. As reported in table 10, 84.75% (i.e. 15.25% are white) of Nigerian 
boards are made up of non-white directors (native Nigerians), whereas, in South 
Africa, 19.37% of boards are made up of non-white directors. The high level of non-
white directors in Nigeria is not surprising, given that racial history in Nigeria is 
different from that in South Africa. Also, owing to need for consistency in 
measurement across both countries (as noted in Chapter 5), ethnic diversity was 
measured as percentage of non-white directors to total board size. Interestingly, 
despite the continuous encouragement for firms to increase non-white representation 
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in South African corporate entities with laws such as the 2008 company act, Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) of 2003 and Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Amendment Act, 2013 (Act No. 46 of 2013), non-white 
ethnic groups are still underrepresented on South African boards. South African non-
white ethnic groups make up approximately 92% of the population (Statistics South 
Africa, 2016, p.2.), which suggests that the 8% minority white population represents 
80.63% of the South African board directorship. However, the descriptive also shows 
that non-white directors make up 90.91% of some boards in South Africa whereas 
other boards have zero non-white representation. Interestingly, owing to the historical 
differences between Nigeria and South Africa, the minimum non-white representation 
in Nigeria is 28.57% whereas it is zero (0%) in South Africa.  
 
With respect to board interlocks, on average at least one (0.87) director in Nigeria sits 
on other boards whereas in South Africa at least two directors occupy directorship 
positions in another board. This suggests that South African boards are on average 
more interlinked than Nigerian boards. Similarly, there are boards in both countries 
with no interlocks but there are others with an average maximum of nine directors 
(8.63) in South Africa sitting on other boards and six (5.71) in Nigeria. The corporate 
CG codes in both countries do not limit number of interlocks but caution against high 
levels of board interlocks which may limit directors effectively in performing board 
duties. Similarly, with regard to board busyness, it is not surprising that an average 
director attends at least five (4.58) and eight (8.48) board meetings in Nigeria and 
South Africa respectively. In addition, some boards have board members attending up 
to 50 (49.77) and 35 (35.00) board meetings out of the firm. It will be interesting to 
see (in Chapter 8) whether the busyness hypothesis, which suggests directors holding 
more directorships outside a firm have less time for board activities owing to their 
commitment to attend board meetings in other firms which may impact negatively on 
firm performance is confirmed (Jiraporn et al., 2009,pp.819).  
 
Furthermore, the debt to equity ratio (gearing) shows that 40.38% of Nigerian firms 
compared to 33.08% of South African firms are financed through debt. This implies 
that Nigerian firms on average depend more on debt finance than South African firms. 
Similarly, while there are firms in both countries with no debt finance, there are 100% 
highly geared firms in both countries. The 33% gearing ratio in South Africa is 
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generally consistent with the 34.78% reported by Ntim (2015,pp.32) for the period 
2003 to 2007. However, the 40.38% gearing in Nigeria exceeds the 29.16% reported 
by Ehikioya (2009,pp.236).The Nigerian results suggest that firms have increased 
their debt finance over the years as compared to South Africa, which has had a mild 
decrease compared to the findings from prior studies.  
 
Director shareholding descriptive indicates an average of 19.55% of shares are held 
by directors in South Africa compared to 26.75% in Nigeria. This indicates that both 
executive directors and NEDs of firms own more shares in Nigeria than in South 
Africa. Remarkably, there is almost equal maximum ownership of shares by directors 
in Nigeria (97.16%) and South Africa (98%). Compared to prior country-specific 
research, the reported director share ownership exceeds the 15.35% reported by 
Ehikioya (2009,pp.236) in Nigeria, but it is similar to the 19.24% reported by Ntim 
(2012a,pp.20) in South Africa.  
 
Institutional shareholding in Nigeria is on average 52.48% compared with 62.26% in 
South Africa. This implies South African firms are on average owned by institutional 
shareholders compared to Nigerian firms. However, the above 50% institutional 
shareholding is consistent with observations in extant literature that African countries 
have concentrated ownership structures (Ntim, 2012a, Ntim, 2013d, Ntim et al., 
2014a, Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim et al., 2015b, Ogbechie, 2010, Okeahalam, 2004, 
Rwegasira, 2000, Sanda et al., 2005). Indeed, in both countries, there are firms with a 
maximum of 99% institutional ownership. However the level of institutional 
shareholding reported for South Africa is less than the 78.30% reported by Ntim et al. 
(2013,pp.42) for the period 2002–2011. This may suggest that South African firms are 
moving towards dispersed ownership.  
 
Finally, distributional properties for audit committee independence indicate that 
88.59% of audit committees in Nigeria are made up of independent members 
compared to 96.93% in South Africa. This implies South African firms have more 
independent audit committees than Nigerian firms. This can be explained by the fact 
that King III expressively defines the composition of independent audit committees, 
whereas, in Nigeria, it is not well defined. It is therefore left to the discretion of firms 
to choose and interpret as they see fit.  
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics: Country-/Firm-Level Internal Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms  
 
Nigeria (2011–2015) South Africa (2010–2014) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Prop. NED (%) 71.32 12.31 44.44 100.00 69.66 12.11 36.00 100.00 
Prop. ED (%) 28.68 12.31 0.00 55.56 30.42 12.10 0.00 63.64 
Prop. INED (%) 9.01 10.58 0.00 62.50 52.92 14.32 20.00 100.00 
CEO/Chairman Role Separation 
(Units) 
0.98 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.95 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Board Size (Units) 9.80 3.03 3.00 19.00 10.62 3.33 4.00 23.00 
Gender Diversity (%) 12.83 10.95 0.00 42.86 17.52 12.08 0.00 57.14 
Frequency of Board Meetings (Units) 5.07 1.68 2.00 15.00 5.58 1.96 2.00 18.00 
Ethnic Diversity (%) 84.75 18.62 28.57 100.00 37.82 19.37 0.00 90.91 
Board Interlock (Units) 0.87 1.01 0.00 5.71 1.50 1.20 0.00 8.63 
Board Busyness (Units) 4.58 5.37 0.00 35.00 8.48 7.59 0.00 49.77 
Gearing (%) 40.38 39.11 0.00 101.23 37.35 33.08 0.00 100.00 
Director Shareholding (%) 26.75 27.70 0.00 97.16 19.55 24.68 0.00 98.00 
Institutional Shareholding (%) 52.48 22.88 0.00 99.00 62.56 17.44 7.00 99.00 
Audit Committee Independence (%) 88.59 18.09 0.00 100.00 96.93 9.31 50.00 100.00 
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Therefore, it is unsurprising that, whereas the minimum audit committee 
independence in South Africa over the period is at 50%, in Nigeria it is at 0%.  The 
next section discusses the descriptive statistics for control variables.  
 
7.3 Descriptive Statistics: Country-/Firm-Level Performance & 
Control Variables 
 
Distributional properties for control and dependent variables are presented in table 11 
below for both countries. To begin with, the aggregate mean after winsorisation 
(discussed in 7.6) for ROCE in Nigeria is 12.83%, with a minimum of -100.61% and 
a maximum of 102%. In South Africa, average ROCE is 17.69%, with a minimum of 
-99% and maximum of 99%. This implies that South African firms are on average 
performing better than Nigerian firms. However, the deviation of 12.31 and 12.11 in 
Nigeria and South Africa respectively suggests that there is similar wide variation in 
accounting performance of firms in both countries. Similarly, Q-ratio in Nigeria 
ranges from a maximum of 1.87 to a minimum of -0.52 with a mean of 1.50, whereas 
it ranges from 0.00 to 10.00 with a mean of 1.59 in South Africa. This suggests that 
South African firms are more fairly valued by the market than Nigerian firms. Similar 
to ROCE, this shows significant variation in market performance between firms in 
both countries. These variations in performance are similar to those reported in 
governance studies (e.g. Ehikioya (2009).  
 
For the controls, table 11 shows that on average 18% (0.18) of Nigerian firms 
sampled are duallisted, whereas 17% of South African firms are cross listed. In 
addition, firm size according to respective stock market classification shows that the 
sample is split between 50% large and 50% small firms in both countries, therefore 
indicating a balance sample representation by firm size. Audit firm size shows that 
66% (.66) of Nigerian firms are audited by the big four auditors, whereas it is 60% in 
South Africa. Similarly, capital expenditure after winsorisation shows that on average 
Nigerian firms spend 6.24 million Naira on investment in innovation compared to 207 
million Rand spent by South African firms. Total asset of firms in South Africa after 
winsorisation shows an average of 53 billion Rand worth of assets compared to 2.7 
billion Naira for Nigerian firms. Similarly, market value after winsorisation shows 
that, on average, Nigerian firms are valued at 1.15 billion Naira compared to South 
African firms, valued at 3.8 billion Rand.  
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics – Performance & Control Variables  
 
Nigeria (2011–2015) South Africa (2010–2014) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
ROCE  12.83 23.25 -100.61 102.00 17.69 25.98 -99.00 99.00 
Q-ratio 1.50 1.87 - 0.52 17.06 1.59 0.98 0.00 10.00 
Dual Listing  0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Firm Size 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Audit Firm Size 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Capital Expenditure 6,242,644.00 18,800,000 0.00 207,000,000 1,550,901 4,103,389 0.00 52,000,000 
Total Assets 2,704,966.00 46,900,000 68.48 938,000,000 53,000,000 191,000,000 32,545 1,800,000,000 
Market Value 115,901.60 353,086.60 58.72 3,800,000.00 29,456 59,381 38 497,883 
Sales Growth 8.99 20.51 - 99.00 99.89 12.41 27.42 -87.00 100.00 
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Finally, sales growth after winsorisation shows that, on average, South African firms 
grow their sales revenue by 12.41% over the five-year period, whereas Nigerian 
firms’ sales growth is 8.99%. 
7.4 Test of Multi-Collinearity and Bivariate Correlations for Variables 
in the Compliance Index Model  
 
As noted above, the compliance index model variables are reported in table 12 (for 
Nigeria) and 13 (for South Africa) below. The bottom left of each table shows 
Pearson parametric coefficients, while the top right shows Spearman non-parametric 
correlation coefficients. Triple, double and single asterisks denote Pearson Parametric 
and Spearman non-parametric correlations significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Correlation coefficients among the independent variables, dependent and 
control variables in both models range from -0.105 to 0.983 for Nigeria and -0.359 to 
0.834 for South Africa.  
 
The highest correlation between independent variables (Nigerian Corporate 
Governance Index ‘NICGI’) and dependent variables (ROCE, Q-ratio) is 0.130*** 
between NICGI and ROCE, while in South Africa it is -0.065 between South African 
Corporate Governance Index (SACGI) and the Q-ratio. More so, in Nigeria, 
compliance with stakeholder provisions (Stakeholder–NICGI) has a positive 
significant association with both ROCE and the Q-ratio. Similarly, compliance with 
shareholder provisions (Shareholder–NICGI) has a positive association with both 
performance measures, but significantly only with ROCE. This suggests, on average, 
a positive significant relationship between both performance measures and the 
Nigerian Corporate Governance Index (NICGI) and NICGI sub-indices, whereas, in 
South Africa, there is a weak insignificant negative relationship between (the South 
African Corporate Governance Index) SACGI, shareholder provisions (Shareholder–
SACGI) and both performance measures. However, stakeholder provisions in South 
Africa (Stakeholder–SACGI) are negative and significantly related to both 
performance measures. As expected in both countries, there is a high positive 
relationship between the CG composite indices (NICGI and SACGI) and their 
respective sub-indices. This indicates that increased firm compliance with the 
composite index leads to an increase in the compliance with both sub-indices in both 
countries.  
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The highest correlation between independent variables and control variables can be 
seen between NICGI and market value (0.531***) for Nigeria and SACGI and total 
asset for South Africa (0.370***). In brief, this relationship suggests that, as market 
capitalisation/value of listed firms in Nigeria increases, the compliance with the 
Nigerian CG code increases. Meanwhile, in South Africa, as the value of total asset 
increases, compliance with King III CG code increases. As expected, the highest 
correlation between control variables was seen between capital expenditure (CAPEX) 
and market value (MV), with r=0.834*** in South Africa and r=.880*** in Nigeria. 
Increase in market capitalisation is associated with increase in capital expenditure and 
vice versa in both countries. With regard to dependent and control variables, the 
highest correlation is between ROCE and market value for Nigeria (r=0.525***), 
while, in South Africa, Q-ratio and market value/capitalisation showed the highest 
correlation (r=0.407***).  
 
As expected, there is significantly high correlation between the various compliance 
indices NICGI & SACGI and  their  respective sub-indices. Apart from this, the 
correlations among variables are generally low to moderate, with a high not up to 
90% (0.90) in both countries, which suggests that multi-collinearity may not be an 
issue in the compliance index model and therefore model specification can be 
conducted. 
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Table 12: Nigerian Correlations Matrix Between NICGI, Performance and Control Variables – 400 Firm Years 
 
***, **, * denote Pearson Parametric and Spearman non-parametric correlations, significant at 1%,5% and 10% respectively. Spearman correlation coefficients are at the top right of the table while 
Pearson correlation coefficients are at the bottom left of the table. The variables are defined as follows: the Nigerian Corporate Governance Index (NICGI), compliance with shareholder provisions 
(Shareholder–NICGI), compliance with stakeholder provisions (Stakeholder–NICGI), return on capital employed (ROCE), Tobins-q (Q-ratio), sales growth (S-Growth), dual listing (DUA-LIST), size of 
audit firm (AF-SIZE), capital expenditure (CAPEX), total asset (TA), gearing/capital structure (GEAR), firm size (F-SIZE).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. ROCE   .174** 0.091* 0.062 .147*** 0.057 0.083* .244*** .197*** .091* 
-
.168*** 
0.066 .252*** 
2. Q-ratio .248***   .170*** .145*** .186*** -0.033 0.035 .285*** .324*** .179*** .098** .332*** .489*** 
3. NICGI  .130*** 0.07   .975*** .897*** -0.003 .146*** .396*** .496*** .533*** .241*** .504*** .531*** 
4. Shareholder–
NICGI 
0.097** 0.039 .983***   .782*** -0.025 .116** .334*** .430*** .460*** .218*** .438*** .455*** 
5. Stakeholder–
NICGI 
.192*** .138*** .883*** .782***   0.035 .169*** .467*** .544*** .589*** .241*** .548*** .589*** 
6. S-GROWTH .102** -0.045 -0.023 -0.036 0.013   0.047 0.044 0.091* .158*** .149*** .138*** .109** 
7. DUA-LIST .123** -0.04 .128** .102** .175*** 0.043   .185*** .264*** .223*** .101** .267*** .233*** 
8. AF-SIZE .237*** .227*** .379*** .316*** .480*** 0.043 .185***   .409*** .503*** .248*** .503*** .516*** 
9. CAPEX .103** .199*** .165*** .153*** .167*** 0.033 0.079 .193***   .774*** .435*** .621*** .769*** 
10. TA 0.006 -0.028 0.084* 0.083* 0.072 -0.002 -0.011 0.04 -0.003   .517*** .734*** .815*** 
11. GEAR -.105** 0.043 .212*** .184*** .250*** .137*** .105** .260*** .169*** 0.082*   .408*** .336*** 
12. F-SIZE .105** .168*** .453*** .388*** .548*** .114** .267*** .503*** .293*** 0.059 .424***   .750*** 
13. MV .143*** .305*** .175*** .152*** .206*** 0.048 0.024 .213*** .880*** 0.02 .099** .317***   
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Table 13: South African Correlations Matrix between SACGI, Performance and Control Variables – 500 Firm Years 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. ROCE   .456*** -0.065 -0.036 -.120*** .137*** -.168*** -.167*** .083* -.096** -.089** 0.063 .276*** 
2. Q-ratio .303***   -.090** -0.078* -0.084* .105*** -0.048 -.235*** .246*** 0.033 -0.032 .130*** .407*** 
3. SACGI  -0.027 -0.065   .972*** .640*** 0.028 .137*** -.113** .097** .370*** 0.079* .226*** .094** 
4. Shareholder–
SACGI -0.013 -0.054 .984***   .464*** 0.021 .142*** -.118*** .091** .342*** 0.069 .226*** .104** 
5. Stakeholder–
SACGI -0.075* -0.086* .663** .528**   0.05 0.078* -.089** 0.062 .309*** .094** .167*** 0.03 
6. S-GROWTH .089** .112** 0.034 0.029 0.032   -0.043 -0.016 -0.067 0.033 0.02 0.004 0.026 
7. DUA-LIST -.177*** -0.026 .155*** .166*** 0.063 -0.04   -.216*** .168*** .366*** 0.029 .293*** 0.079* 
8. AF-SIZE -.144*** -.232*** -.172*** -.173*** -.103** 0.011 -.216**   -.207*** -.545*** -0.043 -.813*** -.287*** 
9. CAPEX 0.066 .127*** 0.024 0.042 -0.053 -0.05 .109** -.122***   .214*** -0.014 .137*** .834*** 
10. TA -0.042 -0.072* .165*** .162*** .105** 0.041 .102** -.207*** 0.028   .177*** .761*** .261*** 
11. GEAR -.108** -0.026 0.082* 0.081* 0.031 0.046 0.036 -0.057 -0.024 .208***   0.082* -0.032 
12. F-SIZE 0.043 .100** .285*** .282*** .183*** -0.02 .293*** -.813*** 0.028 .258*** 
.088** 
  .217*** 
13. MV .154*** .280*** 0.016 0.034 -0.072* -0.030 0.080 -.212*** .750*** .115** -0.043 0.052   
***, **, * denote Pearson Parametric and Spearman non-parametric correlations, significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Spearman correlation coefficients are at the top right of the table while 
Pearson correlation coefficients are at the bottom left of the table. The variables are defined as: South African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI), compliance with shareholder provisions (Shareholder–
SACGI), compliance with stakeholder provisions (Stakeholder–SACGI), return on capital employed (ROCE), Tobin’s-q (Q-ratio), sales growth (S-Growth), dual listing (DUA-LIST), size of audit firm 
(AF-SIZE), capital expenditure (CAPEX), total asset (TA), gearing/capital structure (GEAR), firm size (F-SIZE).  
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7.5 Correlations Between Variables in Equilibrium Variable Model 
 
Correlation results of alternative internal corporate governance variables, including 
board size (B-SZ), non-executive directors (NEDs), independent non-executive 
directors (INEDs), executive directors (EDs), gender diversity (GDIV), ethnic 
diversity (EDIV), CEO/Chairman separation (DUAL), gearing/capital structure 
(GEAR), board meetings (FRE-M), board interlocks (ILOCK), institutional 
shareholding (INST-SH), director shareholding (D-SH), audit committee 
independence (IAC) and board busyness (Bness), as well as dependent and control 
variables, are reported in table 14 for Nigeria and 15 for South Africa. Correlation 
among dependent and independent variables in this model ranges from -0.351 to 
0.382 in Nigeria, with the highest correlation between Q-ratio and institutional 
shareholding (r=0.382***). In South Africa, correlation between independent and 
dependent variables ranges from -0.354 to 0.131, with the highest correlation between 
CEO duality and Q-ratio (r=0.131***). This shows that, in Nigeria, performance of 
firms as measured by Q-ratio increases with an increase in institutional shareholding, 
while, in South Africa, the results suggest that performance increases with the 
separation of CEO and chairperson positions.   
 
The correlation between independent variables and control variables ranges from -
0.402 to 0.728 in South Africa, with the highest correlation between board size and 
total asset (r=0.728**), while, in Nigeria, it ranges between -0.295 and 0.489, with the 
highest  correlation between board size and firm size. This suggests that, in South 
Africa, increase in total assets is associated with increase in board size. However, in 
Nigeria, large firms are associated with increase in board size. Correlation between 
independent variables in both Nigeria and South Africa showed serious negative 
multi-collinearity between the proportion of NEDs and executive directors (EDs), 
with values above 0.95. This is to be expected, as the total of both the proportion of 
NEDs and proportion of EDs adds up to one (100%). To prevent this from affecting 
the OLS results, three regressions are estimated using the process of elimination 
within the equilibrium variable model. The first regression was conducted with both 
NEDs and EDs in the model to confirm the tolerance results and the VIF scores (see 
detailed discussion in Chapter 8). The subsequent regression was conducted by 
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eliminating executive director variable from the regression and the last regression 
eliminates NEDs in the estimation.   
 
7.6 Dealing with Outliers/Extreme Values of Control and 
Performance Variables (OLS Normality Assumption) 
 
The initial descriptive showed there existed extreme values in both performance and 
control values in the sample data, which violates the OLS assumption of normality 
and may impact on the regression results. The descriptive statistics did not show large 
anomalies with the independent variables in the data set, especially when looking at 
the aggregate level. However, there are variables which showed some level of 
skewness, especially capital expenditure, sales growth and market value. Thus, the 
initial descriptive (not included for brevity reasons) for control and dependent 
variables showed that there are some outlier concerns. For example, the average 
kurtosis for ROCE and Q-ratio in all firm years was 17.48 and 9.096 respectively. 
Similarly, sales growth values of -240% and above were recorded, which does not 
make any theoretical or economic sense. Thus following Klapper and Love 
(2004,pp.704) winsorisation was conducted on these variables to remove the top and 
bottom outliers at 5% and 95% levels. Specifically, in South Africa, both control and 
performance variables with outliers were ranked in a descending order and the bottom 
and top 25th values for these variables were replaced with the 26th and 475th values 
respectively. Similarly, for Nigeria, the top and bottom 20th values were replaced with 
the 21st and 380th values respectively. Hence the values reported in section 7.3 for 
control and performance descriptive are values after winsorisation. Excluding outliers 
or extreme values which may affect OLS results is a practice that is common in CG 
scholarship (see e.g. Durnev and Kim, 2005,pp.1473, Black et al., 2006,pp.379, Fan et 
al., 2007pp.336, Ntim, 2009,pp.235, Black et al., 2012,pp.15, Gupta et al., 
2013,pp.11, Ararat et al., 2017,pp.15).  
7.7 Summary of Chapter 
 
This chapter focused on describing the data for the alternative internal CG structures 
in South Africa and Nigeria in addition to testing OLS assumptions of normality and 
multi-collinearity. The chapter meets three main objectives. First, the chapter provides 
a detailed comparative description of the alternative internal CG mechanisms 
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(independent variables in the equilibrium variable model), performance (dependent 
variables) and control variables. The second objective was to test OLS assumption of 
multi-collinearity. The test of multi-collinearity shows that generally there are no 
serious violations of OLS assumptions in the compliance index model and as such it 
will be appropriate to carry out OLS regressions. However, multi-collinearity could 
be present in the equilibrium variable model. Procedures to eliminate this multi-
collinearity are presented briefly but will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. Finally, the chapter clearly explains how outliers and extreme values in the 
control and performance variables were treated. 
 
The next chapter (8) reports the main results of OLS estimation. Specifically, it 
discusses OLS results based on the compliance index model and the equilibrium 
variable model.  
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***, **, * denote Pearson Parametric and Spearman non-parametric correlations significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Spearman correlation coefficients are at the top right of the table, while Pearson correlation coefficients are at the bottom left of the table. The 
variables are defined as follows: return on capital employed (ROCE), Tobins-q (Q-ratio), board size (B-SZ), non-executive directors (NED), independent non-executive directors (INED), executive directors (ED), gender diversity (GDIV), ethnic diversity (EDIV), 
CEO/Chairman Separation (DUAL), gearing/capital structure (GEAR), board meetings (FRE-M), board interlocks (ILOCK), institutional shareholding (INST-SH), strategic/director shareholding (D-SHD), audit committee independence (IAC), board busyness (Bness), 
dual listing (DUA-LIST), firm size (F-SIZE), capital expenditure (CAPEX), total asset (TA), market value (MV), sales growth (S-GROWTH) and size of audit firm (AF-SIZE). 
Table 14: Nigerian Correlations Matrix between Alternative Internal Corporate Governance Variables, Performance and Control Variables – 400 Firm Years  
  1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
 
23 
 
1. ROCE   .174*** 0.000 -0.04 0.09* 0.04 .109** -.172*** -.129*** -.168*** -0.03 0.08* .147*** .103** -.107** 0.04 0.08* 0.07 .197*** 0.09* .252*** 0.06 .244*** 
2. Q-ratio .248***   0.09* -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08* -.351*** -0.04 .098** 0.03 0.07 .382*** 0.10** -0.07 0.08* 0.04 .332*** .324*** .179*** .489*** -0.03 .285*** 
3. BSZ -0.04 -.113***   -.160*** .306*** .160*** .117** -0.10** .162*** .304*** .333*** .181*** -.128** -.137*** .158*** .270*** .128*** .449*** .546*** .631*** .475*** .103** .183*** 
4. NED -0.05 -0.03 -.220***   -0.03 -1.00*** -.227*** -.193*** .201*** -.213*** -0.06 0.09* .120*** .125*** .295*** 0.07 -.103** 
-
.152*** 
-0.09* 
-
.157*** 
-.124** -0.08* -0.09* 
5. INED 0.01 -0.07 .219*** -0.04   0.03 .272*** 0.00 0.07 0.04 .117** .168*** -0.09* -0.04 .135*** .181*** -0.04 .285*** .310*** .392*** .336*** 0.00 .201*** 
6. ED 0.05 0.03 .220*** -1.000*** 0.04   .227*** .193*** -.201*** .213*** 0.06 -0.09* -.120*** -.125*** 
-
.295*** 
-0.07 .103** .152*** 0.09* .157*** .1248* 0.08* 0.09* 
7. GDIV .151*** 0.05 .145*** -.211** .236*** .211***   .160*** 0.000 .144*** .141*** .180*** -.107** -.106** -0.01 .205*** .169*** .303*** .242*** .281*** .296*** 0.09* .180*** 
8. EDIV 
-
.156*** 
-.309*** -0.03 -.204** -0.01 .204*** .136***   .170*** -0.02 -0.01 -.195*** -.509*** -.305*** .133*** 
-
.191*** 
-
.121*** 
-
.265*** 
-
.291*** 
-
.197*** 
-
.337*** 
.109** -.258*** 
9. DUAL 
-
.135*** 
0.01 .136*** .221** 0.07 -.221*** 0.01 .182***   0.07 .109** 0.04 -0.06 -.162*** .199*** 0.05 
-
.359*** 
-0.06 -0.04 0 -0.05 0.04 -0.108 
10. GEAR 
-
.105*** 
0.04 .374*** -.212** 0.06 .212*** .159*** 0.03 .105**   .133*** .152*** -0.05 -0.07 -.117** .176*** .101** .408*** .435*** .517*** .336*** .149*** .248*** 
11. FRE-
ME 
-0.03 -0.06 .386*** -0.05 0.10** 0.05 .132*** 0.03 0.08* .129***   .218*** 0.00 -.140*** .116*** .417*** .102** .244*** .285** .348** .296** .107** .209*** 
12. ILOCK 0.03 0.05 0.09* .147** .099** -.147*** .206*** -.276*** 0.04 .099** 0.09*   .126*** -0.01 .129*** .959*** .167*** .190*** .320*** .263*** .261*** -0.01 0.08* 
13. INST-
SH 
0.09* .349*** -.173*** .140** -0.09* -.140*** -.140*** -.463*** -0.06 -0.07 -0.08* .153***   .409*** 
-
.202*** 
0.08* 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 .149*** -.123*** .139*** 
14. D-SH 0.05 .161*** -.183*** .110* -0.04 -.110*** -.104** -.333*** -.156*** -0.06 
-
.142*** 
0.08* .476***   
-
.230*** 
-0.07 0.05 -.118** -.112** -0.08* -0.07 -.161*** .148*** 
15. IAC -0.05 -.214*** 0.09* .301** .175*** -.301*** 0.09* 0.06 .162*** -.185*** .134*** .156*** -.232*** -.217***   .140*** -0.08* -0.07 0.06 -0.06 -0.05 0.02 
-
.141**** 
16. Bness 0.01 0.04 .171*** .124* .114*** -.124*** .258*** -.246*** 0.06 .139*** .329*** .938*** .120*** 0.05 .150***   .180*** .244*** .359*** .330*** .313*** 0.02 .121*** 
17. DUA-
LIST 
.123*** -0.04 .130*** -.108* 0.01 .108** .159*** -.125*** -.359*** .105** 0.09* 0.09* 0.01 0.04 -0.03 .136***   .267*** .264*** .223*** .233*** 0.05 .185*** 
18. F-SIZE .105*** .168*** .489*** -.150** .238*** .150*** .292*** -.219*** -0.06 .424*** .235*** .154*** 0.04 -0.07 -0.04 .220*** .267***   .621*** .734*** .750*** .138*** .503*** 
19. CAPEX .103*** .199*** .210*** 0.09 .104** -0.09* -0.06 -.101** 0.02 .169*** .146*** 0.03 .184*** .107** 0.07 0.06 0.08* .293***   .774*** .769*** 0.09* .409*** 
20. TA 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.06 -0.07 .128** -0.01 0.01 0.08* 0.09* .167*** 0.02 0.08* 0.03 .273*** -0.01 0.06 0.00   .815*** .158*** .503*** 
21. MV .143*** .305*** .195*** 0.00 .100** 0.00 0.00 -.117*** 0.00 .099** .107** 0.01 .175*** .110** 0.04 0.03 0.02 .317*** .880*** 0.02   .109*** .516*** 
22. S-
GROWTH 
.102*** -0.05 0.08* -0.04 -0.04 0.04 .106** 0.07 0.02 .137*** 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08* -0.03 -0.01 0.04 .114** 0.03 0.00 0.05   0.04 
23. AF-
SIZE 
.237*** .227*** .206*** -0.09 .180*** 0.09** .178**** -.196*** -0.10** .260*** .163*** 0.04 .146*** .213*** -.108** 0.10** .185*** .503*** .193*** 0.04 .213** 0.04   
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***, **, * denote Pearson Parametric and Spearman non-parametric correlations significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Spearman correlation coefficients are at the top right of the table while Pearson correlation coefficients are at the bottom left of the table. The 
variables are defined as follows: return on capital employed (ROCE), Tobins-q (Q-ratio), board size (B-SZ), non-executive directors (NED), independent non-executive directors (INED), executive directors (ED), gender diversity (GDIV), ethnic diversity (EDIV), 
CEO/Chairman Separation (DUAL), gearing/capital structure (GEAR), board meetings (FRE-M), board interlocks (ILOCK), institutional shareholding (INST-SH), strategic/director shareholding (D-SHD), audit committee independence (IAC), board busyness (Bness), 
dual listing (DUA-LIST), firm size (F-SIZE), capital expenditure (CAPEX), total asset (TA), market value (MV), sales growth (S-GROWTH) and size of audit firm (AF-SIZE). 
 
Table 15: South African Correlations Matrix between Alternative Internal Corporate Governance Variables, Performance and Control Variables – 500 Firm Years  
 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
 
23 
 
1. ROCE  .456*** -.049 -.066 -.047 .066 .131*** .003 .020 -.089** -.081* -.072* -.063 -.105** -.060 -.068 -.168*** .063 .084* -.096** .276*** .137*** -.146*** 
2. Q-ratio .303***  .032 -.053 .027 .053 .028 .027 .133*** -.032 .117*** -.001 .066 -.086* .002 -.036 -.048 .130*** .246*** .033 .407*** .105** -136*** 
3. BSZ -.087* -.046  .333*** .038 -.334*** .105** .046 .198*** .156*** .264*** .028 .018 -.036 -.002 .130*** .170*** .611*** .166*** .728*** .193*** -.010 .325*** 
4. NED -.078* -.049 .270***  .346*** -1.000*** .172*** .180*** .187*** 0.05 .371*** .283*** 0.05 .168*** 0.01 .392*** .188*** .244*** 0.042 .402*** 0.018 .102** .267*** 
5. INED -.046 .016 .024 .376***  -.346*** .251*** .170*** .155*** -.013 .141*** .219*** -.053 
-
.338*** 
.302*** .245*** .183*** .179*** .126*** .210*** .129*** -.032 .167*** 
6. ED .077* .047 .270*** 1.000*** -.375***  .172*** .179*** .187*** -.049 .371*** .282*** -.050 
-
.168*** 
-.011 -.392*** .188*** 
-
.244*** 
-.042 
-
.402*** 
-.018 -.103** -.267*** 
7. GDIV .105** -.007 .073* .179*** .234*** -.179***  .504*** -.022 .117*** .040 .110** -.074* -.015 .049 .111** .004 .181*** -.046 .105** .034 -.067 .093** 
8. EDIV .015 .044 -.017 .164*** .144*** -.163*** .528***  .079* -.018 .190*** .110** 
-
.140*** 
-.024 -.019 .142*** -.008 .074* .035 .057 .035 -.001 -.112** 
9. DUAL -.018 .112** .175*** .205*** .161*** -.203*** -.012 -.104**  .129*** .090** -.019 .151*** .096** -.045 .044 .099** .200*** .080* .252*** .038 .090** .134*** 
10. GEAR -.108** -.026 .138*** .029 -.009 -.027 .143*** -.038 .122***  .168*** .012 .098** -.007 -.004 .062 .028 .082* -.014 .177*** -.032 .021 .053 
11. FRE-ME -.110** -.075* .161*** .355*** .141*** -.354*** .043 .159*** .108** .131***  .192*** -.005 -.010 -.003 .501*** .234*** .222*** .130*** .395*** .033 .010 .158*** 
12. ILOCK -.028 .020 -.027 .113** .147*** -.113** .161*** .027 .130*** -.043 .127***  .144*** .003 .227*** .880*** .384*** .131*** .135*** .184*** .111*** -.019 .063 
13. INST-SH -.094** .079* .044 .055 -.009 -.055 -.090** -.093** .212** .107** .018 .159***  .193*** .087* .124*** .183*** -.003 .072* -.003 0024 -.022 -.102** 
14. D-SH -.128*** -.035 -.029 .220*** -.246*** -.219*** -.006 0.011 .097** .007 .054 .103** .302***  -.113*** .010 -.092** -.037 
-
.164*** 
-.047 .194*** .032 -.140*** 
15. IAC -.010 .005 .032 .054 .337*** -.053 .041 -.005 .047 -.011 -.001 .205*** .057 -.041  .187*** .139*** .071 .039 -.006 .041 -.092** .135*** 
16. Bness -.098** 004 .044 .267*** .202*** -.266*** .154*** .101** -.065 .015 .552*** .838*** .173*** .139*** .166***  .384*** .200*** .162*** .300*** .110** -.016 .116*** 
17. DUA-
LIST 
-.177*** -.026 .145*** .182*** .200*** -.183*** -.017 -.029 .099** .036 .212*** .261*** .169*** .000 .135*** .363***  .293*** .168*** .3668** .079* -.043 .144*** 
18. F-SIZE .043 .100** .574*** .241*** .191*** -.242*** .145*** .062 .200*** .088** .188*** .029 .005 -.029 .112** .146*** .293***  .137*** .761*** .217*** .004 .292*** 
19. CAPEX .066 .127*** -.009 .085* .089** -.087* .057 .156*** -.039 -.024 .118*** .132*** .080* -.061 .057 .174*** .109** .028  .214*** .834*** -.067 -.115** 
20. TA -0.04 -0.07 .394*** .255*** .140*** -.254*** .010 .026 .058 .208*** .128*** .088** -.068 -.024 .000 .127*** .102** .258*** .029  .261** .034 .341*** 
21. MV .154*** .280*** .073* .048 .070 -.049 .062 .125*** -.074* -.043 .040 .158*** .052 -.096** .013 .157*** .080 .052 .750*** .115***  .026 -.108*** 
22. S-
GROWTH 
.089** .112** -.009 .110** -.042 -.110** -.025 .003 .057 .046 .005 -.055 -.029 .025 -.120*** -.058 -.037 -.020 -.049 .041 -.030  -.007 
23. AF-SIZE -.147*** 
-
.182*** 
.304*** .284*** .166*** -.283*** .101** -.127*** .134*** .046 .143*** -.009 -.109** -.102** .166*** .043 .144*** .292*** 
-
.138*** 
.093** -.236*** -.007 
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CHAPTER 8 
8.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: OLS REGRESSION 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has demonstrated that both the compliance index model and equilibrium 
variable model are statistically appropriate to be estimated using OLS regression. Drawing 
from the preliminary chapters, this chapter reports the main result of the thesis based on OLS 
estimation of the compliance index model and the equilibrium variable model using ROCE as 
the accounting measure of profitability and Q-ratio as a market measure of profitability. Each 
of the models has two sub-models. In the first sub-model (Model I), ROCE and Q-ratio are 
estimated using control variables only, while in the second model (Model II), ROCE and Q-
ratio are evaluated with the independent variables in addition to the control variables. Both 
ROCE and Q-ratio results are reported in the same table. Triple, double and single asterisks 
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
The research questions and hypotheses examined in each of the chapter sections are stated at 
the beginning of each section. Specifically, the chapter presents a set of eight results in eight 
tables. The first set of results discussed in 8.2.1 and 8.22  as reported in tables 16 and 17 
present results for the compliance index model for Nigeria (NICGI) and South Africa 
(SACGI) respectively and provide empirical evidence to test hypothesis 10a and sub-research 
question 1 stated as ‘How and in what ways does firm-level compliance with exogenously 
developed corporate governance provisions impact on firm financial performance in Nigeria 
and South Africa?’ Subsections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 discuss the results of the alternative internal 
CG mechanisms and firm performance nexus as measured by the equilibrium variable model 
(hypotheses 1 to 9 and 11) and shown in tables 18 and 19. These results answer sub-research 
question 2 stated as ‘Do endogenously generated alternative firm-level internal corporate 
governance mechanisms affect firm financial performance in Nigeria and South Africa?’ The 
next two sets of results discussed in 8.4.1 and 8.4.2 and reported in tables 20 and 21 provide 
the OLS estimation of the sub-CG compliance indices in Nigeria (Shareholder–NICGI and 
Stakeholder–NICGI) and South Africa (Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI) 
respectively. These results provide a test of hypotheses 10b and 10c and answer sub-research 
question 1. Subsections 8.5.1 and 8.5.2 report a comparison of results of the compliance 
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index model and the equilibrium variable model (tables 22 and 23) in Nigeria and South 
Africa respectively. These comparisons provide evidence for sub-research question three (3) 
stated as ‘Are firms’ choices of alternative internal CG structures as measured by the 
equilibrium variable model associated with better firm performance than firm-level 
compliance with country-level CG provisions as measured by the compliance index model?’ 
The results discussed in the various sections and sub-research questions provide evidence to 
answer the main research question stated as ‘Why, and in what ways, do the choices of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and compliance with corporate governance 
provisions affect firm financial performance of listed firms in Nigeria and South Africa?’ 
Specifically, this is summarised comparatively in section 8.6 and on table 24. This is 
followed by a summary of the chapter in 8.7.  
8.2 Results Based on the Compliance Index Model 
 
Sub-research Question 1: How and in what ways does firm-level compliance with 
exogenously developed corporate governance provisions impact on firm financial 
performance in Nigeria and South Africa? 
Hypothesis: 10a 
  8.2.1 Nigerian Empirical Results – Compliance Index Model 
 
Table 16 contains OLS results based on accounting measure (ROCE) and market measure 
(Q-ratio) for Nigeria only. The equation for the compliance index model is stated as: 
 
P =δ + β1NICGIit + β2CONTROLSit + Uit……………………… (3)     
 
As noted earlier, in the first sub-model (Model I), the control variables are regressed against 
ROCE and Q-ratio. Columns 3 and 4 of table 16 provide the results based on the controls, 
whereas columns 5 to 14 show multi-variate regression of the Nigerian Corporate 
Governance index (NICGI) and the control variables for the pooled sample and for each of 
the five firm-years respectively.  
 
The F-value of 5.290(0.000) *** for ROCE and 9.156(0.000) *** for Q-ratio indicate that 
Model I is statistically significant at 1% with adjusted R2 of 0.155 and 0.258 respectively. 
This therefore suggests that the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient of the control 
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variables is zero is rejected. Inferring that, the control variables explain 15.5% of the 
variations in the firms’ accounting returns (ROCE) and 25.8% of variations in the firms’ 
market return (Q-ratio). As a result, the model does not suffer from omitted variable bias and 
therefore adding the quality of internal corporate governance structures in Nigeria as 
measured by the NICGI will generate results that are not spurious.  
 
In Model II, the quality of internal corporate governance structures (NICGI) was added to the 
equation. The F-value for both ROCE and Q ratio remained significant at 1% (p≤0.001). The 
adjusted R2 for both ROCE and Q-ratio are 0.171 and 0.264 respectively. This shows that 
there is a positive improvement in the degree of variation by 1.6% with the accounting 
measure (ROCE) and by 0.6% with the market measure (Q-ratio). This indicates that the 
quality of internal corporate governance structures (NICGI) and control variables jointly 
explain 17.1% of the variations in the accounting returns and 26.4% of the market returns for 
listed firms in Nigeria between 2011 and 2015. The adjusted R2 ranged from 6.5% to 26.4% 
between 2011 to 2015 with regard to accounting returns, with highest adjusted R2 in 2013, 
whereas, with regard to market return, the adjusted R2 ranged from 30.3% to 34.8% with the 
highest adjusted R2 in 2012. Across the five firm years, the model explains a pooled average 
of 17.1% variation in the accounting return and 26.4% for market return for listed firms in 
Nigeria.  
 
For the compliance index model, the interest is whether the quality of internal corporate 
governance structures in Nigeria as measured by NICGI has any meaningful impact on the 
market and accounting returns of listed firms in Nigeria. From Model II in table 16, the 
results indicate that NICGI is positively related to accounting return (ROCE) with a 
coefficient of 0.241(.004) *** which is statistically significant (p≤0.001) and positively 
related to market returns (Q-ratio), which are statistically significant at 5% (p≤0.05). 
Regarding the five firm years, NICGI showed a positive relationship across all firm years but 
the results in relation to ROCE are significant only in 2011 at 1% (p≤0.001) and 2012 at 10% 
(p≤0.10), whereas NICGI is significantly associated with Q-ratio only in 2013 at 5% 
(p≤0.05). These differences between cross-sectional (yearly) and longitudinal results (five 
firm year) suggest that, over time, the impact of NICGI is stronger than within individual 
years. Specifically, the marginal increase in firm performance because of changes in NICGI 
is not significant enough to cause cross-sectional changes in individual firm year. But on 
aggregate level, marginal increases/decrease in compliance and firm financial performance 
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year-on-year compounds to significant association between NICGI and firm financial 
performance in the panel estimation. As such the longitudinal nature of both NICGI and firm 
performance generates more accurate predictions for individual effects of NICGI on 
performance by pooling the data rather than generating predictions of individual cross-
sectional outcomes. The aggregate impact of NICGI on firm performance is in line with the 
correlation results, which showed that there was a positive relationship between quality of 
internal corporate governance structures in Nigeria as measured by the NICGI and firm 
financial returns. The significant positive relationship between NICGI and ROCE and Q-ratio 
therefore supports hypothesis 10a, which states that there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between compliance with the Nigerian Corporate Governance Index (NICGI) 
and firm financial performance as measured by the ROCE and Q-ratio. This therefore 
indicates that firms that are compliant with the corporate governance code implemented by 
the SEC in 2011 perform better than firms that do not comply. These results are consistent 
with the findings of Klapper and Love (2004), who also reported a positive relationship 
between CG compliance and firm performance. The results are also consistent with other 
studies which have found a positive relationship in Africa, e.g. Ghana (Owusu and Weir, 
2012) and Kenya (Lishenga  and Mbaka 2015), South Africa (Ntim, 2013c).  
 
With regard to the control variables, as expected, sales growth is positively and significantly 
related to ROCE at 1% (p≤0.001) in both Model I and Model II but not significantly related 
to Q-ratio in both Model I and Model II. Across the five firm years, sales growth significantly 
relates to ROCE in 2012 and 2013 at 1% (p≤.001), whereas sales growth is only statistically 
related to Q-ratio positively in 2014 at 1% (p≤0.01). 
  
Dual listing positively affects ROCE but negatively impacts Q-ratio insignificantly. The 
negative relationship with Q-ratio may suggest rejecting the proposition that dual-listed firms 
are exposed to more financial resources and perform better than non-dual-listed firms. 
However, the positive relationship with accounting returns is consistent with the results of 
Charitou and Louca (2009), who reported that dual-listed firms are associated with positive 
accounting returns. On the contrary, audit firm size positively and significantly affects ROCE 
and Q-ratio at 1% (p≤0.001). Firm size is insignificantly and positively associated with 
ROCE in Model I but negatively in Model II. Nevertheless, firm size significantly affects Q-
ratio in both models I and II. This is consistent with the results of Klapper and Love (2004), 
who found similar positive results.  
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As expected, capital structure (gearing) is positively related to Q-ratio insignificantly but 
negatively related to ROCE significantly at 1% (p≤0.001). This indicates that highly geared 
firms perform better in relation to market returns but worse in relation to accounting returns. 
Like gearing, the results indicate that total asset has a positive insignificant relationship with 
ROCE but a significantly negative relationship with Q-ratio at 1% (p≤0.01). It is also 
significant and negatively related to Q-ratio in 2013, 2014 and 2015 at 5% (p≤0.05). 
However, market value is significantly and positively related to Q-ratio at 1% but 
insignificantly related to ROCE. Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) is insignificantly negatively 
related to ROCE but significantly negatively related to Q-ratio at 5% (p≤0.05).   
 
The next section, 8.2.2, discusses the results of the compliance index model in South Africa.  
 
 
  8.2.2 South African Empirical Results – Compliance Index Model 
 
Like Nigeria, multi-variate OLS regression results on the compliance index model based on 
accounting measure (ROCE) and market measure (Q-ratio) for South Africa are reported in 
table 17 below. The equation for the compliance index model for South Africa is stated as: 
Pit =δ + β1SACGIit + β2CONTROLSit + Uit …………………………(4)     
 
As noted earlier in 8.2.1, in the first sub-model (Model I), the control variables were 
regressed against ROCE and Q-ratio. Columns 3 and 4 of table 17 show the result based on 
the controls, whereas columns 5 to 14 show multi-variate regression of the South African 
Corporate Governance index (SACGI) and the control variables for the pooled sample (500 
firm years) and for each of the five firm years respectively.  
 
Following from table 17 below, the adjusted R2 for Model I with ROCE and Q-ratio against 
control variables are 0.189 and 0.212, with F-values of 7.84(0.000) *** and 8.90(0.000) *** 
respectively and significant at 1% (p≤0.001). In Model II, with addition of the South African 
Corporate Governance index (SACGI) to the equation, the adjusted R2 for ROCE and Q-ratio 
is 0.194 and 0.217 with F-values of 7.67(0.000) *** and 8.70(0.000) *** respectively and 
significant at 1% (p≤ 0.001).
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Table 16: Nigerian OLS Regression Results for the Compliance Index Model Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance 
Variable (Q-ratio) 
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. More so, to avoid dummy variable trap, year 2012 and health care/consumer goods industry are excluded from the regression 
analysis. They are both used as base year dummy and base industry dummy for comparison reasons. NICGI is the Nigerian Corporate Governance Index.
 
Exp All firm years 
(Model I) 
All firm years (Model II) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
 
Sign ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2) 
 
.191 .290 .208 .294 .331 .455 .341 .463 .394 .426 .231 .427 .349 .305 
Adjusted R2 
 
.155 .258 .171 .264 .187 .337 .199 .348 .264 .303 .065 .303 .208 .156 
F-value 
 
5.29(.000) *** 9.156(.000)*** 5.568(.000) *** 8.947(.000) *** 2.299(.012) 
*** 
3.87(.000)**** 2.41(.009)*** 4.00(.000) *** 3.023(.001) *** 3.453(.000) *** 1.393(.182) 3.46(.000) *** 2.485(.000)*** 2.04(.028)** 
Standard Error 
 
21.348 1.530 21.143 1.524 25.390 0.950 22.273 0.995 19.997 1.580 20.398 1.508 15.478 2.196 
Durbin–Watson 
 
.970 1.066 .970 1.074 1.926 2.113 2.114 2.081 1.759 2.212 2.134 2.049 2.224 1.819 
No of observations 
 
400 400 400 400 80 80 80 80 80 80 100 80 80 80 
Constant 
 
4.605(.226) 2.778(.000) *** -9.070(.133) 2.334(.000) *** -32.08(.024)** 1.839(.023)** -18.20(.172) 2.66(.002) *** -19.517(.123) 2.313(0.088) * 0.741(.958) 3.683(.010) *** 1.585(.898) 2.329(.257)  
NICGI + - - .241(.004) *** 0.013(.043)** .654(.003)*** .004(.608) 0.325(.092)* .008(.387) .260(.152) .037(.024) ** .0350(.858) .012(.464) .083(.600) .182(.507) 
Sales Growth + .132(017) *** 0.000(.939) 0.139(.011) *** 0.001(.803) -0.002(.987) .000(.975) 0.364(.010)*** -0.008(.178) .363(002)*** 0.006(.451) .123(.298) .014(.017)*** .000(.995) -.027(.250) 
Dual Listing + 3.037(.560) -0.516(.167) 1.725(.739) -0.581(.119) 1.568(.917) .060(.908) -1.012(.936) .490(.383) 17.832(.137) -0.957(0.291) -4.850(.175) -.411(.125) -.145(.986) -.574(.637) 
Audit Firm Size + 10.49(.000) *** 0.707(.000) *** 8.500(.002) *** 0.631(.002) *** 14.202(.052)** -.040(.884) -1.7650(.788) .345(.240) 14.018(.023)** .296(.054) ** 10.153(0.099)* .835(.066)* 8.936(.055)** 1.412(.035)** 
Firm Size + 1.698(.565) 0.675(.005)*** -0.571(.850) 0.639(.008)*** -7.82(.334) .360(.309) 10.461(.157) .049(.891) -6.674(.365) .568(0.361) 3.545(.595) 1.143(.043)** -5.141(.302) .454(.358) 
Capital Structure 
(Gearing) 
+/- -0.121(.000) *** 0.003(.201) -0.12(.000) *** .004(.128) -0.101(.241) .002(.511) -0.135(.090)* .008(.031)** -0.084(.290) .007(.317) -0.211(.008)*** .004(.413) -.078(.124) ..001(.825) 
Total Asset +/- .000(.635) -.000(.003)*** .000(.673) -.000(.003)*** -.000(.399) -.000(.544) -.000(.309) .000(.948) -.000(.262) -.000(.030)** 2.725(.937) -.000(.027)** .000(.711) -.000(.047)** 
Market Value + .000(.129) .000(.000) *** .000(.119) 0.000(.000) *** .000(.816) .000(.000) *** .000(.124) .000(.000)*** .000(.462 .000(.001)*** 8.876(.490) .000(.001) *** .000(.045)** .000(.062)* 
Capital Expenditure 
(CAPEX) 
+/- -.000(.594) -0.000(.117) -.000(.517) -.000(.047)** .000(.573) -.000(.295) -.000(.313) -.000(.104) * -0.000(.833) -.000(.230) -1.283(.634) -.000(.559) -.000(.117) -.000(.753) 
Agriculture/Consumer 
Goods 
 
12.278(.001) *** 0.782(.006)*** 12.460(.0001)*** 0.905(.002) *** 10.851(.282) .566(.157) 13.353(.131) -.311(.482) 16.292(.041)** 1.586(.028)** 11.202(.161) 1.435(.031)** 4.618(.449) 1.538(.116) 
Finance Industry 
 
2.487(.452) -0.536(.057) ** 0.770(.817) -0.50(.074)* -9.355(.317) -.620(.131) 1.390(.869) -1.06(.016)** 7.827(.300) -.203 (.766) 6.625(0.378) -.244(.704) .121(.983) .151(.868) 
ICT/Real-estate 
 
9.749(.044) ** 0.429(.234) 10.583(.027)** 0.569(.120) 12.038(.364) .180(.729) 23.181(.049) ** -.245(.673) 19.920(.055)** .410(.636) 13.614(.195) .194(.814) -21.18(.008)*** 2.915(.017)*** 
Industrial/ 
Conglomerate 
 
0.829(.875) -0.576(143) 1.741(.740) -0.407(.309) -13.899(.341) -.374(.500) 6.466(.611) -1.541(.013) * 0.995(.931) -.223(.815) 3.491(.756) -.339(.702) -2.369(.782) .250(.854) 
Natural Resource/Oil 
& Gas 
 
18.12(.000) *** 0.219(.528) 19.729(.000)*** 0.420(.244) 4.683(.709) -.397(.449) 34.490(.003)*** -1.254(0.026) 22.783(.026)** 1.456(.104) * 24.802(.019) 1.173(.172) 15.775(.040)** 1.666(.148) 
Year 2011 
 
-5.617(.097) * 0.057(.814) -4.699(.163) 0.089(.711) - - - - - - - - - - 
Year 2013 
 
-1.434(.676) 0.288(.242) -2.038(.550) 0.257(.295) - - - - - - - - - - 
Year 2014 
 
-3.352(.327) 0.207(.397) -4.750(.165) 0.130(.598) - - - - - - - - - - 
Year 2015  -4.866(.157) 0.553(.025)** -7.630(.031)** 0.408(.110)         - - 
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Similar to Nigeria, this indicates that both models are significant in South Africa and thus the 
null hypothesis that the regression coefficient of the control variables and the SACGI is zero 
is not accepted. Results from Model I indicate that the control variables account for 18.9% of 
the variations in the accounting returns of listed firms (ROCE) and 21.2% variation in market 
return of listed firms (Q-ratio). With the addition of the South African Corporate Governance 
index (SACGI) to the equation (Model II), adjusted R2 for ROCE increased to 0.194 and Q-
ratio to 0.217. The control variables plus the quality of internal corporate governance 
structures in South Africa (SACGI) explain 19.4% of variation in the accounting return 
(ROCE) and 21.7% of the market return of listed firms (Q-ratio) in South Africa. There is an 
increase of 0.5% in the adjusted R2 for ROCE and Q-ratio with the addition of the quality of 
internal corporate governance structures in South Africa (SACGI). This may suggest that the 
quality of internal corporate governance structures in South Africa accounts for a 0.5% 
variation in both the accounting and market returns of listed firms. This is, however, lower 
than the results of Klapper and Love (2004,pp.719), Ntim (2009,pp.269-273), who reported 
that the quality of internal corporate governance structures in South Africa accounts for 3% 
and 10% respectively of the variations in the accounting returns and market returns of listed 
firms in South Africa. This low explanatory power of the quality of internal corporate 
governance structures (SACGI) is a result of inertia in relevance attached to CG compliance 
over the years. Firms may be complying with CG provisions by ticking the box but not 
necessarily making sure that the selected structures are meaningfully used to improve on firm 
performance. More so, the apply or explain principle of King III which gives firms flexibility 
to choose whatever structures they see fit may account for a relaxation in adopting good CG 
standards with a consequential weak CG monitoring system which may not meaningfully 
impact on firm performance. As the descriptive earlier suggested, after the introduction of 
King III, firms increased their CG compliance in 2011, but beyond that, compliance levels 
have increased at a decreasing rate. 
 
The adjusted R2 ranged from 9.1% to 23.2% between 2010 and 2014 with regard to 
accounting returns and the highest was in 2014, whereas, with regard to market return, the 
adjusted R2 ranged from 14.5% to 29.3% with the highest in 2014. For the five firm years, the 
model explains a pooled average of 19.4% variation in the accounting returns and 21.7% 
market returns variation for listed firms in South Africa. This is similar to the results reported 
by Ntim (2009,pp.269-273), who reported adjusted R2 of 7% to 23% based on accounting 
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returns and 7% to 21% in the market returns of listed firms in South Africa in the period 2002 to 
2006.   
 
The variable of interest in this equation, the quality of internal corporate governance 
structures in South Africa as measured by the SACGI, shows that SACGI is positively and 
significantly related to accounting returns (ROCE) with coefficients of 0.318(0.05**) but 
negatively and significantly related to market returns with coefficients of -0.013(.038**) both 
at 5% (p≤0.05). Regarding the five firm years, the quality of internal corporate governance 
structures in South Africa showed positive relationship across all the firm years with ROCE, 
but the results were only significant in 2014 at 10% (p≤0.10). On the other hand, the quality 
of internal corporate governance structures in South Africa with regard to Q-ratio shows 
negative relationship across all firm years but only significant in 2012 at 10% (p≤0.10). Like 
Nigeria, the differences in significance between cross sectional and panel results for SACGI 
impact on firm performance suggest that the latter includes more sample variability over time 
than the former which adds variability of individual year effects of SACGI on firm 
performance which improves on the significant positive impact of SACGI on firm accounting 
performance and negative impact on market returns. More so, the insignificant cross-sectoral 
effect suggests that SACGI effect on firm financial performance improves over time 
compared to individual periods. The significant SACGI-Q-ratio association, are consistent 
with the correlation results reported in table 15 which showed that there was a negative and 
significant association between the quality of internal corporate governance structures in 
South Africa and the market return (Q-ratio). This negative impact suggests that over time, 
the application of governance guidelines as required by King III in South Africa is negatively 
valued by the stock market.  
 
 The significant positive relationship between SACGI and ROCE supports hypothesis 11a, 
which states that there is a statistical significant positive relationship between compliance 
with King III corporate governance provisions and firm financial performance as measured 
by ROCE. On the other hand, the result based on Q-ratio suggests hypothesis 11a cannot be 
accepted and therefore the alternative hypothesis that compliance with King III corporate 
governance provisions does not positively affect firm market performance as measured by Q-
ratio is accepted. Therefore, compliance with the King III corporate governance provisions by 
South African-listed firms affects market returns negatively but impacts positively on their 
accounting returns. Consequently, compliance with the King III corporate governance 
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provisions in view of the results of this study is a double-edged sword whereby more 
compliant firms experience increasing accounting returns and, on the other hand, decreasing 
market valuation.   
 
The positive results between the quality of internal corporate governance structures in South 
Africa is consistent with Klapper and Love (2004), who found a positive relationship between 
CG compliance and firm performance in South Africa based on accounting returns. The 
results based on accounting returns (ROCE) are also consistent with the results discussed in 
8.2.1 with regard to compliance with Nigerian corporate governance provisions of the SEC 
and are also consistent with other studies which have found positive relationships between 
these two variables in Africa, e.g. Ghana (Owusu and Weir, 2012) and Kenya (Lishenga  and 
Mbaka 2015), South Africa (Ntim, 2013c). However, the results based on the market returns 
contradict the findings of Klapper and Love (2004) and Ntim (2013c), who found a positive 
relationship between the quality of internal corporate governance structures in South Africa 
and markets returns as measured by Q-ratio. On the other hand, inverse link between CG 
index and market value are consistent with the results of Bebchuk et al. (2008), using S&P 
500 firms with data for the period 1993–2002, and Madanoglu et al. (2016), using US-listed 
firms between 1990–2008. The differences in results from prior South African studies may be 
attributable to different periods of studies as well as differences in measurement of the 
SACGI. For example, Ntim (2009) and Ntim (2013c) developed corporate governance index 
for South Africa based on provisions of King II in the period 2002–2006, while the current 
study is based on the provisions of the current King III. More so, these differences in results 
may be attributable to the different reporting styles between the King II and King III. The 
King II required firms to comply or explain their reasons for non-compliance while the King 
III works within the framework of apply or explain the reasons for non-application. Hence, 
within the King III framework, firms can apply the provisions as they see fit based on the 
firms’ needs and, as such, the market may not view this favourably. Finally, the differences in 
results may be attributable to the problem of inertia in the market. Inertia exists because, over 
the years, the development of different corporate governance reports (King I to III) has led to 
investors feeling disconnected and paying little attention to CG regulations and, as such, 
punishing firms who pay attention more to compliance rather than pursuing profit 
maximisation. This may suggest that compliant firms are undervalued by investors for 
pursuing compliance goals at the expense of profitability goals. In such a case, investors and 
markets do not see any value in complying with corporate governance provisions and 
158 
 
158 | P a g e  
 
therefore value compliant firms negatively. In fact, this is in line with the results of Tariq and 
Abbas (2013), who reported that firms that comply highly with corporate governance 
provisions in Pakistan are less profitable than average- and low-compliance firms.  
 
Concerning the control variables, as expected and similar to the Nigeria results, sales growth 
in South Africa is positive and significantly related to ROCE at 5% (p≤0.05) in both models 
II and I. Nevertheless, contrary to Nigeria results, sales growth is also significantly related to 
Q-ratio in both models II and I at 1% (p≤.001). Again, similar to Nigeria results and contrary 
to expectations, dual listing has negative impact on both ROCE and Q-ratio but is only 
statistically significant with ROCE in both models I and II at 1% (p≤0.001). As noted, this 
result rejects the preposition that dual-listed firms tend to benefit from abundant supply of 
resource and therefore perform better than non-dual-listed firms. In the same way, it 
contradicts the results of Charitou and Louca (2009), who found that dual-listed firms are 
associated with positive accounting returns.  
 
In addition, and contrary to the results from analysis of Nigeria data, the results from South 
African data analysis show that audit firm size negatively and significantly affects both 
ROCE and Q-ratio at 1% (p≤0.001). Consistent with the Nigerian results and the results of 
Klapper and Love (2004), firm size in South Africa was found to have a significant positive 
effect on ROCE and Q-ratio in both models.  
 
As argued by Ntim (2009, 2013d, 2013a), gearing can impact on market returns and 
accounting returns differently. Results show capital structure (gearing) is positively related to 
Q-ratio insignificant but negatively related to ROCE significantly at 1% (p≤0.001). These 
results are also consistent with the result reported for Nigeria in 8.2.1. These results suggest 
that, in South Africa, highly geared firms outperform lowly geared firms in relation to market 
returns but perform worse in relation to accounting returns.  
 
Contrary to the Nigerian results, total asset has a negative insignificant relationship with 
ROCE across both models. However, it  is significant and negatively associated with Q-ratio 
at 10% (p≤0.10) in Model I. Similar to Nigeria results, capital expenditure (CAPEX) in South 
Africa affects significantly and negatively on Q-ratio at 1% (p≤0.001). Nevertheless, contrary 
to Nigerian results, CAPEX insignificantly affects ROCE positively.  
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Table 17: South African OLS Regression Results for the Compliance Index Model (SACGI) Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market 
Performance Measure(Q-ratio) 
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. More so, to avoid dummy variable trap, year 2011 and consumer services/health care industry are excluded from the regression 
analysis. They are both used as base year dummy and base industry dummy for comparison reasons. SACGI is the South African Corporate Governance index based on King III corporate governance code.
  
 All firm years (Model I) All firm years (Model II) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Exp 
Sign ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2)  .217 .239 .223 .246 .22 0.266 .265 .363 .252 .303 .294 .335 .341 .393 
Adjusted R2  .189 .212 .194 .217 .091 .145 .144 .259 .129 .188 .178 .225 .232 .293 
F-value  7.84(.000) *** 8.90(000)*** 7.67(.000) *** 8.70(.000)*** 1.71(.069)* 2.20(.014)*** 2.19(.015)** 3.47(.000)*** 2.04(.024)** 2.64(.003)*** 2.530(.005)*** 3.05(.001)*** 3.14(.001)*** 3.93(000) *** 
Standard Error  23.298 0.872 23.328 0.869 24.156 1.125 23.136 0.767 21.422 0.906 64.648 0.811 25.127 .712 
Durbin–Watson  1.047 1.026 1.055 1.041 2.251 2.269 2.222 2.211 2.135 2.161 2.208 1.793 1.822 2.216 
Highest VIF Score  2.054 2.019 2.057 2.022 2.223 3.238 2.15 3.259 2.077 3.224 2.063 3.224 2.131 3.901 
No of observations  500 500 500 500 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Constant  33.143(.000)*** 1.876(.000)*** 8.099(.55) 2.61(.000) *** 18.516(.489) 3.110(.014)*** 15.024(.624) 2.716(.009)*** 4.014(.668) 4.340(.001)*** -7.782(.828) 3.465(.004)*** -49.987(.191) .801(.456) 
SACGI +   .318(.05) ** -.013(.038)** .190(.573) -.021(.194) .252(.491) -.011(.344) .368(.291) -.026(.076)* .448(.277) -.015(.269) .798(.068)* .010(.433) 
Sales Growth + .076(.051)** .005(.001)*** .072(.065)* .005(.001)*** .028(.767) .012(.005)*** .059(.453) .008(.003)*** .179(072)* -.002(.633) .188(.067)* .001(.690) .041(.661) .001(.506) 
Dual Listing + -8.129(.009)*** -.152(.188) -8.322(.007)*** -.144(.209) -9.979(.170) -.088(.794) -3.630(.598) -.173(.452) -10.135(.113) -.111(.678) -.767(.912) .014(.955) -13.887(.070)* -.356(.099)* 
Audit Firm Size + -9.287(.012)*** -.456(.001)*** -9.972(.007) *** -.429(.002)*** -13.018(.148) -.375(.369) -10.919(.210) -.710(.015)*** -9.040(.271) -.555(.111) -16.525(.080)* -.461(.136) 3.176(.715) .162(.511) 
Firm Size + 6.408(.007)*** .304(.001)*** 5.369(.026)** .345(.000)*** -.618(.918) .475 (.094)* -.079(988) .318(.074)* 3.591(.476) .360(.093)* 7.029(.220) .130(.488) 19.713(.001)*** .287(.095)* 
Capital Structure 
(Gearing) +/- -.103(.002)*** .001(.531) -.107(.002) *** .001(.457) .021(.791) .002(.662) -.076(.367) .002(.441) -.131(.083)* .001(.769) -.114(.154) .001(.593) -.191(.015)*** -.001(.661) 
Total Asset +/- -.000(.28) -.000(.097)* -.000(.18) -.000(.171) -.000(.323) .000(.546) -.000(.748) -.000(.470) -.000(.391) -0.000(.903) 0.000(.452) .000 (.966) .000(.898) .000(.017)*** 
Market Value + .000(.035)** .000(.000)*** .001(.035)** .000(.000)*** .001(.273) .000(.164) 0.001(.352) .000(.009)*** .000(.866) .000(.008)*** .000(.292) .000 (.003)*** -.000(.430) .000(.002)*** 
Capital Expenditure 
(CAPEX) +/- .000(.736) -.000(.003)*** .000(.700) -.000(.003)*** -.000(.606) -.000(.754) -.000(.918) -.000(.069)* .000(.607) -.000(.079)* .000(.777) -.000(.088)* .000(.260) -.000(.272) 
Basic Material  -21.734(.000)*** -.149(.290) -22.862(.000) *** -.104(.461) -16.66(.052)** .354(.372) -26.025(.003)*** .410(.145) -16.444(.060)* -.220(.553) -27.456(.004)*** -.533(.087)* 29.386(.002)*** -.733(.007)*** 
Consumer Goods  4.734(.286) .313(.059)** 3.653(.412) .355(.033)** 14.125(.178) .537(.270) 12.254(.222) .777(.021)** 1.469(.873) .471(.228) 3.332(.752) .102(.768) -15.138(.165) -.040(.896) 
Finance Industry  -2..731(.417) -.614(.000)*** -2.488(.458) -.624(.000)*** -3.611(.645) -.456(.213) -5.521(.460) -.386(.121) -6.221(.371) -.683(.022)** .527(.947) -.862(.001)*** -2.700(.747) -.675(.005)*** 
Industrial  -7.076(.046)** -.287(.030)** -8.373(.020)** -.236(.078)* -4.630(.578) .029(.939) -6.336(.434) -.060(.824) -10.012(.183) -.290(.361) -6.027(.489) -.294(.306) -20.690(.021)** -.554(.029)** 
Telecoms/Technology 
Industry  4.922(.267) -.115(.487) 4.476(.312) -.097(.555) 8.746(.414) -.312(.531) 3.49(.728) .089(.786) 3.932(.668) .0189(.961) 7.090(.500) -.148(.667) 1.411(.894) -.124(.681) 
Year 2010  -.034(.992) .148(.232) 1.371(.686) .093(.462)           
Year 2012  -.149(.964) .053(.668) -.882(.791) .082(.509)           
Year 2013  -5.355(.107)* .028(.820) -6.551(.053)** .074(.556)           
Year 2014  -7.315(.028)** -.086(.489) -8.644(.011)*** -.034(.790)           
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The next section presents results based on alternative firm-level internal corporate 
governance mechanisms as examined in the equilibrium variable model.  
 
8.3 Results Based on Equilibrium Variable Model (EVM) 
 
Sub-research Question 2: Do endogenously generated alternative firm-level internal 
corporate governance mechanisms affect firm financial performance in Nigeria and 
South Africa? 
 
Hypothesis: 1–9 and 11.  
 
  8.3.1 Nigerian Empirical Results – Equilibrium Variable Model (EVM) 
 
Table 18 below contains OLS results based on accounting measure (ROCE) and market 
measure (Q-ratio) for the equilibrium variable model for Nigeria only. In this model, ROCE 
and Q-ratio are regressed against board size (BSZ), non-executive directors (NEDs), 
independent non-executive directors (INEDs), executive directors (EDs), gender diversity 
(GDIV), ethnic diversity (EDIV), gearing (GEAR), frequency of board meetings (FRE-M), 
board interlock (ILOCK), institutional shareholding (D-SH), director shareholding (ST-SH), 
audit committee independence (IAC) and board busyness (BNESS) as independent variables 
plus the control variables. The control variables are the same variables used in the 
compliance index model, except for gearing, which is included as an alternative internal 
corporate governance variable (independent variable). Similar to the compliance index 
model, two sub-models are estimated in the equilibrium variable model. As noted earlier, in 
the first sub-model (Model I), the control variables are regressed against ROCE and Q-ratio. 
Columns 3 and 4 of table 18 below show the result based on the controls, whereas column 5 
to 14 show multi-variate regression of the alternative internal corporate governance variables 
plus the control variables for the pooled sample and for each of the five firm years 
respectively. 
  
As can be read in table 18 below, the adjusted R2 for Model I with Q-ratio and ROCE against 
control variables are 0.253 and 0.124 with F-values of 9.478(0.000) *** and 4.537(0.000)*** 
respectively and significant at 1% (p≤0.001). The results of Model I in the equilibrium 
variable model are similar to those of the compliance index model (8.2.1). However, with the 
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absence of gearing as a control variable in the equilibrium variable model, the explanatory 
power (adjusted R2) of the controls on ROCE decreases from 0.155 to 0.124 and that of Q-
ratio decreases from 0.258 to 0.253. Generally, the signs and significant level of the control 
variables in the equilibrium variable model in Nigeria are similar to those reported in the 
compliance index model. As such, for purposes of brevity, they will not be discussed here.  
 
A priori, the correlation results showed serious multi-collinearity between NEDs and EDs 
variables (highlighted in 7.4); therefore, in Model II, three multiple regressions (IIa, b and c) 
were piloted using a process of elimination. To check for robustness of results, regression IIa 
(first regression in Model II) was tested by including both NEDs and EDs as part of the 
model (regression IIa). This enables a verification of multi-collinearity using the tolerance 
statistics and VIF values to confirm if there exists serious multi-collinearity as suggested by 
the correlation results. The results from this regression show adjusted R2 of 0.167 for ROCE 
and 0.337 for Q-ratio significant at 1% (p≤0.001). Nonetheless, the VIF values for proportion 
of NEDs and EDs variables were 1839.532 and 1666.741, with corresponding tolerance 
statistics of 0.001 for both variables. These results confirmed the suggestion of the correlation 
results of serious multi-collinearity, and thus including both variables in the same regression 
may lead to poor regression coefficients, which may affect the interpretation, validity and 
reliability of the results. As a result, following Kutner et al. (2004) recommendations, two 
additional regressions (regression IIb and IIc) were estimated by excluding EDs variable in 
regression IIb, while, in regression IIc, proportion of NEDs was excluded from the 
regression.  
 
The regression (regression IIb) removing the executive directors (EDs) variable showed that 
the adjusted R2 remained unchanged at 0.167 for ROCE and 0.337 for Q-ratio at 1% 
(p≤0.001) and the signs and significance of the other variables except for NEDs remained 
unchanged. The proportion of NEDs which was positively and significantly related to ROCE 
and negatively and significantly associated with Q-ratio in regression IIa remained positively 
and negatively related to ROCE and Q-ratio respectively but insignificantly. The tolerance 
and VIF statistics for NEDs changed to 1.7504 for both Q-ratio and ROCE with tolerance 
statistics of 0.571 for both measures. 
 
The final regression (regression IIc) excluded NEDs from the equation and included EDs 
variable. Similar to regression IIb, the adjusted R2 remained unchanged at 0.167 for ROCE 
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and 0.337 for Q-ratio at 1% (p≤0.001). Consistent with the previous two regressions, the 
signs and significance of all other variables apart from EDs did not change. However, 
proportion of EDs, which was positively and significantly associated with ROCE, changed to 
a negative insignificantly related to ROCE, while the results on Q-ratio changed from a 
negative to positive association with EDs but insignificantly. The tolerance and VIF statistics 
for EDs remained similar to those of NEDs in regression IIb (changed to 1.7504 for both Q-
ratio and ROCE with tolerance statistics of 0.571).  
 
Following from the three sub-regressions in Model II (IIa, b and c), eliminating NED and ED 
indicates that multi-collinearity in an OLS regression has the potential to cause statistically 
significant results for some variables when they should be insignificant. This is because, 
when both proportion of EDs and NEDs were included in the same regression (IIa), they both 
had significant results, but by eliminating each of them in subsequent regressions (IIb and 
IIc), they showed insignificant results with different signs and coefficients. Nonetheless, 
since the adjusted R2, signs and significance of the variables in the three regressions in Model 
II were the same across all the sub-regressions except for the two variables (NED and ED), 
which had serial negative correlations, for the sake of brevity in presentation, only the 
regression results of regression IIb are presented in table 18, though the coefficients of ED (as 
it was eliminated in regression IIb because of multi-collinearity with NEDs) in the table 18 
below were extracted from regression IIc. 
 
In Model II (IIb), with addition of 14 alternative internal corporate governance variables to 
the extraneous variables, the adjusted R2 for ROCE and Q-ratio are 0.167 and 0.337 with F-
values of 3.742(.000) *** and 7.972(.000)*** respectively and significant at 1% (p≤ 0.001). 
Following from the results, the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient of the control 
variables and the alternative internal corporate governance variables are zero is not accepted. 
Thus, the results indicate that the control variables and alternative internal corporate 
governance structures in Nigeria explain 16.7% variation in the accounting returns (ROCE) 
and 33.7% variation in the market return of listed firms (Q-ratio) in Nigeria. There is an 
increase (from 12.4% in Model I to 16.7% in Model II) by 4.3% in the adjusted R2 for ROCE 
and 8.4% (from 25.3% in Model I to 33.7% in Model II) for Q-ratio because of the addition 
of the alternative firm-level internal corporate governance structures. This suggests firm-level 
internal corporate governance structures in Nigeria account for about 8.4% variation in 
market returns and 4.3% variation in the accounting returns of listed firms in Nigeria.  
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These results show slightly higher effect than the results from similar studies in Africa, e.g. 
Ntim (2009), who found that, on average, the alternative firm-level internal corporate 
governance structures explain 6% variation in both market and accounting returns of listed 
firms in South Africa. Adjusted R2 for ROCE for the five firm years range from -0.05% to 
29.1%, whereas the market return (Q-ratio) adjusted R2 range from 11.2% to 43.7% in the 
period 2011 to 2015. These results are similar to the results of Ntim (2009), who reported 
firm year adjusted R2 of 1% to 10% for ROA in South Africa for the period 2000–2006. 
However, the results (Adjusted R2) for Q-ratio are higher than those reported by Ntim 
(2009,pp.259), 11% to 24%, and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006,pp.1053), 22% to 28%.  
 
As reported in column 8 of table 18, the VIF scores for both sub-models (Model I and II) are 
less than or equal to ten, indicating that multi-collinearity was not a problem in the 
equilibrium variable model after eliminating the variables which had serial correlations as 
discussed above. More so, the Durbin–Watson test results of more than one indicates that 
there was no serious autocorrelation problem in the model.  
 
Concerning the main effect of the 14 firm-level internal corporate governance structures 
(independent variables), the results indicate that board size has a significantly negative 
relationship with Q-ratio at 1% (p ≤0.001) but an insignificant positive relationship with 
ROCE. These results based on the accounting measure of performance do not support the 
findings of Sanda et al. (2005), who reported a significant positive relationship between 
board size and firm performance in Nigeria. More so, the negative relationship between board 
size and market return is consistent with the results from similar studies of Singaporean and 
Malaysian firms by Mak and Kusnadi (2005). Similarly, Guest (2009) used a sample of UK-
listed firms covering the period 1981 to 2002 and reported negative relationship between the 
size of the board and market returns. Based on these findings, therefore, hypothesis three 
(H03), which states that there is a statistical positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance, is rejected. In fact the results support the argument that smaller boards may be 
more prone to effective executive monitoring, candid assessment of management 
performance and fast, effective and easy decision-making (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992, Jensen, 1993).  
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The proportion of non-executive directors was found to be positively and but insignificantly 
related to ROCE but negatively and significantly related to Q-ratio. This indicates that the 
presence of NEDs on corporate boards may have a positive impact on accounting returns but 
a negative impact on market returns. More so, positive results may also suggest agency 
theory recommendation that increasing the proportion of NEDs on board enhances firm 
accounting returns but reject the recommendation that NEDs positively affect firm market 
returns. Hence, we therefore reject hypothesis 1a which states that there is a statistical 
positive relationship between NEDs and firm financial performance irrespective of the 
performance proxy used. 
 
In relation to the proportion of executive directors (EDs) on the board, the results are contrary 
to those for NEDs as there is a positive relationship between the proportion of EDs on a 
board and firm market returns. Whereas a negative relationship based on accounting returns 
though both results are insignificant. The positive results (though insignificant) on market 
returns may lend support to the resource dependency premise that executive directors are 
there to fulfil the task of meeting the internal resource dependency requirements of the firm 
(Hillman et al., 2000; Bryant and Davis, 2012). 
 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors was found to have negative 
association with accounting returns (ROCE) and market performance (Q-ratio), but only the 
results of the latter are significant at 1% (p ≤0.001). However, the results based on accounting 
returns were significant in 2013. These results suggest that the presence of independent 
directors on corporate boards in Nigeria may adversely affect firm performance. This may be 
because, if companies appoint independent directors for the sake of meeting regulatory 
provision without the right skills needed to perform the duties as independent directors, 
performance will suffer because such INEDs will have little to contribute to the functioning 
of the board.  
 
The separation of CEO/Chairman positions showed a negative association with accounting 
returns (ROCE) but positive impact on market returns (Q-ratio), but only the latter results are 
statistically significant. The insignificant results with accounting returns are consistent with 
the findings of other researchers, who found no significant impact of CEO/chairman role 
separation on accounting performance ( e.g. Baliga et al., 1996, Pearce and Zahra, 1992, 
Pearce and Zahra, 1991). The significant positive impact of CEO/Chairman separation on 
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market returns implies that the market values firms that separate this position more than firms 
that do not separate the positions. Hence, the insignificant results for accounting returns reject 
hypothesis two which states that there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between CEO/chairman separation and accounting returns. However, this hypothesis is 
accepted with regards to market returns. The accounting returns results lend support to the 
stewardship theory argument that a duly empowered CEO possesses the necessary technical 
and managerial competence that contributes to easy decision-making and enhances 
performance. As such, CEO role duality can build trust, stimulate and motivate management 
to perform well and thus enhance organisational performance. However, significant impact of 
leadership separation on market returns suggests separating leadership is a good CG practice 
which enhances the board’s ability to monitor and control management which consequently 
will lead to an increase in board independence, and thus agency conflict will reduce, which 
has a positive impact on shareholders’ value maximisation goal. 
 
Furthermore, frequency of board meetings showed positive association with both accounting 
returns (ROCE) and market returns, but the results are not statistically significant. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Ntim (2009,pp.263), who found positive but 
insignificant relationship between frequency of board meetings and market valuation. These 
results may lend supports to the results of Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), who conducted 
research using a sample of 275 US-listed firms from 1995 to 2000 and found a positive 
relationship between frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance. The 
results are also consistent with the results of Mangena and Tauringana (2006), who studied a 
sample of 157 Zimbabwean-listed firms covering the period 2001–2003 and found a positive 
relationship between firm performance and frequency of board meetings. However, 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Mangena and Tauringana (2006) had statistically 
significant results. Though these results are insignificant, they may however suggest that, 
ceteris paribus, more frequent board meetings can enhance board quality decision-making, 
managerial monitoring and control, which can be perceived as good practices.  
 
Board interlocks showed a positive relationship with accounting returns but a negative 
relationship with market returns insignificantly.  But results for market returns is significant 
in 2014 at 10% (p ≤0.10). These results based on accounting return (ROCE), even though 
insignificant, lend support to the findings of Ong et al. (2003), who studied interlocking 
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Table 18: Nigerian OLS Regression Results for Equilibrium Variable Model Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance 
Variable (Q-ratio) 
 
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. More so, to avoid dummy variable trap, year 2012 and health care/consumer goods industry are excluded from the regression 
analysis. They are both used as base year dummy and base industry dummy for comparison reasons.
  
 
All firm years 
(Model I) 
All firm years (Model II) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
 
 
Exp 
Sign 
ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2) 
 
.159 .284 .228 .385 .332 .604 .390 .615 .515 .500 .313 .553 .468 .400 
Adjusted R2 
 
.124 .253 .167 .337 .023 .421 .108 .437 .291 .269 -.005 .346 .213 .112 
F-value 
 
4.537(.000) *** 9.478(.000)*** 3.742(.000)*** 7.972(.000)*** 1.075(.400) 3.299(.000)*** 1.381(.160) 3.457(.000)*** 2.295(.005)*** 2.163(.009)*** .983(.503) 2.217(.001) *** 1.835(.033)** 1.387(.158) 
Standard Error 
 
21.729 1.534 21.246 1.449 27.834 0.882 23.516 0.924 19.634 1.618 21.729 1.475 15.624 2.278 
Durbin–Watson 
 
1.963 1.089 1.986 1.236 2.215 2.463 2.420 2.368 2.112 2.268 2.174 2.362 2.116 1.770 
Highest VIF Score  4.788 5.402 9.302 9.904 20.449 17.495 18.721 18.72 10.90 21.94 21.679 21.34 8.867 8.867 
No of observations 
 
400 400 400 400 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Constant 
 
3.289(.392) 1.148(.000)*** 28.916(.068)* 3.418(.001)*** 9.984(.820) 2.310(.101)* -18.635(.642) 2.889(.071)* 4.615(.897) 3.466(.241) 62.883(.153) 5.314(.074)* 25.235(.438) 2.675(.601) 
Board Size +/- - - .005(.992) -.101(.005)*** -.036(.985) -.037(.545) 1.808(.278) .015(.815) 1.948(.158) -.022(.848) .265(.843) -.145(.112) .284(.790) -.108(.485) 
NED + - - .003(.971) -.003(.677) -.385(.260) .002(.858) .374(.211) .006(.629) .200(.466) -.006 (.762) .021(.940) -.015(.415) -.085(.653) -.002(.924) 
Independent NED + - - -.117(.306) -.019(.012)*** .317(972) -.001(.897) ..046(.885) -.006(.609) -.446(.108)* -.022(.328) -.020(.785) -.006(.274) -.121(.508) -.030 (.258) 
Executive Directors +/- - - -.004(.971) .003(.677) .385(.260) -.002(.858) -.378(.211) -.006(.587) -.200(.466) .007(.770) -.021(.940) .015(.427) .085(.653) .003(.924) 
CEO Duality - - - -2.0115(.837) 1.395(.037)** 36.931(.150) .859(.288) -3.911(.858) .316(.714) -6.973(.780) .901(.662) -29.890(.285) 1.567(.404) -11.21(.603) 3.088(.328) 
Board Meetings + - - .784(.457) .017(.812) 2.860(.346) .004(.969) .015(.997) .019(.888) .102(964) .016(.931) -.168(.939) -.072(.628) 3.387(.211) .085(.828) 
Director Shareholding  + - - -.092(.070)* -.004(.199) -.029(.884) .002(.747) -.151(.402) .005(.474) -.069(.574) -.010(.343) -.107(.412) -.008(.383) -.203(.039)** -.025(.080)* 
Institutional Shareholding + - - -.042(.501) .007(.066)* -.063(.767) .007(.320) .061(739) .007(.312) -.162(.290) .008(.535) -.031(.836) .010(.306) .065(.519) .014(.317) 
Board Busyness - - - -1.545(.100)* .031(.626) -2.304(.457) -.017(.861) -2.126(.451) .062(.573) -1.159(.557) .072(.660) -1.258(.509) .202(.119) -1.995(.463) -.120(.760) 
Ethnic Diversity + - - -.181(.023)** -.018(.001)*** -.407(.121) -.019(.028)** -.035(.871) -.006(.448) -.157(.381) -.017(.260) -.126(.574) -.031(.043)** -.164(.204) -.035(.063)* 
Gender Diversity + - - .328(.007)*** .016(.004)*** .847(.213) .017(.174) .222(.477) .014(.258) .449(.119) .030(.202) .238(.468) .015(.492) .321(.089)* .012(.657) 
Board Interlocks + - - 7.140(.123) -.196 (.533) 10.452(.447) -.064(.883) 10.219(.460) -.500(.329) 4.756(.621) -.305(.700) 6.080(.542) -1.208(.076)* 10.551(.408) .857(.644) 
Audit-Com. Independence + - - -.078(.292) -.015(.002)*** .143(.521) -.005(.446) -.192(.307) -.018(.019)** -.085(.593) -.017(.196) -.197(.369) -.006(.688) -.166(.213) -.017(.375) 
Capital Structure (Gearing) +/- - - -.127(.000)*** .001(.526) -.149(.164) .004(.284) -.172(.077)* .007(.054)** -.171(.052)** .005(.496) -.224(.015)*** .006(.284) -.096(.111) -.004(.602) 
Sales Growth + .110(.048)** -.001(.794) .128(.021)** -.002 (.519) .014(.890) -.003(.581) .310(.049)** -.008(.177) .284(.013)*** -.001(.912) .116(.408) .015(.115) -.037 (.383) -.026(.321) 
Dual Listing + 4.982(346) -.503(.178) 2.623(.648) -.175(.655) 14.373(.923) .415(.451) 3.601(.802) .621(.274) 10.878(.387) -.491(.635) -8.796(.521) -1.244(.181) -5.498(.636) .001(.999) 
Audit Firm Size + 10.041(.000) *** .509(.008)*** 11.828(.000) *** .470(.015)*** 17.231(.049)** -.185(.499) 4.206(.585) -.073(.809) 18.780(.004)*** .933(.078)* 11.792(.103)* .522(.280) 12.53(.013)*** 1.62(.027)** 
Firm Size + -2.429(386) .271(.170) -1.966(.554) .179(.430) -11.990(.267) .154(.652) 8.192(.348) .041(.903) -7.301(.387) -.107(.877) 2.563(.758) .157(.780) -8.540(.125) -.327(.684) 
Total Asset +/- -0.000(.823) -.000(.390) -.000(.248) -.000(.264) -.000(.780) -.000 (.385) -.000(.294) -.000(.683) -.000(.197) -.000(.206) -.000(.307) -.000(.292) .000(.446) .000(.956) 
Market Value + .000(.026)** .000(.000)*** .000(.273) .000(.000)*** .000(.890) .000(.002)*** .000(.099)* .000(.001)*** .000(.384) .000(.007)*** .000(.840) .000(.011)*** .000(187) .000(.109)* 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) +/- -.000(.244) -.000(.001)*** .000(.741) -.000(.020)** .000(.517) -.000(.197) -.000(.256) -.000(.075)* -.000(.812) -.000(.097)* .000(.922) -.000(.227) -.000(.641) -.000(.458) 
Agriculture/Consumer Goods 
 
12.128(.001)*** .412(.121) 9.836(.013)*** .383(.156) -.519(.353) .116(.782) 5.978(.592) -0.515(.243) 15.857(.065)* .573(.413) 79.0987(.333) .365(.563) 2.301(.720) .990(294) 
Finance Industry 
 
1.598(.634) -1.114(.000)*** 1.872(.607) -.635(.011)*** -10.949(302) -.391(.293) 2.927(.771) -1.129(.006)*** 5.650(.480) -.693(.294) 5.201(.541) -.802(.165) -2.288(.717) -.111(.904) 
ICT/Real-estate 
 
8.634(.078)* .111(.747) 10.329(.046)** -.083(.813) 11.320(.521) -.017(.976) 21.702(.132) -1.117(.050)** 20.553(.059)* -.504(.568) 129.946(.424) -.603(.472) -20.8(.019)*** 2.192(.087)* 
Industrial/Conglomerate 
 
-1.514(.777) -.835(.027)** -1.8713(.740) -1.053(006)*** -23.156(.227) -.604(.319) .442(.977) -1.800(.004)*** -.057(.996) -1.500(.128) 6.481(.656) -1.757(.077)* -1.854(.884) -.330(.815) 
Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
 
15.904(.001)*** -.092(.780) 16.072(.001)*** -.307(.358) -1.959(.896) -.685(.152) 36.749(.005)*** -1.613(.002)*** 26.268(.014)*** .002(.998) 21.118(.099)* .204(.811) 15.311(.079)* 1.172(.652) 
Year 2011 
 
-5.492(.111) .101(.676) -5.574(.100)* .090(.695) - - - - - - - - - - 
Year 2013 
 
-1.772(612) .217(.378) -.722(.836) .219(.356) - - - - - - - - - - 
Year 2014 
 
-4.277(218) .162(.508) -2.492(.475) .148(.533) - - - - - - - - - - 
 Year 2015  -5.678(.104)* .5285(.032)** -5.283(.135) .500(.036)** - - - - - - - - - - 
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directorates among 295 listed Singapore firms and found a positive relationship with firm 
performance (using ROA, return on sales, profit before tax as proxies). In relation to the 
market returns, the results are in line with the results of Fich and Shivdasani (2006), who 
reported an inverse statistically significant relationship to market-to-book ratio of firms. 
Deducing from these findings, hypothesis 7a, which states that there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between board interlock and firm financial performance, is 
rejected with respect to accounting return (ROCE) and market returns (Q-ratio). 
 
Furthermore, board busyness is developed as an index to measure busyness of boards. It is 
being created by multiplying the average board interlock for a year by the number of board 
meetings for the year to capture how much time a director will spend on other board activities 
out of a firm. The results show that there is a negative relationship between board busyness 
and ROCE but positive impact on Q-ratio, though only the results of the former are 
statistically significant. The negative significant results on accounting returns imply that 
director’s busyness with other board activities outside firms affects negatively firm 
accounting returns directly as these directors are too busy to concentrate on performing board 
activities. Surmising from these findings, hypothesis 7b, which states that there is a 
statistically significant negative relationship between board busyness and firm financial 
performance, is accepted with respect to accounting returns (ROCE) and but rejected for 
market returns (Q-ratio). 
 
In addition, director shareholding (number of shares held by both executive and non-
executive directors) shows negative and significant association with accounting returns at 
10% (p ≤0.10), but is insignificantly related to market returns. However, these results are 
significant with both performance measures in 2015. This negative relationship contradicts 
the agency theory premise that increasing ownership of managers in firms reduces agency 
cost and enhances firm performance. In fact, the results suggest the proposition of the 
entrenchment theory, which stipulates that managers with high levels of ownership tend to 
focus more on maximising the market share rather than profit maximisation. The results are 
in line with the findings of prior research ( e.g. Dwivedi and Jain, 2005) that reported 
negative impact of directors’ shareholding on firm value. More so, the insignificantly 
negative relationship with market returns is consistent with the findings of Weir and Laing 
(2001) and Faccio and Lang (2002), who found no statistically significant effect of board 
ownership or management ownership on firm market value. Inferring from findings of this 
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study, hypothesis 9a, which states that there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between director shareholding and firm financial performance, is rejected irrespective of the 
performance proxy used.  
 
However, the results of institutional shareholding showed a positive and significant 
association with market return (Q-ratio) at 5% (p ≤0.05) but a negative and insignificant 
relationship with accounting returns (ROCE). These results suggest that the stock market 
values institutional shareholdings positively and therefore sees institutional shareholders as a 
medium to reduce agency cost. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) support this view by showing that 
large external equity holders can mitigate agency conflicts because of their strong incentives 
to monitor and discipline management. However, the results based on accounting return 
(though insignificant) may suggest that institutional shareholding may negatively affect 
accounting returns. Considering these results, hypothesis 9b, stating that there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm financial 
performance, is accepted based on the results of institutional shareholding and market value, 
but is rejected on the bases of institutional shareholding and accounting returns.  
 
The results of ethnic diversity show a negative significant relationship with both accounting 
returns and market returns at 10% (p ≤0.10) and 1% (p ≤0.001) respectively. The results 
contradict Ntim (2014) results in South Africa, which indicated that board ethnic diversity is 
positively linked to market valuation. The negative and significant relation of ethnic diversity 
and Q-ratio is also significant in 2011 and 2014 at 5% (p ≤0.05) and with ROCE in 2015. 
This thus suggests that diverse boards in Nigeria inhibit the performance of listed firms 
irrespective of the performance measure. These results are supported from a social impact 
theory point of view (Brammer et al., 2007, Carter et al., 2010), which argues that directors 
who possess majority status have a tendency to exert an unequal amount of influence during 
the board decision-making process. This may be true for Nigeria, as a majority of board 
members are native Nigerians and may therefore influence the board decision-making, which 
may be detrimental to a firm’s performance. Therefore, hypothesis 6, which states that there 
is a statistically significant positive relationship between board ethnic diversity and firm 
financial performance, is rejected irrespective of the performance proxy.  
 
Conversely, the results of gender diversity showed a positive and significant association with 
both market return (Q-ratio) and accounting return at 1% (p ≤0.001). This thus suggests that 
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women directors do enhance the execution of board strategic function and increase firm 
financial performance (Fondas, 2000). In fact, these results are consistent with the findings of 
Carter et al. (2003), who reported a significantly positive association between gender 
diversity and firm performance (measured using Tobin’s Q). The results are also in line with 
the results of Erhardt et al. (2003) and Adams and Ferreira (2004), who found that higher 
gender diversity on boards has a statistically significant impact on firm performance. 
Therefore, the presence of female directors on Nigeria corporate boards impacts positively on 
firm financial performance irrespective of the performance measure. Thus, hypothesis four, 
which states that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm financial performance, is accepted.  
 
Concerning gearing (debt-to-equity ratio), results indicate that there is a positive insignificant 
relationship between a firm gearing and a firm market valuation. However, there is an inverse 
relationship between gearing and accounting returns at 1% (p ≤0.001). The positive 
relationship between gearing and market returns may suggest that investors view highly 
geared firms positively as it can reduce agency conflict which comes a result of ‘free cash 
flows’ mismanagement by opportunistic agents (see Jensen, 1986a,pp.323). However, the 
negative relationship between gearing and accounting return supports the findings of Ntim 
(2009,pp.277) and therefore suggests that more profitable entities tend to prefer higher equity 
than debts as higher equity avails managers of financial flexibility. Following from the results 
thereof, hypothesis 8, which states that there is a statistically significant negative relationship 
between firm gearing and firm financial performance, is accepted based on accounting 
returns but rejected based on market returns.  
 
Finally, audit committee independence (a measure of the proportion of independent directors 
in the audit committee) showed a negative relationship with both market return and 
accounting return but significant only with Q-ratio (market return) at 5% (p ≤0.05). The 
results with Q-ratio are also significant in 2012. Following from the results thereof, 
hypothesis 11, which states that there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between audit committee independence and firm financial performance, is not accepted 
regardless of the performance measure. The results suggest that the presence of independent 
directors on audit committee inhibits the functioning of the committee as independent 
directors may not have the necessary skills or knowledge of the company or audit process to 
be able to monitor management. These results are also consistent with the earlier-reported 
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results that presence of independent board members on boards negatively affects firm 
financial outcomes. However, the results can also be attributed to the fact that the SEC 2011 
code requires a minimum of one independent director. As such, firms tend to recruit the 
minimum required and, with this limited number, it may be difficult for a standalone, 
independent director to make meaningful effects on a firm’s strategy and direction as well as 
monitor and control management.  
 
The difference in results between cross-sectoral estimates and panel estimates for some of the 
internal governance variables on firm performance suggests that the latter compounds 
marginal effects of respective internal governance variables from individual period effect 
over time. More so, as mentioned earlier, owing to similarity of the coefficients and 
significant level of control variables in Nigeria (in equilibrium variable and compliance index 
model) control variables are not discussed under the equilibrium variable model.  
 
The next section discusses equilibrium variable model results in South Africa.  
  8.3.2 South African Empirical Results – Equilibrium Variable Model (EVM)  
 
Similar to Nigeria, table 19 below contains OLS results based on accounting measure 
(ROCE) and market measure (Q-ratio) for the equilibrium variable model for South Africa. 
Akin to Nigeria, two sub-models were examined using the equilibrium variable model 
regression. As noted earlier, in the first sub-model (Model I), the control variables were 
regressed against Q-ratio and ROCE. Columns 3 and 4 of table 19 below show multivariate 
regression results based on the control variables only; columns 5 to 14 show multivariate 
regression of the alternative internal corporate governance variables plus the control variables 
(Model II) for the pooled sample and each year respectively.  
 
Following from table 19, the adjusted R2 for Model I for ROCE and Q-ratio against control 
variables are 0.249 and 0.213 with F-values of 11.356(0.000) *** and 9.44(0.000) *** 
respectively with significant level at 1% (p≤0.001). The results of Model I in the equilibrium 
variable model are similar to those of the compliance index model (6.1.2) with respect to Q-
ratio but the results based on ROCE increased approximately 6%. However, this is a result of 
removing gearing as a control variable in the equilibrium variable model. Therefore, with the 
absence of gearing as a control variable in the equilibrium variable model and contrary to the 
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results of Nigeria, the explanatory power (adjusted R2) of the controls on ROCE increased 
from 0.189 to 0.249 and that of Q-ratio remained almost the same, from 0.212 to 0.213.  
 
In Model II and as a priori suggested by correlation results, there is serious multi-collinearity 
between NED and ED variables highlighted in 8.3.1. Three regressions (IIa, b and c) are 
conducted using the process of elimination. Similar to Nigeria, to ensure robustness, the first 
regression included both NED and ED in the model (regression IIa) to confirm the tolerance 
results and the VIF scores and to ensure there is actually serious multi-collinearity. 
The results from this regression showed that the adjusted R2 was 0.278 for ROCE and 0.220 
for Q-ratio significant at 1% (p≤0.001). However, the VIF score for NEDs variable was 
2664.713 and 2655.770 for ED variable, with tolerance statistics of 0.000 for both variables. 
This thus confirms serious multi-collinearity and thus including both variables in the same 
regression may lead to poor regression coefficients, which may affect the validity and 
reliability of results. Two additional regressions (regression IIb and IIc) were estimated by 
eliminating ED variable in one (regression IIb) while the other (regression IIc) eliminated the 
NED variable. 
 
The regression (regression IIb) eliminating executive director variable showed that the 
adjusted R2 remained the same as in regression IIa at 0.278 for ROCE and 0.220 for Q-ratio 
at 1% (p≤0.001) and the signs and significance of the other variables with the exception of 
NEDs remained the same. The proportion of NED, which was positively and insignificantly 
related to ROCE and negative and insignificantly associated with Q-ratio, became positively 
related to ROCE and significant at 1% (p≤0.001), whereas the results on Q-ratio remained 
negatively associated with NED insignificantly. The tolerance and VIF statistics for NEDs 
were 1.852 and 1.840 for Q-ratio and ROCE with tolerance statistics of 0.540 and 0.543 
respectively.  
 
The last regression (regression IIc) eliminated NEDs from the equation and included ED 
variable. Similar to regression IIb, in this regression (regression IIc), the adjusted R2 
remained the same at 0.278 for ROCE and 0.220 for Q-ratio at 1% (p≤0.001). Consistent with 
the previous two regressions, the signs and significance of all other variables except for EDs 
remained the same. In the latter regression, EDs, which was positively but insignificantly 
associated with ROCE, is now negatively and significantly related to ROCE at 1% (p≤0.001), 
while the results on Q-ratio changed from negative to positive association with ED but still 
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insignificantly. The tolerance and VIF statistics for EDs are 1.858 and 1.834 for Q-ratio and 
ROCE, with tolerance statistics of 0.538 and 0.545 respectively. 
 
Accordingly, the results of two regressions eliminating either NED or ED indicate that multi-
collinearity in an OLS regression has the potential to cause statistically insignificant results 
for some variables when they should be significant. Adjusted R2, signs and significance of the 
variables in the three regressions in Model II were the same apart from the two variables 
(NED and ED) which had serial negative correlations; for the purpose of brevity, only the 
regression results of regression IIb are presented in table 19.  
 
However, the coefficients of ED (as it was eliminated in regression IIb because of multi-
collinearity with NEDs) in the table 19 were extracted from regression IIc. The results of 
Model II (regression IIb) show that the adjusted R2 for ROCE and Q-ratio are 0.278 and 
0.220 with F-values of 7.570(0.000) *** and 5.833(0.000) *** respectively and significant at 
1% (p≤ 0.001). The results suggest that the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient of 
the alternative internal corporate governance (independent variables) variables and control 
variables is zero is not accepted. As a result, the findings indicate that the control variables 
and alternative internal corporate governance structures in South Africa explain 27.8% 
variation in the accounting returns (ROCE) and 22% of the market returns (Q-ratio) of South 
African-listed firms. This shows an increase of 2.9% in the adjusted R2 for ROCE and a slight 
increase of 0.7% for Q-ratio with the addition of the alternative firm-level internal corporate 
governance structures. Thus, these suggest that firm-level internal corporate governance 
structures in South Africa account for about 0.7% variation in market returns and 2.8% 
variation in the accounting returns of listed firms in South Africa. These results are lower 
than the results of a similar study by Ntim (2009), who found that, on average, alternative 
firm-level internal corporate governance structures explain 6% variation in both market and 
accounting returns of listed firms in South Africa. Adjusted R2 for ROCE for the five firms 
years range from 13% to 26.4% whereas the market return (Q-ratio) ranges from 9.1% to 
28.6% in the period 2010–2014. However, cross-sectional results for ROCE are higher than 
those reported by Ntim (2009), ranging from 1% to 10% for accounting returns in South 
Africa in the period 2002 to 2006. On the other hand, the results (adjusted R2) for Q-ratio are 
similar to those reported by Ntim (2009,pp.259), 11% to 24%, and Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006,pp.1053), 22% to 28%.  
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Like Nigeria, the VIF scores as reported in column 8 of table 19 for both sub-models (Model 
I and II) are less than or equal to ten, indicating that multi-collinearity was not a problem in 
the equilibrium variable model in South Africa. Furthermore, the Durbin–Watson test results 
of more than one indicates that there was no serious autocorrelation problem in the model. 
Consistent with the Nigerian results, signs, coefficients and significant level of the control 
variables of the equilibrium variable model in South Africa are similar to those of the 
compliance index model reported in table 17 with the exception of capital expenditure, which 
was positively related to ROCE in the latter, but now negatively in the former but 
insignificantly. Hence, for brevity, since it has been discussed in 8.2.2, it is not discussed 
here.   
 
With reference to the impact of individual firm-level internal corporate governance structures 
(independent variables) on firm financial performance, the results indicate that board size is 
significantly negatively associated with both Q-ratio and ROCE at 5% (p ≤0.05). Across the 
five firm years, board size was only significant and negatively related to ROCE in 2014. 
These results do not support the findings of Ntim et al. (2015b), who reported positive 
association between board size and firm valuation using 169 South African firms from 2002 
to 2011. Similarly, this negative relationship is consistent with the results of Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005), who reported similar results using Singaporean and Malaysian firms. Thus, 
these findings reject hypothesis 3, which states there is a significant positive relationship 
between board size and firm performance irrespective of the measure of performance used. 
This contradicts the argument that larger boards provide better access to external and internal 
resources. On the other hand, the results support the argument put forward by some scholars 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Pearce and Zahra, 1992, Jensen, 1993) that smaller boards are 
likely to be effective in executive monitoring, frank assessment of management performance 
and fast, effective and easy decision-making.  
 
Like the Nigerian results, the proportion of non-executive directors is positively and 
significantly associated with ROCE at 1% (p ≤0.001), whereas it is negative and 
insignificantly related to Q-ratio. The positive relationship between ROCE and NEDs is 
consistent across each firm year but only significantly in 2011 at 10% (p ≤0.10). This shows 
that increasing the proportion of NEDs on corporate boards increases the accounting returns 
significantly but decreases the market returns. Hence, the results based on accounting returns 
therefore validate the agency theory recommendation that by increasing the proportion of 
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Table 19: South African OLS Regression Results for Equilibrium Variable Model Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance 
Measure (Q-ratio) 
 Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. More so, to avoid dummy variable trap, year 2011 and consumer services/health care industry are excluded from the regression analysis. They are both used as base year 
dummy and base industry dummy for comparison reasons.
  
Exp 
sign 
 
All firm years 
(Model II) 
All firm years 
(Model II) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2)  .273 .238 .320 .266 .358 .326 .402 .474 .383 .350 .420 .400 .460 .451 
Adjusted R2  .249 .213 .278 .220 .142 .098 .200 .286 .171 .130 .222 .198 .275 .265 
F-value  11.356(.000)*** 9.44(.000)*** 7.570(.000)*** 5.833(.000)*** 1.653(.050)** 1.428(.121) 1.990(.012)*** 2.526(.001)*** 1.809(.027)** 1.601(.064)* 2.118(.007)*** 1.976.013)*** 2.483(.001)*** 2.430(.002)*** 
Standard Error  22.517 .871 22.145 .869 23.476 1.555 22.362 .753 20.987 .937 24.085 .825 24.547 .726 
Durbin–Watson  1.979 1.876 2.004 1.841 2.108 1.864 1.902 1.838 2.118 2.099 2.337 2.151 1.736 1.847 
Highest-VIF Score  2.693 2.572 8.222 8.128 14.302 13.277 14.846 14.966 13.994 10.125 16.535) 16.592 15.959 16.469 
No of observations  500 500 500 500 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Constant  32.457(.009)*** 1.907(.000)*** 16.874(.384) 1.696(.003)*** 62.083(.923) 3.194(.056)** 18.732(.690) 0.522(.650) 39.22(.370) 2.084(.202) -29.165(.515) 2.242(062)* -104.76(.101)* 0.858(.464) 
Board Size +/- - - -1.055(.023)** -.035(.037)** -.534(.642) .015(.759) -.724(.493) -.045(.188) -.831(.399) -.033(.430) -1.378(.269) -.062(.138) -2.568(.050)** .000(.990) 
NED + - - 0.290(.009)*** -.001(.862) .378(.180) -.013(.330) .391(.100)* .001(.860) .206(.452) -.001(.820) .468(.142) .001(.924) -.262(.403) -.002(.812) 
Independent NED + - - -.242(.010)*** .000(.975) -.006(.979) .006(.609) -.265(.281) .004(.503) .-250(.217) -.003(.872) -.238(.369) -.005(.509) -.347(.150) .000(.988) 
Executive Directors +/- - - -0.287(.010)*** .001(.921) -.377(.180) 0.013(.338) -.390(.099)* -.000(.866) -.208(.448) 0.003(.834) .462(.496) -0.001(.928) -.260(.403) 0.002(.818) 
CEO Duality - - - 5.367(.344) .414(.062)* 2.877(.825) .301(.642) 1.968(.878) .512(.252) -.203(.988) .655(.278) 9.981(524) .656(.235) 24.184(.07)* .097(.825) 
Board Meetings + - - 2.066(.041)** -.085(.031)** 3.425(.110) -.204(.048)** 1.691(.535) -.063(.469) 3.035(.238) -.037(.744) -1.045(.689) -.046(.601) .750(.798) -.057(.502) 
Director Shareholding  + - - -.085(.094)* -.001(.595) -.080(.554) .007(.264) -.168(.180) -.004(.352) .140(.250) .000(.864) -.172(.197) -.001(.904) -.143(.246) -.002(.618) 
Institutional 
Shareholding 
+ 
- - 
-.116(.088)* -.001(.748) -.119(.451) -.004(.623) -.007(.965) .005(.374) -.266(.096)* -.006(.360) -.324(.079)* -.009(195) .069(.692) .006(.226) 
Board Busyness - - - -1.086(.019)** .023(.193) -1.948(.086)* .115(.031)** -.990(.453) -.041(.376) -1.993(.092)* -.038(.286) .715(.5555) .036(.400) -.436(720) -.002(.961) 
Ethnic Diversity + - - -.030(.662) .003(.287) .005(.975) .006(.465) -.198(.223) .003(.638) .014(.923) .007(.248) -.102(.581) .002(.763) -.002(.993) -.003(.601) 
Gender Diversity + - - 0.127(.253) -.003(.457) -.243(.336) -.002(.893) .183(.516) -.010(.318) .253(.281) -.011(.306) .044(.886) -.014(.193) .395(.155) .016(.045)** 
Board Interlocks + - - 5.152(.027)** -.071(.430) 9.745(.073)* -.500(.054)** 1.675(.792) .270(.209) 8.899(.126) .191(.437) -2.744(.655) -.135(.519) 5.831(.389) .029(.884) 
Audit-Committee 
Independence 
+ 
- - 
.102(.383) .004(.351) -.237(.394) -.007(.648) .386(.203) .007(.461) .007(.982) .003(.821) .286(.377) .008(.428) .468(.238) .004(.628) 
Gearing +/- - - -.067(.056)** .001(.413) .046(.593) .003(.573) -.039(.595) .003(.309) -.029(.722) .001(.870) -.080(346) .000(.999) -.178(.036)** .001(.823) 
Sales Growth + 2.466(.368) .005(.001)*** 1.961(.483) .005(.001)*** 1.733(.790) .011(.022)** 1.049(.874) .011(.000)*** 4.288(.573) -.003(.622) 5.512(.470) .000(.834) 8.483(.354) .002(.534) 
Dual-listing + -6.947(.021)** -.149(.196) -4.558(.163) -.182(.151) -2.616(.732) -.226(.463) .260(.953) -.345(.160) -2.803(.692) .065(.920) -3.008(728) .028(.877) -20.01(.027)** -.376(.137) 
Audit Firm Size + -4.706(.188) -.457(.001)*** -9.314(.016)*** -.368(.016)** -8.064(.397) -.160(.749) -16.591(.080)* -.738(.029)** -6.563(.474) -.431(.352) -16.883(.082)* -.440(.203) -1.183(.899) .159(.584) 
Firm Size + 8.772(.004)*** .307(.001)*** 10.987(.000)*** .396(.000)*** 10.7043.139) .170(.612) 9.650(.216) .520(.018)** 11.417(.118) .378(.118) 14.322.077)* .226(.353) 2.393(.788) .250(.212) 
Total Asset +/- -6.239(.001)*** -.000(.114) -5.007(.037)** -.000(.394) -10.615(.094)* .000(.918) -7.465(.220) .000(.546) -6.364(.234) .000(.960) -6.000(.298) .000(.825) 7.888(391) -.000(.072)* 
Market Value + 0.000(.000)*** 0.000(.000)*** 0.000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** 7.971(.089)* .000(.121) 9.060(.035)** .000(.011)** 4.513(.284) .000(.016)*** 12.429(.010)*** .000(.007)*** 11.602(.166) .000(.009)*** 
Capital Expenditure +/- -.475(.736) -.000(.004)*** -1.145(.4467) -.000(.001)*** -.849(.804) -.000(.601) -2.368(.468) -.000(.105)* 2.858(.384) -.000(.187) -4.326(.250) -.000(.058)** 1.114(817) -.000(.243) 
Basic Material  -19.409(.000)*** -.165(.230) -21.111(.000)*** -.104(.500) -17.264(.066)* .210(.644) -20.084(.022)** .582(.047)** -20.906(.013)** -.430(.318) -23.782(.021)** -.665(.076)* -16.013(.122) -.516(.096)* 
Consumer Goods  2.615(.539) .307(.063)* 4.563(.293) .346(.043)** 16.136(.127) .316(.542) 13.492(.182) .946(.006)*** 2.936(.750) .543(.203) 1.799(.866) .154(.677) -9.677(.387) -.060(858) 
Finance Industry  -2.201(.502) -.615(.000)*** -2.83(.524) -.564(.000)*** -1.475(.867) -.601(.147) -1.709(.840) -.151(.580) -7.482(.359) -.655(.065)* -3.849(.692) -.78(.012)*** .113(.995) -.699(.014)*** 
Industrial  -8.166(.018)*** -.290(.028)** -6.039(.096)* -.224(.111) .063(.991) -.391(.358) 1.294(.874) .111(.686) -11.851(.151) -.301(.406) -0.767(.935) -.300(.358) -14.890(.102)* -.508(.068)* 
Telecoms/Technology  7.853(.061)* -.128(.436) 6.450.(.161) -.082(.653) 11.149(.311) -.558(315) 10.939(.324) .421(.257) 3.181(.765) -.041(.298) 8.492(.474) -.122(.770) -.220(.983) -.178(.585) 
Year 2010  -.300(925) .150(.226) -.469(.887) .157(.208) - - - - - - - - - - 
Year 2012  -.501(.875) .053(.667)) -.860(.785) .043(.720) - - - - - - - - - - 
Year 2013  -5.594(.080)* .031(.801) -5.256(.098)* .013(.918) - - - - - - - - - - 
Year 2014  -7.819(.015)*** -.080(.514) -6.691(.039)** -.101(.423) - - - - - - - - - - 
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NEDs on corporate boards, firm accounting returns increase. This finding is similar to the 
findings of other scholars (e.g. Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 
2006b, Mangena and Chamisa, 2008), who found a positive relationship between NEDs and 
accounting returns. The insignificant results of market returns and proportion of NEDs are 
similar to the results found in South Africa by Ntim (2009) and in Nigeria (Sanda et al. 
(2005). Following from the results, hypothesis 1a, which states that there is a statistically 
positive relationship between NEDs and firm accounting returns, is accepted, but, based on 
market returns, this hypothesis is not accepted. 
 
Relative to the proportion of EDs and contrary to Nigerian results, there is a negative and 
significant relationship between the proportion of EDs and firm performance based on 
accounting returns at 1% (p ≤0.001). On the other hand, the proportion of EDs is positively 
associated with market returns with insignificant statistics. The negative association between 
ROCE and EDs is also significant in 2011 at 10% (p ≤0.10). This negative result on 
accounting returns doesn’t support the resource dependency argument that EDs are there to 
fulfil the task of meeting the internal resource dependency requirements of the firm (Bryant 
and Davis, 2012, Hillman et al., 2000), and as such their presence on boards doesn’t enhance 
firm financial outcomes. But the results support agency theory argument that increasing the 
number of inside directors increases agency cost and adversely impacts on firm financial 
performance. In addition, the results refute stewardship theory argument that increase in firm 
financial performance is associated with EDs presence on corporate boards as their interests 
are asymptotic to those of shareholders (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Inferring from this result, 
hypothesis 1b, which states that there is significant positive relationship between the 
proportion of EDs and firm financial performance, is not accepted. 
  
Similar to the results with regard to EDs, the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors (INEDs) is negatively associated with accounting returns (ROCE) but positively 
related to market returns (Q-ratio), but only the results of the former are significant at 1% (p 
≤0.001). The results based on accounting return suggest that the presence of INEDs on South 
African boards adversely impacts on firm performance. Concluding from this result, 
hypothesis 1c, which states that there is a statistical positive relationship between the 
proportion of INEDs and firm financial performance, is not accepted. Hence, the result does 
not support King III recommendation for INEDs to be a majority of NEDs. This result is also 
similar to the results of Nigeria (8.3.1). This may suggest that firms may be appointing 
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independent directors for the sake of applying King III requirements without making sure that 
such INEDs possess appropriate skills needed to perform board functions.  
 
Contrary to the results of INED, the separation of the positions of CEO and chairperson 
showed a positive association with both accounting returns (ROCE) and market returns (Q-
ratio), but only the finding established with Q-ratio is statistically significant at 10% (p 
≤0.10). Nonetheless, the result based on accounting returns is statistically significant and 
positive related to CEO/Chairman position in 2014 at 10% (p ≤0.10). The insignificant results 
with accounting return based on the pooled sample are alike with the findings of other 
researchers ( e.g. Baliga et al., 1996, Pearce and Zahra, 1992, Pearce and Zahra, 1991). 
Nevertheless, the significant results to ROCE support hypothesis two, which states that there 
is a statistically significant positive relationship between CEO–chairman separation and 
accounting returns. These results support the argument that, with separation of leadership, the 
board’s ability to monitor and control management increases, which consequently leads to 
enhanced board independence, and thus shrinking agency conflict and information 
asymmetry, which has a positive impact on shareholders’ value maximisation goal 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, Kula, 2005). 
 
Furthermore, frequency of board meetings showed positive association with accounting 
returns (ROCE) but negative relationship with market returns, both statistically significant at 
5% (p ≤0.05). The results based on market returns are similar to the findings reported by 
Ntim (2009,pp.263) in South Africa, but Ntim had insignificant results. More so, the results 
based on accounting returns lend support to the results of Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and 
Mangena and Tauringana (2006), who found a positive relationship between accounting 
returns and frequency of board meetings. On the other hand, the negative results between 
frequency of board meetings and market return are similar to those found by Vafeas (1999), 
who studied a sample of 307 US-listed firms over the period 1990–1994. The results based on 
market returns suggest that frequent board meetings may not be essentially useful as 
directors’ attention given to various formalities and presentation of management reports 
during meetings reduces the amount of time they spend effectively to monitor management 
on behalf of shareholders (Vafeas, 1999, Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). However, the results 
based on accounting returns suggest frequent board meetings enhance the quality  of board 
decision-making, managerial monitoring and control, which improves firm accounting 
returns. Considering these results, hypothesis five (H5), which states that there is a 
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statistically significant positive relationship between frequency of board meetings and firm 
financial performance, is accepted with respect to ROCE but rejected in relation to Q-ratio.  
 
Like the Nigerian results, board interlocks exhibited a significant positive relationship with 
accounting returns at 5% (p ≤0.05) but showed an insignificantly negative association with 
market returns. The positive relationship between board interlocks and ROCE is positive 
across all the firm years but only significant in 2010 at 5% (p ≤0.05), whereas the negative 
relationship with Q-ratio was only significant in 2010 at 5% (p ≤0.05). The significant results 
established with accounting return (ROCE) lend support to the findings of Pombo and 
Gutiérrez (2011), who studied board interlocks and firm performance using 335 Colombian 
firms for the period 1996–2006. They reveal a positive relationship between board interlocks 
and firm performance (using ROA as proxy). In relation to the market returns, the significant 
results in 2010 are similar to the results reported by Fich and Shivdasani (2006), who found a 
negative statistically significant relationship with interlocks (using market-to-book ratio as a 
proxy). Inferring from the results, hypothesis 7a, which states that there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between board interlocks and firm financial performance, is 
accepted with respect to accounting return (ROCE) but rejected with respect to market return 
(Q-ratio). Comparable with the Nigerian results, the South African findings indicate there is a 
significant negative relationship between board busyness and ROCE in the pooled sample at 
5% (p ≤0.05) and in 2010 at 10% (p ≤0.10) and 2012 at 5% (p ≤0.05). Conversely, board 
busyness showed a positive relationship with Q-ratio though insignificantly in the pooled 
sample but significantly in 2010 at 5% (p ≤0.05).  
 
The results based on accounting returns suggest that firms with directors who sit on other 
boards and attend equal numbers of meetings have poor performance than their counterparts 
without such levels of interactions. However, the results based on market return may suggest 
that investors appreciate firms that have directors who spend equal time and resources 
working for other firms as a sign of skill, knowledge and willingness to work. Deducing from 
these findings, hypothesis 7b, which states that there is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between board busyness and firm financial performance, is accepted with respect 
to accounting return (ROCE) but rejected with respect to market return (Q-ratio). 
 
Furthermore, similar to the results reported for Nigeria, director shareholding (measured by 
the number of shares held by both executive directors and non-executive directors) shows a 
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negative association to both accounting and market returns but significant only with 
accounting returns at 10% (p ≤0.10). This negative relationship contradicts agency theory 
premise that increasing ownership of managers/board in firms reduces agency cost and 
enhances firm performance. In fact, similar to Nigeria, the results suggest the arguments of 
the entrenchment theory (Dwivedi and Jain, 2005), which contends managers and directors 
with high levels of ownership tend to focus more on maximising the market share rather than 
profit maximisation. The results are in line with the findings of scholars (e.g. Dwivedi and 
Jain, 2005) who reported that directors’ equity ownership has negative effect on firm value. 
However, the results contradict the results of Ntim (2012a), who reported a positive 
association between the two variables in South Africa. More so, insignificant relationship 
with market returns is consistent with the findings of Weir and Laing (2001) and Faccio and 
Lang (2002), who found no statistically significant effect of directors’ shareholding and firm 
market value. Interpreting from these findings, hypothesis 9a, which states that there is a 
statistically significant negative relationship between director shareholding and firm financial 
performance, is accepted with regard to accounting returns but rejected with respect to market 
returns.  
 
Similar to preceding results and contrary to the results reported for Nigeria, institutional 
shareholding in South Africa showed a negative significant association with accounting 
returns (ROCE) at 10% (p ≤0.10) but a negative and insignificant relationship with market 
returns (Q-ratio). These results are contradictory to the results of Elyasiani and Jia (2010), 
who reported that institutional shareholders had a positive effect on firm performance through 
the reduction of information asymmetry. These results suggest that investors do not value 
institutional shareholders positively and therefore institutional shareholders may not be a 
mechanism to reduce agency cost. Considering these results, hypothesis 9b, stating that there 
is a statistically significant positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm 
financial performance, is not accepted.  
 
Furthermore, ethnic diversity showed a negative relationship with accounting returns but a 
positive association to market returns, though both results are insignificant. These results 
though insignificant lend support to Ntim (2014) results in South Africa, which indicated that 
board ethnic diversity is positively linked to market valuation. However, the results based on 
accounting returns suggest that directors who possess majority status have a tendency to exert 
an unequal amount of influence during board decision-making processes. In fact, this result 
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suggests the South African government’s introduction of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Codes of Good Practice as guidelines to ensure firms’ compliance with black 
empowerment by increasing black directors in corporate boards may not be yielding 
significant impacts as increasing black directors does not increase accounting returns. 
However, with regard to market returns, the results may suggest that the market values firms 
compliant with Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Codes of Good Practice better 
than non-compliant firms. Therefore, the inconclusive results suggest that hypothesis 6, 
which states that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between board ethnic 
diversity and firm financial performance, is not supported irrespective of the performance 
measure. 
 
Like the results of ethnic diversity, the results based on gender diversity showed a positive 
and insignificant association with accounting return and negative insignificant association 
with market return (Q-ratio). Nevertheless, the results based on Q-ratio are positively and 
statistically significant in 2014 at 0.5% (p ≤0.05). These insignificant results are similar to 
those reported by Rose (2007) and Bøhren and Strøm (2010). The results for ROCE (though 
insignificant) suggest that female directorship enhances the execution of board strategic 
function and increases accounting returns (Fondas, 2000). On the other hand, the positive and 
significant results in 2014 with respect to Q-ratio support the findings of Carter et al. (2003).  
 
These insignificant results may suggest increasing women directors in corporations (as 
enshrined in the South African Commission for Gender Equality Act of 1996 created post-
apartheid South Africa, incorporated in the 2008 corporate act and in  King I, II, III corporate 
governance codes) to increase women’s participation in the economy may not be yielding a 
significant impact on firms’ value creation. Hence, as it has been argued, if women are 
appointed to boards just to motivate societal pressure for greater equality in gender (Ntim, 
2015), as may be the case in South Africa, then female representation on boards will have a 
negative impact on firm performance. However, the results suggest and support the 
arguments which have been put forward by some scholars (e.g. Hillman et al., 2007, Ntim, 
2015) that women’s opinions and views in corporate boards are marginalised as a result of 
their limited representations on male-dominated boards. Thus, hypothesis four (H4,), which 
states that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm financial performance, is rejected.  
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Relating to gearing (debt-to-equity ratio), findings in South Africa indicate that there is an 
inverse significant relationship between gearing and firm accounting returns at 10% (p ≤0.10) 
in the pooled sample and in 2014 at 5% (p ≤0.05). However, there is a positive insignificant 
association between gearing and market returns in both the pooled sample and all five firm 
years. The negative significant relationship between gearing and accounting return supports 
the findings of Ntim (2009,pp.277) in South Africa. This suggests that firms that are more 
profitable tend to prefer higher equity than debts as higher equity offers managers financial 
flexibility. However, the positive relationship between gearing and market returns (though 
insignificant) lends support to the findings of Fosu (2013) in South Africa using firm-level 
data for 257 firms over 12 years. The positive relationship between gearing and market return 
(though insignificant) may suggest that the markets view highly geared firms positively as it 
can reduce agency conflict, which comes as a result of ‘free cash flows’ mismanagement by 
opportunistic agents (see Jensen, 1986a,pp.323). Inferring from the results thereof, hypothesis 
8 (H8), which states that there is a significant negative relationship between firm gearing and 
firm financial performance, is accepted with respect to accounting returns but rejected based 
on market returns. 
 
Last of all, contrary to Nigerian results, audit committee independence showed a positive 
relationship with both market return and accounting return but not significantly both in the 
pooled sample and individual firm years. Thus, the results (though insignificant) may suggest 
that the presence of independent directors on audit committees of South African firms 
enhances both accounting and market return. However, hypothesis 11, which states that there 
is a statistically significant positive relationship between audit committee independence and 
firm financial performance, is not accepted regardless of the performance measure. 
 
Similar to Nigeria, the change in significance from cross-sectoral to panel estimates for some 
of the internal governance variables on firm financial performance implies that the latter adds 
the marginal impacts of respective internal governance variables from individual firm year to 
improve aggregate effect over time. More so, generally, the impact of the 14 governance 
mechanisms on firm accounting returns in South Africa is generally positive and more 
significant compared to the negative associations with market returns. This may suggest the 
investors may not value corporate governance mechanisms positively. More so, the results 
imply maturation of governance institutions in South Africa does not necessarily lead to 
improved valuation of firms with good CG internal mechanisms.  
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The next section discusses the results based on the sub-indices of the Nigerian and South 
African corporate governance indices (NICGI and SACGI) respectively. 
 
8.4 Empirical Results Based on the Compliance Index Model (CIM) Sub-
Indices of NICGI and SACGI 
 
 
Table 20 below contains the regressions results for Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–
NICGI for Nigeria, whereas table 21 shows the results of Shareholder–SACGI and 
Stakeholder–SACGI for South Africa. As noted in Chapter 5, these indices are a breakdown 
of NICGI and SACGI respectively into two sub-indices. The shareholder sub-index 
represents provisions in King III (for South Africa) and Nigeria’s SEC 2011 corporate 
governance code which seek to reduce agency cost and increase shareholder value. 
Meanwhile the stakeholder sub-index captures the contextual provisions of the Nigerian 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions and the South African 
Inclusive action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions. The splitting of corporate 
governance provisions in each country is consistent with prior studies in corporate 
governance (e.g. Durnev and Kim, 2005, Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim, 2013c, Ntim, 2013a). For 
instance, Durnev and Kim (2005) split their composite index into transparency, shareholder 
protection, and social awareness sub-indices. Meanwhile, Ntim et al. (2012) separated a 
composite index in South Africa into shareholder and stakeholder sub-indices. The composite 
index is split into various sub-indices to examine empirically if the two sub-indices in both 
countries affect firm financial performance. This is premised from the theoretical and 
scholarly argument that the inclusion of contextual specific issues and stakeholder 
requirements in corporate governance codes to be complied with by listed firms may impose 
additional cost which may be detrimental to a firm’s financial performance (Ntim, 2009, 
Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim, 2013c). From the preceding argument, it is expected that compliance 
with the shareholder sub-index is likely to have a positive impact on firm financial 
performance since these provisions are centred on protecting shareholders and increasing 
shareholders’ value. However, in same rationale, it is expected that compliance with the 
stakeholder sub-index will negatively affect firm performance.  
 
The subsequent section reports the results of the two sub-indices in each country.  
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  8.4.1 Nigerian Empirical Results – Shareholder (Shareholder–NICGI) and 
Stakeholder (Stakeholder–NICGI) Compliance Index  
 
As highlighted above, the Nigerian composite compliance index (NICGI) is divided into two 
sub-indices. The Shareholder–NICGI captures traditional corporate governance requirements 
aimed at increasing shareholders’ value by reducing agency cost. The Shareholder–NICGI 
sub-index is composed of 61 provisions, which include provisions for: board composition and 
management (17 provisions), audit committee composition and function (ten provisions), risk 
governance (six provisions), governance and remuneration committee composition and 
function (12 provisions), maintaining shareholder relationships (five provisions), accounting 
and reporting (11 provisions). On the other hand, the Stakeholder–NICGI is composed of 14 
contextual affirmative actions and stakeholder provisions. These stakeholder affirmative 
provisions include: (i) dealings with stakeholders (STKDEAL), (ii) outcome of stakeholder 
dealings (OUTSTK), (iii) dealings with environmental issues (INV), (iv) health and safety 
(HSP), (v) HIV AIDS and diseases (DISP), (vi) employment equity (EMP), (vii) gender 
diversity (GENDIV1), (viii) physically challenged persons (PCP), (ix) staff diversity and 
number (STADIV), (x) corruption policy (CORRP), (xi) social investment policy (SIP), (xii) 
stakeholder communication (STKCOM), (xiii) code of ethics (COE), (xiv) laws and 
standards (LAS).  
 
The results based on both Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI are reported in table 
20 below. For easy comparison, the results based on NICGI are also reported in the table. 
Columns 3 and 4 of table 20 report the results of the Shareholder–NICGI; columns 5 and 6 
report the results of Stakeholder–NICGI; and columns 7 and 8 report the OLS estimates of 
NICGI. Note that regression of control variables (Model I) is not reported in the table because 
the results are the same as those estimated in the OLS and discussed in 8.2.2. Therefore, the 
reported results in table 20 are based on Model II, which is the regression of Shareholder–
NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI individually plus the control variables.  
 
From table 20, the F-value of 5.405 (.000) *** for ROCE and 8.887(0.000***) for Q-ratio 
indicates that the regression based on the Shareholder–NICGI plus control variables is 
statistically significant at 1% with adjusted R2 of 0.165 and 0.262 respectively. Hence, the 
null hypothesis that the regression coefficient of Shareholder–NICGI and control variables is 
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zero is rejected. Consequently, Shareholder–NICGI and control variables explain 16.5% of 
the variations in the firms’ accounting returns (ROCE) and 26.2% of variations in market 
returns (Q-ratio). This also indicates that with the addition of Shareholder–NICGI to the 
control (Model II), there is improvement in the degree of variation by 1% in accounting 
return (ROCE), but with a slight increase in the degree of variation with respect to market 
return (Q-ratio) by 0.4%. This thus indicates that the quality of shareholder corporate 
governance disclosures (Shareholder–NICGI) explains variations in the accounting returns by 
1% and 0.4% of the market returns for listed firms in Nigeria between 2011–2015.   
 
The adjusted R2 for the Shareholder–NICGI is similar to those reported in columns 7 and 8 of 
table 16 for NICGI. However, comparing the results based on Shareholder–NICGI and 
NICGI shows the former (Shareholder–NICGI) has a slightly weaker ability in explaining 
variations in the market returns (adjusted R2 is 26.2) than the latter (26.4%) by 0.2%. 
Similarly, with respect to accounting returns, the regression results based on Shareholder–
NICGI (adjusted R2 is 16.5%) are smaller than those of the NICGI (adjusted R2 is 17.1%) by 
0.6%. Thus, NICGI has a better explanatory power in explaining variations in accounting and 
market returns than Shareholder–NICGI. Specifically, compliance with integrated 
governance provisions (NICGI) explains variations in firm performance better than 
compliance solely to shareholder provisions. Furthermore, the coefficients of the 
Shareholder–NICGI under both Q-ratio 0.014(.044**) and ROCE 0.212 (.014***) are 
positive and statistically significant at 5% (p≤0.05) and 1% (p≤0.01) respectively. The 
positive relationship between the Shareholder–NICGI and both accounting and market 
returns supports the theoretical expectations that compliance with provisions that protect 
shareholders’ value reduces agency cost and increases firm performance. 
 
The significant positive relationship between Shareholder–NICGI and both performance 
variables supports hypothesis 10b, which states that there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between the compliance with the shareholder provisions of SEC 2011 corporate 
governance code and firm financial performance. This implies that firms which are more 
compliant with shareholder provisions of SEC 2011 perform better than less compliant firms 
regardless of the performance measure. More so, this shows firms who comply with the 
NICGI also comply with shareholder provision of SEC 2011 corporate governance code.  
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Table 20: Results of Sub-Indices of NICGI–Compliance Index Model Based on Accounting 
Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance Variable (Q-ratio) 
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. More so, to avoid dummy variable trap, year 2012 and 
health care/consumer goods industry are excluded from the regression analysis. They are both used as base year dummy and base 
industry dummy for comparison reasons. NICGI is the Nigerian Corporate Governance index. Shareholder–NICGI is composed of 
61 provisions of SEC 2011 code aimed at protecting shareholders’ interest. Stakeholder–NICGI is composed of 14 provisions of 
SEC 2011 code to capture contextual stakeholder provisions.
  
  
Results of Shareholder–NICGI Results of Stakeholder–NICGI OLS Estimates of NICGI  
 Exp 
Sign 
ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2) 
 
.203 .296 .240 .308 .208 .294 
Adjusted R2 
 
.165 .262 .204 .275 .171 .264 
F-value 
 
5.405(.000) *** 8.887(.000)*** 6.678(.000)*** 9.415(.000)*** 5.568(.000) *** 8.947(.000) *** 
Standard Error 
 
21.208 1.529 20.717 1.512 21.143 1.524 
Durbin–Watson 
 
1.021 1.068 1.000 1.131 .970 1.074 
No of observations 
 
400 400 400 400 400 400 
Constant + -8.477(.194) 2.212(.000)*** 3.853(.588) 2.746(.000) *** -9.070(.133) 2.334(.000) *** 
NICGI + - - - - .241(.004) *** .013(.043)** 
Shareholder–NICGI +/- .212(.014)*** .014(.044)** - - - - 
Stakeholder–NICGI +/- - - .155(.010)*** .013(.002)*** - - 
Sales Growth + .138(.012)*** .001(.802) .130(.015)*** .001(.780) .139(.011) *** .001(.803) 
Dual Listing + 2.111(.684) -0.572 (.126) 1.558(.759) -.637 (.086)* 1.725(.739) -.581(.119) 
Audit Firm Size + 9.148(.001)*** .652(.001)*** 8.294(.003)*** .524(.010)*** 8.500(.002) *** .631(.002) *** 
Firm Size +/- .122(.967) .659(.007)*** -.255(.939) .549(.024)** -.571(.850) .639(.008)*** 
Capital Structure (Gearing) +/- -.121 (.000)*** .003(.131) -.110(.001)*** .003(.102)* -.12(.000) *** .004(.128) 
Total Asset + .000(.674) -.000(.001)*** -.000 (.059)** -.000(.000)*** .000(.673) -.000(.003)*** 
Market Value +/- .000(.111) .000(.000) *** .000(.035)** .000(.000)*** .000(.119) .000(.000) *** 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 
 
-.000(.492) -.000(.048)** .000(.001)*** -.000(.027)** -.000(.517) -.000(.047)** 
Agriculture/Consumer Goods 
 
12.916(.000)*** .937(.002)*** 7.917(.040)** .798(.005)*** 12.460(.000)*** .905(.002) *** 
Finance Industry 
 
1.414(.669) -.479 (.090)* .271(.943) -.585(.036)** .770(.817) -.50(.074)* 
ICT/Real Estate 
 
10.581(.028)** .574(.118) 9.865(.043)*** .574(.110) 10.583(.027)** .569(.120) 
Industrial/Conglomerate 
 
1.952(.711) -.386 (.339) -2.648(.620) -.459 (.240) 1.741(.740) -.407(.309) 
Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
 
19.678(.000)*** .432(.234) 16.274(.001)*** .413(.237) 19.729(.000)*** .420(.244) 
Year 2011 
 
-4.869(.149) .088(.715) -3.994(.226) .101(.672) -4.699(.163) .089(.711) 
Year 2013 
 
-1.949(.569) .257(.296) -1.569(.638) .250(.304) -2.038(.550) .257(.295) 
Year 2014  -4.546(.186) .129(.522) -4.216(.207) .117(.629) -4.750(.165) .130(.598) 
 Year 2015  -7.232(.042)** .403(.117) -6.482(.057)** .396(.111) -7.630(.031)** .408(.110) 
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These results are consistent with Ntim (2009), Ntim et al. (2012), Ntim (2013c), who reported 
a positive relationship between compliance with shareholder provisions of corporate 
governance code and firm performance in South Africa.  
 
With respect to Stakeholder–NICGI, from table 20, columns 5 to 6, the F-value 6.678(.000) 
*** for ROCE and 9.415(.000)*** for Q-ratio shows that the regression based on the  
Stakeholder–NICGI plus control variables is statistically significant at 1% with adjusted R2 of 
0.204 and 0.275 respectively. As a result, the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient of 
the Stakeholder–NICGI and control variables is zero is not accepted. Thus, the Stakeholder–
NICGI plus the control variables explains 20.4% variations in firms’ accounting returns 
(ROCE) and 27.5% variations in market returns (Q-ratio) in Nigeria. Similar to the results 
reported for the Shareholder–NICGI, with the addition of Stakeholder–NICGI to the control 
variables (Model II), there is a moderate increase in the degree of variation by 4.9% with 
respect to accounting returns (ROCE) and 1.7% increase with respect to market measure (Q-
ratio). Hence compliance with contextual/stakeholder affirmative provisions in Nigeria 
(Stakeholder–NICGI) explains 4.9% variations in the accounting returns and 1.7% variations 
in market returns for listed firms between 2011–2015.  
 
Comparatively, the adjusted R2 for the Stakeholder–NICGI is similar to those reported in 
columns 3 to 4 for Shareholder–NICGI and 7 to 8 for NICGI in table 20. Comparing the 
regression results based on the Stakeholder–NICGI with those reported under NICGI and 
Shareholder–NICGI shows that regression on the Stakeholder–NICGI has a stronger ability 
in explaining variations in the market returns (adjusted R2 is 27.5%) than both NICGI 
(26.4%) by 1.1% and Stakeholder–NICGI (adjusted R2 is 26.2) by 1.3%. Correspondingly, 
with respect to accounting returns, the regression results based on Stakeholder–NICGI 
(adjusted R2 is 20.4%) are higher than those of the NICGI (adjusted R2 is 17.1%) by 3.3% 
and much higher than Shareholder–NICGI (adjusted R2 is 16.5%) by 3.9%. This indicates 
that Stakeholder–NICGI has a higher explanatory power in determining changes in both 
accounting and market returns than NICGI and Shareholder–NICGI.  
 
Similar to the NICGI and Shareholder–NICGI, the coefficients of Stakeholder–NICGI under 
both ROCE 0.155 (.002 ***) and Q-ratio 0.013 (.002 ***) are positive and statistically 
significant at 1% (p≤0.001). This implies that the theoretical expectations that compliance 
with stakeholder affirmative provisions has an adverse effect on firm accounting returns are 
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not supported. Hence, firms compliant with stakeholder affirmative provisions of the SEC 
perform better than firms who do not comply irrespective of the performance measure used. 
This may suggest that firms who comply with both NICGI and Shareholder–NICGI tend to 
comply with the stakeholder provision of the SEC 2011 corporate governance code. The 
results based on the contextual stakeholder affirmative provisions of the SEC 2011 corporate 
governance code (NICGI) are consistent with the results of Ntim (2009), Ntim et al. (2012), 
Ntim (2013c). Therefore, the significant positive relationship between Stakeholder–NICGI 
and both performance variables supports hypothesis 10c, which states that there is a 
statistically significant positive association between compliance with stakeholder provisions 
of the SEC 2011 corporate governance code and firm performance. These results show 
disclosing transparent information on stakeholder engagements in Nigeria improve both their 
accounting returns and market valuation by reducing political, social and environmental cost. 
Similarly, firms increase in disclosure of stakeholder-inclusive actions signals adaption to 
societal/institutional norms (local isomorphism). This contextual adaptation curbs 
environmental vulnerability and improves firm returns. 
 
  8.4.2 South Africa Empirical Results – Shareholder (Shareholder–SACGI) & 
Stakeholder (Stakeholder–SACGI) Compliance Index  
 
 
Similar to decomposition of the Nigerian index, the South African composite index (SACGI) 
is separated into two sub-indices. The Shareholder–SACGI captures the conventional 
corporate governance provisions borrowed from the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model with the premise of reducing agency cost and increasing shareholders’ return. The 
South African Shareholder–SACGI is composed of 71 provisions. The 71 provisions fall 
under the following categories: (i) ethical leadership and corporate citizenship (4 provisions), 
(ii) board composition and management (19 provisions), (iii) remuneration committee 
composition and function (10 provisions), (iv) accounting and auditing/audit committee (11 
provisions), (v) governance of risk (9 provisions), (vi) governance of information technology 
(4 provisions), (vii) compliance with laws, rules, codes and standards (3 provisions), (viii) 
internal audit (3 provisions), (ix) integrated reporting and disclosure (8 provisions).  
 
Similar to Nigeria Stakeholder-NICGI, the South African Stakeholder–SACGI has 13 
contextual inclusive actions and stakeholder provisions. The 13 provisions of Stakeholder–
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SACGI fall under two sub-headings. The first is Governing Stakeholder Relationships, with 
five provisions: (i) managing relationships with each stakeholder grouping (STAR), (ii) 
outcome of stakeholder dealings (OUTSTK), (iii) equitable treatment of shareholders (ETS), 
(iv) minority shareholders’ protection (MSP), (v) dispute resolution. The second sub-heading 
is integrated sustainability reporting, with the eight remaining provisions: (vi) broad-based 
black economic empowerment (BEE), (vii) employment equity (EMP), (viii) HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, (ix) implementing rules and regulations on the environment (RREN), (x) ethnic 
board diversity (BODDIV), (xi) gender diversity (GENDIV1), (xii) community support and 
other corporate social investments (CSCSI), (xiii) code of ethics (COE).  
 
The results for Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI sub-indices are shown in table 
21 above. Like Nigeria, for easy comparison, the regression results based on the quality of 
internal corporate governance structures (SACGI) are reported in table 21 alongside those of 
Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI. Columns 3 and 4 of table 21 report the 
regression results of Shareholder–SACGI, whereas columns 5 and 6 show the results of the 
Stakeholder–SACGI, and finally columns 7 and 8 report the OLS estimates of SACGI (which 
have been reported and discussed in section 8.2.2, table 17). Similarly, the regression of 
control variables (Model I) is not reported in table 21 since the results are similar to those 
estimated for SACGI on table 17 and discussed in 8.2.2. Therefore, the reported results in 
table 21 are grounded on Model II, which is the regression of Shareholder–SACGI and 
Stakeholder–SACGI in addition to control variables. 
 
Reading from table 21 above, the F-value of 13.634(0.000***) and 11.4000(0.000***) for Q-
ratio and ROCE indicates that the regression based on Shareholder–SACGI in addition to 
control variables is statistically significant at 1% with adjusted R2 of 0.313 and 0.273 
respectively. 
 
Therefore, the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient of the Shareholder–SACGI plus 
the control variables is zero is not accepted. As a result, Shareholder–SACGI and the 
extraneous variables explain 31.3% variations in firms’ market returns (Q-ratio) and 27.3% of 
firms’ accounting returns (ROCE). This implies with the addition of Shareholder–SACGI to 
the extraneous variables (Model II), the degree of variation increases by 10.1% with respect 
to market return (Q-ratio) and 8.4% with respect to accounting returns (ROCE).  
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Table 21: Results of Sub-Indices of SACGI–Compliance Index Model Based on Accounting 
Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance Variable (Q-ratio) 
 
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. More so, to avoid dummy variable trap, year 2011 and consumer 
services/health care industry are excluded from the regression analysis. They are both used as base year dummy and base industry dummy 
for comparison reasons. Shareholder–SACGI is composed of 71 provisions of King III code aimed at protecting shareholders’ interest. 
Stakeholder–SACGI is composed of 13 provisions of King III code to capture contextual stakeholder-inclusive provisions
  
  
Results on Shareholder–SACGI Results on Stakeholder–SACGI OLS Estimates of SACGI 
 Exp 
Sign 
ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2) 
 
.299 .338 .288 .288 .223 .246 
Adjusted R2 
 
.273 .313 .261 .262 .194 .217 
F-value 
 
11.4000(.000)*** 13.634(.000)*** 10.808(.000)*** 10.824(.000)*** 7.67(.000) *** 8.70(.000)*** 
Standard Error 
 
22.166 0.808 22.340 .838 23.328 .869 
Durbin–Watson 
 
1.075 1.079 1.680 1.045 1.055 1.041 
Highest VIF Score  5.049 3.473 4.998 3.401 2.057 2.022 
No of observations 
 
500 500 500 500 500 500 
Constant + 10.136(.495) 2.013(.000)*** 31.545(.020)** 1.168(.004)*** 8.099(.55) 2.61(.000) *** 
SACGI + - - - - .318(.05) ** -.013(.038)** 
Shareholder–SACGI +/- 0.414(.007)*** -0.009(.073)* - - - - 
Stakeholder–SACGI +/- - - 0.067(.547) -.007(.086)* - - 
Sales Growth + 0.070(.058)** .004(.007)*** 0.074(.048)** .082(.003)*** .072(.065)* .005(.001)*** 
Dual Listing + -6.639(.025)** -0.129(.224) -6.566(.028)** -0.123(.266) -8.322(.007)*** -.144(.209) 
Audit Firm Size + -8.064(.032)** -0.525(.000)*** -7.459(.048)** -0.591(.000)*** -9.972(.007) *** -.429(.002)*** 
Firm Size +/- 1.120(.801) -0.286(.035)** 1.712(.702) -0.349(.012)*** 5.369(.026)** .345(.000)*** 
Capital Structure (Gearing) +/- -0.076(.018)*** -0.001(.437) -0.072(.024)** .001(.516) -.107(.002) *** .001(.457) 
Total Asset + -.000(.001)*** -.000(.693) -0.000(.003)*** -.000(.576) -.000(.18) -.000(.171) 
Market Value +/- 0.000(.001)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .001(.035)** .000(.000)*** 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 
 
-.000(.572) -.000(.147) -0.000(.991) -.000(.027)** .000(.700) -.000(.003)*** 
Basic Material 
 
-21.174(.000)*** -0.160(.212) -20.292(.000)*** -0.185(.167) -22.862(.000) *** -.104(.461) 
Consumer Goods 
 
1.333(.753) 0.179(.247) 2.924(.490) 0.140(.377) 3.653(.412) .355(.033)** 
Finance Industry 
 
-.0.690(.828) -0.779(.000)*** -1.218(.709) -0.629(.000)*** -2.488(.458) -.624(.000)*** 
Industrial 
 
-8.672(.011)*** -0.380(.002)*** -8.113(.020)** -0.426(.001)*** -8.373(.020)** -.236(.078)* 
Telecoms/Technology 
Industry 
 
6.190(.147) -0.004(.978) 
6.697(.109)* -0.072(.655) 4.476(.312) -.097(.555) 
Year 2010 
 
2.061(.523) 0.071(.547) 0.276(.931) 0.118(.322) 1.371(.686) .093(.462) 
Year 2012 
 
-1.031(.744) 0.040(.728) -0.312(.922) 0.025(.831) -.882(.791) .082(.509) 
Year 2013  -6.587(.039)** -0.010(.931) -5.528(.084)* -0.024(.839) -6.551(.053)** .074(.556) 
Year 2014  -8.336(.008)*** -0.022(.854) -7.414(.022)** -0.022(.855) 8.644(.011)*** -.034(.790) 
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Therefore, compliance with shareholder corporate governance provisions (Shareholder–
SACGI) explains 10% and 8.4% variations in market value and accounting returns for listed 
firms in South Africa for the period 2010–2014.  Comparatively, adjusted R2 for 
Shareholder–SACGI shows an overall improvement from those reported in the SACGI 
regression (see columns 7 and 8). Contrasting the results of the Shareholder–SACGI 
(columns 3 and 4 of table 21) and SACGI (columns 7 and 5 in table 21) shows that 
Shareholder–SACGI (market returns have adjusted R2 of 31.3% and accounting returns of 
27.3%) explains changes in both market return and accounting return better than SACGI 
(market returns adjusted R2 is 21.7% and accounting returns is 19.4%). Hence, Shareholder–
SACGI explains 9.6% and 7.9% variations in market and accounting returns respectively 
compared to SACGI. These results are consistent with those reported by Ntim (2009) and 
Ntim et al. (2012), who reported that the Shareholder–SACGI explains approximately 9% of 
the changes in both accounting and market returns in South Africa. Concisely, these results 
indicate Shareholder–SACGI is able to explain significant variations in both accounting and 
market returns. In fact, the results suggest that the inclusion of Stakeholder–SACGI as part of 
the composite index (SACGI) may reduce the explanatory power of SACGI.  
 
Moreover, consistent with theoretical expectations, the coefficients of Shareholder–SACGI 
on ROCE 0.414(.007 ***) are positive and statistically relevant at 1% (p≤0.001). However, 
in contrast to theoretical expectations, the coefficients of Shareholder–SACGI on Q-ratio -
0.009(.073*) are negative and significant at 10% (p≤0.10). These results are similar to the 
results reported on SACGI in section 8.2.2, table 17. Hence, the positive relationship between 
Shareholder–SACGI and accounting returns suggests the theoretical expectations that 
compliance with provisions increases firm accounting returns. Consequently, firms that are 
compliant with the shareholder provisions of King III outperform less compliant firms with 
respect to accounting returns. Conversely, the results based on market returns do not lend 
support to the theoretical argument that compliance with provisions aimed at increasing 
shareholder value by reducing agency cost increases firm valuation. Therefore, firms with 
low compliance with shareholder provisions of King III are highly valued than  high 
compliant firms. The results based on accounting returns are consistent with Ntim (2009) and 
Ntim et al. (2012). However, the negative significant results based on market return is in 
contrast with those reported in South Africa by Ntim (2009) and Ntim et al. (2012). 
Therefore, the significant positive relationship between Shareholder–SACGI and accounting 
returns supports hypothesis 10b, which states that there is a statistically significant positive 
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relationship between compliance with shareholder/economic provisions of King III and 
accounting returns. However, this hypothesis is not accepted respect to market returns. 
 
Consistent with the results reported for Shareholder–SACGI, Stakeholder–NICGI (see table 
21 columns 5–6) has an F-value of 10.808 (.000) *** for ROCE and 10.824(.000) *** for Q-
ratio, both significant at 1%. As a result, the regression based on the Stakeholder–SACGI in 
addition to the control variables is statistically significant at 1% with adjusted R2 of 0.261 and 
0.262 for accounting and market returns respectively. Accordingly, the null hypothesis that 
the regression coefficient of Stakeholder–SACGI and extraneous variables is equal to zero is 
not accepted. Consequently, Stakeholder–SACGI plus control variables accounts for 26.1% 
variations in accounting returns (ROCE) and 26.2% variations in the market valuation (Q-
ratio). Comparable to the results reported for Shareholder–SACGI, with the addition of 
Stakeholder–SACGI to the extraneous variables (Model II), the degree of variation increased 
by 7.2% and 4.9% for accounting returns (ROCE) and market valuation (Q-ratio) 
respectively.  
 
Relatively, the adjusted R2 for the Stakeholder–SACGI for both market returns, and 
accounting returns are similar but lower compared to those reported in columns 3 to 4 for 
Shareholder–SACGI but higher than those in columns 7 to 8 for SACGI in table 21. 
Comparatively, Stakeholder–SACGI has a higher explanatory power in explaining changes in 
the market returns (adjusted R2 is 26.2) than SACGI (adjusted R2 is 19.4%) statistically by 
6.8% but lower explanatory rigour when matched with Shareholder–SACGI (adjusted R2 is 
31.3%) statistically by -4.9%. In the same way, with respect to accounting returns, the results 
based on Stakeholder–SACGI (adjusted R2 is 26.1%) are greater than SACGI (adjusted R2 is 
19.4%) statistically by 6.7% but moderately lower than Shareholder–SACGI (adjusted R2 is 
27.3%) statistically by 1.2%. Inferring from this, the Stakeholder–SACGI has a higher 
explanatory power in determining changes in both market and accounting returns than 
SACGI but is less predictive relative to Shareholder–SACGI. This thus suggests both sub-
indices (Stakeholder–SACGI and Shareholder–SACGI) possess stronger explanatory power 
on both accounting returns and market returns as standalones; however, this is diminished 
when they are joined to form the composite index (SACGI).   
 
Consistent with the results reported for Shareholder–SACGI and SACGI, the coefficients of 
the Stakeholder–SACGI under ROCE 0.067(0.547) are positive but statistically insignificant. 
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More so, Stakeholder–SACGI is negatively associated with market returns with a coefficient 
of -0.007(.086*), significant at 10% (p≤0.10). The negative significant results based on 
market return suggest that the market undervalues firms compliant with contextual and 
stakeholder-inclusive provisions of King III and rewards non-compliant firms. Consequently, 
the market does not value stakeholder provisions but instead may interpret them as an 
intrusion and distraction to shareholder value creation objectives since complying with these 
provisions is costly. Therefore, the theoretical expectation that compliance with stakeholder 
affirmative provisions has an adverse effect on firm market returns is reinforced. 
Nonetheless, the positive relationship between the Stakeholder–SACGI and accounting 
returns (though insignificant) may suggest that the theoretical expectations that compliance 
with stakeholder inclusive provisions of the King III has an adverse effect on firm accounting 
returns are not supported. Therefore, firms compliant with stakeholder-inclusive provisions of 
King III perform better than non-compliant firms with respect to accounting returns but 
inversely with market returns. Therefore, hypothesis 10c, which states there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between compliance with stakeholder/social provisions of 
King III corporate governance code  and performance, is rejected irrespective of the 
performance measure. 
 
Overall, the similar trend of results between SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–
SACGI suggests that South African-listed firms that are compliant to the King III corporate 
governance code (as measured by SACGI) tend to comply with both the shareholder-oriented 
(Shareholder–SACGI) and stakeholder oriented (Stakeholder–SACGI) provisions.  
 
The results based on the contextual stakeholder-inclusive provisions of the King III corporate 
governance code (Stakeholder–SACGI) are consistent with the results of Ntim (2009), Ntim 
et al. (2012), Ntim (2013c) with respect to accounting returns, though the results of these 
researchers were significant. However, the results based on market returns contrast with the 
results of Ntim (2009), Ntim et al. (2012), Ntim (2013c). As suggested in section 8.2.2, the 
negative significant results between Stakeholder–SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI and market 
valuation (similar to those reported for the SACGI) are attributable to the problem of 
governance inertia. As suggested earlier, this is because, over the years, the development of 
different corporate governance reports (King I to III) has led to investors feeling disconnected 
as well as paying little attention and ascribing little value to CG regulations. As such, the 
market undervalues compliant firms. This suggest compliant firms are penalised by the 
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market for pursuing compliance goals at the expense of profitability goals. Hence, where 
investors do not see any value in complying with CG regulations, they undervalue 
compliance. Indeed, this is consistent with the results of Tariq and Abbas (2013), who found 
that highly compliant firms in Pakistan are less profitable than averagely and lowly compliant 
firms.  
 
8.5 Comparing Results of Equilibrium Variable Model and Compliance 
Index Model 
 
Sub-research Question 3: Are firms’ choices of alternative internal CG structures as 
measured by the equilibrium variable model associated with better firm performance 
than firm-level compliance with country-level CG provisions as measured by the 
compliance index model? 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, one of the research questions (stated above) and contributions in this 
study is to examine across both countries if internal corporate governance structures (e.g. size 
of board, CEO/chairman role separation, proportion of NEDs, leverage, institutional 
shareholding, proportion of women and ethnic diversity) chosen by firms explain 
performance better than the compliance with country-level CG provisions which are 
prescribed by external bodies. In fact, as noted earlier, prior research in CG and particularly 
in an African context has not yet provided a comprehensive and robust understanding of 
internal CG structures selected by firms from a multi-country perspective as well as the level 
at which these firms comply with local CG provisions and their bearing on firm financial 
performance. This study specifically attempts to fill this gap by comparing both models and, 
as a result, unravel whether firm-level choice of corporate governance structures impacts on 
firm accounting and market returns better than complying with externally generated 
governance requirements, which are costly to comply with and may be seen by managers, 
firms and investors as intrusive, irrelevant and distracting from the profit maximisation goal 
of firms.   
 
For comparison purposes of both models, it will be unsuitable to compare non-traditional 
corporate governance requirements such as contextual requirements enshrined in codes in 
both countries. As a result, consistent with the same reasoning applied by Ntim (2009), the 
shareholder compliance index results discussed in 8.4 are compared with the results of the 
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equilibrium variable model. This is because, as noted earlier, the inclusion of contextual 
provisions may diminish the explanatory power of provisions aimed at reducing agency cost 
and increasing shareholder value. More so, the evidence reported in 8.4 for the shareholder 
sub-indices in both countries (Stakeholder and Shareholder indices) shows they possess 
stronger explanatory power in explaining variations in accounting and market returns as 
standalones. However, this is diminished when they are joined together to form the composite 
index (NICGI and SACGI). More so, theoretically, firm-level internal corporate governance 
structures and provisions captured by the shareholder index in both countries are aimed at 
reducing agency cost and increasing shareholder value, whereas the contextual provisions in 
the stakeholder sub-index are mostly aimed at somewhat increasing social equality and 
achieving macro-economic policy objectives of governments and as such may not accurately 
have a quantifiable impact on shareholder value maximisation. For that reason, the 
subsequent subsections compare the results based on the shareholder index (columns 3 and 4 
of tables 20 and 21) and the equilibrium variable model (tables 18 and 19) for Nigeria and 
South Africa respectively.  
 
  8.5.1 Comparing Results of the Equilibrium Variable Model and Compliance 
Index Model in Nigeria 
 
As noted above, in Nigeria, the compliance index model is based on the results of 
Shareholder–NICGI-firm performance link (which contains 61 out of the 75 CG provisions as 
enshrined in the SEC 2011 corporate governance code). This  is compared with the results of 
the equilibrium variable model (based on the choice of firm-level governance structures not 
determined by external bodies). The regression results of both models including extraneous 
variables are reported in table 22 below. However, for robust comparison of results, the 
individual firm year’s statistical results for Shareholder–NICGI, which was not reported in 
table 20, and the firm-year’s results based on the equilibrium variable model, which was 
reported in table 18, are reported in table 22 (rows 2 to 5). This is done to achieve a robust 
comparison, which is not limited only to the pooled sample, and also to compare across 
individual firm years.  
 
As discussed in table 20 columns 4 to 6 (not reported in table 22 for brevity), Shareholder–
NICGI showed positive and statistically significant coefficients with both accounting and 
market returns in the pooled sample. The individual firm year coefficients for Shareholder–
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NICGI (not reported here for brevity reasons) showed a significant positive relationship with 
ROCE in 2011 (5%, p≤0.03) but insignificant in 2012 (12 .6%), 2013 (23.1%), 2014 (95%) 
and 2015 (68%). With regard to Q-ratio, Shareholder–NICGI is consistently positive across 
each firm year but only statistically significant in 2013 (p≤0.10), and insignificant in 2011 
(37.1%), 2012 (25%) and 2014 (21.2%), 2015 (86%). However, the firm year p-values for 
Shareholder–NICGI across both performance measures except for ROCE in 2014 and Q-ratio 
in 2015 are moderately low and close to becoming significant with consistent positive 
coefficients. Overall, the results are consistent with prior researchers (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006, 
Ntim, 2009, Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim, 2013a) who have reported that compliance with 
externally developed codes  positively impacts  firm financial performance.  
 
On the other hand, the results based on the equilibrium variable model (reported in table 18) 
showed mixed results across both performance measures and are consistent with prior CG 
research which has also reported mixed results using the choice of firm-level governance 
structures (e.g. Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006b, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 
2006a, Sanda et al., 2005, Vafeas, 1999). Except for gender diversity and ethnic diversity, 
which showed consistent statistically significant coefficients across both performance 
measures, the variables are either statistically significant with one performance measure or 
insignificant with another performance measure with sometimes contradictory signs of the 
coefficients. Furthermore, most of the variables have insignificant results irrespective of the 
performance measure used. In fact, out of the 14 firm-level internal corporate governance 
structures used as a proxy in this research, four showed insignificant results irrespective of 
the performance measure, whereas eight showed significant results with one performance 
measure and insignificant results with the other. As noted above, only two variables showed 
consistent statistically significant coefficients across both performance measures. Compared 
to the annual results for Shareholder–NICGI in the compliance index model, most of the 
insignificant results for variables in the equilibrium variable model showed p-values up to 
70% and above.  
 
With regard to regression diagnostic and conditions for normal distribution assumptions of 
OLS, some of the variables within the equilibrium variable model had some skewness 
statistic above the critical values of +/-0.8 and kurtosis test results of above the critical values 
of -/+3. The combined average for all the variables had skewness of 0.26 and kurtosis of 
+3.10. Meanwhile the Shareholder–NICGI showed a skewness of -0.63 and kurtosis of 3.08. 
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As a result, the compliance index model (Shareholder–NICGI) showed better distributional 
properties than the equilibrium variable model. This is further supported by the VIF results of 
both models reported in table 22 below.  
 
The VIF results from table 22 show that the highest VIF value in the compliance index model 
is 7.265, while that for the equilibrium variable model showed a VIF value of just equal to 
the critical value of 10 (0.904). Similarly, across firm years, the equilibrium variable model 
has VIF values above 10 (see table 22). More so, the tolerance statistics (not reported here for 
brevity) for some variables in the equilibrium variable model show values slightly higher 
than the critical value of one; meanwhile, those of compliance index model showed values of 
less than one. For example, board interlock and board busyness have tolerance values slightly 
greater than one (1.005). Furthermore, the compliance index model possesses better Cook’s 
test, studentised residuals and engen values (not reported here for brevity reasons) than the 
equilibrium variable model.  
  
The Adjusted R2 and corresponding F-values and significance, Durbin–Watson statistics and 
standards errors for both models are reported in table 22 below. These results have already 
been reported in tables 20 and 18 for the equilibrium variable model and the compliance 
index model respectively. They are reported here for the sake of comparisons. Panels A to F 
show the summary regression statistics for the independent variables plus the controls for 
both ROCE and Q-ratio for the pooled sample (400 firm years) and the individual firm years 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. Specifically, the Adjusted R2 examines the extent to which 
variations in accounting and market returns are explained by internal corporate governance 
variables in each model. Hence, the higher the Adjusted R2, the better the explanatory power 
of a model. In addition, the F-test indicates whether the coefficients of the internal corporate 
governance variables in each model are jointly significant. The closer the F-value is to zero, 
the weaker the explanatory power of the model. Meanwhile, the standard error measures the 
standard deviation of the distribution of residuals for each regression model. Therefore, the 
higher the standards errors, the poorer the model. Finally, the Durbin–Watson test shows the 
presence of autocorrelation in each model. Durbin–Watson test results indicates the presence 
of mild to serious autocorrelation problems.  
 
Consistent with the distributional properties discussed earlier, the compliance index model 
(Shareholder–NICGI) showed better explanatory power than the equilibrium variable model 
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with respect to accounting returns (ROCE), but the latter showed better explanatory power 
than the former with respect to market returns (Q-ratio) on the pooled sample significant at 
1% in both cases. Across the firm years, the adjusted R2 is better with respect to ROCE for 
the Shareholder–NICGI than the equilibrium variable model. Nonetheless, the Adjusted R2 
for Q-ratio is better for the equilibrium variable model than the compliance index model only 
in 2011 and 2012.  
 
For the F-values, the value of the compliance index model is significant within the pooled 
sample and across all firm years irrespective of the performance measure used, whereas those 
for the equilibrium variable model are insignificant in 2011, 2012 and 2013 for ROCE. The 
Durbin–Watson test results showed mixed results as they have a higher value with respect to 
ROCE in the compliance index model in the pooled sample and in 2013 only. More so, with 
respect to Q-ratio, the equilibrium variable model shows better Durbin–Watson test results in 
the pooled sample and across all the years with the exception of 2013. Finally, the standard 
error is lower for the compliance index model in the pooled sample and across each firm year 
with respect to accounting returns. Similarly, apart from 2013, the compliance index model 
has better standard errors with respect to Q-ratio in the pooled sample and in 2011, 2012, 
2014 and 2015.  
 
Overall, given the diagnostic statistical test and results discussed in the preceding paragraphs 
(though with some mixed results), the compliance index model (Shareholder–NICGI) has a 
better explanatory and predictive power than the equilibrium variable model. This suggests 
that, in Nigeria, though laborious, it is value relevant for firms to comply with the integrated 
corporate governance provisions rather than use single firm-level corporate structures in 
isolation.  
 
A possible explanation for this stronger predictive power of the compliance index model is 
due to its ability to capture actual qualitative variations in corporate governance disclosures 
among listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
The subsequent section reports comparison of equilibrium variable model and the compliance 
index model in South Africa.   
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Table 22: Nigerian Summary Regression Results – Compliance Index Model and Equilibrium 
Variable Model 
 
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Shareholder–NICGI composed of 61 provisions of SEC 2011 code 
aimed at protecting shareholders’ interest.  
 
 
  
  
Shareholder Compliance Index Model (Shareholder–NICGI) Results on Equilibrium Variable Model 
 ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
Panel A: Firm Years with Extraneous Variables  
R-Square (R2) 
 
.203 
 
.296 
 
.228 
 
.385 
Adjusted R2 .165 .262 .167 .337 
F-value 
F-significance  
5.402 
(.000)*** 
8.887 
(.000)*** 
3.742 
(.000)*** 
7.972 
(.000)*** 
Standard Error 21.208 1.529 21.246 1.449 
Durbin–Watson 1.021 1.680 .986 1.236 
Highest VIF Score 4.964 7.265 9.302 9.904 
No of observations 400 400 400 400 
     
Panel B: 2011 Firm Year with Extraneous 
Variables       
R-Square (R2) 
 
 
.296 
 
 
.461 
 
 
.332 
 
 
.604 
Adjusted R2 .144 .344 .023 .421 
F-value 
F-significance  
1.954 
(.036)** 
3.496 
(.000)*** 
1.075 
(.400) 
3.299 
(.000)*** 
Standard Error 26.044 .939 27.834 0.882 
Durbin–Watson 2.004 2.397 2.215 2.463 
Highest VIF Score 7.265 7.266 20.449 17.495 
No of observations 80 80 80 80 
     
Panel C: 2012 Firm Year with Extraneous 
Variables       
R-Square (R2) 
 
 
.352 
 
 
.471 
 
 
.390 
 
 
.615 
Adjusted R2 .213 .357 .108 .437 
F-value 
F-significance  
2.527 
(.006)*** 
4.137 
(.000)*** 
1.381 
(.160) 
3.457 
(.000)*** 
Standard Error 22.083 .988 23.516 0.924 
Durbin–Watson 2.330 2.262 2.420 2.368 
Highest VIF Score 4.895 4.895 18.721 18.72 
No of observations 80 80 80 80 
Panel D: 2013 Firm Year with Extraneous 
Variables        
R-Square (R2) 
 
 
.436 
 
 
.452 
 
 
.515 
 
. 
500 
Adjusted R2 .314 .334 .291 .269 
F-value 
F-significance  
3.587 
(.000)*** 
3.826 
(.000)*** 
2.295 
(.005)*** 
2.163 
(.009)*** 
Standard Error 19.302 1.545 19.634 1.618 
Durbin–Watson 2.271 2.297 2.112 2.268 
Highest VIF Score 8.355 8.355 10.90 21.94 
No of observations 80 80 80 80 
Panel E: 2014 Firm Year with Extraneous 
Variables       
R-Square (R2) 
 
 
.261 
 
 
.474 
 
 
.313 
 
 
.553 
Adjusted R2 .103 .360 -.005 .346 
F-value 
F-significance  
1.648 
(.090)* 
4.180 
(.000)*** 
0.983 
(.503) 
2.217 
(.001) *** 
Standard Error 20.525 1.446 21.729 1.475 
Durbin–Watson 2.1614 2.220 2.174 2.362 
Highest VIF Score 6.708 6.708 21.679 21.34 
No of observations 8/0 80 80 80 
Panel F: 2015 Firm Year with Extraneous 
Variables       
R-Square (R2) 
 
 
.248 
 
 
.301 
 
 
.468 
 
 
.400 
Adjusted R2 .207 .150 .213 .112 
F-value 
F-significance  
2.474 
(.007)*** 
1.998 
(.032)** 
1.835 
(.033)** 
1.387 
(.158)  
Standard Error 15.491 2.203 15.624 2.278 
Durbin–Watson 2.228 2.185 2.116 1.770 
Highest VIF Score 5.638 3.294 8.867 8.867 
No of observations 80 80 80 80 
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  8.5.2 Comparing Results of the Equilibrium Variable Model and the Compliance 
Index Model in South Africa 
 
Similar to Nigeria, the compliance index model for South Africa is based on the results of 
Shareholder–SACGI-firm performance association (which contains 71 out of the 84 CG 
provisions as stipulated in the King III corporate governance code). This result is compared 
with the findings of equilibrium variable model (based on the choice of firm-level alternative 
internal governance structures not externally determined). Like Nigeria, the results of both 
models including control variables are reported in table 23 below. Owing to the need for 
robustness and consistency in comparison of results, the individual firm year’s results for 
Shareholder–SACGI, which wasn’t reported in table 21, and the firm-year’s results based on 
the equilibrium variable model, which was reported in table 19, are reported in table 23 
below (rows 2 to 5). As discussed in table 21 columns 4 to 6 (not reported in table 23 for 
brevity), the South African Shareholder–SACGI indicated positive and statistically 
significant coefficients with accounting returns and but negative significant association with 
market returns over the pooled sample. Across individual firm years, coefficients for 
Shareholder–SACGI (not reported here for brevity reasons) with Q-ratio were consistently 
negative but statistically insignificant in 2010 (31.5%), 2011 (21.1%), 2012 (27.9%), 2013 
(31.4%) and 2014 (84.6%). With regard to ROCE, Shareholder–SACGI showed a significant 
positive relationship in 2011 (10%, p≤0.075), 2012 (10%, p≤0.063), but insignificant in 2010 
(32%), 2013 (19.1%) and 2014 (12.5%).   
 
Like Nigeria, the firm year p-values for Shareholder–SACGI across both performance 
measures across all firm years except for ROCE in 2014 are moderately low and close to 
becoming significant with consistent positive coefficients with ROCE and negative 
coefficients with respect to Q-ratio. Generally, the positive results of Shareholder–SACGI 
and accounting returns are consistent with the results of previous researchers in South Africa 
(e.g. Ntim, 2009, Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim, 2013c), who constructed similar 
composite index and reported  that compliance with King II aimed at enhancing shareholders’ 
value maximisation significantly and positively impacts on accounting returns. However, the 
negative results based on market return are not in line with those reported by prior 
researchers using similar composite index (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006, Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim et 
al., 2012, Ntim, 2013a, Ntim, 2013c). 
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Similar to Nigeria, the regression results of the equilibrium variable model (reported in table 
19) showed similar mixed results irrespective of performance measures and are also akin to the 
regression results of prior CG research using  firm-level internal governance structures in 
Africa (e.g. Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006b, Ntim, 2009). Apart from board size, 
which showed consistent negative statistically significant coefficients across both performance 
measures, the rest of the variables are either statistically significant with one performance 
measure but insignificant with another performance measure or significant with both measures 
but with contradictory signs of coefficients. For example, frequent board meetings is 
significantly related to both measures at 5%, but it is positive with ROCE and negative with 
Q-ratio. Indeed, out of the 14 firm-level internal corporate governance structures in this 
research, two revealed insignificant results irrespective of the performance measure used while 
nine exhibited significant results with one performance measure and insignificant results with 
the other. For example, proportion of NED, ED, INED, board interlock, board busyness, 
gearing, director shareholding and institutional shareholding showed significant results with 
ROCE but insignificant results with Q-ratio whereas only CEO/Chairman separation showed a 
significant relationship with Q-ratio and an insignificant association with ROCE. More so, 
comparing each firm year’s results of the variables in the equilibrium variable model with those 
of Shareholder–SACGI (compliance index model), shows that most of the variables in the 
equilibrium variable model showed p-values up to 99.88%.  
 
Furthermore, with respect to regression diagnostic and conditions for normal distribution 
assumptions of OLS, some of the variables within the equilibrium variable model had skewness 
statistics of above the critical values of +/-0.8 and kurtosis test results of above critical values 
of -/+3. For example, director shareholding has a mean kurtosis test value of 3.342 with 
skewness of 1.237. More so, the combined average for all the variables had average skewness 
of 0.1440 and kurtosis of +5.8. On the other hand, Shareholder–SACGI showed a skewness of 
-0.355 and kurtosis of 2.115. Hence like Nigeria, the compliance index model (Shareholder–
SACGI) showed better distributional properties than the equilibrium variable model.   
 
More so, the VIF test reported in table 23 indicates that the highest VIF value in the compliance 
index model for the pooled sample is 5.049, whereas for the equilibrium variable model it is 
8.222. In addition, the VIF values for the equilibrium variable are consistently higher than those 
of the compliance index model (see table 23 above). 
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Table 23: South African Summary Regression Results of the Compliance Index Model and 
Equilibrium Variable Model 
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Shareholder–SACGI composed of 71 provisions of King III code 
aimed at protecting shareholders’ interest.
  
  
Compliance Index Model (Shareholder–SACGI) Results on Equilibrium Variable Model 
 ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
Panel A: Firm Years with Extraneous Variables   
R-Square (R2) 
 
.299 
 
.338 
 
.320 
 
.266 
Adjusted R2 .273 .313 .278 .220 
F-value 
F-significance  
11.4000 
(.000)*** 
13.634 
(.000)*** 
7.570 
(.000)*** 
5.833 
(.000)*** 
Standard Error 22.166 0.808 22.145 .869 
Durbin–Watson 1.075 1.079 2.004 1.841 
Highest VIF Score 5.049 3.473 8.222 8.128 
No of observations 500 500 500 500 
     
Panel B: 2010 Firm Year with Extraneous Variables     
R-Square (R2) 
 
.304 
 
.340 
 
.258 
 
.326 
Adjusted R2 .190 .231 .142 .098 
F-value 
F-significance  
2.652 
(.003)*** 
3.124 
(.001)*** 
1.653 
(.020)** 
1.428 
(.121) 
Standard Error 22.857 1.081 23.476 1.555 
Durbin–Watson 2.217 2.231 2.108 1.864 
Highest VIF Score 4.925 3.538 14.302 13.277 
No of observations 100 100 100 100 
     
Panel C: 2011 Firm Year with Extraneous Variables       
R-Square (R2) 
 
.360 
 
.487 
 
.402 
 
.474 
Adjusted R2 .254 .402 .200 .286 
F-value 
F-significance  
3.408 
(.000)*** 
5.759 
(.000)*** 
1.990 
(.012)*** 
2.526 
(.001)*** 
Standard Error 21.581 0.696 22.362 .753 
Durbin–Watson 2.243 2.286 1.902 1.838 
Highest VIF Score 5.147 3.755 14.846 14.966 
No of observations 100 100 100 100 
     
Panel D: 2012 Firm Year with Extraneous Variables       
R-Square (R2) 
 
.325 
 
.431 
 
.383 
 
.350 
Adjusted R2 .214 .338 .171 .130 
F-value 
F-significance  
2.929 
(.001)*** 
4.603 
(.000)*** 
1.809 
(.027)** 
1.601 
(.064)* 
Standard Error 20.318 0.801 20.987 .937 
Durbin–Watson 2.090 2.166 2.118 2.099 
Highest VIF Score 5.349 3.730 13.994 10.125 
No of observations 100 100 100 100 
Panel E: 2013 Firm Year with Extraneous Variables        
R-Square (R2) 
 
.383 
 
.469 
 
.420 
 
.400 
Adjusted R2 .281 .381 .222 .198 
F-value 
F-significance  
3.770 
(.000)*** 
5.361 
(.000)*** 
2.118 
(.007)*** 
1.976 
(.013)*** 
Standard Error 23.079 0.689 24.085 .825 
Durbin–Watson 2.263 1.788 2.337 2.151 
Highest VIF Score 5.394 3.744 16.535 16.592 
No of observations 100 100 100 100 
Panel F: 2014 Firm Year with Extraneous Variables       
R-Square (R2) 
 
.370 
 
.411 
 
.460 
 
.451 
Adjusted R2 .266 .314 .275 .265 
F-value 
F-significance  
3.566 
(.000)*** 
4.243 
(.000)*** 
2.483 
(.001)*** 
2.430 
(.002)*** 
Standard Error 24.563 0.705 24.547 .726 
Durbin–Watson 1.915 2.228 1.736 1.847 
Highest VIF Score 7.700 6.020 15.959 16.469 
No of observations 100  100 100 
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Moreover, tolerance statistics (not reported here for brevity) for some variables in the 
equilibrium variable model for South Africa indicated values slightly closer to the critical 
value of one (0.850). Contrarily, the compliance index model showed tolerance values of less 
than one (0.650). Additionally, the compliance index model (Shareholder–SACGI) possesses 
better Cook’s test, studentised residuals and engen values results (not reported here for 
brevity reasons) than the equilibrium variable model.  
 
The regression results of the adjusted R2, F-values, standard errors and Durbin–Watson test 
for the pooled sample (500 firm years) are reported in table 23 above. These results have 
already been reported in tables 19 and 21 for the equilibrium variable model and compliance 
index model respectively. Panels A to F show the summary statistics for the independent 
variables plus the controls on both ROCE and Q-ratio for the pooled sample (500 firm years) 
and the individual firm years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. The compliance index 
model (Shareholder–SACGI) shows superior explanatory power compared with the 
equilibrium variable model with respect to market returns (Q-ratio). Nevertheless, the latter 
shows superior explanatory power with respect to accounting returns (ROCE) compared with 
the former on the pooled sample. For example, the adjusted R2 for Q-ratio within the 
compliance index model is 0.313 (31.3%) for the pooled sample whereas for the equilibrium 
variable model it is 0.22 (22.0%). Nevertheless, for ROCE, the Adjusted R2 is 0.27.3 (27.3%) 
and 0.278 (27.8%) for the compliance index model and equilibrium variable model 
respectively. However, across the individual years, the adjusted R2 has superior explanatory 
power with respect to ROCE and Q-ratio for the compliance index model (Shareholder–
SACGI) except for ROCE in 2014.  
 
Comparable to Nigeria, with regard to F-values, the value of the compliance index model 
(Shareholder–SACGI) is higher and significant within the pooled sample and across all firm 
years irrespective of the performance measure at 1%, whereas the equilibrium variable model 
is insignificant in 2010 for Q-ratio. More so, in 2012, Q-ratio for the equilibrium variable 
model is significant at 10%. Similar to Nigeria, the Durbin–Watson test showed mixed results 
in South Africa across both models. In the pooled sample, the Durbin–Watson test is higher 
in the equilibrium variable model than in the compliance index model and but this is 
consistent only in 2012 and 2013 with respect to ROCE. In fact, the Durbin–Watson test 
showed superior values across all firm years with respect to Q-ratio in the compliance index 
model. Finally, similar mixed results are seen for standard errors. Specifically, the latter is 
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lower for the compliance index model in both the pooled sample and across each firm year 
with respect to market returns, but the equilibrium variable model has better standard errors 
with respect to ROCE in the pooled sample and 2014, whereas the compliance index model 
has better standard errors in 2010 to 2013. The mixed results for Durbin–Watson and 
standard errors are consistent with the findings of Ntim (2009) for South Africa.  
 
With the results of the diagnostic statistical test and empirical results discussed earlier, on 
aggregate level, the Shareholder–SACGI (compliance index model) has a superior 
explanatory and prognostic influence in explaining firm financial outcomes in South Africa 
compared with the equilibrium variable model. Like Nigeria, these results suggest value 
relevance in complying with a composite corporate governance index for South Africa rather 
than using single firm-level internal corporate structures in isolation or a few of them in 
examining the corporate governance firm financial performance relationship. Like Nigeria, a 
possible explanation for this stronger prognostic power of compliance index is a result of 
aggregation of qualitative variations in corporate governance mechanisms.   
 
The subsequent section will discuss a summary comparison of Nigeria and South Africa 
findings.  
 
 
8.6 Comparative Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results for Nigeria and 
South Africa Based on Both Equilibrium Variable Model and Compliance 
Index Model 
 
 
Main Research Question: How, and in what ways, do the choices of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and compliance with corporate governance provisions affect firm 
financial performance of listed firms in Nigeria and South Africa?  
 
Following the results reported in sections 8.2 to 8.5, the results in both countries based on 
both models are reported in table 24 below. The table summarises the various hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 4 and their statistical outcomes in both countries using both ROCE and  
Q-ratio, hence providing empirical evidence for the main research question above and in 
section 1.4.1.  
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To begin with, the regression results indicate that the quality of internal corporate governance 
structures (NICGI and SACGI) externally generated for firms to comply with or apply plus 
the control variables as measured by the compliance index model accounts for 17.1% 
variations in accounting returns in Nigeria and 27.3% of the variations in South Africa. 
Similarly, the quality of internal corporate governance structures (NICGI and SACGI) and 
extraneous variables explain 31.3% variations in market returns of South African-listed firms 
and 26.4% variations in market returns of listed firms in Nigeria.  
 
In relation to alternative firm-level internal corporate governance as measured by the 
equilibrium variable model, findings show that these variables plus the extraneous variables 
explain 22.0% and 33.7% of changes in the market returns in South Africa and Nigeria 
respectively. In the same way, alternative firm-level internal corporate governance and 
control variables account for 16.7% and 27.8% of changes in accounting returns of listed 
firms in Nigeria and South Africa respectively.  
 
Furthermore, comparative diagnostic and statistical results in both countries show that the 
compliance index model which measured the impact of the quality of internal CG structures 
as determined by country-level corporate governance provisions explains changes in firm 
financial performance better than the equilibrium variable model (a measure of firm-level 
single CG structures internally generated) in both countries. These results therefore suggest 
that, though the compilation, development and compliance of country- and firm-level 
corporate governance indices may be laborious, costly and demanding, they remain a better 
proxy to aggregate the quality of firm-level corporate governance structures than any 
individual or group of selected firm-level internal corporate governance characteristics.  
 
In relation to the alternative firm-level internal corporate governance variables, the proportion 
of NEDs is insignificant and positively related to ROCE in Nigeria but significant in South 
Africa. More so, with respect to Q-ratio, negative relationship with proportion of NEDs is 
consistent across both countries but insignificantly. As a result, both countries show similar 
results but only South African results with respect to ROCE are significant. Hence, 
hypothesis 1a is accepted in South Africa with respect to accounting returns but not market 
returns. Nonetheless, this hypothesis is not accepted for Nigeria irrespective of the 
performance measure. Proportion of ED is insignificantly associated with both performance 
measures in Nigeria but significantly negatively related to ROCE in South Africa at 5%. 
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However, the latter results are contrary to the hypothesised sign and therefore hypothesis 1b 
is rejected in both South Africa and Nigeria. More so, proportion of INED shows a positive 
relationship with market returns in South Africa but negative in Nigeria, but it is significant 
only with the latter. However, INED is negatively associated with accounting returns in both 
countries but significantly with ROCE in South Africa. Nevertheless, similar to the results of 
EDs, the significant results are contrary to the expected sign and therefore hypothesis 1c is 
rejected in both South Africa and Nigeria.  
 
CEO/Chairman role separation is positively associated and significant with Q-ratio at 10% in 
South Africa and 5% for Nigeria. However, CEO/Chairman role separation impacts 
positively on ROCE in South Africa but negatively in Nigeria insignificantly. Hence, 
hypothesis 2 is accepted for Nigeria and South Africa with respect to Q-ratio but rejected 
with respect to ROCE. Board size (hypothesis 3) is positively related to ROCE insignificantly 
but negatively related to Q-ratio significantly (1%) in Nigeria. However, it is significantly 
negatively associated with both market and accounting returns at 5% in South Africa. Yet, 
since these significant results are different from the hypothesised signs, hypothesis 3 is 
rejected.   
 
Furthermore, gender diversity is positively related to both accounting and market 
performance measure and significantly at 1% in Nigeria but positively insignificant with 
ROCE and negatively insignificant with Q-ratio in South Africa. As a result, hypothesis 4 
(H4) is accepted for Nigeria but not accepted for South Africa regardless of the performance 
measure. Hence, in Nigeria, the presence of women on corporate boards enhances firm 
performance more than in South Africa.  
 
In addition, the board meetings variable is positively but insignificantly related to firm 
performance irrespective of the performance measure in Nigeria. However, it shows mixed 
significant results in South Africa relative to the performance measure. In fact, frequency of 
board meetings shows a positive relationship with accounting returns (ROCE) but negative 
relationship with market returns at 5%. This implies that firms that have more board meetings 
in South Africa witness increase in accounting returns but remain undervalued by the market. 
Meanwhile, in Nigeria, the insignificant results (though positive) reject hypothesis 5 (H5). 
Nonetheless, hypothesis H5 is accepted for ROCE but rejected for Q-ratio in South Africa.  
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Ethnic diversity shows a negative statistical relationship with both performance measures 
significantly at 1% for Q-ratio and 5% for ROCE in Nigeria. However, in South Africa, 
ethnic diversity showed an insignificant positive relationship with Q-ratio but negative 
association with ROCE. The South African results therefore indicate that, despite the 
tremendous effort put in by various South African post-apartheid governments, in terms of 
black empowerment, the outcomes are mixed and not significant. The Nigerian results are, 
however, not surprising since the majority of boards in Nigeria are composed of native 
Nigerians; therefore, performance declines because of the influence of high percentage of 
ethnically homogeneous board members. Following from these results, hypothesis 6 (H6) is 
not accepted in either country irrespective of the performance measure.   
 
Furthermore, board interlocks indicate a positive association with ROCE in both countries 
but significantly only in South Africa at 5%. However, with Q-ratio, board interlock is 
negatively associated in both countries insignificantly. These results suggest firms in both 
countries with high levels of interlocks enjoy increase in accounting returns, but markets do 
not see the relevance of interlocks and, as such, value firms with increasing interlocks 
negatively. This may also suggest that markets may see interlocks as increasing directors’ 
busyness and lack of commitment to a firm. Hence, given the results, hypothesis 7a (H7a) is 
accepted for accounting returns in South Africa but rejected for Q-ratio and rejected for 
Nigeria irrespective of the performance measure. More so, hypothesis 7b, which predicts 
board busyness on firm returns as expected, is negatively associated with both ROCE and Q-
ratio in Nigeria but significantly with ROCE at 10%. However, it is positively associated with 
Q-ratio in South Africa insignificantly but significantly negatively related to ROCE. The 
negative significant association of board busyness and accounting returns in both countries 
suggests that board members who spend most of their time attending other board meetings in 
other firms may spend little time in monitoring management, which impacts negatively on 
accounting returns. Following from these results, hypothesis 7b is accepted in relation to 
accounting returns in both countries but not accepted in relation to market returns. These 
results suggest that, though interlock may increase firm accounting value as opined by the 
resource dependency theory, shareholders may view high interlocks as lack of commitment 
and may undervalue firms with interlocking directors.  
 
Gearing significantly relates to accounting returns negatively in both Nigeria and South 
Africa at 1% and 5% respectively. However, it is positively associated with market returns in 
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both countries but insignificantly. This suggests that, in both countries, markets value firms 
which are highly geared positively since gearing is a good corporate governance mechanism 
which may help align the interest of managers of firms to those of the shareholders. However, 
the negative significant relationship in both countries suggests that highly geared firms have 
decreasing accounting returns as a result of increased cost of debt as compared to equity. 
Following these results, hypothesis 8 (H8) is accepted for accounting returns in both countries 
but rejected for market returns. 
 
Furthermore, director shareholding shows a negative relationship in both countries 
irrespective of the performance measure but only significantly for accounting returns at 10% 
in both countries. This suggests that managerial and board ownership of shares which has 
been argued by agency theory to align the interest of managers and shareholders is not value 
relevant in Nigeria and South Africa. In fact, the case may be increasing managerial and 
board ownership gives corporate managers the power to influence decisions, which may be 
detrimental to firm performance in emerging African economies. Hence, hypothesis 9a is 
accepted in both countries in relation to accounting returns but rejected in relation to market 
returns owing to insignificance of the results in the latter.  
 
In addition, like director shareholding, institutional shareholding showed negative association 
with accounting returns in both countries, significantly in South Africa though insignificantly 
in Nigeria. However, it is positively significant with Q-ratio in Nigeria at 10%, whereas it is 
negatively insignificant in South Africa. 
 
Despite the argument in the literature that institutional shareholders monitor management 
better than disperse shareholders, this may not be true in an African context, which is 
characterised by concentrated institutional shareholders who may manipulate the 
management for personal gains, rather than the overall returns of the firms. In fact, the results 
may suggest that increasing institutional share ownership in African firms adversely affects 
accounting returns of firms. However, the positive relationship in Nigeria with Q-ratio may 
suggest that investors in Nigeria value the presence of institutional ownership of firms and 
therefore see this as a positive signal of good monitoring and control. Drawing from these 
results, hypothesis 9b is accepted with regard to Q-ratio in Nigeria but rejected for ROCE 
Nevertheless, it is rejected in South Africa regardless of the performance measure as the 
significant results with ROCE have a sign contrary to the hypothesised sign.  
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Finally, with respect to the last variable under the equilibrium variable model, audit 
committee independence showed a positive relationship with both performance measures in 
South Africa, though insignificantly. However, in Nigeria, audit committee independence 
showed a negative relationship with both ROCE and Q-ratio, but significantly only with Q-
ratio at 1%. The difference in results may be due to the definition and interpretation of the 
term ‘independence’. In South Africa, for example, the King report clearly defines 
independent audit committee members as those who have no stake in the business and are not 
connected to any shareholder, manager or employee of the firm. However, ‘independent audit 
committee member’ is not defined within the SEC 2011 CG code, and, as such, it is subject to 
interpretation by each entity. For example, some firms in Nigeria include representatives of 
shareholders as independent audit committee members. In fact, the requirements of the 
independent audit committee in the SEC are contradictory to the Enactment of the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990, which is mandatory to comply with, and requires 
shareholder representation in audit committees. Hence, most Nigerian firms include 
shareholders’ representatives who are not board members on audit committees. 
 
This may account for lack of ‘independence’ and an increase in lobbying for shareholder 
representatives who may not possess sufficient auditing skills, knowledge and experience, 
which can lead to associated negative impact on market value and accounting returns.  
On the other hand, the positive relationship (though insignificant) in South Africa may 
suggest that the presence of independent audit committee members who must be independent 
board members as clearly defined in the King III enhances both market and accounting 
returns. However, the insignificant results in South Africa reject hypothesis 11 as well as in 
Nigeria, since the negative significant results with Q-ratio are contrary to the expected sign.  
With regard to the quality of internal corporate governance structures as captured by the CG 
indices (NICGI and SACGI) as well as sub-indices (Shareholder and Stakeholder indices), 
results show that the Nigeria CG index (NICGI) is positively and significantly associated 
with both accounting and market returns at 1% (p≤0.0001) and 5%, (p≤0.05) respectively. 
However, the South African corporate governance index (SACGI) shows a positive 
relationship with accounting returns but a negative association with market returns at 5% 
(p≤0.05). These results indicate firms that are highly compliant to the respective country 
corporate governance regulations benefit from increasing accounting returns. 
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 Table 24: Comparative Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results for Nigeria and South Africa based on both the Equilibrium Variable Model and the 
Compliance Index Model 
      NIGERIA SOUTH AFRICA 
Dependent Variable 
  
ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
Independent Variable Hypothesis 
Number 
Hypothesised 
Sign 
Actual 
Sign 
of 
Result 
Statistical 
Significance of 
Result 
Conclusion 
(Hypothesis) 
Actual 
Sign 
of 
Result 
Statistical 
Significance of 
Result 
Conclusion 
(Hypothesis) 
Actual 
Sign 
of 
Result 
Statistical 
Significance of 
Result 
Conclusion 
(Hypothesis) 
Actual 
Sign 
of 
Result 
Statistical 
Significance of 
Result 
Conclusion 
(Hypothesis) 
Prop. Non-executive Directors 1a + + Insignificant Rejected - Insignificant Rejected + Significant (5%) Accepted - Insignificant Rejected 
Prop. Executive Directors 1b + - Insignificant Rejected + Insignificant Rejected - Significant (1%) Rejected + Insignificant Rejected 
Prop. Independent NED 1c + - Insignificant Rejected - Significant (1%) Rejected - Significant (1%) Rejected + Insignificant Rejected 
CEO/Chairman Role Separation 2 + - Insignificant Rejected + Significant (5%) Accepted + Insignificant Rejected + Significant (10%) Accepted 
Board Size 3 + + Insignificant Rejected - Significant (1%) Rejected - Significant (5%) Rejected - Significant (5%) Rejected 
Gender Diversity 4 + + Significant (1%) Accepted + Significant (1%) Accepted + Insignificant Rejected - Insignificant Rejected 
Board Meetings 5 + + Insignificant Rejected + Insignificant Rejected + Significant (5%) Accepted - Significant (5%) Rejected 
Ethnic Diversity 6 + - Significant (5%) Rejected - Significant (1%) Rejected - Insignificant Rejected + Insignificant Rejected 
Board Interlocks 7a + + Insignificant Rejected - Insignificant  Rejected + Significant (5%) Accepted - Insignificant Rejected 
Board Busyness 7b - - Significant (10%) Accepted + Insignificant Rejected - Significant (5%) Accepted + Insignificant Rejected 
Gearing 8 - - Significant (1%) Accepted + Insignificant  Rejected - Significant (5%) Accepted + Insignificant Rejected 
Director Shareholding  9a - - Significant (10%) Accepted - Insignificant Rejected - Significant (10%) Accepted - Insignificant Rejected 
Institutional Shareholding 9b + - Insignificant Rejected + Significant (10%) Accepted - Significant (10%) Rejected - Insignificant Rejected 
Country CG Index (NICGI & 
SACGI) 
10a + + Significant (1%) Accepted + Significant (5%) Accepted + Significant (5%) Accepted - Significant (5%) Rejected 
Country CG Shareholder Index 
(SH–NACGI & SH–SACGI) 
10b + + Significant (1%) Accepted + Significant (5%) Accepted + Significant (5%) Accepted - Significant (5%) Rejected 
Country CG Stakeholder Index 
(S–NACGI & S–SACGI) 
10c + + Significant (1%) Accepted + Significant (1%) Accepted + Insignificant Rejected - Significant (10%) Rejected 
Audit Committee Independence 11 + - Insignificant Rejected - Significant (1%) Rejected + Insignificant Rejected + Insignificant Rejected 
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However, highly compliant firms with Nigeria SEC 2011governance regulations are highly 
valued by investors but contrarily in South Africa, highly compliant firms to King III are 
negatively valued. The results suggest that stock markets in different countries value firms 
differently in relation to firm-level compliance with country CG provisions. Hence, 
hypothesis 10a, which stated that there is a positive relationship between compliance with 
country-level corporate governance provisions and accounting returns, is accepted in both 
countries. However, this hypothesis in relation to market returns is accepted in Nigeria but 
rejected for South Africa.  
 
More so, and consistent with the results reported for the composite index (NICGI and 
SACGI) discussed in the preceding paragraph, the shareholder sub-index (Shareholder–
NICGI and Shareholder–SACGI) showed a positive relationship with accounting returns in 
both Nigeria and South Africa at 1% (p≤0.0001) and 5%, (p≤0.05) respectively. However, in 
line with the results of the composite indices in both countries, the shareholder sub-index in 
South Africa (Shareholder–SACGI) shows an inverse relationship with market returns 
(p≤0.05) whereas Shareholder–NICGI positively affects market returns ((p≤0.05). As a result, 
hypothesis 10b, which states that there exists a positive significant relationship between 
compliance with country-level shareholder corporate governance provisions and accounting 
returns, is accepted in both countries but rejected in relation to market returns in South Africa 
and accepted for Nigeria.  
 
Finally, compliance with stakeholder CG sub-index (Stakeholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–
SACGI) showed a consistent positive relationship with accounting returns in both countries 
but significant only in Nigeria at 1% (p≤0.0001). On the other hand, Stakeholder–SACGI 
showed a negative relationship with market returns, but Stakeholder–NICGI showed a 
positive impact on market returns significantly at 10% (p≤0.10) and 1% (p≤0.001) 
respectively. Hypothesis 10c, which states that there exists significantly positive impact of 
firm-level compliance with country-level stakeholder corporate governance provisions on 
firm performance, is accepted for Nigeria but rejected for South Africa irrespective of the 
performance proxy. The results suggest that, while Nigerian investors value firms that 
comply with stakeholder expectations, which are aimed at achieving some level of social 
equality, macroeconomic policy and environmental responsibility goals (which may not be in 
line with the firm’s objective of creating maximum value for shareholders), the reverse is true 
for South African investors. 
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The consistent results between composite CG index and the sub-indices suggest that firms’ 
compliance with the composite country index (NICGI and SACGI) is similar with their 
compliance with the two sub-indices in both countries, which is consistent with the results of 
the descriptive and correlations discussed in chapters 6 and 7. The results also suggest that 
firms highly compliant to the composite CG code, shareholder corporate disclosures and 
stakeholder disclosures in both countries witness increasing accounting returns. However, 
while firms highly compliant to the country-level corporate governance provisions, 
shareholder corporate governance provisions and stakeholder disclosures enjoy increasing 
market returns in Nigeria, in South Africa, such firms witness decreasing market returns.  
 
Overall, theoretically, the results in both countries show the historical and contextual path 
dependence has produced a diversity of firm-level and country-level specific internal CG 
structures that may work well and improve firm financial performance within an institutional 
environment but may produce different effects in another. However, consistency in results for 
some internal CG variables, especially CGs mechanisms adopted from international best 
practices, may have similar impact on firm-level performance.  
 
8.7 Summary of Chapter  
 
This chapter focused on presenting and discussing the research findings for research 
questions stated in section 1.4. Specifically, this chapter achieved five main objectives. First, 
it examined whether better governed firms based on compliance with country-level CG 
guidelines (compliance index model) are associated with higher financial performance as 
measured by ROCE and Q-ratio (sub-research question 1). Consistent with prior single-
country studies, despite the differences and similarities owing to historical, societal, formal 
and informal norms which have shaped the CG architecture in both countries, compliance 
with respective CG regulations has a positive impact on firm accounting performance 
(ROCE) of listed firms. On the other hand, inconsistent with prior research in South Africa, 
compliance with King III CG guidelines has a negative impact on firm market performance 
(Q-ratio), which is contrary to the positive impact of compliance with the Nigerian SEC 2011 
CG code on market valuation of firms. Second, the chapter further examined the impact of 
alternative/individual firm-level internal CG mechanisms on firm financial performance 
based on the equilibrium variable model (sub-research question 2) and found consistent 
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mixed results across both countries. Specifically, there is a statistically strong to no 
association between firm-level internal CG structures and firm performance.  
 
Third, the chapter examined the impact of a decomposition of the respective country-level 
CG index into two sub-indices (to capture institutionalised shareholder and stakeholder CG 
requirements) on firm financial performance. Similar to the results of the respective country 
composite indices, compliance with country-specific shareholder and contextual stakeholder 
provisions was found to have a positive impact on firm accounting performance. However, in 
South Africa, compliance with King III shareholder and stakeholder provisions is found to 
negatively impact on market performance, whereas, in Nigeria, higher compliance with the 
SEC 2011 shareholder and stakeholder provisions was found to be associated with higher 
firm market valuation.  
 
Fourth, a comparison between the compliance index model and the equilibrium variable 
model results was examined in both countries (sub-research question 3). Results indicate the 
compliance index model has a superior explanatory and prognostic ability in explaining firm 
financial performance in both countries as compared to the equilibrium variable model. These 
results imply the value relevance in complying with (though expensive and laborious) 
composite/aggregate country-level corporate governance guidelines rather than using single 
firm-level corporate structures in isolation or a few of them. It suggests using CG systems as 
a bundle rather than as individuals.  
 
Finally, based on the preliminary discussion of results for the individual three sub-research 
questions (RQ 1 to 3), the chapter summarises comparatively the results of Nigeria and South 
Africa based on the hypothesis developed in Chapter 4. This provides a holistic overview of 
hypothesis testing to examine the main research question stated in 1.4.1. Consistent with prior 
research, there are mixed results with respect to the impact of individual alternative internal 
CG mechanisms on firm financial returns in both countries. On the other hand, preliminary 
observation in the descriptive, correlation statistics and regressions shows that firms highly 
compliant to country-level composite CG provisions tend to comply highly with shareholder 
CG provisions and country-level stakeholder requirements in both Nigeria and South Africa. 
As such, the direction of firm financial performance consequence of compliance with 
composite country-level CG provisions is the same for institutionalised shareholder and 
stakeholder CG requirements.  
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An essential issue that the current analysis based on OLS regression ignores is the possibility 
of interdependence or endogeneity within the individual internal CG structures and across 
these mechanisms and firm financial performance. Hence the aim of the next chapter is to 
examine the extent to which the reported main results in this chapter are robust or sensitive to 
alternative explanations and estimations. As a result, robustness and/or sensitivity analysis of 
the reported results is thoroughly examined in the next chapter. Specifically, the results are 
examined within a raft of sensitivity analysis comprising of a test of endogeneity using the 
Durbin–Wu–Hausman Exogeneity Test, and other regression models.  
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CHAPTER 9 
9.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: ROBUSTNESS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines and discusses the results based on a raft of sensitivity and robustness 
analyses. The aim therefore is to examine whether the main results (OLS) presented in 
Chapter 8 are sensitive and robust to possible alternative explanations, specifically 
endogeneity. A variable is endogenous if it is determined within the framework of a model. 
On the other hand, a variable is exogenous if its values are determined outside the framework 
of a model but it is correlated with the dependent variable (Roberts and Whited, 2012,pp.6). 
As such, endogeneity exists when a variable assumed as exogenous within a model is 
endogenous. For example, the positive impact of compliance with respective country-level 
CG codes results on firm accounting performance in both Nigeria and South Africa assumes 
that these CG codes are not determined within the compliance index model (exogeneity 
assumption). However, what if the exogeneity assumption is not true for this model and 
compliance with respective country-level CG codes is determined by some variables in the 
model? Therefore, the reported results may not be a true representation of the association 
between compliance and firm performance. Consequently, the results will be biased and 
inconsistent and makes it impossible for reliable inference.  
 
For that reason, in this chapter, the results in Chapter 8 are examined using alternative 
sensitivity and regression models including a test of exogeneity using Durbin–Wu–Hausman 
Exogeneity Test with other regression models including Instrumental Variable Model, Two 
Staged Least (2SLS)/Simultaneous Equation Model and Dynamic System Generalised 
Methods of Moments (GMM) Model. The tables of results for Durbin–Wu–Hausman 
Exogeneity Test and Instrumental Variable Model are reported in the appendix. The chapter 
is organised as follows. Section (9.2) briefly discusses the problem of endogeneity in 
corporate governance research. Section 9.3 discusses the results based on estimation of a Two 
Staged Least (2SLS)/Simultaneous Equation Model. In addition to testing robustness of the 
main findings, the 2SLS is employed to show the interdependence between alternative CG 
mechanism and firm financial performance. Section 9.4 presents the results of Dynamic 
System Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) model. Finally, section 9.5 summarises 
and compares the robustness and sensitivity results for both South Africa and Nigeria by 
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comparing the robustness and sensitivity results of disclosure/compliance-firm performance 
relationship (compliance index model) versus the results of the 14 internal CG structures- 
firm performance (equilibrium variable model) association. Finally, section 9.6 summarises 
the chapter.  
 
9.2 Endogeneity Problem  
 
Until recently, the problem of endogeneity has been ignored in accounting and corporate 
governance research. Roberts and Whited (2012,pp.6) define endogeneity as ‘a correlation 
between the explanatory variables and the error term in a regression’. In fact, according to 
Wintoki et al. (2012,pp.1), empirical research in corporate finance suffers from serious 
endogeneity problems. Wintoki et al. (2012,pp.1) opine that, while research in corporate 
governance has shown that certain governance systems improve firm financial performance, 
these studies are inundated with endogeneity concerns. Hence, this serious endogeneity issue 
can lead to biased and inconsistent parameters that impair the reliability of results (Roberts 
and Whited, 2012) . Indeed, endogeneity can be serious with possibilities of reversing 
statistical inference of results (Roberts and Whited, 2012). Endogeneity problems may arise 
because of omitted variable bias, unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects) simultaneity and 
measurement error (Roberts and Whited, 2012,pp.6) . However, Wintoki et al. (2012,pp.1), 
note that the most noticeable type of endogeneity in corporate finance is the presence of 
‘unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity’. Wintoki et al. (2012,pp.1) argue that the 
difficulty involved in recognising exogenous instruments/natural experiments implies that 
corporate governance scholars frequently depend on fixed-effects estimates and pooled panel 
data estimates for statistical inference.  
 
In this research, one of the major assumptions of OLS regression is that explanatory 
(independent) variables are exogenously determined and are independent of past values of the 
explained (dependent) variable. For example, OLS regression assumes that corporate 
governance indices in both countries are exogenously determined and, as such, not influenced 
by past performance of a firm as well as other explanatory variables. Despite the discussion 
of endogeneity issues in corporate governance scholarship, there are still mixed reactions and 
disagreements as to whether endogeneity issues are a problem that needs to be considered in 
finance and accounting research (Ntim, 2009,pp.305, Larcker and Rusticus, 2010,pp.203) . 
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As a result, Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.203) opine ‘there is no fool-proof way of dealing 
with the problem of endogeneity in empirical accounting research.’  
 
However, consistent with prior research in corporate governance (e.g. Ntim, 2009, Ntim, 
2013a), this study follows the five steps outlined by Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.196) to 
check for endogeneity. Briefly, Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.196) outline five stages to 
check for endogeneity, as shown below: 
 
Fig. 8: Five Stages to Check for Endogeneity 
 
  
Adapted from Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.196).  
 
According to Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.196), the first stage for testing for endogeneity is 
to use rigorous economic theory to explain research questions. In this thesis, various theories 
have been discussed in chapters 2 and 3 and the corresponding theoretical underpinnings 
which guided the development of hypothesis in Chapter 4. As a result, the research has 
rigorously developed and specified the dependent variables (endogenous variables) and the 
independent variables (exogenous variables) within both the compliance index model and the 
equilibrium variable model. The discussions ensured clear articulation of the theoretical links 
between the exogenous and endogenous variables. In addition, Larcker and Rusticus 
Define the 
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(2010,pp.195) opine that researchers should point out the possible reasons why endogeneity 
may be present in an OLS regression. In this respect, a priori CG literature has established 
that corporate governance is complex because no single theory can explain the universal 
pattern of results (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Hence, the adoption of a multi-theoretic 
approach in this study purposes to control for corporate governance complexities. However, 
some of the theories used in this thesis (though advantageous) are contradictory in some 
respects, which may possibly generate endogeneity problems in the OLS regression 
equations. As a result, this study may suffer from potential endogeneity problems which may 
be due to measurement errors, simultaneity or reverse causation, unobserved fixed effects, 
omitted variables bias and equilibrium conditions.  
 
The second stage, according to Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.196), is to explore alternative 
ways to solve the endogeneity problems. Following from this recommendation, subsequent 
sections address this by estimating (1) an instrumental variable model (IV); (2) a two-stage 
least square (2SLS)/simultaneous equation model; and (3) a dynamic system GMM equation.  
  
The third step prescribed by Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.196) involves testing for the 
exogeneity to ascertain if there is actually an endogeneity problem in the regression equation. 
Thus consistent with the suggestion by Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.195), and other 
corporate governance research (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006,pp.267, Ntim, 2009,pp.295), the 
commonly used Durbin–Wu–Hausman exogeneity test is conducted.  
 
The fourth step according to Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.197) is to ensure that any 
instrument used as a proxy for the original explanatory variable is a valid, reliable and 
relevant instrument. As will be discussed later in the instrumental variable model and 
consistent with previous research (e.g. Ntim, 2013c, Ntim, 2013a), this study uses predicted 
values of SACGI (P-SACGI) for South Africa and NICGI (P-NICGI) for Nigeria. As will be 
reported later, the correlation coefficient between the various corporate governance indices 
correlates highly with the predicted values, demonstrating that it is a valid, reliable and 
relevant proxy to replace country-level composite indices.  
 
Finally, the last step suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.196) is to compare the 
statistical significance, magnitude, signs of the OLS estimates with the results of the 
endogenously corrected alternative estimated regressions (e.g. IV model, 2SLS model and 
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dynamic system GMM equation) and verify the level and extent to which results are robust 
and sensitive to endogeneity issues.  
 
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman exogeneity test (reported in table 25 in the appendix) shows that 
NICGI is exogenously determined in the compliance index model based on accounting 
returns (ROCE) but endogenously determined based on market returns (Q-ratio). For South 
Africa (table 27 in the appendix), SACGI is exogenously determined in the compliance index 
model based on market returns (Q-ratio) but endogenously determined based on accounting 
returns (ROCE). More so, results based on instrumental variable estimate (reported in the 
appendix) support the findings reported for OLS estimates in Chapter 8. Briefly, the results 
indicate that the main results reported for both countries in Chapter 8 are robust to possible 
endogeneity problems. The subsequent sections discuss robustness test using 2SLS and 
GMM estimation.  
 
9.3 Simultaneous Equation Model/Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) Model  
 
As noted earlier, most studies in CG in Africa have investigated internal CG mechanisms and 
firm performance using a few CG indices and most times in isolation to each other (see 
column 6 in table 4). These studies have concentrated on board size, CEO duality and NEDs. 
According to Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Ntim et al. (2015a), the existence of 
alternative internal CG structures depicts that the use of one mechanism is dependent on the 
use of other structures to be effective. Thus, the use of one CG mechanism (e.g. board size or 
NEDs or CEO duality) in isolation to examine its impact on firm performance can lead to 
endogenous relationships. This is evidenced from results of the Durbin–Wu–Hausman 
exogeneity test for both South Africa and Nigeria which showed NICGI is endogenously 
related to Q-ratio while SACGI is endogenously related to ROCE. Therefore, using a single 
CG structure in isolation may lead to omitted variable bias and spurious associations. 
Therefore, because of the interdependence of different internal CG structures, a mixture of 
these structures may lead to maximisation of efficient results. This thesis addresses this 
methodological gap by employing five internal CG structures derived from both the 
compliance index equation and the equilibrium variable model equations. Therefore, 
following previous research (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Beiner et al., 2006, Ntim et 
al., 2015a), a system of seven simultaneous equations is developed. The five internal CG 
mechanisms chosen are the respective country CG index (NICGI and SACGI) and four 
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alternative CG mechanisms from the equilibrium variable model which are not part of the 
composite index (NICGI and SACGI). These four alternative CG mechanisms include board 
size (BSZ), director shareholding (D-SH), institutional shareholding (INST-SH) and capital 
structure (GEAR). The latter four variables are the variables included to regress on the CGI 
(NICGI and SACGI) to get the predictive values for CGI (P-NICGI and P-SACGI) in the 
instrumental variable model.  
 
To perform the 2SLS regression, the method employed by prior researchers (e.g. Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996, Beiner et al., 2006, Ntim et al., 2015a) was adopted. Equations 5 to 11 
(discussed later) are estimated as a series of simultaneous equations. In the first-stage 
estimation (as will be seen later), each of the five corporate governance variables, i.e. 
corporate governance index (SACGI and NICGI represented by CGI in the stated equations), 
board size (BSZ), director shareholding (D-SH), institutional shareholding (INST-SH) and 
capital structure (GEAR), i.e. equations 5 to 9, is estimated along with nine control variables 
[(sales growth (S-GROWTH), dual listing (DUA-LIST), audit firm size (AF-SIZE), firm size 
(F-SIZE), total asset (TA), market value (MV), capital expenditure (CAPEX), industry 
dummy (INDUS) and year dummy (YD)]. The predicted values are saved for each of the 
corporate governance variables. In the second stage, each of the five CG mechanisms is 
substituted with their saved predicted values from the first-stage estimation in equation 10 
(based on ROCE) and 11 (based on Q-ratio) in addition to the nine control variables. This 
process allows both the financial performance variables, which are also considered as 
endogenous in equations 5 to 9, to affect the choice of each of the five alternative internal CG 
variables and is affected by each of the selected internal CG variables.   
 
To determine the relationship between financial performance and the five alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms, and following previous research using 2SLS 
regression (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006, Ntim et al., 2015a, Ntim et al., 2012), two conditions 
are to be satisfied: the order condition (necessary condition) and the rank condition 
(sufficient condition). 
 
First, according to Chenhall and Moers (2007), the first necessary condition before a 
system can be identified is the order condition. Following from these researchers, the system 
equation in this research consists of nine exogenous (control) variables. These variables are 
sales growth (S-GROWTH), dual listing (DUA-LIST), audit firm size (AF-SIZE), firm size 
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(F-SIZE), total asset (TA), market value (MV), capital expenditure (CAPEX), industry 
dummy (INDUS) and year dummy (YD) and the five selected internal CG variables, i.e. 
corporate governance index (CGI), board size (BSZ), director shareholding (D-SH), 
institutional shareholding (INST-SH), and capital structure/gearing (GEAR). The order 
condition stipulates that the number of exogenous variables excluded from an equation 
should not be greater than or equal to the number of endogenous variables in the equation 
minus one (see Beiner et al., 2006pp.253, Chenhall and Moers, 2007,pp.189, Ntim, 2009, 
Ntim et al., 2012,pp.29). Following from this, therefore, a minimum of five exogenous 
variables in this regression is to be dropped to meet the order condition.  
 
However, following previous research which has faced similar challenges with more 
exogenous variables (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006pp.253, Chenhall and Moers, 2007,pp.189, Ntim, 
2009, Ntim et al., 2012,pp.29), each of the seven equations developed in the subsequent 
subsections is grounded independently on theory, logic and the availability of data to produce 
rigorous results. Hence, all seven equations are over identified, which is accepted in 
econometric terms (see Beiner et al., 2006, Chenhall and Moers, 2007, Ntim, 2009, Ntim et 
al., 2012). Finally, the rank condition requires that at least one of the excluded exogenous 
variables should have a non-zero coefficient. This condition is met with regard to both OLS 
estimates (in Chapter 8) and the instrumental variable model. Except for market value, 
CAPEX and total asset, which showed zero coefficient in some instances, all other variables 
have non-zero coefficients.  
 
Before developing a series of simultaneous equations, the correlation between the five 
corporate governance variables [corporate governance index (CGI), board size (BSZ), 
director shareholding (D-SH), institutional shareholding (INST-SH) and capital structure 
(GEAR)] was conducted. These correlations are reported in the appendices in tables 26 and 
28 for Nigeria and South Africa respectively.  
 
Reading from table 27 for Nigeria, the correlations coefficients show some level of 
relationship among the variables. First, board size and gearing correlate significantly with 
NICGI, Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI in both Pearson and Spearman 
correlations at 1% (p≤0.001). On the contrary, institutional and director shareholding showed 
negative relations with NICGI, but only the results of institutional shareholding are 
significant at 5% (p≤0.05) in Pearson correlation. This suggests that board size and gearing 
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are complementary internal CG mechanisms with NICGI but institutional and director 
shareholding and NICGI are substitutes. Board size is negatively related to both Q-ratio and 
ROCE but significant only with Q-ratio at 5% (p≤0.05) in both Pearson and Spearman 
correlations. This negative association is consistent with the results reported under OLS for 
Q-ratio in Chapter 8. Director shareholding showed a positive relationship with both 
performance variables but only significant with Q-ratio at 1% (p≤0.001) in both Pearson and 
Spearman correlations at 10% (p≤0.10). Institutional shareholding correlates positively with 
both performance measures significantly at 1% (p≤0.001) for Spearman correlation.  But it is 
10% (p≤0.10) for ROCE and 1% (p≤0.001) for Q-ratio in Pearson correlation. The correlation 
results of institutional shareholding confirm the results of the OLS estimate with Q-ratio but 
contradict the results of ROCE. Finally, gearing showed positive correlation with Q-ratio but 
negative with ROCE, but only the correlation with ROCE is significant at 1% (p≤0.001) for 
Pearson correlation, while both are significant at 1% (p≤0.001) in Spearman correlation. This 
is consistent with the results reported in chapter 8 for   OLS regression.  
 
On the contrary, in South Africa, SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI 
correlate positively with the four alternative CG mechanisms. The exception is a negative 
correlation with director shareholding in Spearman correlation. SACGI significantly and 
positively associates to board size at 1% (p≤0.001) in both Pearson and Spearman 
correlations. These suggest that board size, director shareholding, and institutional 
shareholding and gearing are complementary internal CG mechanisms with SACGI. Director 
shareholding positively correlates with SACGI in Pearson correlation but is negatively 
correlated in Spearman correlation, though both coefficients are insignificant. Institutional 
shareholding and gearing show a positive association with SACGI in both Pearson and 
Spearman correlations but significant only in Pearson correlation at 5% (p≤0.05) and 10% 
(p≤0.10) respectively. Board size and director shareholding are negatively correlated to both 
Q-ratio and ROCE but significant only in Pearson correlation at 10% (p≤0.10) for the latter. 
However, director shareholding shows significant correlation in Spearman correlations at 5% 
(p≤0.05) and  10% (p≤0.10) for ROCE and Q-ratio respectively. Gearing has negative 
correlation with both performance measures but significant only in Pearson correlation at 5% 
(p≤0.05). These negative relationships support the OLS results reported in Chapter 8 for 
board size, director shareholding, institutional shareholding and gearing.  
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Drawing from the correlation results as noted above, a system of seven simultaneous 
equations was developed as follows:  
 
Corporate Governance Index (CGI) Equation 
First, the country CG index equation is stated following prior research (e.g. Beiner et al., 
2006, Chenhall and Moers, 2007, Ntim, 2009, Ntim et al., 2012). The country corporate 
governance index (CGI) is assumed to be endogenously associated with firm performance but 
complemented or substituted by four alternative CG structures including board size (BSZ), 
director shareholding (D-SH), institutional shareholding (INST-SH) and capital structure 
(GEAR). In addition, it is also predicted by nine exogenous/control variables, i.e. sales growth 
(S-GROWTH), dual listing (DUA-LIST), audit firm size (AF-SIZE), firm size (F-SIZE), total 
asset (TA), market value (MV), capital expenditure (CAPEX), industry dummy (INDUS) and 
year dummy (YD). Therefore, assuming a linear relationship between these variables, the 
first equation is stated as: 
 
CGIit = δ it + β1Pit + β2 BSZ it + β3 D-SH it + β4 INST-SH it + β5 GEAR it 
+β6S-GROWTH it + β7 DUA-LIST it + β8 AF-SIZE it + β9 F-SIZE it + β10TA 
it + β11 MV it+ β12 CAPEX it +∑nt=1 β13 INDUSit + ∑nt=1 β14 YDit+ Uit… (5)     
 
Board Size (BSZ) Equation 
As discussed in Chapter 4 and empirically verified for both countries in Chapter 8, board 
size can affect firm performance negatively or positively. Similarly, board size as an 
internal CG mechanism is expected to be positively impacted by control variables, i.e. 
sales growth (S-GROWTH), dual listing (DUA-LIST), audit firm size (AF-SIZE), firm size (F-
SIZE), total asset (TA), market value (MV), capital expenditure (CAPEX), industry dummy 
(INDUS) and year dummy (YD). In addition, assuming a linear relationship, the four 
alternative CG mechanisms (i.e. CGI, director shareholding (D-SH), institutional 
shareholding (INST-SH) and capital structure (GEAR)) are expected to complement or 
substitute board size as shown in the correlation results in tables 26 and 28 and with the 
performance variables (P), hence the equation is stated as:  
 
BSZ it = δ it + β1Pit + β2CGIit + β3 D-SH it + β4 INST-SH it + β5 GEAR it 
+β6S-GROWTH it + β7 DUA-LIST it + β8 AF-SIZE it + β9 F-SIZE it + β10TA 
it + β11 MV it+ β12 CAPEX it +∑nt=1 β13 INDUSit + ∑nt=1 β14 YDit+ Uit… (6)     
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Director Shareholding (D-SH) Equation 
Similarly, director shareholding has been reported to impact both negatively and 
positively on firm performance. Some authors have reported increase in agency cost and 
negatively director ownership- firm financial association (e.g. Klein et al., 2005), while 
others have shown director shareholding impacts positively in aligning the interest of 
managers and shareholders and therefore impacts firm performance positively (Brickley 
et al., 1988, Chung and Pruitt, 1996, Jensen and Murphy, 1990, Mehran, 1995). Consequently 
and assuming a linear relationship following from the OLS results reported in Chapter 8 for 
director shareholding, it is therefore expected to be impacted by the nine control variables, 
i.e. sales growth (S-GROWTH ), dual listing (DUA-LIST), audit firm size (AF-SIZE), firm 
size (F-SIZE), total asset (TA), market value (MV), capital expenditure (CAPEX), industry 
dummy (INDUS) and year dummy (YD). Similarly, from correlation results reported in 
tables 26 and 28, it is expected that, in a linear equation, director shareholding will be a 
substitute or complement to other internal CG structures, including CGI, board size (BSZ), 
institutional shareholding (INST-SH) and capital structure (GEAR). Similarly, it is also 
impacted by the financial performance variables (P). The equation is stated as follows:  
 
D-SH it = δ it + β1Pit + β2CGIit + β3 BSZ it + β4 INST-SH it + β5 GEAR it 
+β6S-GROWTH it + β7 DUA-LIST it + β8 AF-SIZE it + β9 F-SIZE it + β10TA 
it + β11 MV it+ β12 CAPEX it +∑nt=1 β13 INDUSit + ∑nt=1 β14 YDit+ Uit .. (7)   
 
Institutional Shareholding (INST-SH) Equation 
Similar to director shareholding, institutional shareholding has been reported to have 
positive association with firm performance (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Klein et al., 
2005, Elyasiani and Jia, 2010, Ntim, 2012a). Meanwhile, others have shown negative or no 
relationship (e.g. Chen et al., 2008). Accordingly, a linear relationship from the OLS results 
reported in Chapter 8 for institutional shareholding shows some mix results. It is expected 
that institutional shareholding is affected by the performance variables (P) in addition to the 
nine control variables, i.e. sales growth (S-GROWTH ), dual listing (DUA-LIST), audit firm 
size (AF-SIZE), firm size (F-SIZE), total asset (TA), market value (MV), capital expenditure 
(CAPEX), industry dummy (INDUS) and year dummy (YD). Likewise, from correlation 
results reported in tables 26 and 28 in the appendix, it is expected that, in a linear equation, 
institutional shareholding is substituted or complemented with internal CG structures 
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including CGI, board size (BSZ), director shareholding (D-SH) and capital structure 
(GEAR). Hence, the next equation is stated as follows:  
 
 
INST-SH it =δ it + β1Pit + β2CGIit + β3 BSZ it + β4 D-SH it + β5 GEAR it 
+β6S-GROWTH it + β7 DUA-LIST it + β8 AF-SIZE it + β9 F-SIZE it + β10TA 
it + β11 MV it+ β12 CAPEX it +∑nt=1 β13 INDUSit + ∑nt=1 β14 YDit+ Uit ….(8)  
 
Gearing (GEAR) Equation 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986), firm performance can be 
adversely affected by the equity-to-debt ratio which is essentially linked to agency costs. In 
fact, these authors argue that some level of debt can motivate managers to increase efficiency 
and enhance a firm’s ability to survive (Jensen, 1986, p.324). More so, interest payment on 
debts is tax deductible and, as a result, highly geared firms are expected to generate more 
value than lowly geared firms. However, it has also been argued that where risk of default 
occurs causing a conflict between equity and debt investors, this may create debt overhang 
where an increase in debt has a negative effect on the firm value (Myers, 1977, Jensen, 
1986b, Stulz, 1990). Consequently, lowly geared firms will perform better than highly geared 
firms. These differences as opined in the extant literature can be seen in the results reported 
in Chapter 8 for gearing in the equilibrium variable model. For example, in Nigeria and South 
Africa, highly geared firms are more strongly associated with positive market returns but 
negative accounting returns than lowly geared firms. Deducing from this, gearing is assumed 
to be linearly impacted by the nine control variables, i.e. sales growth (S-GROWTH), dual 
listing (DUA-LIST), audit firm size (AF-SIZE), firm size (F-SIZE), total asset (TA), market 
value (MV), capital expenditure (CAPEX), industry dummy (INDUS) and year dummy 
(YD), and the firm financial performance variables (P). In addition, gearing is substituted or 
complemented with other alternative internal CG mechanisms i.e. GI, board size (BSZ), 
director shareholding (D-SH) and institutional shareholding (INST-SH). Therefore, the 
gearing equation is stated as:  
 
GEAR it = δ it + β1Pit + β2CGIit + β3 BSZ it + β4 D-SH it + β5 INST-SH iit 
+β6S-GROWTH it + β7 DUA-LIST it + β8 AF-SIZE it + β9 F-SIZE it + β10TA 
it + β11 MV it+ β12 CAPEX it +∑nt=1 β13 INDUSit + ∑nt=1 β14 YDit + Uit … (9)  
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Financial Performance (P) Equation 
Finally, to determine the relationship between financial performance and the five 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms and following previous research using 
2SLS regression (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006, Ntim, 2012a, Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim, 2013c), 
the final pair of equations are the financial performance variables as dependent variables. 
The equation for ROCE is stated as: 
 
ROCEit =δ it + β1CGIit + β2 BSZ it + β3 D-SH it + β4 INST-SH it + β5GEAR it 
+ β6S-GROWTH it + β7 DUA-LIST it + β8 AF-SIZE it + β9 F-SIZE it + β10TA 
it + β11 MV it+ β12 CAPEX it +∑nt=1 β13 INDUSit + ∑nt=1 β14 YDit+ Uit … (10)   
 
Q-ratio equation is stated as: 
Q-ratioit =δ it + β1CGIit + β2 BSZ it + β3 D-SH it + β4 INST-SH it + β5GEAR 
it + β6S-GROWTH it + β7 DUA-LIST it + β8 AF-SIZE it + β9 F-SIZE it + 
β10TA it + β11 MV it+ β12 CAPEX it +∑nt=1 β13 INDUSit + ∑nt=1 β14 YDit+ 
Uit……………… (11)   
 
The next subsections present the results of 2SLS regression for Nigeria and South Africa 
respectively.  
 
 9.3.1 Simultaneous Equation Model/Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) Model 
Results for Nigeria   
 
As can be read from table 29 below, the F-values from equation 5 to 9 columns 3 to 7 for 
ROCE and columns 9 to 13 for Q-ratio are statistically significant at 1% (p≤0.001). 
Therefore, the null hypothesis that coefficients of the exogenous variables for each of the 
regressions in columns 4 to 6 for ROCE and columns 9 to 13 for Q-ratio are zero is rejected. 
As a result, the coefficients of the independent variables in each of the regressions can 
explain considerable changes in NICGI, board size, director shareholding, institutional 
shareholding and gearing. The adjusted R2  for ROCE ranges from 34.4% to 48.5%, whereas 
for Q-ratio it ranges from 34.6% to 49.6%.  
 
These adjusted R2  are like those reported by prior studies. For example, Ntim et al. 
(2015a,pp.17), using five alternative CG mechanisms reported adjusted R2  range from 13.4% 
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to 39.6% for Q-ratio. With regard to ROCE, Beiner et al. (2006,pp.265) reported adjusted R2  
ranging from 41% to 44% for five alternative CG mechanisms. Similarly, Cornett et al. 
(2009,pp.425), employing five alternative CG mechanisms, reported adjusted R2  of 52.4% to 
58.7%.  
 
The results presented in table 29 columns 3 to 7 for ROCE and columns 9 to 13 for Q-ratio 
show some interesting patterns. First, NICGI is significantly positively impacted only by 
board size in both the ROCE and Q-ratio 2SLS estimates. On the other hand, institutional 
shareholding impacts negatively and significantly on NICGI. However, gearing also shows a 
significant negative relationship with NICGI in the Q-ratio 2SLS estimate in column 9. 
Director shareholding shows positive but insignificant impact on NICGI. The significant 
results between NICGI and board size under both ROCE and Q-ratio suggest that they 
supplement each other. This suggests that larger boards comply more with CG guidelines. 
However, the significant negative gearing–NICGI and institutional shareholding–NICGI 
association suggests that both gearing and institutional shareholding are substitutes to NICGI. 
This supports the premise that a greater usage of one CG mechanism leads to a lesser usage 
of another. Hence, where there is poor internal corporate governance structure, firms are 
more inclined to seek debt finance to equity finance. Similarly, owing to concentrated 
ownership in African economies, owners are able to influence non-compliance with CG 
provisions especially if they do not see the value relevance of compliance. The results of the 
relationship between NICGI and gearing are contrary to findings of Ntim (2013c), who 
reported a positive relationship in South Africa. However, the results on NICGI and board 
size are consistent with the results of Ntim et al. (2012,pp.52).  
 
Columns 4 and 9 shows that NICGI is significantly positively impacted by both ROCE and 
Q-ratio. Therefore, there is a reverse relationship between NICGI and both performance 
variables. This implies that firms that comply with SEC 2011 CG guidelines do not only 
experience increasing market and accounting returns, but there is reverse causation where 
firms with high market and accounting returns put in place better CG structures.   
 
With regard to board size (columns 4 and 10), board size is significantly positively impacted 
by NICGI and gearing under 2SLS estimates of both financial measures. Contrarily, director 
shareholding negatively affects board size significantly. On the other hand, institutional 
shareholding negatively affects board size under ROCE 2SLS estimate though positively 
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under Q-ratio 2SLS estimate, but both results are insignificant. The statistically significant 
relationship between board size and NICGI and board size and gearing indicate that there is a 
complementary association between board size with gearing and NICGI. This means that, 
because of the resource links of larger boards, cheaper debt finance is available to such firms. 
The results of board size and gearing are consistent with the results of Ntim et al. 
(2015b,pp.29), but these authors reported statistically insignificant results. Conversely, the 
negative impact of director shareholding on board size implies that they are substitutes and 
suggests firms with director share ownership tend to prefer smaller boards. Finally, the 
impact of both performance variables on board size is negative but statistically significant 
only with Q-ratio. This indicates that firms with high market and accounting returns have 
smaller boards, as it may be costly to run larger boards. This result contradicts the results of 
Ntim et al. (2015b,pp.29), who reported positive impact of Q-ratio on board size.  
 
With reference to director shareholding results (columns 5 and 11), NICGI and institutional 
shareholding show positive impact on director shareholding. Whereas director shareholder is  
negatively affected by board size but only the results of institutional shareholding and board 
size are significant. Similarly, gearing shows positive insignificant impact on director 
shareholding under Q-ratio 2SLS but negative under ROCE 2SLS. The significant results 
between institutional shareholding and director shareholding suggest that they complement 
each other. The latter results of institutional shareholding–director shareholding association 
indicate that institutional shareholders, as a result of their strong incentive to monitor 
managers/directors, ensure directors’ interest is aligned with theirs by requiring directors to 
own shares in the firm. Contrarily, negative board size–director shareholding association 
suggests substitutability between them and implies larger boards tend to limit director share 
ownership. In addition, both performance variables show negative impact on director 
shareholding insignificantly. This shows firms with increasing accounting and market returns 
do not value director share ownership as the latter may give directors autonomy to take risky 
and unprofitable strategies.  
 
With respect to institutional shareholding (columns 6 and 12), board size insignificantly 
affects institutional shareholding positively under Q-ratio 2SLS but negatively under ROCE 
2SLS. However, NICGI and gearing negatively affect institutional shareholding, whereas 
director shareholding positively affects institutional shareholding, but only the impact of 
NICGI and director shareholding is significant. The latter results show that firms that adopt 
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sound CG practices as measured by their compliance with SEC 2011 CG code are less likely 
to have institutional investors. The significant results between NICGI and institutional 
shareholding indicate that they substitute each other. As a result, firms that adopt better CG 
practices may not value the presence of institutional shareholders. On the other hand, the 
positive impact of director shareholding on institutional shareholding indicates that they 
complement each other. Finally, both ROCE and Q-ratio show positive impact on 
institutional shareholding; however, only the results of the latter are significant. This 
demonstrates that more successful firms are attractive to institutional shareholders. The 
positive Q-ratio  impact on institutional shareholdings is consistent with those reported by 
Ntim et al. (2015b,pp.29), though they reported statistically insignificant coefficients.  
 
Furthermore, gearing results are presented in columns 7 and 13. They show that NICGI and 
institutional shareholding impact negatively on gearing; meanwhile, board size and director 
shareholding show positive relationships with gearing. The only significant result across both 
2SLS is the NICGI–gearing association, whereas the director shareholding–gearing 
association is significant only in the Q-ratio 2SLS. The NICGI–gearing relationship suggests 
substitutability between NICGI and gearing. This implies firms with good corporate 
governance practices are not necessarily better positioned to raise debt finance at a cheaper 
cost than poorly governed firms. On the other hand, the director shareholding–gearing 
association implies they are complementary mechanisms. This association suggests firms 
with director ownership prefer debt finance to equity finance. Finally, gearing is impacted 
positively by Q-ratio but negatively by ROCE significantly. This suggests that firms with 
increasing accounting returns do not seek debt finance because of the high cost of financial 
distress and lower flexibility associated with debt finance. However, the positive Q-ratio 
gearing relationship indicates that highly geared firms are seen by the market as an alternative 
CG mechanism and therefore are more highly valued than lowly geared firms.  
 
The 2SLS aimed at verifying whether results presented in Chapter 8 are robust to endogeneity 
concerns especially simultaneity. As such, regression of the performance variables is 
presented in column 8 for ROCE and column 14 for Q-ratio. The adjusted R2  for ROCE is 
91.4% and for Q-ratio is 45.3% with both having significant F-statistics at 1%.  
 
Results indicate that NICGI is positively and significantly associated with accounting and 
market returns. This supports the OLS results reported in Chapter 8 that better governed firms 
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experience both increasing accounting and market returns more than poorly governed firms. 
However, board size is negatively associated with ROCE significantly but positively 
associated with Q-ratio. These results are inconsistent with those reported in the OLS 
estimates in section 8.3.1; therefore, the OLS results in relation to board size may be sensitive 
to unobserved firm-level individualities and simultaneity.  
 
Director shareholding showed a positive significant relationship with Q-ratio but a negative 
significant impact on ROCE. The results of ROCE are consistent with the results reported in 
8.3.1 in Chapter 8, whereas, like board size, the negative insignificant impact of director 
shareholding on Q-ratio in the OLS estimate is not supported by the 2SLS estimate. 
Consequently, the presence of endogeneity in the director shareholding–Q-ratio association 
may have limited the significance of this relationship. Institutional shareholding from column 
14 shows a positive significant impact on Q-ratio, which is consistent with the OLS estimate 
results reported in 8.3.1 and is therefore robust to endogeneity. However, positive significant 
impact of institutional shareholding on ROCE does not support the positive insignificant 
results of the OLS estimate reported in 8.3.1. Finally, from column 8, gearing is negatively 
associated with ROCE, which is consistent with the results reported in 8.3.1. Hence, the 
results based on the impact of gearing on accounting returns reported in Chapter 8 are robust 
to endogeneity. Nevertheless, the positive significant association between gearing and Q-ratio 
is not consistent with the insignificant relationship reported for the OLS estimate.  
 
In summary, the 2SLS results show the existence of significant interdependence or 
simultaneity of between and among the five alternative CG mechanisms and performance 
variables. The results based on ROCE are generally consistent in both OLS and 2SLS 
estimates whereas Q-ratio results are slightly sensitive to endogeneity.  
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Table 29: Nigerian Two-Stage Least Square Regression Results Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance Measure(Q-
ratio) – All (400) Firm Years 
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. More so, to avoid dummy variable trap, year 2012 and health care/consumer goods industry are excluded from the regression analysis. They are 
both used as base year dummy and base industry dummy for comparison reasons. As explained in 9.3, to limit endogeneity issues, a system of seven simultaneous equations was developed for Nigeria. In the first-stage 
estimate, each of the five corporate governance variables [i.e. Nigerian corporate governance index (NICGI), board size (BSZ), director shareholding (D-SH), institutional shareholding (INST-SH) and capital structure 
(GEAR)] are estimated along with the nine control variables [(sales growth (S-GROWTH ), dual listing (DUA-LIST), audit firm size (AF-SIZE), firm size (F-SIZE), total asset (TA), market value (MV), capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), industry dummies (INDUS) and year dummies (YD)]. The predicted values are saved as instruments for each of the corporate governance variables. In the second stage, each of the five CG 
mechanisms are substituted with their saved predicted values from the first-stage estimation in equations 10 (based on ROCE) and 11 (based on Q-ratio) in addition to the nine control variables.
 Estimation Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) Estimation Based on Market Performance Measure (Q-ratio) 
 Exp 
 Sign 
NICGI 
(5) 
Board Size 
(6) 
Director 
shareholding  
(7) 
Institutional 
Shareholding 
(8) 
Gearing 
(9) 
ROCE 
(10) 
NICGI 
(5) 
Board Size 
(6) 
Director 
shareholding  
(7) 
Institutional 
Shareholding 
(8) 
Gearing 
(9) 
Q-ratio 
(10) 
R-Square (R2)  .492 .512 .382 . .378 .389 .919 .484 .522 .380 .398 .381 .482 
Adjusted R2  .464 .485 .348 .344 .355 .914 .455 .496 346 .365 .347 .453 
F-value  17.45(.000)*** 18.9(.000)*** 11.12(.000)*** 10.95(.000)*** 9.430(.000)*** 203.82(.000)*** 16.89(.000)*** 19.68(.000)*** 11.04(.000)*** 11.94(.000)*** 11.1(.000)*** 16.75(.000)*** 
Standard Error  12.231 2.171 22.375 18.526 31.402 6.795 12.329 2.149 22.405 18.217 31.600 1.379 
Durbin–Watson  1.707 1.741 1.095 1.055 1.071 1.056 1.711 1.800 1.079 1.069 1.076 1.130 
Highest VIF Score  5.455 10.770 10.770 10.770 10.770 9.545 6.071 10.254 10.20 10.254 10.255 9.544 
No of observations  400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Constant  45.810(.000)*** 4.502(.000)*** -9.105(.236) 42.364(.000)*** -39.784(.002)*** -123.45(.000)*** 45.607(.000)*** 4.545(.000)*** -8.289(.281) 53.258(.000)*** -42.588(.001)*** . 3.402(.035)** 
NICGI  - .055(.000)*** .110(.240) -.127 (.102)* -.304 (.024)** 1.094(.000)** - .055(.000)** .098(.291) -.145 (.056)** - 410 (.002)*** .048(.023)** 
Board Size +/- 1.758(.000)*** - -1.148(.030)** -.232 (.597) . 1.120(.178) -9.158(.000)*** 1.819(.000)*** - -1.191(.026)** .007(.987) 1.358(.105)* .374(.001)*** 
Director Shareholding  +/- .033(.240) -.010(.003)*** - .358(.000)*** .019(.789) -.688 (.000)*** .029(.291) -.010 (.026)** - .353(.000)*** .045(.532) .050(.000)*** 
Institutional Shareholding +/- -.05(.102)* -.003(.597) .523(.000)*** - -125 (.150) -.227(.000)*** -.066(.056)** .000(.987) .534(.000)*** - -.167(.060)* .036(.000)*** 
Gearing +/- -.022(239) .016(.000)*** -.003 (.925) -.036 (.204) - -2.696(.000)*** -.035(.059)** .017(.000)*** .007(.818) -.044 (.115) - .138(.000)*** 
ROCE  .091(.002)*** -.005 (.276) -.076(.158) .012(.791) -.233(.000)*** - - - - - - - 
Q-Ratio  - - - - - - .724(.068)* -.207(.003)*** -.715 (.322) 2.080(.000)** 2.227(.030)** - 
Sales Growth +/- -.036(.252) -.000(.963) -.003(.949) .001(.984 .151(.064)* .494(.000)*** -.023(.463) -.001(.813) -.015 (.791) .005(.910) .121(.136) -.158 (.000)*** 
Dual Listing +/- 1.605(.598) 1.694(.002)*** 7.723(.165) -.816(.859) -15.373(.049)** -25.348(.000)*** 2.197(.474) 1.56(.003)*** 7.227(.195) .072(.987) -15.205(.053)** .476(.263) 
Audit Firm Size +/- 7.042(.001)*** -.203(.492) 14.470(.000)*** -.020 (.993) 1.713(.697) 4.735(.001)*** 7.717(.000)*** -.166 (.564) 14.084(.000)*** -.774(.753) -1.806(.681) -.171 (.565) 
Firm Size +/- 6.666(.002)*** 1.090(.001)*** -12.575(.000)*** 7.229(.009)*** 12.660(.012)*** 31.213(.000)*** 6.521(.000)*** 1.123(.000)** -12.371(.000)*** 6.470(.017)*** 11.679(.022)** -1.257(.000)*** 
Total Asset +/- .000(.534) -.000(.339) .000(.106)* -.000(.967) .000(.007)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.417) -.000(.251) .000(.128) .000(.867) .000(.000)*** -.000(.000)*** 
Market Value +/- -.000(.769) -.000(.757) .000(.288) -.000(.915) -.000(.000)*** -.000(.000)*** -.000(.593) .000(.668) .000(.236) -.000(.299) -.000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** 
Capital Expenditure +/- .000(.712) .000(.103)* .000(.780) .000(.289) .000(.016)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.555) .000(.264) .000(.863) .000(.106)* .000(.005)*** -.000(.000)*** 
Agriculture/Consumer Goods  -3.336(.125) 1.144(.003)*** -1.586(.691) 5.744(.081)* -7.034(.222) -2.524(.090)* -2.528(243) 1.14(.002)*** -2.263(.566) 4.774(.136) -11.727(.040)** 1.595(.000)*** 
Finance Industry  2.220(.276) 1.774(.000)*** 6.41(.085)* -12.403(.000)*** -16.822(.004)*** -32.489(.000)*** 2.938(.156) 1.578(.000)*** 5.778(.125) -10.482(.001)*** -16.95(.004)*** 1.348(.000)*** 
ICT/Real Estate  -5.015(.079)* .745(.142) 21.335(.000)*** -.498 (.909) -5.619(.470) 14.707(.000)*** -4.045(.157) .684(.169) 20.525(.000)*** -.581(.891) -9.942(.201) .174(.634) 
Industrial/Conglomerate  -3.830(.208) .193(.721) -9.116(.101)* .669(.885) 2.985(.711) 10.505(.000)*** -3.223(.296) .021(.967) -9.786(.080)* 2.269(.619) 3.638(.655) -.319(.422) 
Natural Resource/Oil & Gas  -5.182(.062)** -1.410(.004)*** 5.674(.264) -5.465(.194) 7.489(.331) 21.251(.000)*** -3.456(207) -1.501(.002)*** 4.167(.403) -4.941(.222) 1.965(.796) .736(.070)* 
Year 2011  -3.235(.097)* .064(.853) 1.281(.720) -2.877(.333) -2.576(.607) -2.737(.017)*** -3.837(.050)** .125(.715) 1.764(.621) -3.200(.270) -1.908(.705) .351(.130) 
Year 2013  2.367(.235) -.070(.842) 10.531(.004)*** -3.234(.284) 1.573(.759) 6.886(.000)*** 2.126(.291) -.017(.960) 10.816(.00)*** -3.581(.228) 1.384(.789) -.543 (.039)** 
Year 2014  6.001(.002)*** -.236(.505) 5.689(.119) 1.264(.676) 6.943(.175) 13.238(.000)*** 5.651(005)*** -.194 (.597) 6.085(.095) 1.049(.724) 7.962(.121) -1.460(.000)*** 
 Year 2015  12.281(.000)*** -.802(.029)** 2.485(.513) 3.137(.318) 6.217(.243) -4.616(.008)*** 11.495(.000)*** -.664(.067)* 3.356(.374) 2.155(.484) 7.180(.179) -.779(.023)** 
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 9.3.2 Simultaneous Equation Model/Two Staged Least Square (2SLS) Model 
Results for South Africa  
 
The results of 2SLS estimation are reported in table 30 below. The F-values for equations 5 
to 9 in table 30 below, columns 3 to 7 for ROCE and columns 9 to 13 for Q-ratio, are 
statistically significant at 1% (p≤0.001). Consequently, the null hypothesis that coefficients of 
the independent variables for each of the regressions in columns 3 to 7 for accounting returns 
(ROCE) and columns 9 to 13 for market returns (Q-ratio) are equal to zero is not accepted. 
Therefore, the coefficients of the exogenous variables in each of the regressions substantially 
and significantly explain variations in SACGI, board size, director shareholding, institutional 
shareholding and gearing. The adjusted R2  for ROCE estimates ranges from 9.1% to 55.7%, 
while, for Q-ratio estimations, it ranges from 10.1% to 49.2%. The adjusted R2  are similar to 
those reported for Nigeria in subsection 9.5.1 and by prior studies. For instance, Ntim et al. 
(2015b,pp.1), using five alternative CG mechanisms in South Africa, reported adjusted R2  
range from 13.4% to 39.6% for Q-ratio. Similarly, Beiner et al. (2006,pp.265) reported 
adjusted R2  ranging from 41% to 44% for six alternative CG mechanisms.  
 
From the results presented in table 30, columns 3 to 6 for ROCE and columns 9 to 13 for Q-
ratio, SACGI shows a positive relationship with the other four alternative CG mechanisms 
but only the board size–SACGI relationship is significant in both the ROCE and Q-ratio 
estimations. The positive impact of the four alternative CG structures with SACGI (albeit 
insignificant for some) suggests alternative CG mechanisms are complementary with SACGI, 
but more significantly with board size. Like the Nigerian results, this supports the expectation 
that larger boards improve compliance with CG principles. The gearing–SACGI association 
is consistent with the findings of Ntim et al. (2012,pp.52) in South Africa. More so, the 
results of the SACGI–board size link are consistent with the results reported by Ntim et al. 
(2012,pp.52) in South Africa.  
 
In relation to the performance variables, columns 4 and 9 show that SACGI is significantly 
positively affected by ROCE but negatively affected by Q-ratio. Hence, similar to Nigeria, 
there is a reverse relationship between SACGI and accounting performance but inverse 
association with market performance. This suggests that firms with increasing accounting 
returns put in place better CG structures. Contrarily, firms with high market returns have poor 
CG structures.    
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The regression of board size as the dependent variable is reported in columns 4 and 10. These 
results suggest that SACGI, institutional shareholding and gearing positively affect board 
size, but only SACGI is significant across both financial measures, whereas institutional 
shareholding is significant only under Q-ratio 2SLS. In contrast, and similar to the Nigerian 
results, director shareholding negatively affects board size, but the results are insignificant 
irrespective of the performance estimate. The statistically significant SACGI–board size and 
institutional shareholding–board size relationship indicates that there is a complementary 
association between board size and SACGI and board size–institutional shareholding. This 
implies compliance with King III CG regulations is associated with increase in board size. In 
addition, institutional shareholders are more likely to advocate for an increase in board size. 
The insignificant gearing–board size results are consistent with the insignificant results 
reported by Ntim et al. (2015b,pp.29) in South Africa. Finally, similar to the Nigerian results, 
the impact of Q-ratio and ROCE on board size is negative and statistically significant. This 
indicates that firms with high market and accounting returns do not necessarily have larger 
boards. In addition, these findings are contrary to those reported in South Africa by Ntim et 
al. (2015b,pp.29), who reported positive impact of Q-ratio on board size.  
 
Columns 5 and 11 show results based on director shareholding as dependent variable. SACGI 
and institutional shareholding have a positive impact on director shareholding, but only the 
impact of the latter is significant in both columns 5 and 11, while SACGI–director 
shareholding impact is significant only in column 5, whereas director shareholding is 
negatively affected by gearing and board size insignificantly. The significant positive 
SACGI–director shareholding and institutional shareholding–director shareholding 
association suggests that they complement each other. Like Nigeria, the results of the 
institutional shareholding–director shareholding link imply institutional shareholders in South 
Africa use director shareholding as a mechanism to align the interest of directors with theirs. 
In addition, the SACGI–director shareholding impact implies that firms with good CG 
structures tend to encourage director shareholding to align the interest of directors with that 
of stockholders. Similar to Nigeria, performance variables in South Africa impact negatively 
on director shareholding but insignificantly. The negative impact suggests firms with 
increasing accounting and market returns do not value director share ownership as the latter 
may give directors autonomy to make risky and unprofitable decisions.  
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Table 30: South African Two-Stage Least Square Regression Results Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance 
Measure(Q-ratio) for all (500) Firm Years 
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. More so, to avoid dummy variable trap, year 2011 and consumer services/health care industry are excluded from the regression analysis. They 
are both used as base year dummy and base industry dummy for comparison reasons. As explained in 9.3, to limit endogeneity issues, a system of seven simultaneous equations was developed for South Africa. In the 
first-stage estimate, each of the five corporate governance variables [i.e. South African corporate governance index (SACGI), board size (BSZ), director shareholding (D-SH), institutional shareholding (INST-SH) and 
capital structure (GEAR)] are estimated along with the nine control variables [(sales growth (S-GROWTH), dual listing (DUA-LIST), audit firm size (AF-SIZE), firm size (F-SIZE), total asset (TA), market value 
(MV), capital expenditure (CAPEX), industry dummies (INDUS) and year dummies (YD)]. The predicted values are saved as instruments for each of the corporate governance variables. In the second stage, each of the 
five CG mechanisms are substituted with their saved predicted values from the first-stage estimation in equations 10 (based on ROCE) and 11 (based on Q-ratio) in addition to the nine control variables.
 Estimation Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) Estimation Based on Market Performance Measure (Q-ratio) 
 Exp 
Sign 
SACGI 
(5) 
Board Size 
(6) 
Director 
shareholding  
(7) 
Institutional 
 Shareholding 
(8) 
Gearing 
(9) 
ROCE 
(10) 
SACGI 
(5) 
Board Size 
(6) 
Director 
Shareholding  
(7) 
Institutional 
 Shareholding 
(8) 
Gearing 
(9) 
Q-ratio 
(11) 
R-Square (R2)  .367 .557 .174 .273 .129 .694 .354 .492 .172 .264 .139 .469 
Adjusted R2  .334 .538 .138 .242 .091 .681 .326 .469 .135 .232 .101 .445 
F-value  13.19(.000)*** 28.620.000)*** 4.3810(.000)*** 8.560(.000)*** 3.400(.000)*** 51.667(.000)*** 12.51(.000)*** 22.02(.000)*** 4.71(.000)*** 8.180.000)*** 3.660(.000)*** 20.060(.000)*** 
Standard Error  6.696 2.266 22.909 15.189 31.527 14.681 6.761 2.427 22.949 15.284 31.370 .732 
Durbin–Watson  0.733 .712 .838 .812 .705 2.000 .722 0.726 .825 .826 0.693 1.827 
Highest VIF Score  3.657 4.956 5.072 4.948 5.073 8.034 4.459 3.651 4.547 4.402 4.550 8.0342 
No of observations  500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
Constant  68.443(.000)*** -7.675(.000)*** -15.210(.339) 64.644(.000)*** -23.06(.318) -210.336(.000)*** 72.886 (.000)*** 1.562(.293) -16.000(.255) 57.708(.000)*** 11.605(.558) 17.083(.000)*** 
SACGI  - 0.035(.024)** .131(.411) .113(.289) 0.293(.184) 5.430(.000)***  0.063(.000)*** .0858(.578)*** 0.064(.532) .337(.112) -0.244(.000)*** 
Board Size +/- 0.589 (.000)*** - -0.562(.228) .352(.253) -0.100 (.875) -8.397(.000)*** 0.475 (.000)*** - -0.585(.175) 0.572(.044)** .268(.647) -0.140 (.012)*** 
Director Shareholding  +/- 0.012 (.346) -0.005(.207) - .209(.000)*** . -0.040 (.528) .608(.000)*** 0.0120 (.375) -0.006(.175) - 0.222 (.000)*** -0.037(.551) -0.032(.000)*** 
Institutional Shareholding +/- 0.023 (.239) 0.007(.252) .4878(.000)*** - 0.211(.026)** -.963(.000)*** 0.012(.532) 0.015(.033)** 0.499(.000)*** - .234(.012)*** 0.025(.000)*** 
Gearing +/- 0.015 (.118) -0.000(.859) -0.010(.753) .049(.026)** - -1.912(.000)*** 0.015(.112) 0.002(.550) -0.006(.851) 0.056.(.012)*** - 0.064(.000)*** 
ROCE  0.040 (.002)*** -0.009(.056)** -.065(.157) -.069(.027)** -0.140(.032)** - - - - - - - 
Q-Ratio  - - - - - - -0.783(.031)** -.271(.035)** -0.491(.686) -0.107(.896) 2.090(.215) - 
Sales Growth +/- 0.009(.385) 0.0001(.971) 0.0426(.264) 0.073(.950) 0.754(.755) 0.051(.049)** 0.015 (.181) 
0.002(.643) 
0.040(.299) -0.013(.600) 0.033(.532) .007(.000)*** 
Dual Listing +/- 1.534(.092)* -1.088(.000)*** -5.953(.059)** 7.947(.000)*** -0.589(.892) 0.417(.853) 1.010(.267) -0.709(.030)** -5.738(.064)* 8.730(.000)*** 1.180(.780) -.483(.000)*** 
Audit Firm Size +/- 2.389(.041)** 0.1263(.748) -6.093(.133) -9.456(.000)*** -5.283(.335) -18.03(.000)*** 1.846(.116) 1.168(.006)*** -5.524(.171) -8.836(.001)*** 0.281(.959) .026(.875) 
Firm Size +/- 3.615 (.004)*** 1.2711(.006)*** -2.438(.613) -11.08(.000) -5.686(.379) 2.8911(.620) 3.402(.007)*** 4.208(.000)*** -2.590(.555) -11.00(.000)*** 2.995(.609) .1.293(.000)*** 
Total Asset +/- .000(.105)* 0.000(.000)*** -0.458(.840) -0.000(.699) 6.8942.028)** 0.000(.000)*** .000(.120) 
0.000(.000)*** 
0.000(.595) -0.000(.206) 0.000(.002)*** 0.000(.981) 
Market Value +/- .000(.465) 0.000(.599) -0.000(.505( 0.000(.215) -0.000(.056)** 0.000(.000) .000(.018)*** 
0.000(.000)*** 
-0.000(.484) -0.000(.930) -0.000(.001)*** .000(.000)*** 
Capital Expenditure +/- .000(.005)*** -0.000(.073)* -0.000(.241) -0.000(.019)*** -0.000(.965) 0.000(.282) -.000(.184) 
-0.000(.006)*** 
-0.000(.216) 0.000(.110) 0.000(.050)** -.000(.000)*** 
Basic Material  4.603(.000)*** -0.151(.691) 16.932(.000)*** -10.63(.000) -21.08(.000)*** -86.19(.000)*** 3.714 (.001)*** 
0.358(.381) 
18.420(.000)*** -9.857(.000) -19.66(.000)*** 2.09(.000)*** 
Consumer Goods  3.024 (.019)*** 0.849(.052)** 4.843(.274) 2.765(.347) -7.047(.248) -15.99(.000)*** 3.714(.013)*** 
0.902(.054)** 
4.797(.280) 2.831(.336) -8.212(.174) 1.636(.000)*** 
Finance Industry  -0.49(.624) 0.056(869) 12.066(.000)*** -12.79(.000)*** 3.026(.521) -10.73(.000)*** 1.123(.174) 
0.349(.346) 
11.623(.001)*** -12.00(.000)*** 3.705(.440) -.290(.029)** 
Industrial  3.011(.004)*** 0.493(.167) 13.534(.000)*** -3.780(.114) -4.176(.401) -26.67(.000)*** 2.271(.033)** 1.294(.001)*** 13.864(.000)*** -3.579(.138) -0.766(.877) 1.237(.000)*** 
Telecoms/Technology  2.317(.067)* -0.535(.211) 4.8592(.267) -3.631(.206) -12.41(.037)** -41.12(.000)*** 2.513(.052)** -0.894(.054)** 4.633(.291) -4.186(.155) -16.79(.005)*** 1.384(.000)*** 
Year 2010  -4.776 (.000)*** 0.035(.916) 0.501(.879) 0.305(.891) 3.917(.395) 26.337(.000)*** -4.571(.000)*** 0.152(.668) 0.389(.907) -0.108(.961) 3.596(.431) -1.105(.000)*** 
Year 2012  2.408 (.011)*** -0.379(.240) -0.273(.933) -0.349(.872) -0.353(.937) -13.30(.000)*** 2.345(.015)*** -0.315(.362) -0.173(.958) -0.153(.944) 0.024(.996) .545(.000)*** 
Year 2013  3.981(.000)*** -0.714(.029)** -2.180(.511) 0.333(.880) 1.701(.710) -18.63(.000)*** 3.635(.000)*** -0.581(.096)* -1.730(.601) 1.042(.636) 2.747(.543) .551(.000)*** 
Year 2014  4.547(.000)*** -0.749(.024)** -3.105(.355) 0.930(.677) 3.194(.490) -17.64(.000)*** 3.944(.000)*** -0.590(.093)* -2.594(.436) 1.865(.400) 4.834(.288) .434(.005)*** 
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Institutional shareholdings estimate is shown in columns 6 and 12. The results indicate all 
four alternative CG mechanisms, i.e. SACGI, board size, director shareholding and gearing, 
positively affect institutional shareholding, but only board size, director shareholding and 
gearing have significant impact under Q-ratio 2SLS, whereas board size and director 
shareholding have significant impact under ROCE 2SLS. The positive significant impact of 
board size, director shareholding and gearing indicates they complement each other. Contrary 
to the Nigerian results, South African results show that both ROCE and Q-ratio impact 
negatively on institutional shareholding; however, only the results of ROCE are significant. 
Contrary to expectations, this demonstrates that more successful firms are less attractive to 
institutional shareholders. The results of Q-ratio impacting negatively on institutional 
shareholdings in South Africa are contrary to the results reported by Ntim et al. 
(2015b,pp.29).  
 
Gearing estimates are presented in columns 7 and 13. The results illustrate that SACGI and 
institutional shareholding impact positively on gearing, but only the impact of the latter is 
significant. Meanwhile, board size and director shareholding show negative effects on 
gearing in ROCE 2SLS estimations, whereas board size shows positive impact on gearing but 
none of the latter results are significant. The institutional shareholding–gearing impact 
suggests complementary association between both CG mechanisms. This implies firms with 
institutional investors can raise debt finance at a cheaper cost. Finally, similar to the Nigerian 
results reported in 9.3.1, gearing is impacted positively by Q-ratio insignificantly but 
negatively by ROCE significantly. This implies that firms with increasing accounting returns 
do not seek debt finance. Conversely, the positive Q-ratio–gearing impact, though 
insignificant, markets value such geared firms more highly than lowly geared firms. 
 
Consistent with Nigeria, the 2SLS in South Africa was meant to validate whether results 
presented in Chapter 8 are robust to endogeneity concerns. Regression results of the 
performance variables are presented in column 8 for ROCE and column 14 for Q-ratio. The 
adjusted R2  for ROCE is 68.1% and for Q-ratio 44.5%, with both having significant F-
statistics at 1%.  
 
Results from columns 8 and 14 reported in table 30 show that SACGI positively and 
significantly impacts on accounting returns but negatively impacts on market returns. This 
result supports the OLS estimates results reported in subsection 8.2.2 that better governed 
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firms in South Africa benefit from increasing accounting returns but are faced with 
decreasing market returns more than poorly governed firms. Similar to Nigeria, board size in 
South Africa significantly negatively affects both ROCE and Q-ratio. The results based on 
impact of board size on both performance measures are consistent with those reported in the 
OLS estimates in section 8.3.2. Therefore, these results are robust to endogeneity. 
 
Contrary to the results reported in 2SLS for Nigeria (9.3.1), in South Africa, director 
shareholding showed a positive significant relationship with ROCE but a negative significant 
impact on Q-ratio. The results based on Q-ratio are consistent with the results reported in 
8.3.2 in Chapter 8, though the OLS estimate for Q-ratio was not significant. The positive 
significant impact of director shareholding on ROCE in the 2SLS estimate does not support 
the significantly negative relationship reported in the OLS estimates. Consequently, the 
presence of endogeneity may have affected the OLS results on the impact of director 
shareholding on ROCE. From column 14, institutional shareholding positively and 
significantly impacts on ROCE, which is consistent with the OLS estimates results reported 
in 8.3.2, and is therefore robust and not sensitive to endogeneity. However, the positive 
significant impact of institutional shareholding on Q-ratio does not support the negative 
insignificant results of the OLS estimate reported in 8.3.2.  
 
Finally, from column 8, gearing negatively and significantly affects ROCE but positively 
affects Q-ratio significantly, which is consistent with the results reported in 8.3.1. Therefore, 
the results based on the impact of gearing on both accounting and market returns reported in 
Chapter 8 (8.3.2) are robust to endogeneity.  
 
Similar to the Nigerian results, the 2SLS results in South Africa support the results of the 
OLS estimates reported in Chapter 8 for the compliance index model. Similarly, the 2SLS 
results based on the equilibrium variable model show overall robustness to endogeneity 
problems with a few dissimilar results.  
 
The next section presents a test of robustness based on a Dynamic System Generalised 
Method of Moments for both the compliance index model and the equilibrium variable model 
in Nigeria and South Africa.  
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9.4 Dynamic System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Regression  
 
As discussed earlier, an extensive body of empirical research in CG suggests that certain 
governance mechanisms enhance firm performance. However, some scholars (e.g. Lu et al., 
2009, Schultz et al., 2010, Di Miceli da Silveira et al., 2010, Pham et al., 2011, Roberts and 
Whited, 2012, Wintoki et al., 2012, Barros et al., 2013) have noted that these research results 
are plagued with endogeneity problems. As Wintoki et al. (2012) point out, it is not often 
possible to determine whether the causation in CG–firm performance association is actually 
reversed. For example, does performance drive firms to choose good CG structure rather than 
the other way around as investigated in CG scholarship? What if CG is merely an indication 
of an essential unobservable factor which also affects firm performance? As a result, to 
determine what estimates of parameters may suggest becomes difficult.  
 
As mentioned earlier, corporate finance research has observed at least three sources of 
endogeneity, i.e. simultaneity, unobserved heterogeneity. However, endogeneity problems 
arising from the possibility that current CG mechanism values can be because of past 
financial performance values (dynamic endogeneity) have been ignored either explicitly or 
implicitly. As noted by (Wintoki et al., 2012; p.1 ), ignoring this source of endogeneity can 
pose serious consequences for inference arrived at from the OLS estimates. Schultz et al. 
(2010;p.145) observed that variations and inconsistencies in the results of CG–performance 
association are because of the inability of scholars to control for all forms of endogeneity. 
Consequently, the failure to control all forms of endogeneity can lead to spurious CG–
performance relationships. Hence, some writers have contended that corporate governance 
and firm performance are ‘simultaneously’ determined by unobservable firm-specific 
dynamics and that CG variations are determined by present and/or expected and past firm-
level idiosyncrasies. Some scholars (e.g. Lu et al., 2009, Schultz et al., 2010, Di Miceli da 
Silveira et al., 2010, Pham et al., 2011, Roberts and Whited, 2012, Wintoki et al., 2012, 
Barros et al., 2013) have provided evidence suggesting that there are three types of 
endogeneity in CG research, namely unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity. Therefore, CG studies which do not control for these endogeneity issues should 
be interpreted with caution.   
 
The results reported for the OLS estimate and subsequently investigated for endogeneity with 
the use of the Durbin–Wu–Hausman exogeneity test and instrumental variable confirm the 
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argument put forward by scholars (e.g. Lu et al., 2009, Schultz et al., 2010, Di Miceli da 
Silveira et al., 2010, Pham et al., 2011, Roberts and Whited, 2012, Wintoki et al., 2012, 
Barros et al., 2013) that the CG–firm performance relationship suffers from endogeneity 
issues. The 2SLS model further confirms the existence of reverse causation (simultaneous 
endogeneity) for CG–firm association. For example, the 2SLS results for both South Africa 
and Nigeria indicate that the respective CG indices (NICGI and SACGI) are both affected by 
firm performance and firm performance is also impacted by these CG indices. However, the 
instrumental variable estimation and 2SLS estimations have controlled for unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity, with the results showing aggregate robustness with the OLS 
estimate reported in Chapter 8 across both countries. However, the instrumental variable 
estimation and 2SLS estimations do not control for dynamic endogeneity.  
 
Drawing from Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), the dynamic system generalised method of moments (dynamic systems GMM) is 
employed to overcome the problems of unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity in this research, consistent with a few prior corporate governance scholars (e.g. 
Schultz et al., 2010, Wintoki et al., 2012) who employed the dynamic systems GMM; hence, 
this study provides unbiased and consistent estimates by employing internally generated valid 
instruments in the estimation.  
 
As noted earlier, prior studies (e.g. Lu et al., 2009, Di Miceli da Silveira et al., 2010, Schultz 
et al., 2010, Pham et al., 2011, Roberts and Whited, 2012, Wintoki et al., 2012, Barros et al., 
2013) are the foundation for employing dynamic systems GMM in this study. These studies, 
however, investigated single or a few corporate governance structures on firm performance. 
For example, Wintoki et al. (2012) investigated board structure–performance association; 
Schultz et al. (2010) examined the impact of director compensation, director ownership, 
block ownership, board independence and size on firm performance. Pham et al. (2011) 
employed board independence and size, insider shareholdings, outsider shareholdings on firm 
performance. However, this research extends these previous studies by employing 14 
alternative CG structures in the equilibrium variable model to investigate the CG–
performance relations using dynamic systems GMM. More so, these prior studies have also 
hugely concentrated on developed economies. For example, Schultz et al. (2010) and Pham et 
al. (2011) used Australian firms; meanwhile, Wintoki et al. (2012) used US-listed firms. 
However, until now, only a few studies in emerging markets, particularly in Africa, have 
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addressed endogeneity issues arising from CG–firm performance relationship (e.g. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008, Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim, 2013c, Ntim et al., 
2015a) using either lagged OLS, pooled GLS or 2SLS estimations. For example, Ntim et al. 
(2015a) employed 2SLS; Ntim (2013c) and Ntim et al. (2012) employed lagged OLS and 
2SLS. Meanwhile, Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) employed random-effect GLS regression. 
Nonetheless, these few African studies controlled for unobserved heterogeneity and 
simultaneity but failed to control for dynamic endogeneity. Hence, by controlling for the 
three forms of endogeneity, this study also contributes to extend on the empirical models 
employed in the CG–firm performance association in Africa. Furthermore, studies in both 
developed and emerging economies have not examined unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity issues using the compliance index model. This study 
intends to fill this gap in CG scholarship. In summary, this research provides a more 
comprehensive examination of the relationship between CG and firm performance by 
including a broader range of CG measures and controls than prior studies.  
 
 9.4.1 Dynamic System GMM Equation  
 
The dynamic system GMM is based on the notion that OLS and instrumental variable 
approach (IV and 2SLS) do not exploit all the available information in a sample. Thus, 
dynamic system GMM exploits all the available information in a sample and therefore 
provides more efficient estimates of causal associations (Arellano and Bond, 1988, Arellano 
and Bond, 1991, Arellano and Bover, 1995, Blundell and Bond, 1998). Consistent with prior 
research, to be able to conduct a dynamic system GMM model, it is essential to first conduct 
OLS regressions to compare with dynamic system estimates. The estimate for OLS has been 
reported in Chapter 8 for both Nigeria and South Africa, but, in addition, the Durbin–Wu–
Hausman exogeneity test, instrumental variable model and 2SLS estimations have been 
conducted as a pre-requisite to conduct the dynamic system GMM.  
 
In the main OLS equation examined in Chapter 8, firm performance = f (corporate 
governance mechanisms, exogenous/control variables, fixed effects). Where corporate 
governance mechanism(s) is the corporate governance index (CGI) for respective countries as 
stated in the compliance index model. Similarly, corporate governance mechanism(s) are the 
14 CG mechanisms in the equilibrium variable model equation and the control are the nine 
controls for the compliance index model and equilibrium variable model equations. This 
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study posits that for the dynamic model, firm financial performance = f (past firm 
performance, corporate governance mechanisms, exogenous/control variables, fixed effects). 
In this dynamic systems GMM, the first transformation equation (1) is determined by a first 
difference model and then uses the lagged level of regressors and differences in the lagged 
levels as an instrument to transform the first difference regressors. Hence, in the compliance 
index model, the instruments are the level of CGI, while, in the equilibrium variable model, 
the instruments are 14 CG variables (board size, independent NED, NED, ED, CEO/chairman 
separation, board meetings, director shareholding, institutional shareholding, board busyness, 
ethnic diversity, gender diversity, board interlocks, audit-committee independence and 
gearing) in addition to the level of non-dummy controls (sales growth, market value, total 
asset, capital expenditure) in both South Africa and Nigeria and difference at t-1. The rest of 
the control dummy variables are included as exogenous instruments. Last, one lag for the 
performance variables (L. ROCE and L. Q-ratio) is added to capture the persistent impact of 
past performance on current CG structures.  
 
As Schultz et al. (2010,pp.149) noted, one of the essential properties of difference GMM is 
that it uses internal instruments embedded in the existing dataset which are available to the 
econometrician. Schultz et al. (2010,pp.149) add that since all variables are time variant, 
unobservable firm idiosyncrasies are eliminated without the compulsion for strict exogeneity 
assumptions, which therefore allows for performance lag (dependent variable lag) to be 
included in the right-hand side of the equation to account for any likely dynamic endogeneity. 
Hence, the estimates produced from the equation are robust to firm fixed effects, endogenous 
regressors, serial correlation of financial performance improvement and heteroscedasticity. 
Therefore, using the compliance index model as an example and consistent with Schultz et al. 
(2010,pp.149), the dynamic difference equation for the compliance index model is stated as:  
 
Pit =L. ∆Pδit + ∆β1CGIit +∑nt=1 β2∆CONTROLSit + Uit …………………… (12)     
 
Note: L is a one-period lag operator; ∆P is a (N – I) × 1 trajectory/vector of the differenced 
firm financial performance variable across N observations and I firms, where δ is a 1 × 1 
scalar of lag time coefficient for differenced financial performance proxy, L∆P, across N 
observations. ∆CGI is a (N – I) × H matrix of the H differenced corporate governance index 
variable (NICGI and SACGI) across N observations and I firms. β1 is a H × 1 vector of 
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coefficients for the H differenced corporate governance index. ∆CONTROLS is a (N – I) × Q 
matrix of the Q-differenced firm-level exogenous variables across N observations for I firms. 
β2 is a Q × 1 vector of coefficients for the Q-differenced firm-level exogenous variables. 
Finally, ∆U is a (N – I) × 1 vector of the error terms across N observations for I firms. 
 
The difference GMM estimation is improved upon by a simultaneous difference and level 
equation as developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell 
and Bond (1998) which yields more efficient estimators than difference GMM. As noted by, 
for example, Schultz et al. (2010,pp.150), in addition to difference GMM equation, all level 
equations are added to develop a system of equations as stated below: 
 
∆Pit =L. ∆Pδit + β1∆CGIit +∑nt=1 β2∆CONTROLSit+ ∆Uit …………… (13)     
 
The first system of equation (12) shows the impact of lag performance variable in addition to 
CGI variables plus the control variables. The second system of equation (13) shows the 
impact of lag financial performance changes in addition to changes in CGI variable and 
changes in control variables regressed on change in performance variable. According to 
Schultz et al. (2010,pp.150), dynamic system GMM model increases the efficiency of 
difference GMM specification in two ways. First, supposing the true relationship between 
CGI and firm financial performance is in levels, equation 13 provides a more accurate and 
robust specification of associations underlying dynamics. Finally, Schultz et al. 
(2010,pp.150) point out that, if there exists slight persistence in variables levels, then the 
variable lagged levels may be weak instruments for difference equation. Thus, the dynamic 
system GMM improves the moment conditions by instrumenting CGI–firm financial 
performance association with lagged variations of firm financial performance, CG variables 
and control variables. Hence, dynamic system GMM produces consistent and efficient 
estimates for the compliance index or equilibrium variable model parameters which are 
robust to biases presented by unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity.  
 
A key exogeneity assumption in the dynamic system GMM equation is that historical firm 
financial performance and CG variables are exogenous with respect to financial innovations 
and current shocks. Consistent with Wintoki et al. (2012,pp.15) and following from Arellano 
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and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), two essential 
tests are to be conducted to verify this assumption. 
 
In the first test, the second-order serial correlation ascertains whether or not the system GMM 
equation in this study has included sufficient lags to control for dynamic characteristics of 
empirical associations (Wintoki et al., 2012,pp.15). If this assumption is true, then any 
historical performance value beyond the lags is a hypothetically valid instrument. This is 
because the values will be exogenous to current firm financial performance shocks. Hence it 
is expected that, given this assumption, the dynamic system GMM estimates are valid. By 
creation, the residual values in first differences AR (1) can be correlated; however, no serial 
correlation should exist in the second differences AR (2).  
 
Second, the dynamic system GMM estimation uses multiple time lags as instruments, and 
therefore if the system in this equation is over identified,  Hansen test of over-identification 
verifies  over-identification in the equation (e.g. Schultz et al., 2010,pp.157, Wintoki et al., 
2012,pp.15). The Hansen test produces J-statistics following a chi-square distribution with 
null hypothesis that instruments in the dynamic system GMM are valid. In addition, the Diff-
in-Hansen tests of exogeneity with the null of instruments in the system GMM equation 
levels are exogenous is  tested.  
 
Following from the derivation of the dynamic system GMM equation, the subsequent 
subsections discuss the results of dynamic system GMM equation for the compliance index 
model and equilibrium variable model in Nigeria and South Africa.  
 9.4.2 Dynamic System GMM Results–Compliance Index Model for Nigeria 
 
Table 31 below shows the results of dynamic system GMM equation for Nigeria. Following 
the suggestions of Larcker and Rusticus (2010,pp.196), OLS estimates are also reported in 
table 31 to allow comparison of the statistical significance, magnitude, signs of the OLS 
estimates with the results of the endogenously corrected alternative estimates. This allows for 
verification of the level and extent to which the main results are robust and/or sensitive to 
endogeneity issues. Columns 3 to 5 show the dynamic system GMM results for NICGI, 
Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI for ROCE as dependent variables. Columns 6 
to 8 report the results of dynamic system GMM for NICGI, Shareholder–NICGI and 
Stakeholder–NICGI for Q-ratio as dependent variable. Columns 9 to 11 are the results of 
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OLS estimates of NICGI and NICGI-sub indices with ROCE as dependent variable; 
meanwhile, columns 12 to 14 are OLS estimates of NICGI and sub-indices with Q-ratio as 
dependent variable. It should be noted that the dynamic system GMM reduces the number of 
observations from 400 firm years to 320 firm-year observations because of a one-year lag.  
 
From table 31, columns 3, 4 and 5, the F-values for ROCE and columns 6, 7 and 8 for Q-ratio 
for NICGI, Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI respectively indicate that the 
dynamic system GMM results are statistically significant at 1% (p≤0.00001). This therefore 
suggests that the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient of the NICGI and NICGI sub-
indices and the control variables is equal to zero is rejected. Comparing the F-values with 
those reported under the OLS estimates (columns 9 to 14) shows consistency; however, the 
system GMM F-values are on average higher than those reported for OLS estimates.  
 
In addition, the test of second-order serial correlation AR (2) across all the dynamic system 
GMM results in columns 3 to 8 shows that there is no serial correlation between the 
variables. Therefore, the equations have sufficient lag instruments to control for the dynamic 
characteristics of empirical associations and hence dynamic system GMM estimates are valid. 
In addition, Hansen J test of over-identification indicates that the instruments included in all 
the system GMM regressions are valid and none of the equations is over-identified. 
More so, Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity indicate  GMM equation-level instruments 
across all the system GMM regressions are exogenous. These results are similar to those 
reported by prior studies (e.g. Schultz et al., 2010, Pham et al., 2011, Wintoki et al., 2012).  
 
For the compliance index model, the main interest is whether the quality of internal corporate 
governance structures in Nigeria as measured by the NICGI and NICGI sub-indices has any 
meaningful impact on the market and accounting returns of listed firms in Nigeria as reported 
in OLS estimates in Chapter 8 and included in table 31. From table 31, column 3 (ROCE) and 
column 6 (Q-ratio), the results indicate that NICGI is positively related to both accounting 
and market returns with statistical significance at 1% (p≤0.001). The significant positive 
relationship between NICGI and both performance variables therefore supports hypothesis 
10a and is consistent with the OLS estimate results reported in Chapter 8 and columns 11 and 
12 of table 31.  
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The system GMM results for Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI for dynamic 
system GMM are reported in columns 4 and 5 for ROCE and 7 and 8 for Q-ratio in table 31 
respectively. Shareholder–NICGI positively impacts significantly on Q-ratio (1%) and ROCE 
(5%). This is also consistent with the results reported in Chapter 8 (8.4.1) for OLS estimates 
that firms that comply with the NICGI turn to comply with shareholder provision of SEC 
2011.  
 
From columns 5 and 8, Stakeholder–NICGI for dynamic system GMM indicates positive 
significant impact on both ROCE and Q-ratio both at 1%. These results are consistent with 
those reported in Chapter 8 (8.4.1) and in columns 11 and 14 for OLS estimates in table 31. 
As noted earlier, these results suggest that firms that comply with both NICGI and 
Shareholder–NICGI tend to comply with the stakeholder provision of the SEC 2011 
corporate governance provisions. Thus, overall results for the Nigeria corporate governance 
index and sub-indices in Chapter 8 are robust to possible unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity.  
 
The next subsection reports the results of dynamic system GMM equation for the compliance 
index model for South Africa.  
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Table 31: Dynamic System GMM Results for the Nigerian Corporate Governance Index (NICGI), Sub-Indices and Accounting Returns (ROCE) and Market 
Returns (Q-ratio) Relations for All (320) Firm Years 
 
 
 
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. NICGI is the Nigerian Corporate Governance index based on SEC 2011 corporate governance code. Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI are the sub-indices for NICGI for shareholder 
provisions (61) and stakeholder provisions (14) of the based-on SEC 2011 provisions. The Arellano–Bond test statistic (AR1) and (AR2) follows an asymptotic normal distribution, with null (H0): No autocorrelation of order “v in the differenced 
errors. By creation the residual values in first differences AR (1) can be correlated; however, no serial correlation should exist in the second difference AR (2). The Hanson test of over-identification (J-Statistic) follows a chi-squared distribution with 
(l-r) degrees of freedom, with l indicating the number of moment conditions whereas r is the parameters to be estimated; with a null (H0) = moment conditions are specified correctly (i.e. instruments in the dynamic system GMM are valid). Diff-in-
Hansen tests of exogeneity have a null (H0) = instruments in the system GMM equation levels are exogenous.
 Dynamic System GMM on Corporate Governance Structure (NICGI and NICGI Sub-
Indices) – Financial Performance (320 firm years)  
Results Based on OLS Estimates of Corporate Governance Structure (NICGI and NICGI 
Sub-Indices) – Financial Performance (400 firm years) 
 
Dynamic Systems GMM Estimation Based on 
ROCE 
Dynamic Systems GMM Estimation Based 
on Q-ratio 
OLS Estimates Based on ROCE OLS Estimates Based on Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2 ) - - - - - - 
.208 .203 .240 .294 .296 .308 
Adjusted R2 - - - - - - .171 .165 .204 .264 .262 .275 
F-value 43.81(.000) *** 45.16(.000)*** 22.02(.000) *** 68.72(.000)*** 
   
78.1(.000)*** 70.22(.000)*** 
5.568(.000) *** 5.405(.000) *** 6.678(.000)*** 8.947(.000) *** 8.887(.000)*** 9.415(.000)*** 
Standard Error - - - - - - 21.143 21.208 20.717 1.524 1.529 1.512 
Durbin–Watson - - - - - - .970 1.021 1.000 1.074 1.068 1.131 
AR (1) test (p-value) .027 .024 .026 .19 .196 .169 - - - - - - 
AR (2) test (p-value) .134 .134 .184 .291 .288 .306 - - - - - - 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-
value) .392 .332 .649 .360 .394 .258 - - - - - - 
Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity 
(p-value) ..701 .607 .955 .836 .817 .582 - - - - - - 
No of observations 320 320 320 320 320 320 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Constant -7.050(.271) -5.892(.408) 1.175(.757) -.554(.492) -.887 (.316) 1.005(.068)* -9.070(.133) -8.477(.194) -2.075(.622) 2.334(.000) *** 2.212(.000)*** 2.746(.000) *** 
L. ROCE .310(.000)*** .333(.000)*** .249(.000)*** - - - - - - - - - 
L. Q-ratio - - - .269(.001)*** .293(.001)*** .301(.000)*** - - - - - - 
NICGI .282(.006)*** - - .045(.003)*** - - .241(.004)*** - - .013(.043)** - - 
Shareholder–NICGI - .242(.022)** - - .044(.001)*** -  .212(.014)*** - - .012(.101)* - 
Stakeholder–NICGI - - .198(.007)*** - - .025(.012)***  - .155(.010)*** - - .013(.002)*** 
Sales Growth .035(.488) ..024(.631) .093(.102)* .018(.000)*** .017(.000)** .020(.000)** .139(.011) *** .138(.012)*** .130(.015)*** .001(.803) .001(.802) .001(.780) 
Dual Listing .322(.918) .440(.890) 2.345(.491) -.709(.010)*** -.623(.018)*** -.659 (.019)*** 1.725(.739) 2.111(.684) 1.558(.759) -.581(.119) -0.572 (.126) -.637 (.086)* 
Audit Firm Size 2.969(.117) 3.469(.101)* 1.560(.518) .234(.153) .259(.108)* .148(.387) 8.500(.002) *** 9.148(.001)*** 8.294(.003)*** .631(.002) *** .652(.001)*** .524(.010)*** 
Firm Size -2.695(.210) -1.965(.341) -3.292(.194) .116(.615) .194(.353) -.004(.987) -.571(.850) .122(.967) -.255(.939) .639(.008)*** .659(.007)*** .549(.024)** 
Gearing -.071(.017)*** -.066(.020)** -.093(.007)*** .002(.445) .002(.552) .001(.691) -.12(.000) *** -.121 (.000)*** -.110(.001)*** .004(.128) .003(.131) .003(.102)* 
Total Asset .000(.676) .000(.676) .000(.633) -.000(.297) .000(.517) -.000(.528) .000(.673) .000(.674) -.000 (.059)** -.000(.003)*** -.000(.001)*** -.000(.000)*** 
Market Value .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.119) .000(.111) .000(.035)** .000(.000) *** .000(.000) *** .000(.000)*** 
CAPEX -.000(.008)*** -.000(.020)** -.000(.019)*** -.000(.000)*** -.000(.000)*** -.000(.000)*** -.000(.517) -.000(.492) .000(.001)*** -.000(.047)** -.000(.048)** -.000(.027)** 
Agriculture/Consumer Goods 4.132(.111) 4.582(.058)** 3.229(.308) 1.076(.002)*** 1.148(.002)*** .574(.062)* 12.460(.000)*** 12.916(.000)*** 7.917(.040)** .905(.002) *** .937(.002)*** .798(.005)*** 
Finance Industry -1.683(.460) -.821 (.689) -2.268(.438) -.161(.561) -.082(.756) -.465(.131) .770(.817) 1.414(.669) .271(.943) -.50(.074)* -.479 (.090)* -.585(.036)** 
ICT/Real estate .257(.920) .104(.966) 1.238(.621) .646(.080)* .675(.063)* .351(.353) 10.583(.027)** 10.581(.028)** 9.865(.043)*** .569(.120) .574(.118) .574(.110) 
Industrial/Conglomerate -1.728(.519) -1.177(.626) -2.653(.428) .482(.123)) .576(.080)* -.024(.925) 1.741(.740) 1.952(.711) -2.648(.620) -.407(.309) -.386 (.339) -.459 (.240) 
Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 16.469(.000)*** 17.132(.000)*** 15.105(.001)*** 1.470(.000)*** 1.429(.000)*** 1.032(.003)*** 19.729(.000)*** 19.678(.000)*** 16.274(.001)*** .420(.244) .432(.234) .413(.237) 
Year 2011 - - - -  - -4.699(.163) -4.869(.149) -3.994(.226) .089(.711) .088(.715) .101(.672) 
Year 2013 -4.042(.001)*** -4.162(.000)*** -2.783(.008)*** .258(.038)** .254(.048)** .318(.007)*** -2.038(.550) -1.949(.569) -1.569(.638) .257(.295) .257(.296) .250(.304) 
Year 2014 -5.574(.000)*** -5.537(.000)*** -4.247(.000)*** -.090 (.491) -.073 (.579) -.005(.967) -4.750(.165) -4.546(.186) -4.216(.207) .130(.598) .129(.522) .117(.629) 
Year 2015 -8.696(.000)*** -8.615(.000)*** -6.386(.000)*** .015(.938) .026(.897) .201(.222) -7.630(.031)** -7.232(.042)** -6.482(.057)** .408(.110) .403(.117) .396(.111) 
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 9.4.3 Dynamic System GMM Results–Compliance Index Model for South Africa 
 
Similar to Nigeria, table 32 below presents the results of dynamic system GMM equation for 
South Africa. The dynamic system GMM results for SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI and 
Stakeholder–SACGI for ROCE are available in columns 3 to 5, whereas those for Q-ratio are 
in columns 6 to 8. Similarly, columns 9 to 11 and 12 to 14 are the results of OLS estimates of 
SACGI and SACGI-sub indices for ROCE and Q-ratio respectively. The dynamic system 
GMM reduces the number of observations in South Africa to 400 firm years from 500 firm-
year observations owing to the inclusion of a one-year lag. 
 
Available in columns 3, 4 and 5 from table 32 are the F-values for ROCE, and in columns 6, 
7 and 8 is the Q-ratio for SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI respectively. 
The results for dynamic system GMM as can be seen indicate statistically significant F-
values at 1% (p≤0.00001). For that reason, the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient 
of the SACGI, along with its sub-indices and the control variables, is zero is rejected. Similar 
to Nigeria, equating the F-values with those reported for OLS estimates (columns 9 to 14) 
demonstrates consistency. The test of second-order serial correlation AR (2) for South Africa 
available in columns 3 to 8 shows no serial correlation between variables. Consequently, the 
equations have sufficient lag instruments to control for any dynamic characteristics of 
empirical relationships and therefore dynamic system GMM results for South Africa are 
valid. The Hansen J test of over-identification also shows that the included instruments in the 
system GMM estimations are valid, and not a single equation is over-identified. Finally, Diff-
in-Hansen tests of exogeneity in South Africa show that GMM equation levels instruments 
are exogenous. These results are consistent with those reported by Schultz et al. 
(2010,pp.150), Pham et al. (2011), Wintoki et al. (2012) and (Barros et al., 2013).  
 
Similar to Nigeria, dynamic system GMM estimation was conducted to examine whether the 
results for OLS estimates for SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI 
association with firm financial results are robust to possible unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. Columns 3 (ROCE) and 6 (Q-ratio) in table 32 show 
the dynamic system GMM estimation results for SACGI. Reading from these columns, 
SACGI positively impacts on accounting returns significantly at 1% (p≤0.001), whereas it 
negatively affects market returns significantly at 5% (p≤0.05).
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Table 32: Dynamic System GMM Results for South African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI), Sub-Indices and Accounting Returns (ROCE) and Market 
Returns (Q-ratio) Relations for All (400) Firm Years 
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. SACGI is the South African Corporate Governance index based on King III corporate governance code. Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI are the 
sub-indices for SACGI for shareholder provisions (71) and stakeholder provisions (13) based on King III provisions. The Arellano–Bond test statistic (AR1) and (AR2) follows an asymptotic normal distribution, with 
null (H0): No autocorrelation of order “v” in the differenced errors. By creation the residual values in first differences AR (1) can be correlated; however, no serial correlation should exist in the second difference AR 
(2). The Hanson test of over-identification (J-Statistic) follows a chi-squared distribution with (l-r) degrees of freedom, with l indicating the number of moment conditions whereas “r” is the parameters to be estimated, 
and with a null (H0) = moment conditions are specified correctly (i.e. instruments in the dynamic system GMM are valid). Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity have a null (H0) = instruments in the system GMM 
equation.
  Results Based on Dynamic System GMM on Corporate Governance 
Structure (SACGI and SACGI Sub-Indices) – Financial Performance 
Results Based on OLS Estimates of Corporate Governance Structure (SACGI and 
SACGI Sub-Indices) – Financial Performance      
 
Exp 
Sign 
Dynamic Systems GMM Estimation 
Based on ROCE (400 firm years) 
Dynamic Systems GMM Estimation 
Based on Q-ratio (400 firm years) 
OLS Estimates Based on ROCE 
 (500 firm years) 
OLS Estimates Based on Q-ratio 
(500 firm years) 
R-Square (R2)  - - - - - - 0.223 0.299 0.288 0.246 0.338 0.288 
Adjusted R2  - - - - - - 0.194 0.273 0.261 0.217 0.313 0.262 
F-value  19.43(.000) *** 55.58(.000)*** 57.13(.000) *** 12.73(.000)*** 26.38(.000)*** 5.84(.000)*** 7.67(.000) *** 11.4000(.000)*** 10.808(.000)*** 8.70(.000)*** 13.634(.000)*** 10.824(.000)*** 
Standard Error  - - - - - - 23.328 22.166 22.34 0.869 0.808 0.838 
Durbin–Watson  - - - -  - 1.055 1.075 1.061 1.041 1.079 1.045 
AR (1) test (p-value)  .027 0.027 .006 .006 0.023 .035 - - - - - - 
AR (2) test (p-value)  0.491 .651 .461 .465 .144 .282 - - - - - - 
Hansen J test of over-identification (p-value)  .231 .126 .148 .432 .157 .146 - - - - - - 
Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-value)  .851 .538 .298 .903 .886 .990 - - - - - - 
No of observations  400 400 400 400 400 400 500 500 500 500 500 500 
Constant  9.441(.283) -19.380(.232) -51.52(.002)*** 3.698(.125) 1.104(.041)** 1.558(.183) 8.099(.55) 10.136(.495) 31.545(.020)** 2.61(.000) *** 2.013(.000)*** 1.168(.004)*** 
L. ROCE  .402(000) *** .338(.000)*** .814(.000)*** - - - - - - - - - 
L. Q-ratio  - - - .522(.000)*** .193(.000)*** .550(.000)*** - - - - - - 
SACGI + .271(.006)*** - - -.059(.059)* - - .318(.05) ** - - -.013(.038)** - - 
Shareholder-SACGI + - .387(.043)** - - -.009(.065)* - - 0.414(.007)*** - - -0.009(.073)* - 
Stakeholder-SACGI +/- - - .546(.002)*** - - -.035(.005)*** - - 0.067(.547) - - -0.007(.086)* 
Sales Growth +/- 2.267(.052)** 1.241(.087)* 8.016(.000)*** .003(.349) .002(.000) *** .046(.401) .072(.065) * 0.070(.058)** 0.074(.048)** .005(.001)*** .004(.007)*** .082(.003)*** 
Dual-listing + 3.952(.007)*** -5.438(.000)*** .268(.845) -.981(.031)** -.823(.010)*** .729(.320) -8.322(.007) *** -6.639(.025)** -6.566(.028)** -.144(.209) -0.129(.224) -0.123(.266) 
Audit firm size + -3.721(.184) -3.093(.242) 3.156(.157) .526(.387) .250(.388) -.128(.899) -9.972(.007) *** -8.064(.032)** -7.459(.048)** -.429(.002)*** -0.525(.000)*** -0.591(.000)*** 
Firm size + 2.032(.431) 1.174(.637) 5.398(.007)*** .672(.279) .514(.066)* .330(.671) 5.369(.026)** 1.120(.801) 1.712(.702) .345(.000)*** -0.286(.035)** -0.349(.012)*** 
Gearing +/- -.089(.001)*** - - .010(.008)*** .000(.902) - -.107(.002) *** -0.076(.018)*** -0.072(.024)** .001(.457) -0.001(.437) .001(.516) 
Total asset +/- 0.000(.157) -0.000(009)*** -.000(.012)*** -.000(.568) -.000(.002)*** -.000(.361) -.000(.18) -.000(.001)*** -0.000(.003)*** -.000(.171) -.000(.693) -.000(.576) 
Market Value + 0.000(.177) .000(.003)*** .000(.212) .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .001(.035) ** 0.000(.001)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** 
CAPEX +/- 0.000(.305) .000(.087)* .000(.241) -.000(.401) -.000(.000)*** .000(.539) .000(.700) -.000(.572) -0.000(.991) -.000(.003)*** -.000(.147) -.000(.027)** 
Basic Material  13.00(.000)*** -14.02(.000)*** -2.537(.358) -.088(.764) -.404(.006)*** -.463(.134) -22.862(.000) *** -21.174(.000)*** -20.29(.000)*** -.104(.461) -0.160(.212) -0.185(.167) 
Consumer Goods  1.004(.851) -1.909(.622) -.786(.801) -.174(.489) -.105(.372) .105(.806) 3.653(.412) 1.333(.753) 2.924(.490) .355(.033)** 0.179(.247) 0.140(.377) 
Finance Industry  -.330(.899) -2.725(.290) 1.161(.558) -.705(.012)*** -.699(.000)*** -.263(.471) -2.488(.458) -.0.690(.828) -1.218(.709) -.624(.000)*** -0.779(.000)*** -0.629(.000)*** 
Industrial  -4.961(.091)* -7.656(.004)*** -5.021(.016)*** -.376(.184) -.413(.000)*** -.053(.878) -8.373(.020)** -8.672(.011)*** -8.113(.020)** -.236(.078)* -0.380(.002)*** -0.426(.001)*** 
Telecoms/Technology Industry  2.708(.376) 1.662(.605) .911(.613) .164(.470) -.116(.386) .127(.758) 4.476(.312) 6.190(.147) 6.697(.109)* -.097(.555) -0.004(.978) -0.072(.655) 
Year 2010  - - - - - - 1.371(.686) 2.061(.523) 0.276(.931) .093(.462) 0.071(.547) 0.118(.322) 
Year 2012  -.522(.660) -1.442(.094)* -1.697(.166) .210(.049)** .033(.213) .151(.020)** -.882(.791) -1.031(.744) -0.312(.922) .082(.509) 0.040(.728) 0.025(.831) 
Year 2013  -4.295(.000) *** -6.514(.000)*** -7.247(.000)*** .184(.031)** .032(.340) .206(.011)*** -6.551(.053)** -6.587(.039)** -5.528(.084)* .074(.556) -0.010(.931) -0.024(.839) 
Year 2014  2.665(.191) -8.282(.000)*** -3.004(.106)* .184(.213) -.071(.099)* .133(.227) 8.644(.011)*** -8.336(.008)*** -7.414(.022)** -.034(.790) -0.022(.854) -0.022(.855) 
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These results are consistent with those reported for OLS estimation in columns 9 and 12 of 
table 32. The significant positive relationship between SACGI and ROCE supports 
hypothesis 10a but rejects the hypothesis base on Q-ratio.  
 
In addition, the dynamic system GMM results for Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–
SACGI are reported in columns 4 and 5 for accounting returns (ROCE) and 7 and 8 for 
market returns (Q-ratio) in table 32 respectively. Reading from columns 4 and 7, 
Shareholder–SACGI positively affects ROCE significantly (p≤0.05) but negatively impacts 
Q-ratio significantly (p≤0.10). Similar to the results reported for SACGI, Shareholder–
SACGI results are consistent with the results reported in Chapter 8 (8.4.2) and in columns 10 
and 13 on table 32 for OLS estimates. Again, this result indicates that South African firms 
that comply with the SACGI turn to comply with the shareholder provision of the King III 
corporate governance code.  
 
Equally, the Stakeholder–SACGI in columns 5 and 8 on table 32 for dynamic system GMM 
points to a positive significant impact on ROCE but a negative significant impact on Q-ratio, 
both at 1% (p≤0.001). The results based on both performance measures are consistent with 
those reported in Chapter 8 (8.4.2) and columns 11 and 14 for OLS estimates on table 32. 
Nevertheless, the OLS estimate results were insignificant for ROCE. However, these results 
lend support to the fact that firms who comply with both SACGI and Shareholder–SACGI 
tend to comply with King III stakeholder provisions. Yet, in contrast to Nigerian results, the 
negative results based on market return suggest that the market undervalues firms that 
comply with stakeholder provisions of King III.  
 
Similar to Nigerian results, the overall results for dynamic system GMM in South Africa for 
SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI demonstrate reliability with the OLS 
estimates reported in Chapter 8. Accordingly, OLS estimates reported for the South African 
corporate governance index (SACGI) and sub-indices (Shareholder–SACGI and Social–
SACGI) are robust to any possible unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity.  
 
The next subsection reports the results of dynamic system GMM equation for equilibrium 
variable model for Nigeria (9.4.4) and South Africa (9.4.5).  
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 9.4.4 Dynamic System GMM Results–Equilibrium Variable Model for Nigeria 
 
The results of dynamic system GMM equation for equilibrium variable model for Nigeria are 
available in table 33 below. OLS estimates are also available in table 33 to permit evaluation 
of statistical significance, magnitude, signs of the OLS estimates compared to those of 
dynamic system GMM equation. Columns 3 (ROCE) and 4 (Q-ratio) present the dynamic 
system GMM results for the impact of 14 firm-level alternative internal corporate governance 
variables on firm financial performance, whereas columns 5 (ROCE) and 6 (Q-ratio) report 
OLS estimates for the 14 firm-level alternative internal corporate governance mechanisms on 
firm performance. As noted earlier, owing to one lag period, the dynamic system GMM 
reduced the number of observations from 400 firm years to 320 firm year observations.  
 
Reading from columns 3 and 4 on table 33, the F-values for ROCE and Q-ratio respectively 
for the 14 firm-level alternative internal corporate governance mechanisms show dynamic 
system GMM results are statistically significant at 1% (p≤0.00001). Hence, the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficient of the 14 firm-level alternative internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and the control variables is zero is not accepted. Matching the F-
values in columns 3 and 4 for dynamic system GMM estimate with those reported in columns 
5 and 6 for ROCE and Q-ratio for OLS estimate displays consistency in significance.  
 
Furthermore, the AR (2) test (the test of second-order serial correlation) for the dynamic 
system GMM for ROCE (column 3) and Q-ratio (column 4) indicates no serial correlation 
between the variables. Deducing from this, the equations have appropriate lag instruments to 
control for dynamic features of empirical relations. Hence, the dynamic system GMM 
estimates for the 14 firm-level alternative internal corporate governance mechanisms are 
valid. Likewise, the Hansen J test of over-identification shows instruments contained within 
the system GMM regressions are valid and the equations are not over-identified. The Diff-in-
Hansen tests of exogeneity also evidence that GMM equation-levels instruments in the 
system GMM regressions are exogenous.  
 
Similar to the compliance index model, the dynamic system GMM estimation of the 
equilibrium variable model aims at confirming if OLS results reported in Chapter 8 (8.3.1) 
for the effect of 14 firm-level alternative internal corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
financial performance are robust to possible endogeneity problems. To begin with, reading 
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from table 33, column 3 (ROCE) and column 4 (Q-ratio), board size is negatively and 
insignificantly related to ROCE but negatively and significantly associated with Q-ratio. 
Comparing with the results reported in columns 5 and 6 for OLS estimate, the sign and 
coefficients of board size are consistent with Q-ratio estimates. However, board size changes 
from positive in OLS to insignificantly negative in dynamic systems GMM.  
 
Likewise, NEDs insignificantly impact on ROCE positively and but negatively affect Q-ratio 
in OLS estimates, but the sign for Q-ratio remained the same but significant in the GMM 
estimation, whereas for ROCE it has changed to negative. Contrarily, the results of 
independent NEDs show robustness across both OLS and GMM estimations as its effect 
remains negative across both ROCE and Q-ratio but significant only with Q-ratio. Similar to 
NEDs, executive directors (EDs) positively affect ROCE and Q-ratio respectively but 
insignificantly in GMM estimates. However, the sign of the coefficient of EDs has remained 
like those reported for Q-ratio in OLS estimate but significantly, whereas for ROCE it has 
changed from negative to positive insignificantly in the dynamic system GMM estimation. 
 
Furthermore, regarding the results for CEO/Chairman separation, the positive significant 
impact on Q-ratio is robust across both OLS and dynamic system GMM estimate. However, 
the sign of the coefficient of CEO/Chairman separation–ROCE association changed from 
negative insignificance to positive significance from OLS to dynamic system GMM estimate. 
Similarly, frequency of board meetings showed positive relationships with both performance 
variables insignificantly in OLS estimate, but in the dynamic system GMM estimate the signs 
remain the same but significantly. Conversely, the results based on director shareholding 
show consistent negative significant impact on ROCE but insignificantly with Q-ratio in OLS 
and dynamic system GMM estimate. This implies the impact of director shareholding on both 
accounting and market returns is robust to possible endogeneity. 
 
 Similarly, institutional shareholding shows significant positive relationships with Q-ratio 
under both OLS and dynamic system GMM estimate. However, with regard to ROCE, 
institutional shareholding shows negative insignificant association in OLS estimate but 
insignificant positive association in dynamic system GMM estimate. The positive significant 
institutional shareholding–market returns association is robust to endogeneity, whereas the 
effect on accounting returns is sensitive to endogeneity.  
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Table 33: Nigerian Dynamic Systems GMM Estimation of the Equilibrium Variable Model Based on 
Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance Variable (Q-ratio) for 320 
Firm Years  
The Arellano–Bond test statistic (AR1) and (AR2) follows an asymptotic normal distribution, with null (H0): No autocorrelation of order 
“v” in the differenced errors. By creation the residual values in first differences AR (1) can be correlated; however, no serial correlation 
should exist in the second difference AR (2). The Hanson test of over-identification (J-Statistic) follows a chi-squared distribution with (l-r) 
degrees of freedom, with l indicating the number of moment conditions whereas “r” is the parameters to be estimated, and with a null (H0) = 
moment conditions are specified correctly (i.e. instruments in the dynamic system GMM are valid). Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity have 
a null (H0) = instruments in the system GMM equation levels are exogenous.
Results Based on Dynamic System GMM on Firm-level Alternative Internal Corporate 
Governance Structure – Financial Performance 
Results Based on OLS Firm-level Alternative Internal 
Corporate Governance Structure – Financial 
Performance 
  
 
All firm years (320) All firm years (400) 
 
 
Exp 
Sign 
ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2) 
 
- - .228 .385 
Adjusted R2 
 
- - .167 .337 
F-value 
 
   49.14(.000)***   89.45(.000)*** 3.742(.000)*** 7.972(.000)*** 
Standard Error  - - 21.246 1.449 
Durbin–Watson  - - 1.986 1.236 
AR(1) test (p_value)  .011 .146 - - 
AR(2) test (p_value)  .322 .514 - - 
Hansen J  test of over-identification (p-value) 
 
.651 .461 - - 
Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-value) 
 
.846 .239 - - 
No of observations  320 320 400 400 
Constant 
 
-66.053(.221) -14.88(.036)** 28.916(.068)* 3.418(.001)*** 
L. ROCE  .499(.000)*** - - - 
L. Q-ratio  - .303(.003)*** - - 
Board Size +/- -1.178(.132) -.216(.001)*** .005(.992) -.101(.005)*** 
NED + -.061(.678) -.034(.001)*** .003(.971) -.003(.677) 
Independent NED + -.203(.187) -.029 (.007)*** -.117(.306) -.019(.012)*** 
Executive Directors +/- .061(.678) .034(.034)** -.004(.971) .003(.677) 
CEO/Chairman Separation - 112.112(.019)*** 23.376(.002)*** -2.0115(.837) 1.395(.037)** 
Board Meetings + 2.211(.075)* .3740(.008)*** .784(.457) .017(.812) 
Director Shareholding  + -.163(.004)*** -.003 (.403) -.092(.070)* -.004(.199) 
Institutional Shareholding + .022(.815) .022(.004)*** -.042(.501) .007(.066)* 
Board Busyness - -2.289(.082)* -.232(.024)** -1.545(.100)* .031(.626) 
Ethnic Diversity + -.216 (.049)** -.053 (.000)*** -.181(.023)** -.018(.001)*** 
Gender Diversity + .260(.051)** .026(.002)*** .328(.007)*** .016(.004)*** 
Board Interlocks + 11.935(.164) .928(.116) 7.140(.123) -.196 (.533) 
Audit-Committee Independence + -.184 (.231) -.009 (.101)* -.078(.292) -.015(.002)*** 
Gearing +/- -.119(.030)** .003(.313) -.127(.000)*** .001(.526) 
Sales Growth + .215(.005)*** .004(.027)** .128(.021)** -.002 (.519) 
Dual Listing + 11.532(.213) 1.229(.168) 2.623(.648) -.175(.655) 
Audit Firm Size + 5.523(.017)*** .316(.275) 11.828(.000) *** .470(.015)*** 
Firm Size + -3.375(.180) -.039(.898) -1.966(.554) .179(.430) 
Total Asset +/- .000(.028)** .000(.657) -.000(.248) -.000(.264) 
Market Value + -.000(.402) .000(.000)*** .000(.273) .000(.000)*** 
Capital Expenditure +/- .000(.004)*** .000(.812) .000(.741) -.000(.020)** 
Agriculture/Consumer Goods 
 
5.113(.101)* -.188 (.598) 9.836(.013)*** .383(.156) 
Finance Industry 
 
6.796(.022)** .251(.517) 1.872(.607) -.635(.011)*** 
ICT/Real Estate  4.784(.294) .408(.436) 10.329(.046)** -.083(.813) 
Industrial/Conglomerate 
 
-3.796(.410) -1.997(.006)*** -1.8713(.740) -1.053(006)*** 
Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
 
11.512(.043)** .322(.713) 16.072(.001)*** -.307(.358) 
Year 2011  - - -5.574(.100)* .090(.695) 
Year 2013  -2.099(.208) .165(.234) -.722(.836) .219(.356) 
Year 2014 
 
-3.312(.053)** -.066(.622) -2.492(.475) .148(.533) 
 Year 2015  -4.849(.002)*** .176(.036)** -5.283(.135) .500(.036)** 
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Likewise, the impact of board busyness showed robustness as it is consistently and 
significantly associated with ROCE in both OLS and dynamic system GMM estimate 
negatively. On the other hand, board busyness shows negative association with Q-ratio 
significantly in GMM estimate but positive association in OLS estimate insignificantly. On 
the contrary, board interlocks show robustness and consistent significant positive impact on 
ROCE in both estimates. However, with Q-ratio, board interlocks showed positive 
insignificant association in dynamic system GMM estimate but negative insignificant impact 
in OLS estimate.  
 
Furthermore, ethnic diversity consistently affects Q-ratio and ROCE significantly and 
negatively across both OLS estimates and dynamic system GMM estimate. Similarly, gender 
diversity shows consistent positive impact on ROCE and Q-ratio significantly across both 
OLS estimation and dynamic system GMM estimate. This indicates that ethnic and gender 
diversity results reported in OLS estimate in Chapter 8 (8.3.1) are robust to any endogeneity 
problems.  
 
Finally, audit committee independence shows consistent negative insignificant impact on 
ROCE and significant impact on Q-ratio across both OLS estimation and dynamic system 
GMM. These results indicate the finding in Chapter 8 for audit committee independence in 
subsection 8.3.1 is robust to possible endogeneity issues. Finally, akin to ethnic, gender 
diversity and audit committee independence, gearing has a positive insignificant impact on 
Q-ratio but a negative significant impact on ROCE across both OLS estimation and dynamic 
system GMM. This shows that the findings reported for gearing in subsection 8.3.1 is robust 
to possible endogeneity issues.  
 
Generally, the results show consistency and robustness to possible endogeneity problems 
with a  few sensitivities to endogeneity depending on the performance proxy. The next 
subsection reports the results of dynamic system GMM equation for equilibrium variable 
model for South Africa.  
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 9.4.5 Dynamic System GMM Results–Equilibrium Variable Model for South Africa 
 
South African dynamic system GMM equation results for equilibrium variable model are 
presented in table 34 below. Similar to previous discussions, OLS estimations are also 
available in table 34 to allow for comparative evaluation of statistical significance, magnitude 
and signs of OLS estimates discussed in Chapter 8 (8.3.2). The F-values for ROCE and Q-
ratio are shown in columns 3 and 4 respectively on table 34 for the 14 firm-level alternative 
internal corporate governance mechanisms. The results of dynamic system GMM are 
statistically significant at 1% (p≤0.00001). Therefore, the null hypothesis that the regression 
coefficient of the 14 South Africa firm-level alternative internal corporate governance 
structures and the nine control variables is zero is not accepted. Comparing the F-values for 
dynamic system GMM estimate in columns 3 and 4 with OLS estimate F-values in columns 5 
and 6 for ROCE and Q-ratio displays consistency in significance.  
 
Akin to reported results for Nigeria (9.6.4) and the compliance index model for South Africa 
(9.6.3), AR (2) test for both performance proxies (columns 3 and 4) confirms absence of 
serial correlation between the variables. More so, the Hansen J test of over-identification 
confirms the instruments in the dynamic system GMM estimations are valid and there is no 
over-identification in the equations. Finally, diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity provide 
confirmation that GMM equation levels instruments in the system GMM estimation are 
exogenous.  
 
As earlier mentioned, dynamic system GMM estimation of the equilibrium variable model in 
South Africa purposes to confirm whether OLS estimates as presented in Chapter 8 (8.3.2) 
for the influence of 14 firm-level alternative internal corporate governance structures on 
accounting and market returns are robust to possible endogeneity concerns. First, interpreting 
from table 34, ROCE (column 3) and Q-ratio (column 4), board size impacts negatively and 
significantly on ROCE in the dynamic systems GMM regression, which is consistent with 
results reported for OLS estimate in column 5. Similarly, negative and insignificant impact of 
board size on Q-ratio in dynamic systems GMM is consistent with results for OLS estimate 
(column 6), but the latter estimate is significant. In the same way, the results of NEDs are 
consistently positively associated with ROCE significantly in both OLS and dynamic systems 
GMM regression, which means these results are robust to possible unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. However, results based on OLS estimate for Q-ratio 
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have changed sign from negative insignificant to positive insignificant in dynamic systems 
GMM estimation.  
 
Contrarily to NEDs results, independent NEDs negatively affect ROCE significantly in both 
OLS and dynamic systems GMM regression but consistently positively impact on Q-ratio 
insignificantly across both regressions. This implies the OLS results for independent NEDs 
are robust to possible unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. 
Similarly, EDs negatively affects ROCE in both OLS and dynamic systems GMM regression 
significantly. This result implies the OLS estimate for EDs reported for ROCE is robust to 
possible endogeneity. However, OLS estimate for Q-ratio has changed sign from negative 
insignificance to positive insignificance in dynamic systems GMM estimation.  
 
CEO/Chairman separation displays constant positive effect on ROCE and Q-ratio across both 
OLS estimates and dynamic system GMM estimate. Similarly, frequency of board meetings 
demonstrates consistent negative significant impact on Q-ratio in both dynamic system GMM 
and OLS estimates, thus suggesting that frequency of board meetings results reported for 
OLS estimate in Chapter 8 are robust to all forms of endogeneity. Conversely, board 
meetings, which was positive and significantly affecting ROCE in the OLS estimate, is now 
significantly negative in the dynamic system GMM estimate. 
 
Similar to results reported for Nigeria, director shareholding shows negative and significant 
effect on ROCE in OLS estimate and dynamic system GMM estimate, suggesting robust OLS 
results to endogeneity. Similarly, director shareholding, which was not significant in OLS 
estimate of Q-ratio, remains negative but now significant in dynamic system GMM estimate. 
Institutional shareholding shows negative influence on ROCE in both OLS and dynamic 
system GMM estimate but not significantly in the latter regression. Conversely, Q-ratio is 
affected by institutional shareholding negatively in OLS estimate but is significant positively 
in dynamic system GMM estimate. 
 
Contrary to Nigeria results, board busyness in South Africa showed consistent negative 
significant association with ROCE in both OLS estimate and dynamic system GMM 
estimate, implying that OLS regression results in column 5 and reported in Chapter 8 are 
robust to all forms of endogeneity.  
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Table 34: South African Dynamic Systems GMM Estimation of the Equilibrium Variable Model 
Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance Variable (Q-ratio) 
The Arellano–Bond test statistic (AR1) and (AR2) follows an asymptotic normal distribution, with null (H0): No autocorrelation of order 
“v” in the differenced errors. By creation the residual values in first differences AR (1) can be correlated; however, no serial correlation 
should exist in the second difference AR (2). The Hanson test of over-identification (J-Statistic) follows a chi-squared distribution with (l-r) 
degrees of freedom, with l indicating the number of moment conditions whereas “r” is the parameters to be estimated, and with a null (H0) = 
moment conditions are specified correctly (i.e. instruments in the dynamic system GMM are valid). Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity has a 
null (H0) = instruments in the system GMM equation levels are exogenous. 
Results Based on Dynamic System GMM on Firm-level Alternative Internal 
Corporate Governance Structure – Financial Performance 
Results Based on OLS Firm-level Alternative Internal 
Corporate Governance Structure – Financial Performance   
All firm years All firm years 
 
 
Exp 
Sign 
ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2) 
 
- - .320 .266 
Adjusted R2 
 
- - .278 .220 
F-value 
 
19.71 (.000)*** 144.14(.000)*** 7.570(.000)*** 5.833(.000)*** 
Standard Error  - - 22.145 .869 
Durbin–Watson  - - 2.004 1.841 
AR(1) test (p_value)  .057 .003 - - 
AR(2) test (p_value)  .907 .128 - - 
Hansen J test of over-identification (p-value) 
 
.538 .353 - - 
Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-value) 
 
.669 .976 - - 
No of observations  400 400 500 500 
Constant 
 
-26.669(.126) .713(.419)*** 16.874(.384) 1.696(.003)*** 
L. ROCE 
 
.260(.000)*** - - - 
L. Q-ratio 
 
- .487(.000)*** - - 
Board Size +/- -2.889(.005)*** -.020(.413) -1.055(.023)** -.035(.037)** 
NED + .262(.002)*** .003(.407) 0.290(.009)*** -.001(.862) 
Independent NED + -.245(.001)*** .005(.345) -.242(.010)*** .000(.975) 
Executive Directors +/- -.408(.002)*** -.004(.353) -0.287(.010)*** .001(.921) 
CEO/Separation - 8.007(.002)*** .253(.376) 5.367(.344) .414(.062)* 
Board Meetings + -1.186.001)*** -.103 (.000) *** 2.066(.041)** -.085(.031)** 
Director Shareholding  + -0.081(.014)*** -.007(.000)*** -.085(.094)* -.001(.595) 
Institutional Shareholding + -.054(.284) .010(.003)*** -.116(.088)* -.001(.748) 
Board Busyness - -.723(.002)*** -.032 (.021)** -1.086(.019)** .023(.193) 
Ethnic Diversity + -.010(822) .002(.573) -.030(.662) .003(.287) 
Gender Diversity + .203(.015)*** .003 (.492) 0.127(.253) -.003(.457) 
Board Interlocks + 3.929(.003)*** .042(.678) 5.152(.027)** -.071(.430) 
Audit-Committee Independence + .149(.128) -.008(.210) .102(.383) .004(.351) 
Gearing 
+/- 
-.020(.389) .007(.002)*** -.067(.056)** .001(.413) 
Sales Growth 
+ 
.525(.820) .001(.658) 1.961(.483) .005(.001)*** 
Dual Listing + -5.911(.015)*** -.258 (.223) -4.558(.163) -.182(.151) 
Audit Firm Size + -4.677(.107)* -.268(.203) -9.314(.016)*** -.368(.016)** 
Firm Size + 4.714(.253) .315(.228) 10.987(.000)*** .396(.000)*** 
Total Asset +/- .000(.144) -.000(.067)* -0.000(.037)** -.000(.394) 
Market Value 
+ 
.000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** 0.000(.000)*** .000(.000)*** 
Capital Expenditure +/- .000(.062)* -0.000(.000)*** -0.000(.4467) -0.000(.001)*** 
Basic Material 
 
-13.373(.000)*** .174 (.175) -21.111(.000)*** -.104(.500) 
Consumer Goods 
 
3.932(.427) .352(.054)** 4.563(.293) .346(.043)** 
Finance Industry  -2.929(.387) -.181 (.152) -2.83(.524) -.564(.000)*** 
Industrial 
 
-5.339(.108)* -.063 (.581) -6.039(.096)* -.224(.111) 
Telecoms/Technology 
 
3.422(.376) .096(.410) 6.450.(.161) -.082(.653) 
Year 2010  - - -.469(.887) .157(.208) 
Year 2012  -2.484(.031)** .052 (.267) -.860(.785) .043(.720) 
Year 2013 
 
-6.592(.000)*** .015(.762) -5.256(.098)* .013(.918) 
Year 2014 
 
-4.514(.016)*** -.049 (.381) -6.691(.039)** -.101(.423) 
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Nonetheless, board busyness shows negative significant association with Q-ratio in dynamic 
system GMM estimate but positive insignificant association in OLS estimate. On the 
contrary, board interlocks shows consistent significant positive impact on ROCE in both 
estimates, implying that OLS results for board interlocks in column 5 and reported in Chapter 
8 are robust to all forms of endogeneity. On the other hand, board interlocks showed positive 
insignificant association with Q-ratio in dynamic system GMM estimate but negative 
insignificant impact in OLS estimate.  
 
Ethnic diversity consistently affects ROCE insignificantly negatively and insignificantly 
positively on Q-ratio across both OLS estimates and dynamic system GMM estimate. This 
indicates the OLS results for ethnic diversity in Chapter 8 are robust to possible unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. Contrarily, gender diversity shows 
consistent positive impact on ROCE insignificantly in OLS estimation but significantly in 
dynamic system GMM estimation. Nevertheless, gender diversity shows positive 
insignificant association with Q-ratio in dynamic system GMM estimate but negative 
insignificant impact in OLS estimate. 
 
Audit committee independence shows consistent positive insignificant impact on ROCE 
across both OLS estimation and dynamic system GMM, suggesting that the results in Chapter 
8 for ROCE are robust to possible unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity. The results based on Q-ratio reported for audit committee independence are 
negative insignificant in system GMM estimation but positive insignificant in OLS 
estimation. Last of all, contrary to Nigeria results, gearing has a positive significant impact on 
Q-ratio across both OLS estimation and dynamic system GMM, but only the results of the 
latter estimation are significant. On the other hand, the results based on the impact of gearing 
on ROCE in OLS estimate are positively insignificant but negatively insignificant in dynamic 
system GMM.  
 
The next subsection summarises and compares the results of the robustness and sensitivity 
analysis in both countries.  
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9.5 Comparison of Nigerian and South African Results – Robustness and 
Sensitivity Analysis  
 
As explained earlier, three main robustness and sensitivity analyses were performed to 
address the problem of endogeneity, which has called into question the validity of claims 
made by prior studies in the CG–firm returns association. To address this, the Durbin–Wu–
Hausman exogeneity test was conducted in both Nigeria and South Africa to test for 
exogeneity by using country-level CGI firm performance association as a proxy equation. 
Subsequently, instrumental variable -2SLS and dynamic system GMM estimations were 
conducted to verify the robustness of results.  
 
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman exogeneity results indicate the quality of internal corporate 
governance mechanism in Nigeria (NICGI) is endogenously related to market returns (Q 
ratio) but exogenously related to accounting returns (ROCE), whereas, in South Africa, the 
quality of internal corporate governance mechanism (SACGI) is endogenously associated 
with accounting returns (ROCE) but exogenously associated with market returns (Q ratio). 
Results of instrumental variable regression indicate that the results reported for Nigeria and 
South Africa are robust to unobserved endogeneity. This therefore supports the OLS results 
based on the compliance index model that, in Nigeria, the quality of internal corporate 
governance mechanism (NICGI) significantly improves both accounting and market 
performance, whereas, in South Africa, SACGI significantly increases accounting returns but 
significantly reduces market returns.  
 
Furthermore, a two-stage least square estimation (2SLS) was explored to control for 
unobserved endogeneity and simultaneity by using five alternative internal CG mechanisms, 
including the respective country CG indices (NICGI and SACGI), board size, director 
shareholding, institutional shareholding and gearing. Like the instrumental variable estimate, 
the 2SLS findings indicate that the results of the compliance index model are robust to 
unobserved endogeneity and simultaneity in both Nigeria and South Africa.  
 
With regard to the four alternative variables from the equilibrium variable model, in South 
Africa, the results based on board size and financial performance variables are robust to 
endogeneity and consistent with those reported in Chapter 8. However, in Nigeria, the board 
size–accounting performance relationship is consistent and robust but the board size–market 
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performance relationship reported in Chapter 8 is not robust, suggesting that the latter is 
sensitive to endogeneity. In addition, director shareholding shows consistent and robust 
results with accounting returns in Nigeria but robust and consistent results in South Africa 
with regard to market returns. The other results for director shareholding on market returns in 
Nigeria and accounting returns in South Africa are sensitive to endogeneity. Similarly, 
institutional shareholding–market returns association is robust for Nigeria and institutional 
shareholding–accounting returns results are robust for South Africa. Finally, gearing shows 
robustness of  results to those reported in Chapter 8 in South Africa, but only the gearing–
accounting performance relationship is robust in Nigeria.  
 
The 2SLS regression also shows some independence between the five alternative internal CG 
variables as well as between these variables and performance variables. For example, in both 
Nigeria and South Africa, CG index (SACGI and NICGI) shows significant positive 
association with board size, suggesting they are complementary mechanisms. However, 
institutional shareholding and gearing show negative significant association with NICGI, 
suggesting substitutability between these variables and NICGI. Similarly, NICGI is positively 
impacted by both performance variables, which suggests firms with increasing accounting 
and market performance put in place good CG structures. Similar to Nigeria, accounting 
returns show positive significant association with SACGI but negative significant market 
performance–SACGI association. The negative market performance–SACGI association in 
South Africa suggests that, contrary to Nigeria, firms with high market performance have 
poor CG structures.  
 
In addition, in South Africa, SACGI and institutional shareholding significantly impact on 
board size, whereas, in Nigeria, NICGI, gearing and institutional shareholding affect board 
size positively but director shareholding–board size relationship is negative. The positive 
relationship suggests complementary use of CG structures, but the negative implies 
substitutability. Both performance variables impact negatively on board size in South Africa 
significantly, but only market return–board size negative relationship is significant in Nigeria. 
This suggests that firms with high market and accounting returns do not necessarily have 
large boards, as larger boards are costly to manage.  
 
Institutional shareholding is a significant complement to director shareholding in both 
Nigeria and South Africa, whereas board size indicates substitutability with director 
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shareholding. In addition, the SACGI–director shareholding association is positive in South 
Africa, indicating they are complements. Both performance variables show negative 
insignificant association with director shareholding. Furthermore, in South Africa, SACGI 
and director shareholding impact positively on institutional shareholding, suggesting 
complementary use of these corporate governance mechanisms. However, unlike the situation 
in South Africa, NICGI negatively impacts on institutional shareholding, implying 
substitutability, whereas, as in South Africa, director shareholding impacts positively on 
institutional shareholding, suggesting complementary use of these corporate governance 
mechanisms in Nigeria. Firms with higher financial performance in South Africa are less 
likely to have institutional investors. Contrarily, the Nigerian results show positive firm 
performance–institutional shareholding association, implying that more successful firms are 
attractive to institutional investors.  
 
In Nigeria, NICGI affects gearing negatively, indicating substitutability, whereas director 
shareholding–gearing association suggests complementary adoption of both mechanisms. 
However, in South Africa, institutional shareholding–gearing impact suggest complementary 
association between both CG mechanisms. In both countries, gearing is affected positively by 
market performance but negatively by accounting returns. Hence firms with increasing 
accounting returns do not seek debt finance owing to the high cost of financial distress and 
less flexibility associated with debt finance. On the other hand, the positive market 
performance–gearing impact suggests investors view geared firms as alternative CG 
mechanisms and therefore value highly geared firms more than lowly geared firms.  
 
Finally, the dynamic system GMM regression was conducted to control for all forms of 
endogeneity which are not controlled for by instrumental variable model and 2SLS 
regressions. Hence, by controlling for the three forms of endogeneity, this study also 
contributes to expand on the empirical models employed in the CG–firm performance 
association in Africa. 
 
Table 35 below compares the hypothesis testing results for OLS and dynamic system GMM 
estimations in both Nigeria and South Africa. The results of dynamic system GMM for the 
compliance index model show that the compliance with the Nigerian CG index (NICGI) and 
sub-indices (Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI) positively and significantly 
impacts on both accounting and market performance of listed firms in Nigeria.  
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 Table 35: Comparative Summary of  Hypothesis Testing for Dynamic System GMM  & OLS  Results for Nigeria and South  Africa
   NIGERIA SOUTH AFRICA 
Dependent Variables 
 
 ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
Independent Variables Hypothesis 
 
Expected  
Sign 
OLS 
Sign 
OLS 
Conclusion 
GMM 
Sign 
GMM 
Conclusion 
OS 
Sign 
OLS 
Conclusion 
 
GMM 
Sign 
GMM 
Conclusion 
 
OLS 
Sign 
OLS 
Conclusion 
 
GMM 
Sign 
GMM 
Conclusion 
 
OLS 
Sign 
OLS 
Conclusion 
 
GMM 
Sign 
GMM 
Conclusion 
Prop. Non-executive Directors 1a + + Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected + Accepted + Accepted - Rejected + Rejected 
Prop. Executive Directors 1b + - Rejected + Rejected + Rejected + Accepted - Rejected - Rejected + Rejected - Rejected 
Prop. Independent NED 1c + - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected + Rejected + Rejected 
CEO/Chairman Role 
Separation 
2 + - Rejected + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Rejected + Accepted + Accepted + Rejected 
Board Size 3 + + Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected 
Gender Diversity 4 + + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Rejected + Accepted - Rejected + Rejected 
Board Meetings 5 + + Rejected + Accepted + Rejected + Accepted + Accepted - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected 
Ethnic Diversity 6 + - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected + Rejected + Rejected 
Board Interlocks 7a + + Rejected + Rejected - Rejected + Rejected + Accepted + Accepted - Rejected + Rejected 
Board Busyness 7b - - Accepted - Accepted + Rejected - Accepted - Accepted - Accepted + Rejected - Accepted 
Gearing 8 - - Accepted - Accepted + Rejected + Rejected - Accepted - Rejected + Rejected + Accepted 
Director Shareholding 9a - - Accepted - Accepted - Rejected - Rejected - Accepted - Accepted - Rejected - Accepted 
Institutional Shareholding 9b + - Rejected + Rejected + Accepted + Accepted - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected + Accepted 
Country CG Index (NICGI & 
SACGI) 
10a + + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted - Rejected - Rejected 
Country CG Shareholder  
Index 
10b + + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted - Rejected - Rejected 
Country CG Stakeholder  Index 10c + + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Accepted + Rejected + Accepted - Rejected - Rejected 
Audit-Committee 
Independence 
11 + - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected - Rejected + Rejected + Rejected + Rejected - Rejected 
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Similarly,  results show that compliance with the South African CG index (NICGI) and sub-
indices (Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI) positively and significantly impacts 
on accounting returns and but negatively affects market performance of listed firms in South 
Africa. Except for Stakeholder–SACGI–accounting performance association, which wasn’t 
significant in Chapter 8, the dynamic system GMM findings are consistent with the reported 
findings for the research and therefore the findings are robust and not sensitive to any 
possible unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. Similarly, results 
of dynamic system GMM for the equilibrium variable model indicate estimates are generally 
consistent with those reported in Chapter 8 across both countries with some noticeable 
changes. Overall, results discussed in Chapter 8 for both countries based on OLS are robust 
to endogeneity.  
9.6 Summary of Chapter  
 
As noted earlier, empirical research in corporate finance, which has attempted to evaluate 
cause-and-effect relationship, often suffers from serious endogeneity problems (Wintoki et 
al., 2012,pp.1). As a result, this chapter examined if the OLS results in Chapter 8 are robust 
to a raft of econometric tests. Specifically, the chapter has examined whether the results 
presented in Chapter 8 are sensitive and robust to possible alternative explanations through 
examination of Durbin–Wu–Hausman Exogeneity Test with other regression models 
including Instrumental Variable Model, Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS)/Simultaneous 
Equation Model and Dynamic System Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) Model.  
 
Results in both countries and across instrumental variable model, two-stage least square  
(2SLS)/simultaneous equation model and dynamic system GMM indicate that the reported 
OLS results (in Chapter 8) which examined the impact of the quality of CG mechanism 
(SACGI and NICGI) and their respective sub-indices on firm financial performance 
(compliance index model) are generally robust to unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and 
dynamic endogeneity. However, the sensitivity and robustness results based on examining the 
impact of alternative firm-level internal CG structures (equilibrium variable model) indicate 
that, overall, most of the variables in the OLS results reported in Chapter 8 in both countries 
are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. Nonetheless, 
some few variables are sensitive to endogeneity depending on the performance proxy. 
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The next chapter (10) will present the conclusion, recommendation and limitations of this 
study and direction for future research.  
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CHAPTER 10 
10.0 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTION 
RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION  
10.1 Introduction and Summary 
 
This study is developed because of the absence of prior studies from a multi-country 
perspective that are aimed at providing a comprehensive and robust understanding of internal 
CG structures selected by firms as well as the level at which firms comply with 
institutionalised CG provisions and their bearing on firm financial performance. 
Consequently, this study fills this gap in CG scholarship by investigating and comparing the 
impact of internally generated corporate governance structures and compliance with country-
level CG provisions on performance of listed firms in South Africa and Nigeria. Using a 
compliance index model equation, the study specifically investigates and compares if firm-
level compliance with exogenously developed country-level corporate governance provisions 
in Nigeria (as measured by NICGI, Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI) and South 
Africa (SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI) impacts on firm financial 
performance (sub-research question one). On the other hand, using equilibrium variable 
model, the study further evaluates and compares the effect of 14 endogenously generated 
firm-level internal corporate governance mechanisms (measured by proportion of NEDs, 
proportion of EDs, proportion of independent NEDs, CEO/Chairman role separation, board 
size, board gender diversity, frequency of board meetings, board busyness, board ethnic 
diversity, board interlocks, gearing, director shareholding, institutional shareholding and 
audit committee independence) on firm financial performance of listed firms in Nigeria and 
South Africa (sub-research question two). Finally, the study examines and compares whether 
firms’ choice of individual internal CG structures as measured by the equilibrium variable 
model is associated with increase in firm financial performance compared to firm-level 
compliance with country-level CG provisions as measured by the compliance index model in 
South Africa and Nigeria (sub-research question three).  
 
To achieve the above objectives, data for compliance with country-level CG provisions were 
collected from annual reports of 80 listed firms in Nigeria for the period 2011 to 2015 
inclusive and 100 South African-listed firms for the period 2010–2014. Data for the 14-
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individual firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance and 
control variables are extracted from both Datastream and annual reports.   
 
Drawing from these backgrounds, this chapter focuses on, summarising results (10.2) of the 
impact of CG disclosure/compliance index on firm financial performance in Nigeria and 
South Africa (sub-research question one). Further, it compares and summarises the results of 
the 14 alternative internal CG mechanisms–financial performance association as measured by 
the equilibrium variable model (sub-research question two). Finally, a summary comparison 
of the results of disclosure/compliance–firm performance relationship (compliance index 
model) versus the results of the 14 alternative CG structures–firm performance (equilibrium 
variable model) association in South Africa and Nigeria (sub-research question three) is 
presented. Section 10.3 provides contribution and recommendations of the research. Section 
10.4 presents policy and practical implications of the research. 10.5 discusses the 
caveats/limitations of the study. Finally, section 10.6 presents directions for future research.  
10.2 Summary of Results  
 
To begin with, the results based on the variables for the compliance index in both (SACGI) 
South Africa and NICGI (Nigeria) are both statistically significant and consistent. They show 
that, in Nigeria, NICGI, Shareholder–NICGI and Stakeholder–NICGI are positively 
associated with both accounting and market returns. This is consistent with the results 
reported by prior researchers ( e.g. Ntim, 2009, Ntim, 2013c, Ntim, 2013a, Ntim et al., 2012) 
in Africa. Similarly, in South Africa, SACGI, Shareholder–SACGI and Stakeholder–SACGI 
show positive significant relations with accounting performance whereas inverse association 
with market valuation. 
 
However, the variables in the equilibrium variable models show mixed results, which are 
similar to the mixed results reported by previous studies which have employed the 
equilibrium variable model (e.g. Vafeas, 1999, Sanda et al., 2005, Kyereboah-Coleman and 
Biekpe, 2006a). For example, in South Africa, excluding board size, which showed consistent 
negative statistically significant coefficients across both performance measures, the rest of the 
variables in this model are either statistically significant with one performance measure but 
insignificant with the other performance measure or significant with both measures but with 
contradictory signs of the coefficients. Similarly, in Nigeria, out of the 14 firm-level internal 
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corporate governance structures employed in the equilibrium variable model, six showed 
insignificant results irrespective of the performance measure, whereas six showed significant 
results with one performance measure and insignificant results with the other. Only gender 
diversity and ethnic diversity variables showed consistent statistically significant coefficients 
across both performance measures.  
 
Generally, comparative diagnostic statistics and results for both Nigeria and South Africa 
suggest that the compliance index model which measured association between the quality of 
internal CG structures as determined by the SEC 2011 CG code in Nigeria and the King III 
CG code in South Africa with their sub-indices provides better and superior explanation to 
changes in firm financial performance than the equilibrium variable model. Theoretical and 
methodologically, this suggest even though compilation, development and compliance with 
country-level CG regulations may be laborious, costly and demanding, it remains a better 
proxy to aggregate the quality of firm-level internal corporate governance structures than any 
individual or group of selected firm-level internal corporate governance characteristics. In 
addition, the results indicate that the construction of a country-level broad-based composite 
index and sub-indices incorporates several internal CG structures which can capture the 
actual qualitative differences in country-level CG behaviours across firms in different 
institutional settings. The results also suggests using a composite CG index provides better 
explanatory power in the CG–firm performance nexus than using a single or a few CG 
mechanisms in isolation to each other.   
 
The next section discusses the contribution of the study.  
 
10.3 Research Contribution  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, CG in Africa has been under-researched as compared to CG in 
many Western economies, and comparative studies of different CG systems and institutional 
settings are almost non-existent. This research therefore is timely to examine and compare 
internal CG mechanisms in Nigeria and South Africa, which are the two most advanced 
economies in Africa (see their historical development of CG in sections 3.3 and 3.4). To 
begin with, by adopting a multi-theoretical approach and, more importantly, New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) theory, this study shows cultural, contextual, institutional 
similarities and differences in corporate governance mechanisms across different countries 
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impact differently on firm-level behaviour which affects firm financial performance 
differently. More so, the results of this study show historical and contextual path dependence 
has produced a diversity of firm-level and country-level specific internal CG structures that 
may work well within an institutional environment in which they have evolved but may not 
work well in others. Specifically, this study contributes in advancing NIE by showing that the 
level of maturity in governance institutions, in addition to normative rules and informal 
norms across countries, has a significant bearing on firm-level governance practices. The 
resulting consequence is that, in countries with developed or more mature governance 
institutions, stock markets undervalue firms with high compliance with normative 
governance rules, whereas, in countries with emerging/growing governance institutions, local 
stock markets highly value a firm’s compliance with normative governance guidelines.  
 
In addition, the descriptive statistics reveal that emerging African economies are beginning to 
see the value relevance of governance institutions. In fact, even though African countries like 
Nigeria have been associated with institutional voids and lack of enforcement of laws, this 
study shows that firms in these countries are overcoming institutional constraints by 
improving in their governance disclosure practices, which is seen by local stock markets as 
valuable in reducing information asymmetry amid weak institutional parameters. The results 
therefore do not support the theoretical argument put forward by some scholars (e.g. 
Adegbite, 2012, Adegbite, 2015, Adegbite et al., 2013, Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012, 
Nakpodia et al., 2016) that institutional voids render CG regulations an idealism in emerging 
African economies. In fact, the results show that, despite the institutional void, firms are 
committed in improving governance institutions by adopting recommended good CG 
practices implemented by regulatory authorities. The findings show firms in emerging 
African economies are adopting institutional isomorphic practices in governance compliance. 
Specifically, firms in these markets are transmitting good governance institutions to emerging 
economies by improving on their CG practices.  
 
In addition, the study has revealed complementary and substitutable uses of different internal 
CG systems and provides some insights for theoretical configuration approach in comparative 
institutional CG studies. The study evidences how complementary and substitutable 
application of different CG structures is shaped by the national institutions in emerging 
African economies. In fact, this study shows that national institutions shape the degree of 
substitutability and complementarity among firm-level internal CG mechanisms, which yields 
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patterns of disparities at both firm and country level. Following the above theoretical 
contributions, the study makes the following empirical contributions and extends CG 
scholarship in the following ways: 
 
First, the study argues that economic, governance and financial circumstances perceptibly 
vary greatly from country to country and therefore employed New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) Theory as an additional theoretical lens to the traditional CG theories for this research. 
Using manually collected data from annual reports of listed firms in the two biggest 
economies in Africa, the study offers for the first-time direct evidence of comparative 
institutional perspective by examining the association between internal CG mechanisms and 
firm financial performance. As noted in Chapter 5, the study employs a balance of both small 
and large firms, which increases the generalisability of results. Different from prior single-
country studies in Africa which are highly concentrated in South Africa (e.g. Ntim et al., 
2010, Ntim, 2011, Ntim, 2012b, Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim, 2013c, Ntim, 2013d), this research 
developed a CG compliance index developed within South African and Nigerian institutional 
governance structures, incorporating both  local stakeholder-inclusive contextual 
requirements  and shareholder requirements. In addition, distinct from prior South African 
research which used the King II CG requirements (e.g. Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim, 2011, Ntim et 
al., 2012, Ntim, 2013c, Ntim, 2013a), this study offers for the first time evidence on the level 
of compliance with the most recent CG code in South Africa (King III). In addition, distinct 
from prior research in Nigeria, this study for the first time provides comprehensive evidence 
on the level of compliance with the SEC 2011 CG code. In this light, the findings of the 
research offer for the first-time comparative evidence that the positive impact of compliance 
with normative CG guidelines on firm accounting performance in countries with mature 
governance institutions (South Africa) is similar to that with emerging governance 
institutions (Nigeria). Conversely, the results further evidence that improvement in CG 
practices in countries with emerging governance institutions is highly valued by investors but 
undervalued in countries with more mature governance institutions.  
 
More so, with the exception of Ntim (2009) and Ntim et al. (2012), there is dearth of studies 
investigating compliance with shareholder requirements and firm returns in Africa. This 
study extends Ntim et al. (2012) studies of King II by incorporating King III requirements. In 
Nigeria, this study provides evidence for the fist time on compliance with shareholder 
requirements of SEC 2011 CG code. Consistent with the results of Ntim et al. (2012) in South 
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Africa, this study provides distinct comparative evidence that compliance with normative 
shareholder practices as recommended by SEC 2011 CG code improves both market and 
accounting returns of listed firms in Nigeria but, in South Africa, compliance with King III 
shareholder requirements improves accounting returns although it negatively affects market 
returns. 
  
Again, except for Ntim (2009) and Ntim et al. (2012) studies of South Africa’s King II, there 
is deficiency of both single-country and cross-country studies examining the economic 
consequences of compliance with inclusive stakeholder and contextual corporate governance 
provisions in Africa. This study offers new contributions in this area. First, the study shows 
the level of compliance with inclusive normative stakeholder and contextual CG 
requirements by listed firms in both South Africa and Nigeria is increasing over time. In 
addition, the research results provide new comparative evidence in Nigeria suggesting that 
listed firms that provide more transparent information on normative stakeholder compliance 
practices improve both their market and accounting performance by reducing political cost 
and gaining access to environmental resources. However, in more mature governance 
environments, stakeholder compliance practices are valued negatively by investors. From an 
NIE perspective, the findings indicate that increasing stakeholder disclosures signal that a 
firm is conforming to societal norms and adapting to local isomorphism, which enhances firm 
returns in countries with emerging governance institutions, whereas these practices are 
negatively valued in more mature governance environments.  
 
Furthermore, this study extends on existing studies in CG scholarship by moving away from 
the traditional use of one or a few CG variables in isolation to each other to examine the CG–
firm performance relationships ( e.g. Ntim, 2012b, Ntim, 2014, Ntim et al., 2014b, Zattoni et 
al., 2017). The study fills this gap by examining and comparing 14 alternative internal CG – 
firm performance associations within two distinct and interesting African economies. The 
findings show albeit some similarities may exist on how different internal CG mechanisms 
are structured and adopted by firms in different countries, but there are considerable 
differences in how these mechanisms impact on firms’ financials.  
 
In addition, as noted earlier, most studies conducted in Africa and beyond have used a sample 
of non-financial firms or financial firms (e.g. Abor, 2007, Barako et al., 2006, Kula, 2005, 
Ntim, 2009, Ntim, 2013c, Ntim et al., 2010). This study fills this gap in the research as it uses 
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a large sample of firms across both countries including both financial and non-financial firms. 
This provides a robust and representative comparison between countries and increases the 
statistical significance and validity of the results as well as providing stronger evidence for 
generalisation of the findings. Hence, the study contributes immensely in understanding the 
trend of global CG governance divergence and convergence across different countries and 
industries. Specifically, the findings indicate that, in countries with emerging governance 
institutions, financial firms are more compliant with normative governance guidelines than 
non-financial firms. Contrarily, in more mature governance environments, non-financial 
firms comply more with normative governance guidelines than financial firms.  
 
This study offers two methodological contributions. First of all, for the first time, this study 
offers comparative analysis of the compliance index model and the equilibrium variable 
model using multi-country evidence. The multi-country evidence shows that methodological 
choices on analysing CG–firm performance nexus have the potential to influence research 
findings, which has important implications for future research.  
 
Second, the research results make a new analytical methodological contribution to CG 
scholarship. As noted earlier, only a few studies particularly in Africa have addressed 
endogeneity issues arising from the CG–firm performance relationship (e.g. Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2008, Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim, 2012b, Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim, 2013c, Ntim, 
2013a). However, these studies controlled for unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity but 
did not control for dynamic endogeneity. As Schultz et al. (2010,p.145) observed, variations 
and inconsistencies in findings of CG–financial returns research may be a consequence of the 
inability of scholars to control for all forms of endogeneity. As a result, in addition to the 
traditional OLS, Instrumental Variable, 2SLS estimations, a dynamic systems GMM 
estimation which controls for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endoge-
neity is examined. This study provides multi-country evidence that findings based on the 
compliance index model are unbiased and consistent across a raft of econometric models 
compared to those of the equilibrium variable model. The study shows that most of the 
findings of the CG–firm performance association are robust and not sensitive to possible 
endogeneity issues.  
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10.4 Policy Implications and Recommendations  
 
The research results have essential regulatory, policy and practical implications for firms, 
governments and regulatory authorities. First, analyses of the level of compliance with CG 
code in both Nigeria and South Africa indicate that there is a general improvement of CG 
standards by listed firms, with an average of above 70% over 5-year periods. This implies the 
efforts put in place by stakeholders in both countries are beginning to yield some fruit. The 
evidence shows that the introduction of CG standards in the form of codes of good CG 
practices in both countries is substantially improving corporate practices of listed firms. 
Given this evidence, it may be useful for policy makers to require implementation by unlisted 
firms, especially in Nigeria where only listed firms are to comply with SEC 2011 CG code.   
 
Similarly, the evidence shows that CG practices vary from country to country and from one 
firm to another. This implies that policy makers should apply some level of judgement and 
flexibility in developing CG guidelines between small firms and large firms given that 
compliance is very expensive, and it is may be costlier for smaller firms to comply than 
larger firms. For example, the UK combined code of 2006 includes requirements which are 
not applicable to smaller firms (i.e. firms listed below FSTE 350) and with initial public 
offerings (IPOs). For example, smaller firms are allowed to have remuneration and audit 
committees with only two independent NEDs. Hence policy makers in other countries should 
design and provide guidance on how to comply with recommended practices which are 
proportional to and are in line with firm size and resources.  
 
Third, low or zero compliance as is the case for some firms in Nigeria for stakeholder 
requirements, or 23% as in the case of South Africa, suggests that some of the provisions may 
be inappropriate within the country context or that enforcement of compliance is weak. This 
suggests policy makers need to improve on enforcement of normative governance guidelines, 
otherwise institutional void and unethical practices such as corruption will perpetuate for 
short- and long-term performance goals and may adversely affect the internationalisation 
objectives of firms, especially firms seeking to expand to developed markets. 
 
Fourth, the study evidences that, while CG compliance is seen as beneficial by investors in 
Nigeria, this may not be the case in South Africa as investors in the latter undervalue firms 
who comply with King III. This implies that the ‘apply or explain’ requirements of King III 
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may not fit well with South African investors and therefore they undervalue firms that 
increase their application of King III. Hence policy makers in South Africa need to 
incorporate such considerations in the draft King IV report. More so, the evidence suggests 
that compliance with CG requirements has reached a point of inertia for investors in South 
Africa, some of whom do not value CG’s contribution. Therefore, the draft King IV needs to 
incorporate investors’ perspectives in the final guidelines, without which investors will not 
legitimise the guidelines and will undervalue compliance firms. 
 
Fifth, increasing levels of compliance with institutionalised stakeholder-inclusive provisions 
in both countries suggest that increase in compliance is linked to access to resources and local 
government contracts. Therefore, firms’ compliance with these provisions may offer them 
access to resources including government contracts, tax breaks and subsidies among others.      
 
More so, the positive association between CG compliance and firm financial performance, 
especially in Nigeria, provides governments and regulatory authorities with strong incentives 
to pursue policy reforms and extend reforms which are relevant to the local institutions and 
encourage firms to provide for specific institutional stakeholder needs (e.g. needs of 
employees, local and traditional councils, creditors, suppliers etc.). For firms, the results 
evidence they can improve on their accounting performance by disclosing more transparent 
information on broad-based CG disclosures and shareholder and stakeholder disclosures.  
 
In addition, the positive CG compliance–market performance association in Nigeria whereas 
inverse relationship in South Africa suggests in some countries investors may not view CG 
requirements favourably. Therefore, copy and paste some CG requirements from one country 
to another may not be suitable with the institutions in some countries and as a result may not 
yield the expected outcome. This may call into question whether the continuous changes in 
the various King reports are seen as burdensome to investors, and any future amendments of 
the King III in the forthcoming King IV need to consider investors’ input and approval.    
 
In addition, significant ethnic diversity–performance relations in Nigeria and insignificant 
results in South Africa may suggest high homogeneity (Nigeria) or heterogeneity (South 
Africa). This does not lend support to the King III code requirement for ethnic diversity. 
However, the positive gender diversity results in both South Africa and Nigeria suggest that 
the presence of women on boards can significantly improve performance if their number 
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increases. In fact, it lends support to both the King III and SEC 2011 and gender diversity 
literature which encourages firms to increase the number of women on corporate boards. 
Specifically, the results suggest that, despite the patriarchal nature of African societies (e.g. 
South Africa and Nigeria), female directors are instrumental in enhancing decision making 
which impacts positively on accounting profitability and market valuation. Hence regulatory 
authorities should develop gender quota laws in boardrooms and TMT to encourage female 
representation. More so, firms can enhance their performance by restructuring their boards to 
encourage more female representation.   
 
In addition, the interdependence between some of the internal CG variables in both countries 
suggests that firms can complement and substitute CG structures to fit the needs of the firm. 
As such, one-size-fits-all structures may not be beneficial. This lends support to both King III 
requirements and SEC 20111 CG code which recommend that firms should set up CG 
structures which are fit for purpose, diverse and demographically effective. Therefore, firms 
have to structure their boards to ensure adaptation to the business environment of the firm.  
 
More so, findings in both countries suggest that, on average, director shareholding and 
institutional shareholding impact negatively on firm performance. This suggests copying 
perceived good practices from developed economies which suggests director ownership and 
concentrated/institutional shareholding reduce agency cost may not be beneficial in the 
African context. Therefore, firms and regulators in African economies should take such 
recommended best practices with caution, as the legal and institutional context, especially in 
emerging economies characterised by weak enforcement of laws and strong informal societal 
norms, can encourage managers to show limited accountability. Specifically, owing to the 
high level of concentrated ownership, coupled with weak enforcement mechanisms, diffuse 
ownership should be encouraged to avoid opportunistic behaviour from institutional 
shareholders or director investors. Furthermore, more stringent regulations should be 
implemented in corporate governance codes to align the interest of institutional shareholders 
to those of minority investors in emerging African economies.  
 
Finally, on average, CEO/chairman separation, frequency of board meetings and board 
interlock positively impact on firm financial performance in both countries, implying that 
separating leadership roles, having a minimum of four board meetings and employing 
resourceful directors as required by the CG codes of both countries are good practices and 
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other firms in both countries and beyond can benefit from such good practices. However, 
firms should avoid excessive board interlock, as this limits directors’ concentration on 
monitoring management and assisting the company, meaning that they may become too busy 
to serve. As the evidence shows in both countries, board busyness negatively impacts on firm 
performance.  
 
10.5 Limitations of Study  
 
Every research study suffers from limitations. As such, the findings of this research should be 
interpreted considering the following caveats. First, there is potential limitation of the sample 
selected. The sample of 100 firms in South Africa and 80 firms in Nigeria may be relatively 
small. However, this sample size is larger compared to other cross-country studies which 
have included both countries. For example Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) included 16 firms, 
and Sanda et al. (2005) 93 firms from Nigeria. In South Africa, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) 
used 81 firms. In addition, the sample size surpasses those used in prior African studies (e.g. 
Barako et al. (2006). More so, most of the corporate governance variables were manually 
extracted from annual reports for 900 firm years, which is highly laborious. As such, time 
limitations, cost and practical circumstances meant the sample was chosen to ensure it is 
large enough for statistical significance and significant contribution while ensuring that the 
PhD is completed within the time frame.  
 
More so, the various country CG compliance indices (SACGI and NICGI) were coded using 
a binary coding scheme and the indices are unweighted. As noted by Barako et al. (2006), 
Ntim (2009) and Ntim et al. (2012), unweighted indices are not able to capture important 
groups of requirements as they treat all CG provisions as equal in importance, which may be 
inconsistent in theory and practice. However, empirical research in CG suggests that 
weighted and unweighted indices give similar results especially where CG provisions are 
large (e.g. Barako et al., 2006, Ntim et al., 2010, Ntim et al., 2012, Ntim, 2013c). 
Specifically, this study did not use weighted indices because, in the latter, some CG 
provisions are awarded more weight than others which is not an accurate representation of 
respective country CG regulations. More so, the use of unweighted indices in this study is 
consistent with prior research (Ntim, 2013a, Ntim, 2013c, Black et al., 2006). 
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In addition, the study utilised primarily annual reports for data collection, especially for 
Nigeria, owing to the absence of data in databases such as DataStream and Compustat. The 
absence of other data sources limited the ability of the research to triangulate some of the 
annual reports’ data with those from other sources. More so, as enforcement of good practices 
and accounting standards in emerging economies is notably weak, the reported information 
on annual reports may not reflect the true state of affairs. However, the use of annual reports 
in this study is consistent with previous CG studies conducted in Africa which have used 
principally annual reports ( e.g. Ntim et al., 2014b, Ntim et al., 2014a, Ntim, 2014, Akinkoye 
and Olasanmi, 2014).  
10.6 Direction for Future Research 
 
Comparative corporate governance research in emerging economies, especially in Africa, is 
nascent and relatively new. This study has contributed in filling this gap, but there is still 
potential for future research. First, this study used the two biggest Africa economies, which 
may be similar in some form. Therefore, future comparative studies of large and a small 
economy, two smaller economies or a mix of more than two Africa economies will greatly 
improve on comprehensive understanding of CG practices.  
 
Furthermore, comparing CG studies of emerging African economies and other developing 
economies across the globe may increase our understanding of how corporate governance 
interplays with local institutions to shape firm behaviour. More so, comparative studies 
between developed and emerging African economies testing similar constructs may improve 
our understanding of global corporate governance. 
 
In addition, the study has mainly examined and compared the internal corporate governance–
firm performance nexus. Future research can investigate how external CG mechanisms, 
(including the impact of market for corporate control, managerial and labour market, law 
among others) impact on firm financial performance. More so, future comparative studies can 
examine the impact of interdependence between internal and external CG structures on firm 
financial performance.  
 
Moreover, other internal corporate governance variables not included in this research can be 
included in future research. For example, though this research incorporated 14 CG internal 
structures, other structures such as executive and non-executive compensation, board human 
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capital, intellectual diversity, board education diversity, and CEO and chairman tenure can be 
examined.  
 
Fifth, future research should examine whether compliance with past CG regulations and 
current CG regulations has similar firm performance effect. For example, a longitudinal study 
of compliance with King II–firm performance association and compliance with King III–firm 
performance relations will enhance our understanding of how firms comply with various CG 
regulations over time.  
 
In addition, future research can improve on the current study by constructing weighted and 
unweighted CG indices to investigate whether there are sensitivities between weighted CG 
index–firm performance and unweighted–firm performance. More so, the reliability of the 
results may be improved upon if future research includes at least two coders to check inter-
coder consistencies. More so, future research can also use questionnaires to supplement 
information from annual reports.  
  
Furthermore, this study adopted a purely positivist approach in studying CG behaviours. 
However, a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative research can provide a more holistic 
interpretation of results. For example, the results of this research can be improved through 
follow-up interviews with company directors to understand the reason for compliance with 
normative governance guidelines. This will add deeper understanding of quantitative results. 
Specifically, this method will provide information which is not reported in annual reports and 
may lead to deeper understanding of why firms comply with some provisions and not others 
and reasons for such behaviours.        
 
Finally, future research can investigate what motivates corporate governance reforms in 
countries and the reasons for moving from one CG code to another. This can be done by 
conducting face-to-face interviews with key stakeholders in different countries who are 
involved with CG reforms. This will enhance our understanding of how CG structures and 
systems in different countries evolve.
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APPENDICES  
 
APPENDIX A: TABLES 
Table 25: Nigerian Instrumental Variable Regression Results for the Compliance Index Model 
Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance Variable (Q-ratio) for 
All 400 Firm Years  
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. More so, to avoid dummy variable trap, year 2012 and health 
care/consumer goods industry are excluded from the regression analysis. They are both used as base year dummy and base industry dummy 
for comparison reasons. NICGI is the Nigerian Corporate Governance index. R-NICGI is the residuals of the NICGI regressed against the 
control variables. P-NICGI is the instrumental variable used in the Instrumental Variable Estimate. It is the predicted values of NICGI got 
from regressing the NICGI against the control variables and four other internal variables including Board Size, Director Shareholding, 
Institutional Shareholding and Capital Structure (Gearing).
  
  
Durbin–Wu–Hausman Test Instrumental Variable Estimate  OLS Estimates  
 Exp 
Sign 
ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2) 
 
.211 .303 .204 .277 .208 .294 
Adjusted R2 
 
.171 .268 .167 .243 .171 .264 
F-value 
 
 5.331(.000) *** 8.683(.000)*** 5.431(.000) *** 8.100(.000)*** 5.568(.000) *** 8.947(.000) *** 
Standard Error 
 
 21.141 1.520 21.408 1.602 21.143 1.524 
Durbin–Watson 
 
1.008 1.138 1.017 1.143 .970 1.074 
No of observations 
 
400 400 400 400 400 400 
Constant +  -16.372(.080)* 2.658(.000)***  13.084(.001)*** 7.021(.006) *** -9.070(.133) 2.334(.000) *** 
NICGI +  .371(.014)*** -.026(.014)*** - - .241(.004) *** .013(.043)** 
R-NICGI +/-  -2.023(.306) .449(.002)*** - - - - 
P-NICGI +/- - - 10.11(.004)*** 1.484(.054)** - - 
Sales Growth +  .142(.009) *** -.001(.620) .153(.006)*** .006(.239) .139(.011) *** .001(.803) 
Dual Listing +  1.062(.204) -.347(.356) -1.049(.846) -1.064(.028)** 1.725(.739) -.581(.119) 
Audit Firm Size +  7.424(.012)*** .730(.001)*** 3.993(.256) .075(.846)  8.500(.002) *** .631(.002) *** 
Firm Size +/-  -1.783(583) .485(.038)** -5.649(.150) .377(.203) -.571(.850) .639(.008)*** 
Capital Structure (Gearing) +/- -.121 (.000)***  .001(.662) -.118(.000)*** .008(.026)** -.12(.000) *** .004(.128) 
Total Asset + .000(739) -.000(.528) .000(.957) -.000(.002)*** .000(.673) -.000(.003)*** 
Market Value +/- .000(.097)* .000(.000)*** .000(.050)** .000(.000)*** .000(.119) .000(.000) *** 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) +/- -.000(.421) -.000(.004)*** -.000(.200) -.000(.026)*** -.000(.517) -.000(.047)** 
Agriculture/Consumer Goods 
 
 12.553(.001)*** .391(.137)  15.91(.000)*** 2.054(.000*)** 12.460(.000)*** .905(.002) *** 
Finance Industry 
 
 -.144(.967) - .932 (.000)*** -3.062(.425) -1.164(.000)*** .770(.817) -.50(.074)* 
ICT/Real Estate 
 
 11.06(.022)** .001(.998) 15.652(.003)*** 1.836(.001)*** 10.583(.027)** .569(.120) 
Industrial/Conglomerate 
 
 2.279(.665) -.970 (.011)*** 7.058(.209) 1.078(.115) 1.741(.740) -.407(.309) 
Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
 
 20.607(.000) *** - .296(.381) 26.468(.000)*** 2.141(.006)*** 19.729(.000)*** .420(.244) 
Year 2011 
 
 -4.211(.215) .001(.997) -2.654(.454) .330(.257) -4.699(.163) .089(.711) 
Year 2013 
 
 -2.385(.486) .287(.244) -3.493(.321) .030(.917) -2.038(.550) .257(.295) 
Year 2014   -5.516(.116) .313(.213) -7.960(.036)** -.436(300) -4.750(.165) .130(.598) 
 Year 2015  -9.082(.017)*** .823(.003)*** -13.711(.003)*** -.658(.332) -7.630(.031)** .408(.110) 
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Table 26: Nigerian Correlation for Alternative Internal Corporate Governance Structures and Firm 
Performance for All 400 Firm Years  
***, **, * denotes Pearson Parametric and Spearman non-parametric correlation significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Spearman correlation coefficients are at the top right of the table while Pearson correlation coefficients are at the bottom left of the 
table. NICGI is the Nigerian Corporate Governance index. R-NICGI is the residuals of the NICGI regressed against the control variables. P-
NICGI is the instrumental variable used in the instrumental variable estimate. It is the predicted values of NICGI got from regressing the 
NICGI against the control variables and four other internal variables including Board Size, Director Shareholding, Institutional Shareholding 
and Capital Structure (Gearing). 
 
 
  
 
ROCE Q-Ratio NICGI Shareholder 
–NICGI 
Stakeholder 
–NICGI 
P_NICGI R_NICGI Board 
Size 
Director 
Shareholding  
Institutional 
Shareholding 
Gearing 
ROCE 
 
.174*** .091* .062 .147*** .105** .030 -.004 .103** .147*** -.168*** 
Q-Ratio .248***  .170*** .145*** .186*** .156*** .036 .094* .097** .382*** .098** 
NICGI .130*** .070  .975*** .897*** .785*** .521*** .498*** -.031 -.034 .241*** 
Shareholder–
NICGI 
.097** .039 .983***  .782*** .753*** .527*** .474*** .003 -.017 .218*** 
Stakeholder–
NICGI 
.192*** .138*** .883*** .782***  .735*** .437*** .468*** -.081* -.081* .241*** 
P_NICGI .098** .013 .775*** .739*** .742***  -.062 .625*** -.035 -.042 .257*** 
R_NICGI .085* .095** .632*** .650*** .487*** .000  -.025 .045 -.016 -.021 
Board Size -.037 -.113** .495*** .459*** .508*** .640*** 0.000  -.137*** -.128*** .304*** 
Director 
Shareholding  
.048 .161*** .004 .018 -.033 .005 0.000 -.183**  .409*** -.070 
Institutional 
Shareholding 
.089* .349*** -.079 -.073 -.080 -.051 -0.062 -.173** .476**  -.051 
Gearing -.105* .043 .212** .184*** .250*** .273*** 0.000 .374** -0.057 -0.067  
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Table 27: South African Instrumental Variable Regression Results for the Compliance Index Model 
Based on Accounting Performance Measure (ROCE) and Market Performance Variable (Q-ratio) 
for All 500 Firm Years  
Note: ***, **, * regression significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. More so, to avoid dummy variable trap, year 2011 and 
consumer services/health care industry are excluded from the regression analysis. They are both used as base year dummy and base 
industry dummy for comparison reasons. SACGI is the South African Corporate Governance index. R-SACGI is the residuals of the 
SACGI regressed against the control variables. P-SACGI is the instrumental variable used in the instrumental variable estimate. It is 
the predicted values of SACGI got from regressing the SACGI against the control variables and four other internal variables 
including board size, director shareholding, institutional shareholding and capital structure (gearing).  
  
  
Durbin–Wu–Hausman Test Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimate  OLS Estimates  
 Exp 
Sign 
ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio ROCE Q-ratio 
R-Square (R2) 
 
.288 .277 .233 
.328 .223 .246 
Adjusted R2 
 
.260 .248 .205 .303 .194 .217 
F-value 
 
10.214(.000) *** 9.674(.000)*** 8.133(.000)*** 
13.065(.000)*** 7.67(.000) *** 8.70(.000)*** 
Standard Error 
 
22.355 0.851 23.800 .827 23.328 .869 
Durbin–Watson 
 
1.055 1.101 2.005 1.856 1.055 1.041 
Highest VIF Score  10.376 10.376 4.032 4.596 2.057 2.022 
No of Observations 
 
500 500 500 
500 500 500 
Constant + 48.732(.136) 1.427(.252) -142.936(.123) 7.269(.024)** 8.099(.55) 2.61(.000) *** 
SACGI + -.574(.161) -.008(.589) - 
- .318(.05)** -.013(.038)** 
R-SACGI +/- .950 (.031)** -.008(.628) - - - - 
P-SACGI +/- - - 2.033(.081)* -.076(.061)* - - 
Sales Growth + .078(.036)** .004(.002)*** .060.160) .005(.002)*** .072(.065)* .005(.001)*** 
Dual Listing + -7.425(.012)*** -0.120(.285) -9.157(.005)*** -.092(.409) -8.322(.007)*** -.144(.209) 
Audit Firm Size + -8.573(.025)*** -.569(.000)*** 
-16.190(.001)*** -.381(.021)** -9.972(.007) *** -.429(.002)*** 
Firm Size +/- -2.967(.486) -.326(.045)** -16.367(.026)** .072(.779) 5.369(.026)** .345(.000)*** 
Capital Structure (Gearing) +/- -.073(.024)** .001(.274) -.122(.001)*** .002(.201) -.107(.002) *** .001(.457) 
Total Asset + -.000(.657) -.000(.425) -.000(.057)* -.000(.893) -.000(.18) -.000(.171) 
Market Value +/- .000(.001)*** .000(.000)*** .000(.192) .000(.000)*** .001(.035)** .000(.000)*** 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 
 
-.000(.372) -.000(.090)* 
.000(.001)*** -.000(.000)*** .000(.700) -.000(.003)*** 
Basic Material 
 
-18.040(.000)*** -.142(.331) -28.799(.000)*** .065(.733) -22.862(.000) *** -.104(.461) 
Consumer Goods 
 
4.939(.268) .218(.199) -2.275(.631) .401(.055)** 3.653(.412) .355(.033)** 
Finance Industry 
 
-2.907(.369) -.638(.000)*** 1.276(.723) -.840(.000)*** -2.488(.458) -.624(.000)*** 
Industrial 
 
-6.980(.063)* -.418(.004)*** 
-16.918(.004)*** -.106(.606) -8.373(.020)** -.236(.078)* 
Telecoms/Technology Industry 
 
8.916(.039)** -.014(.931) 3.885(.410) .083(.608) 4.476(.312) -.097(.555) 
Year 2010 
 
-2.157(555) .11(.424) 9.158(.138) -.221(.304) 1.371(.686) .093(.462) 
Year 2012 
 
0.852(.797) .059(.638) -4.847(.261) .193(.197) -.882(.791) .082(.509) 
Year 2013  -3.638(.298) .047(.720) 
-12.780(.018)*** .231(.218) -6.551(.053)** .074(.556) 
Year 2014  -5.390(.135) -.048(.726) 
-15.836(.008)*** .256(.213) 8.644(.011)*** -.034(.790) 
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Table 28: South African Correlation for Alternative Internal Corporate Governance Structures and 
Firm Performance for All 500 Firm Years  
 
 ROCE Q-Ratio SACGI 
Shareholder–
SACGI 
Stakeholder–
SACGI P_SACGI R_SACGI 
Board 
Size 
Director 
Shareholding  
Institutional 
Shareholding Gearing 
ROCE 
 
.456*** -.065 -.036 -.120*** -.182*** .097** -.049 -.105** -.062 -.089** 
Q-Ratio .303***  -.090** -.078** -.084* .002 -.100** .032 -.086* .066 -.032 
SACGI -.027 -.065  .972*** .640*** .591*** .716*** .346*** -.072 .035 .079* 
Shareholder–
SACGI 
-.013 -.054 .984***  .464*** .564*** .713*** .301*** -.075* .026 .069 
Stakeholder–
SACGI 
-.075* -.086* .663*** .528***  .424*** .412*** .331*** -.012 .066 .094** 
P_SACGI -.157*** .001 .649*** .626*** .492***  -.069 .578** .006 .081* .128*** 
R_SACGI .100** -.086* .760*** .761*** .453*** .000  -.028 -.075* -.026 -.029 
Board Size -.087* -.046 .359*** .333*** .307*** .547*** .000  -.036 .018 .156*** 
Director 
Shareholding  
-.128*** -.035 .042 .040 .056 .066 .000 -.029  .193*** -0.007 
Institutional 
Shareholding 
-.094** .079* .094** .096** .054 .144*** .000 .044 .302***  .098** 
Gearing -.108** -.026 .082* .082* .031 .121*** .000 .138*** .007 .107***  
***, **, * denotes Pearson Parametric and Spearman non-parametric correlations significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Spearman correlation coefficients are at the 
top right of the table while Pearson correlation coefficients are at the bottom left of the table. 
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES 
 
 
   
FIRM FINANCIAL RETURN VARIABLES (DEPENDENT VARIABLES) 
Q-ratio Ratio of total assets minus equity book value plus market value of equity to total assets. 
ROCE  Percentage of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by capital employed. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES COMPLIANCE INDEX MODEL  
NICGI  Binary variable which takes a score of ‘1’ or ‘0’ if a firm complies with any of the 75 CG provisions of the SEC 2011. A firm’s total 
compliance score for the year ranges from zero (0%), indicating no compliance, to 75 (100%), indicating full compliance.  
SACGI Binary variable which takes a score of ‘1’ or ‘0’ if a firm complies with any of the 84 CG provisions of the 2009 King III. A firm’s total 
compliance score for the year ranges from zero (0%), indicating no compliance, to 84 (100%), indicating full compliance.  
Shareholder–NICGI  Binary variable which takes a score of ‘1’ or ‘0’ if a firm complies with any of the 61 shareholder CG provisions of the SEC 2011. A 
firm’s total compliance score for the year ranges from zero (0%), indicating no compliance, to 61 (100%), indicating full compliance. 
Shareholder–SACGI Binary variable which takes a score of ‘1’ or ‘0’ if a firm complies with any of the 71 shareholder CG provisions of the 2009 King III. A 
firm’s total compliance score for the year ranges from zero (0%), indicating no compliance, to 71 (100%), indicating full compliance. 
Stakeholder–NICGI Binary variable which takes a score of ‘1’ or ‘0’ if a firm complies with any of the 14 stakeholder CG provisions of the SEC 2011. A 
firm’s total compliance score for the year ranges from zero (0%), indicating no compliance, to 14 (100%), indicating full compliance.  
Stakeholder–SACGI Binary variable which takes a score of ‘1’ or ‘0’ if a firm complies with any of the 13 stakeholder CG provisions of the 2009 King III. A 
firm’s total compliance score for the year ranges from zero (0%), indicating no compliance, to 13 (100%), indicating full compliance. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES EQUILIBRIUM VARIABLE MODEL 
Board Structure (NEDs) A variable which measures percentage of non-executive directors to total number of directors who serve on a board.  
Executive Directors (EDs) A variable which measures percentage of executive directors to total number of directors who serve on a board.  
 
Proportion of independent 
NEDs (INEDs) 
A variable which measures percentage of independent non-executive directors to total number of directors who serve on a board.  
 
Frequency of Board Meetings A variable which measures number of board annual meetings. 
CEO/Chairman Role Separation 
(Duality) 
A dummy of ‘1’ if the positions of board chairman and CEO are held by separate individuals, otherwise ‘0’ where the positions are held 
by an individual. 
Gender Diversity Measures percentage of women directors to total number of directors.  
Ethnic Diversity Measures the percentage of black directors to total number of directors. 
Interlocking Directorate Average number of boards the directors of a firm sit on. 
Board Busyness Average firm-level number of board meetings multiplied by average firm-level board interlock. 
Gearing  Percentage of total debt to total equity.  
Institutional Shareholding Percentage of institutional shareholders to the total shares of a firm. 
Director Shareholding Number of shares held by directors (both executive and non-executive) to the total shares of a firm as a percentage. 
Independent Audit Committee 
(IAC) 
Percentage of independent non-executive directors to total number of directors who serve on the audit committee. 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
Sales Growth  Percentage change of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales divided by previous year’s sales.  
Dual Listing  A dummy variable ‘1’ if a firm is listed on another stock market, otherwise ‘0’. 
Total Asset  Firm’s total asset. 
Market Value  Firm’s Market Value (a firm share price multiplied by number of issued shares). 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX)  The percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets of a firm at the end of a financial year. 
Audit Firm Size  A dummy variable ‘1’ if a firm is audited by top big four firms (i.e. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG and 
Ernst and Young), otherwise ‘0’. 
Industry  Six industry dummies for the classification of industry in each country.  
Year  Dummy variable representing each year of the sample period in respective countries. 
Firm Size A dummy variable ‘1’ if a firm is classified as a big firm in an industry per respective stock market rating, otherwise ‘0’.  
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APPENDIX C: NORMALITY CURVES FOR COMPLIANCE LEVELS  
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APPENDIX D: LIST OF SAMPLED FIRMS FOR NIGERIA 
 
Company Name Industry 
A.G. Leventis ICT/Real Estate 
Access Bank Finance Services  
AfroMedia Health Care/Consumer Services 
AIICO Finance Services  
Airline Services/Logistics Health Care/Consumer Services 
Ashaka Cement Industrial/Conglomerate 
AXA MANSAARD Finance Services  
C & I Leasing Industrial/Conglomerate 
Cadbury Nigeria Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
CAP OIL Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
Capital Hotels Health Care/Consumer Services 
Caverton Health Care/Consumer Services 
Champion Brewery Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
CHAMS ICT/Real Estate 
Computer Warehouse Group ICT/Real Estate 
ConOil Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
Consolidated Hallmark Finance Services  
Continental Insurance Finance Services  
Cornerstone Insurance Finance Services  
CourtVille ICT/Real Estate 
Custodian Finance Services  
Dangote Cement  Industrial/Conglomerate 
Dangote Sugar Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Diamond Bank Finance Services  
Ecobank Finance Services  
Equity Insurance Finance Services  
Eternal Oil Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
Fidelity Bank Finance Services  
Fidson Health Care/Consumer Services 
First Community Monument Bank Finance Services  
First Aluminium Industrial/Conglomerate 
First Bank Finance Services  
Flour Mill Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Forte Oil Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
GlaxoSmith Health Care/Consumer Services 
GoldInsure Finance Services  
Guarantee Trust Finance Services  
Guinness Nigeria Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Honeywell Flour Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Julius Berger ICT/Real Estate 
Livestock Nigeria Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Mobil Oil Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
Morison Health Care/Consumer Services 
MRS Oil Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
Multiverse Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
Nascom Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
NEM Insurance Finance Sector 
Nestlé Nigeria Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Niger Insurance Finance Services  
Nigeria Aviation Health Care/Consumer Services 
Nigeria Brewery Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
OANDO Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
Okomo Oil Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Pharmdeko Health Care/Consumer Services 
Presco ltd Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Prestige Finance Services  
PZ Cussons Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Red Star Health Care/Consumer Services 
Regency  Finance Services  
Royal Exchange Plc Finance Services  
Skye Bank Finance Services  
Sovereign Insurance Finance Services  
STACO Finance Services  
Stanbic Finance Services  
Standard Insurance Finance Services  
Sterling Bank Finance Services  
Total Natural Resource/Oil & Gas 
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Tourist Company of Nigeria Health Care/Consumer Services 
Transcorp Industrial/Conglomerate 
UACN ICT/Real Estate 
UBA Finance Services  
Unilever Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Union Dicon Salt Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
Unity Bank Finance Services  
Unity Kapital Finance Services  
University Press Plc Health Care/Consumer Services 
VITAFOAM Agriculture/Consumer Goods  
WAPCO/LARFARGE Industrial/Conglomerate 
Wema Bank Finance Services  
Zenith Bank Finance Services  
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APPENDIX E: LIST OF SAMPLED FIRMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Company Name Industry  
Abdulela Financial Services 
Adaptit Technology/Telecommunications  
Adcock Consumer Services/Health Care  
AECI Industrial  
Africa Bank Financial Services 
Africa Equity Financial Services 
Africa Media Entertainment Technology/Telecommunications  
Africa Rainbow Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Afro Centric Consumer Services/Health Care  
Afrox Industrial  
Anglo Gold Ashanti Industrial  
Anglo-American Platinum Industrial  
Arcelormittal Industrial  
Argent Industrial  
Aspen Consumer Services/Health Care  
Assore Industrial  
Astra Foods Consumer Goods 
Aveng Group Industrial  
Avi Consumer Services/Health Care  
Barclays Africa Financial Services 
Barloworld Industrial  
Basil Read Industrial  
Bauba Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Bell Equipment Industrial  
Bidvest Industrial  
Biege Consumer Goods 
Blu Label Telecoms Technology/Telecommunications  
Buildmax Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Cadiz Financial Services 
Capitec Financial Services 
Cargo Carriers Consumer Services/Health Care  
Cash Build Consumer Services/Health Care  
Caxton Consumer Services/Health Care  
Click Group Consumer Goods 
Clientele Financial Services 
Coronation Financial Services 
Datacentrix Technology/Telecommunications  
Datatec Technology/Telecommunications  
Discovery Financial Services 
Distell Consumer Goods 
DRD GOLD Basic Materials /Oil and Gas /Utilities  
Emira Financial Services 
EOH Technology/Telecommunications  
EVRAZ Industrial  
EXXARO Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Finbond Financial Services 
First Rand Financial Services 
Fortress Financial Services 
Goldfields Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Goliath Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Grand Parade Financial Services 
Grindrod Industrial  
Group Five Industrial  
Growth Point Financial Services 
Harmony Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Hosken Financial Services 
Hospitality Financial Services 
Howden Industrial  
Hulamin Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
ILOVO Consumer Goods 
Implates Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Infrasors Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Invicta Industrial  
JD Group Industrial  
JSE Financial Services 
Kumba Iron Ore Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Lewis Stores Consumer Goods 
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Liberty Financial Services 
Life Healthcare Consumer Services/Health Care  
Marafe Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Mediclinic International Consumer Services/Health Care  
MetAir Consumer Goods 
MTN Technology/Telecommunications  
Naspers Consumer Services/Health Care  
Nu-World Consumer Services/Health Care  
Oasis Financial Services 
Omnia Industrial  
Pick & Pay Consumer Goods 
Pinnacle Technology/Telecommunications  
PPC Industrial  
PSG Financial Services 
Purple Financial Services 
Royal Bafokeng Platinum Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Santova Consumer Services/Health Care  
Sasfin Financial Services 
Sasol Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Sentula Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Shoprite Holdings Consumer Services/Health Care  
Standard Bank Financial Services 
Tiger-Brands Consumer Goods 
Trencor Consumer Services/Health Care  
Value Group Consumer Services/Health Care  
Verimark Consumer Services/Health Care  
Vodacome Technology/Telecommunications  
Vukila Financial Services 
Vunani Financial Services 
Wesizwe Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Woolworths Consumer Services/Health Care  
York Timba Basic Materials/Oil and Gas/Utilities  
Zeder  Financial Services 
 
 
